Occasional Paper No. 37

YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN UGANDA: Policy, Evidence and Stakeholders

A Context Analysis

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The Economic Policy Research Centre (EPRC) is an autonomous not-for-profit organization established in 1993 with a mission to foster sustainable growth and development in Uganda through advancement of research –based knowledge and policy analysis. Since its inception, the EPRC has made significant contributions to national and regional policy formulation and implementation in the Republic of Uganda and throughout East Africa. The Centre has also contributed to national and international development processes through intellectual policy discourse and capacity strengthening for policy analysis, design and management. The EPRC envisions itself as a Centre of excellence that is capable of maintaining a competitive edge in providing national leadership in intellectual economic policy discourse, through timely research-based contribution to policy processes.

Any enquiries can be addressed in writing to the Executive Director on the following address:

Economic Policy Research Centre
Plot 51, Pool Road, Makerere University Campus
P.O. Box 7841, Kampala, Uganda
Tel: +256-414-541023/4
Fax: +256-414-541022
Email: eprc@eprc.or.ug
Web: www.eprc.or.ug

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On behalf of EPRC, this review report was prepared for ILO-YEF by a team comprising Madina Guloba, Gemma Ahaibwe, Elizabeth Aliro, and Ibrahim Kasirye. The opinions reflected in this report and any recommendations contained herein are solely the views of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the institution(s) they represent. All errors and omissions remain of course the responsibility of the authors. All the three working papers on policy and regulatory frameworks review, stakeholder mapping and evidence review will be made available on ILO and EPRC websites.

For further information, please contact: Madina M. Guloba, EPRC, Uganda
(mguloba@eprc.or.ug) or Drew Gardiner, ILO, Geneva (gardiner@ilo.org)

PIP PROJECT BACKGROUND

The Youth Entrepreneurship Facility (YEF) is a partnership among the African Commission, the Youth Employment Network (YEN) and the International Labour Organization (ILO). The YEF was established to enable African youth to translate their energy and ideas into business opportunities, thereby increasing incomes and creating decent work for themselves and others. From this perspective and through one of its five core components on "Evidence-Based-Advocacy" in youth entrepreneurship, the YEF sought to increase the uptake of research in the policy arena in Uganda through the development and implementation of a Policy Influence Plan (PIP). The objective of the PIP is to increase the likelihood of evidence uptake on youth entrepreneurship in decision-making processes in Uganda. It is based on the recognition that typically credible and often relevant impact evaluation research findings do not find their way into policy debate and implementation strategies due to a variety of factors ranging from political interests to fiscal conditions and priorities within the policy agenda. However, with the right conditions and appropriate audience, impact evaluation findings can be critical to fostering the legitimacy of existing policies or introducing substantial changes.

To this end, the aim of the PIP is to identify the factors and the key change agents that may be associated with the ability to exert such influence and advocate for evidence-based decision making and change facilitation in the area of youth entrepreneurship policies and interventions in Uganda. To achieve this, the context analysis includes policy makers and other influencers, policy formulation processes, and public policies themselves. The aim here is to unpack the political and institutional structures at the heart of policy-making processes in Uganda and access the windows of opportunity to stimulate changes in different realms through various actors. The context analysis thus provides a diagnosis of the youth entrepreneurship policy environment in the country. It is composed of a policy review, an evidence review and a stakeholder analysis. The goal of the context analysis is fourfold:

1. To improve our knowledge of <u>what works</u> and <u>does not work</u>, <u>for whom</u> and <u>under what circumstances</u> in youth entrepreneurship programmes;
2. Encourage the uptake of evidence in the policy-making process;
3. Understand the channels and methods by which research translates into policy; and
4. Identify entry points and change agents to champion the process.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Youth unemployment and underemployment pose a formidable challenge for the Government of Uganda. As a result, the government has embraced youth entrepreneurship as an avenue to expand employment opportunities. This report sheds light on the developments of youth entrepreneurship policies in the country. In a bid to increase research uptake and the use of evaluation evidence in policy formulation and programming, this report analyses and provides a perspective on youth entrepreneurship along three interrelated dimensions: policy, evidence and stakeholders. The objective therefore is to determine to the extent to which youth entrepreneurship policies in Uganda are evidence based and the nature of the stakeholders involved in the decision-making process. With regard to methods, the study reviewed previous research and impact evaluations of different programme packages on business and labour market outcomes in Uganda and beyond.

