Fishery Management Games: How to reduce effort and admit new members

This paper addresses the two main problems that Regional Fishery Management Organizations face. First, how to induce independent nations to reduce their fishing efforts from the competitive equilibrium to prevent the fish stock from extinction or to increase profits. We argue that adjustment from the Nash equilibrium to a state of sustainable yield can be achieved by means of the proportional rule without harming any of the countries involved. Next we propose the population monotonic allocation scheme as management rule for the second problem: the division of profits within an


Issue Date:
2006
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/31964
Total Pages:
21
JEL Codes:
C71; C72; D62; D74; Q22
Series Statement:
Conference Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)