Quality Provision and Governance Structure Variety: Pooling versus double markup

This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.


Issue Date:
Jun 16 2010
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
DOI and Other Identifiers:
ISBN 978-3-938584-50-7 (Other)
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/90805
Total Pages:
20
JEL Codes:
C72; L22; Q13




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-25

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