Impact evaluations of entrepreneurship as a means of enhancing labour market outcomes can influence multiple levels of the policy process and different stakeholders. This influence may range from improving the knowledge of certain stakeholders (and therefore expanding their capacities) to fundamentally redesigning policies. The analysis in this report highlights the inherent complexities of the policy-making process in Uganda—in particular, the challenge in finding meaningful ways to encourage the use of evidence in decision-making processes. Note that often credible and relevant impact evaluation findings do not automatically translate into policy changes because of a variety of factors that range from political interest, to financial constraints, and priorities within the policy agenda.

The review highlights several critical issues:

(1) **On the policy front**, the analysis reveals the presence of broad policies pertaining to youth, employment and entrepreneurship initiatives. Furthermore, the broad policies incorporate strategies intended to foster enterprise development among youth. However, the challenge lies in their effective implementation. Furthermore, given the cross-cutting nature of youth entrepreneurship, most of the policies intended to enhance the growth of Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) are spread across different Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs), e.g., MTIC, MoGLSD and MoFPED.

(2) **In relation to the use of evidence in policy processes**, we note that in practice, the use of evaluations and research is limited despite the consideration of research in the policy process and the existence of a Monitoring & Evaluation Policy—which calls for periodic reviews of policies and programmes as a basis for evidence-based policy and programme creation. In addition, although most ministries have policy and planning units, the capacity of these units to conduct rigorous empirical work to inform policy is generally weak. As such, policy design is often undertaken by consultants—sourced from outside the ministries.

(3) **On institutional linkages**, the study notes that synergies between researchers and policy makers are weak. Often, suppliers of research (think tanks, universities, other specialised institutions, etc.) do not understand the policy-making processes in practice and also may not be aware that a particular policy is undergoing design. Indeed, the limited conceptualisation of the process has led to substantial impact evaluation research on entrepreneurship that has failed to feed into policy formulation and implementation. It should be noted, however, that the available evidence is often not relevant to policy needs at a given time. However, policy makers' demand for evidence from local research institutions is low, as policy makers sometimes doubt its credibility.

(4) **With regard to existing evidence**, findings from Uganda show that impact evaluations of interventions seeking to support entrepreneurship development, especially those targeting youth and adopting a gender focus, should be integrated with different components of skills training, targeting various stages of business development, achieve higher impacts than those offering no training. This implies that, for programme success, multi-pronged entrepreneurship programmes have the greatest individual impact on young entrepreneurs. Furthermore, studies evaluating various modes of financing for business ventures revealed that in-kind grants performed better than unconditional cash grants and that the impacts of such financing were higher when coupled with business and financial training. In addition, the micro-credit facilities yielded better labour market outcomes than did grants, especially when financial training was provided to participants. For most financing programmes targeting young men and women, the effects tended to be stronger among males. Furthermore, sustainability of entrepreneurial ventures was higher among educated youths. Note that if such critical evaluation findings are well packaged for the interested elite (policy makers with influence), they can make substantial impacts on the implementation of programme(s) such as the Youth Livelihood Programme.

In conclusion, given that Uganda's business and regulatory environment is one of the factors hindering private investment in the country, policies should focus on addressing the regulatory challenges—especially of establishing a business. For example, MSMEs operate in the same business environment as other players but face greater challenges, which might limit the effectiveness of the designed polices. Moreover, for evidence-based research to feed into policy, synergies between policy makers (users of evidence) and researchers (producers of evidence) need to be revisited. Currently, institutions seem to work independently, often duplicating efforts with no intermediate impact in the policy arena.

