WELFARE EFFECTS OF AGRICULTURAL TRADING BLOCS: THE SIMULATION OF A NORTH AMERICAN CUSTOMS UNION

Agricultural trade liberalization among the three North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) signatories is modeled using a political preference function. The model distinguishes among Canada, Mexico, the United States, and a politically passive rest of the world. Through the use of intracountry compensation, the analysis shows that, from an agricultural perspective, economic integration is in the best interest of the group as a whole, although not in the best interest of individual countries. More specifically, of the agricultural production sectors, Canadian dairy, Mexican corn, and U.S. beef producers suffer the greatest losses from the formation of North American customs union.


Issue Date:
1998-07
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/31185
Published in:
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Volume 23, Number 1
Page range:
99-109
Total Pages:
11




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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