Collusion and seasonality of market price - A case of fixed market shares

The paper develops a simple supergame model of collusion that focuses on the role of fixed (exogenous to game played) system of quantity market shares. Conclusions implied by the model could be used to motivate data - saving markers of collusion based on market price behavior. Following conclusions of the theoretical model we propose marker of collusion based on detecting changes in seasonal parameters of prices in periods of possible collusion. An empirical application of method has been done on well known data of Lysine cartel case.


Issue Date:
Jul 27 2010
Publication Type:
Journal Article
DOI and Other Identifiers:
ISSN 1804-1205 (Print) ISSN 1804-5006 (Online) (Other)
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/95962
Published in:
Business and Economic Horizons
Volume 02
Issue 2
Page range:
48-59
Total Pages:
12
JEL Codes:
L11; L13; L41




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-22

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