EXTERNALITIES FROM ROAMING LIVESTOCK: EXPLAINING THE DEMISE OF THE OPEN RANGE

Fence-in laws in most states require ranchers to pay for fences to keep their livestock from trespassing onto others’' property. Some states, or jurisdictions within states, have a fence-out rule that requires ranchers'’ neighbors to pay for fences to keep livestock out. Both rules are Pareto optimal. Using a potential Pareto criterion, we show that a preference for fence-out in some areas may end as conditions change, such as increased nonranching land uses. Changed conditions may have legal consequences. Specific fence-out and fence cost-sharing provisions may be potentially Pareto inefficient and may be challenged for being unconstitutional under the due process clause.


Issue Date:
1998-07
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/31183
Published in:
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Volume 23, Number 1
Page range:
71-84
Total Pages:
14




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-22

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