Recommendations for government

From the foregoing, we recommend that government:

- Close policy implementation gaps. We recommend that the government identify the most effective delivery methods to provide youth entrepreneurship services, whether via public institutions for monitoring and supervision, public-private partnerships for cost effectiveness and efficiencies, or through the education system for national coverage and early sensitisation. In addition, the Cabinet should not pass any policy without an action plan and a clear, strong M&E component.
- Promote evidence-based policy making. Research uptake, especially evidence-based research in policy, programme design and implementation, should be considered to allow for successful programme impacts and sustainability in the long run.
- Improve skills training for youth in the informal sector. Trainers have to be willing to be trained, and the training has to be relevant. Furthermore, it is necessary to prioritise the "business component" of the BTVET system by ensuring that the existing curriculum and training programmes are not substantially inclined towards the TVET aspects but also prioritise business education and skills development for youths who are largely engaged in the informal sector. Thus, the standardisation of training products for all BTVET institutions is important.
- Create an enabling environment that supports MSMEs and informality
- Strengthening the role of the National Planning Authority. Given the existence of several regulatory and policy frameworks intended to guide entrepreneurship initiatives in the country, the role of the NPA in coordinating youth issues must be strengthened, as this lies within their mandate.

Recommendations for researchers

For researchers, we recommend that:

- Synergies among researchers, think tanks and universities (producers of evidence) and government (users of evidence) be strengthened, as many institutions are undertaking research on entrepreneurship, but information asymmetry on existing knowledge is still common.
- Recognising institutional-level strengths and weaknesses is critical in programme delivery and changing young entrepreneurs' mind-sets for the better.
- Increase policy intelligence. Researchers should endeavour to learn policy-making processes in practice as a means of identifying entry points for their research to feed into policy.

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ACRONYMS

AYDL	African Youth Development Link
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
BDS	Business Development Services
BTVET	Business, Technical and Vocational Education and Training
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
EAC	East African Community
EPRC	Economic Policy Research Centre
EUG	Enterprise Uganda
GEM	Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
GOU	Government of Uganda
ILO	International Labour Organisation
MDAs	Ministries, Departments and Agencies
MDI	Micro Deposit-taking Institution
MISER	Makerere Institute of Social Economic Research
MoES	Ministry of Education and Sports
MoFPED	Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development
MoGLSD	Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development
MTAC	Management Training and Advisory Council
MTIC	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives
MSMEs	Micro Small and Medium Enterprises
MUBS	Makerere University Business School
NDP	National Development Plan
NEP	National Employment Policy
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
NYC	National Youth Council
NYP	National Youth Policy
PIP	Policy Influence Plan
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PSFU	Private Sector Foundation Uganda
RCT	Randomised Controlled Experiment
SACCOs	Savings and Credit Cooperatives
SWTS	School to Work Transition Survey
TEA	Total early-stage Entrepreneurship Activity
TVVP	Technical and Vocational Vouchers Program
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UIRI	Uganda Industrial Research Institute
UIA	Uganda Investment Authority
UMA	Uganda Manufacturers Association
UNCC	Uganda National Chamber of Commerce
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNICEF	United Nations Children Fund
UIA	Uganda Investment Authority
UIRI	Uganda Industrial Research Institute
UPFYA	Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs
USSIA	Uganda Small Scale Industries Association
UWEAL	Uganda Women Entrepreneurs Association Limited
UYONET	Uganda Youth Network
UYVCF	Uganda Youth Venture Capital Fund
YEN	Youth Employment Network
YES	Youth Entrepreneurship Scheme
YEF	Youth Entrepreneurship Facility
YLP	Youth Livelihood Programme
YOP	Youth Opportunities Program

