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Abstract
This paper discusses the internal processes and decisions that characterized the
transition from collectively held group ranches to individualized property systems among
the Maasai pastoralists of Kajiado district in Kenya. It addresses the question of why
group ranch members would demand individualized property systems, but then turn
against the outcome. In addressing this puzzle the paper discusses the process of land
allocation and distribution during group ranch subdivision. It examines who the main
actors were during subdivision, their degree of latitude in crafting and changing rules,
and the interactions between Maasai and state institutions. Findings suggest that, because
the process by which property rights change is so intertwined with politics, we may need
to move beyond economic models of relative price changes and state enforcement in
order to better understand such transitions. Models that accommodate competition by
actors and the possibility that state actors may not provide the arbitration or enforcement
that is often taken for granted are more useful for analyzing the complexities of shifting
property rights. When the possibility for conflict and competition is factored into the
property rights equation, the relative gains from privatizing/individualizing may not be as
large or as obvious as anticipated.