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Abstract
A typical private good is defined by its excludability and rivalry characteristics.
Information embodied in a technology might not generate rivalry among its users. By
contrast, excludability is certainly a characteristic of this kind of information and its
delivery can generate incentives for private participation. This study examines farmers’
preferences for seed of new rice varieties and their willingness to pay for seed-related
information in villages of Nigeria and Benin. Conjoint analysis is used to estimate the
structure of farmers’ preferences for rice seed given a set of alternatives. Farmers are
considered to be consumers of seed as a production input, preferring one variety over
another based on the utility they obtain from its attributes, which depends on their own
social and economic characteristics, including whether or not they sell rice. Contingent
methods are used to elicit preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for rice seed. The
marginal values of attributes, with and without information about the seed, are estimated
with an ordered probit regression. WTP for information is derived from the analysis of
WTP for rice seed. The results have implications for the best way to finance research and
extension services in the areas of intervention, particularly for new rice varieties.