Simulating a Sequential Coalition Formation Process for the Climate Change Problem: First Come, but Second Served?

We analyze stability of self-enforcing climate agreements based on a data set generated by the CLIMNEG world simulation model (CWSM), version 1.2. We consider two new aspects which appear important in actual treaty-making. First, we consider a sequential coalition formation process where players can make proposals which are either accepted or countered by other proposals. Second, we analyze whether a moderator, like an international organization, even without enforcement power, can improve upon globally suboptimal outcomes through coordinating actions by making recommendations that must be Pareto-improving to all parties. We discuss the conceptual difficulties of implementing our algorithm.


Issue Date:
2009-12
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/55830
Total Pages:
49
JEL Codes:
C79; H87; Q54
Series Statement:
SD
109.209




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-25

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)