The GATT Negotiations and US/EC Agricultural Policies Solutions to Noncooperative Games

Countries cooperate in negotiating treaties. However, treaty compliance is noncooperative; signatories comply with treaties only if compliance leaves them better off than noncompliance. US and EC agricultural policies of 1986 are modeled through a noncooperative game. Bilateral treaties, formalizations of Nash Equilibria, are presented which improve US and EC welfare.


Issue Date:
1989
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/7491
Total Pages:
16
Series Statement:
Bulletin 89-2




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-04-04

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