The Provision Point Mechanism and Scenario Rejection in Contingent Valuation

The provision point mechanism mitigates free-riding behavior in economic experiments. In two contingent valuation method surveys, we implement the provision point design. We ask respondents for their perceptions about the success of the provision point mechanism. We find that respondents who believe that the provision point would not be met are more likely to say no to a contingent valuation dichotomous choice question. The scenario rejection that arises may result in biased willingness-to-pay estimates.


Issue Date:
2009-10
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/55542
Published in:
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, Volume 38, Number 2
Page range:
271-280
Total Pages:
10




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-22

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