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Which Drives More in Business Performance: Differentiating the Effects of Risk-Aversion and Overconfidence about Risk on Business Performance among Agricultural Enterprises

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What Drives More in Business Performance? Differentiating the Effects of Risk-Aversion and



Overconfidence among Agricultural Enterprises

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Introduction

- Overconfident producers would produce more aggressively (Hvide, 2002; Just & Cao, 2016), and are more likely to have better market outcomes than <u>risk-averse yet rational</u> producers.
- The separate effects of risk-aversion and overconfidence on business performance measures have not been empirically tested.

Theoretical Model

From Profit Maximization $R_A \psi^2 = \frac{\mu_g - C'(x)}{\sigma^2 x}$, where the Arrow-Pratt Risk Aversion Coefficient $R_A = -\frac{u''}{u'} > 0$; ψ is the degree of overconfidence, measured as the ratio between perceived variance and the real ones;

 μ_g is the true average output price;

 σ^2 is the true variance of the output price;

C'(x) is the marginal cost, x is quantity.

Key Definitions

Risk Aversion (R_A)

 The behavior of humans to be reluctant to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff.

Overconfidence (ψ)

 Miscalibration Effect: a person tends to believe certain outcomes to be more favorable on average than the outcomes truly are (More and Daylian, 2007).

Data

Production data

• Farm income & production information for beef-cattle farms from Ontario Farm Income Database (OFID) between 2003 and 2013 (12,837 Farm-Year observations).

Price data (Obtained from Statistics Canada)


Yearly average beef-cattle prices and standard deviations.

Method

- Focus only risk-averse farm-year cases ($R_A\psi^2>0$) and those within 10% to 90% percentile to avoid extreme values (N=8,299).
- Assume 20 overconfidence types (ψ) for each farm-year case and generate contingent values of risk aversion (R_A). Overconfidence levels range from 0.8 and 1.2 where lower values indicate more overconfident ($N=8,299\times20$).
- Classify farm-year cases by degrees of overconfidence and risk aversion, yielding 20×20 types of producers.
- Calculate the average business performance for each of the 400 producer types and explore the relationship with the two behavioral traits (i.e. R_A and ψ)

Results

- 1. For a given level of overconfidence (ψ) , as Risk-aversion (R_A) increases, mean gross margin increases at the beginning and then decreases.
- 2. For those with higher risk aversion (top 25 percentile), overconfident farmers (with lower ψ) tends to have larger mean gross margins.



- 1. The linear functional forms verify the expected signs of risk aversion and overconfidence. Both R_A and ψ are negatively related to mean gross margins.
- 2. The quadratic functional form (3) captures the trend that moderate overconfidence yields competitive advantages.

Variables	Gross Profit Gross Profit		Mean Gross Profit	Mean Gross Profit	Mean Gross Profit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(6)
$R_A\psi^2$	-604.53***	-604.53***	-438.25***		
	(57.21)	(12.79)	(16.07)		
R_A				-413.73***	-413.79***
				(16.95)	(16.98)
$oldsymbol{\psi}^2$				-2.23***	-3.06
				(0.43)	(8.43)
$oldsymbol{\psi}$					1.66
					(16.86)
Constant	23.0945***	23.09***	22.67***	24.80***	23.99**
	(0.36)	(80.0)	(0.13)	(0.46)	(8.34)
N	8,496	169,920	400	400	400
Multiple R ²	0.013	0.013	0.654	0.608	0.608
Adjusted R ²	0.013	0.013	0.654	0.606	0.605

Policy Implications & Future Research

(c) ***: p = 0.001; **: p = 0.01.

- Both Overconfidence and Risk-Aversion affect producers' business performance, yet differently.
- **Moderate overconfidence makes producers better off.** Paternalistic government interventions that aim to offset the economic effects of subjective biases, such as overconfidence, may be counterproductive. Government should allow farmers to freely decide whether or not to enroll in Business Risk Management programs, such as AgriStability.
- It may be optimal to be overconfident even though this may result in taking excessive risks. Government should take
 initiatives in providing as accurate market information as possible to farmers. This will make it less likely for overconfident farmers
 to predict their income variance based on wrong information.
- · Next step: Explore the potential links between the income effects of overconfidence and farmers' AgriStability enrolment decision.