GREEN PAYMENT PROGRAMS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE POLLUTION CONTROL: HOW IMPORTANT IS TARGETING FOR COST-EFFECTIVENESS?

Mechanism design theory is used to examine the case of a cost-minimizing regulator who uses input-reduction subsidies to meet an exogenously imposed ambient standard for nonpoint source pollution. A general result claimed for a welfare-maximizing equilibrium. Numerical results suggest the ability to directly target contracts reduces costs significantly for the regulator. But in the absence of this ability, indirect targeting reduces costs only slightly.


Issue Date:
2002-12
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/31117
Published in:
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Volume 27, Number 2
Page range:
406-419
Total Pages:
14




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-04-04

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