1. INTRODUCTION

Youth unemployment and underemployment pose a formidable challenge for the Government of Uganda. This is a result of the demographic structure of Uganda's population, which features an increasing number of persons aged less than 30 years. As such, a large population of youth faces severe labour market constraints, with the largest proportion of this population being underemployed. According to the 2013 School to Work Transition Survey (SWTS) for Uganda, an estimated 13 per cent of youth (aged 15-29 years) are unemployed[1] and 63 per cent are underemployed/underutilised (UBoS and ILO, 2014).[2] While many Ugandan youth seek wage employment in the public and private sectors, these formal sectors are only able to absorb a small percentage of new job seekers entering the labour market. As a result, most youth are self-employed in low-productivity activities in the informal sector. The SWTS also showed that approximately three out of every four youth in the labour market are self-employed. Within self-employment, at least 50 per cent are employed as own-account workers, 21 per cent are contributing (unpaid) family workers, and approximately 3 per cent are employers. Wage employment only accounts for 24.6 per cent of employed youth (Byamugisha et al., 2014).

The high levels of self-employment highlight the important role of entrepreneurship in jobs creation in the country. The 2014 Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) ranked Uganda as the second most entrepreneurial economy after Cameroon among the GEM participating countries with a "Total early-stage Entrepreneurial Activity" (TEA)[3] rate of 35.5 per cent, up from a TEA rate of 31.3 per cent in 2010 (GEM, 2014). This implies that at least one in every three Ugandans is engaged in some form of entrepreneurial activity. Moreover, Ugandan youth (aged 18-35 years) registered a higher TEA than the general adult population Note, however, that most of these youth are necessity entrepreneurs (those that engage in entrepreneurship due to a lack of jobs) as opposed to being opportunity entrepreneurs (motivated by passion for and pursuit of business). Research shows that without an enabling environment and business support services, necessity entrepreneurs are less likely to survive. As a result, it is imperative that support for these necessity entrepreneurs be cultivated or developed through appropriate programmes or policies. Moreover, Uganda also has the highest discontinuation of business rate (21 per cent of TEA), with entrepreneurs citing the non-profitability of business as the leading cause of failure (GEM, 2014). That is, for every business started, nearly one other closed.

Due to the above environment, the Government of Uganda (GoU) has embraced youth entrepreneurship as an important avenue for job creation and economic growth. However, Younis and Younis, (2011) assert that a good job comes from an economic

1 A relaxed definition is: "A person without work and available for work".

2 The labour underutilization rate is the sum of the shares of youth in irregular employment, unemployed (relaxed definition) and inactive non-students.

3 GEM defines TEA as the prevalence rate of individuals in the working-age population who are actively involved in business start-ups, either in the phase preceding the birth of the firm (nascent entrepreneurs) or the phase spanning 3½ years after the birth of the firm (owner-managers of new firms).

and social ecosystem that is conducive to the organic growth of entrepreneurial ventures. This is evident in the many policies that have been recently revised and/or drafted. Such policies include: the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) Policy, 2015, of the Ministry of Trade Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC) and the draft National Youth Enterprise Bill, 2013, of the Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs (UPFYA), and programme initiatives include the Youth Venture Capital Fund (YVCF), which was initiated in 2011 by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED), and the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD)'s Youth Livelihood Program (YLP) in 2013.

Whether, any of the above programmes has achieved its intended objectives is an open question Policy makers remain hampered by a lack of information and rigorous evidence on the types and effectiveness of different entrepreneurship promotion programmes. Understanding what works, for whom, and under what circumstances is paramount for the effective implementation of various interventions and programmes. Furthermore, in cases in which evidence and recommendations on what works exist, information is not channelled to the right people and often does not contain accurate context that would allow for uptake in the policy formulation process. As such, it is important to identify key actors and change agents (including the producers and users of evidence) who are instrumental in influencing policies pertaining to youth entrepreneurship.

In a bid to increase research uptake in policy making, this context analysis characterises the youth entrepreneurship policy environment in Uganda. The analysis is composed of three interlinked steps: a policy review, an evidence review and a stakeholder analysis. The policy review interrogates policies that relate to youth entrepreneurship in Uganda, the structures that influence policy effectiveness and the institutions shaping the aims and outputs of youth policies. The evidence review analyses the existing research base on youth entrepreneurship. The review concentrates on identifying studies that open the "black box" of entrepreneurship development, i.e., the efficacy of various design features of a programme or policy and the relative effectiveness of programme alternatives. Finally, the stakeholder review identifies key informants, change agents and the best strategy to influence policy in Uganda.

