Coordination after gains and losses: Is prospect theory’s value function predictive for games?

We analyze the effects of prior gain and loss experiences on individuals’ behavior in two coordination games: battle of the sexes and simultaneous market entry. We propose subjectively transformed games that integrate elements of prospect theory, aggregation of prior and subsequent payoffs, and social projection. Mathematical predictions of behavior are derived based on equilibrium selection concepts. Males’ behavior in our experimental studies is largely consistent with our predictions. However, the behavior of many female respondents appears to be rather consistent with interpreting the initial random lottery outcomes used to manipulate prior experiences as a signal for the players’ abilities to compete. This could be related to females’ known uneasiness of competing against counterparts that might be male and thus, a generally higher salience of rivalry in our incentivized experiments. Females also chose to play far more mixed strategies than males indicating some uncertainty about what type of behavior is appropriate.


Variant title:
Koordination nach Gewinnen und Verlusten: Hält die Wertfunktion der Prospekttheorie für strategische Spiele?
Issue Date:
2010-02
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/59524
Total Pages:
55
Series Statement:
SiAg-Working Paper
08




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-12-10

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