Dynamic Quotas with Learning

We study the optimal quota sequence, in a stationary environment, where a regulator and a non-strategic firm have asymmetric information, The regulator is able to learn about the unknown cost parameter by using a quota that is slack with positive probability, It is never optimal for the regulator to learn gradually, In the first period, he either ignores the possibility of learning, or he tries to improve his information, Regardless of the outcome in the first period, he never experiments in subsequent periods.


Issue Date:
2000
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/6245
Total Pages:
18
JEL Codes:
D83; L50
Series Statement:
CUDARE Working Paper
914




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-22

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