Umweltfördermaßnahmen in der Landwirtschaft – Teilnehmerauswahl durch Ausschreibungen?

Agri-environmental programs offering uniform payments to farmers achieved only low participation ratios in some regions whereas, in other regions, windfall profits arose. Auctions leading to individual payments equal to farmers’ bids could solve this problem. Simulations showing auctions’ efficiency gains are based on critical assumptions though. In this article the validity of these assumptions is discussed for different auction designs and different subprograms. We find that extensification programs offer the best conditions for successful auctions. However, it seems counterproductive to use auctions for choosing among different areas in environmental contracting.


Variant title:
Agri-environmental Programs – Using Auctions to Select Participants?
Issue Date:
2002
Publication Type:
Journal Article
DOI and Other Identifiers:
ISSN 0002-1121 (Other)
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/98116
Published in:
German Journal of Agricultural Economics, Volume 51, Number 2
Page range:
112-120
Total Pages:
9




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-05-15

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