To inform the analysis, a desk literature review of relevant policy documents was undertaken. In addition, scheduled key informant interviews (KIIs) were held with relevant persons in ministries, agencies and departments (MDAs), youth governing bodies, civil society and development partners (see a list attached in Appendix Table 1). The meetings were guided by a set of questions concerning policy, use of research and stakeholder involvement (see Appendix A.1: Questionnaire Guide). Finally, the evidence review included studies that applied impact evaluation techniques (randomised control trials (RCTs) or quasi-experimental methods). Studies referenced in this report were sourced from the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL) and the Youth Entrepreneurship Inventory (YEI) of the ILO. Only evaluations that were undertaken in Uganda and sub-Saharan Africa from 2000 onwards were considered unless stated otherwise.

Report structure

The report is organised as follows:

- The introductory section (Section 1) summarises the relevant youth (un) employment status in Uganda while delving into the role of entrepreneurship in job creation. The importance of research in policy formulation is also highlighted. It also outlines the methodology employed in the context analysis. The analysis is organised according to three themes: policy, stakeholders and evidence reviews.
- Section 2 examines the developments in youth and entrepreneurship policies, the stakeholders involved and programme initiatives established thus far. Specifically, the policy-making process in Uganda is analysed, and both evidence gaps and opportunities for engagement between policy makers and researchers on how to influence the policy agenda are identified. The actors (demanders and suppliers) involved at various stages of the policy process are identified, as are the stakeholders influencing the entrepreneurship agenda in Uganda.
- Section 3 examines the existing evidence and analyses the means through which the findings can be used to enhance entrepreneurship and business development services. The section also specifically assesses the effectiveness of the programme design in Uganda—especially programme responsiveness to entrepreneurship, business development and sustainability.
- Section 4 outlines the extent to which evidence is used in policy processes and proposes strategies to influence youth entrepreneurship in Uganda, highlighting the need to foster institutional synergies.
- Section 5 concludes by harmonising the main conclusions from the context analysis and providing recommendations for both government and researchers.

2. DEVELOPMENTS IN YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICIES AND PROGRAMMES

This section examines Uganda's approach in addressing the youth employment challenge through promoting entrepreneurship as an avenue for job creation. In addition, the section provides insights on the existing policies and how they foster youth entrepreneurship and whether the policies are based on evidence. The key policy actors (including policy makers) who influence the policy-making process pertaining to youth entrepreneurship are highlighted. To achieve this, we assess the policy environment, the policy-making process, and the relevant legal and regulatory frameworks that influence the effectiveness of youth entrepreneurship. We primarily review laws, policies and programmes that influence youth entrepreneurship through the interrelated themes of: (i) entrepreneurship education and skills training; (ii) access to finance; (iii) business assistance and development services; and (iv) regulation and the business environment.

Uganda has a long-term vision for creating a critical mass of successful young entrepreneurs. This foresight is articulated in the country's Vision 2040, an overarching framework advanced by the GoU intended to transform Uganda from a low-income country to upper-middle-income status by 2040. Vision 2040 highlights inappropriate skills and skills mismatch as major factors in youth unemployment and underemployment in Uganda. It argues that providing young people with the right skills through training is a prerequisite for enhancing human capital for economic and social transformation (GoU, 2013). Therefore, Vision 2040 identifies a list of skills development policies and programmes to make youth competitive and self-reliant as they enter the job market. These include investment priorities in human resource development in areas of education, skills development, technology and innovation. The government has further proceeded to formulate policies, acts, regulatory frameworks and programmes addressing youth and entrepreneurship to foster job-creation initiatives.

2.1 Policy-making process

Generally, the policy making process in Uganda is horizontal in nature and involves multiple players (Bruce, 2003). Uganda has a detailed framework to guide the policy formulation and management process in the country; this is steered by a guiding tool developed in 2009[4] by the Cabinet Secretariat in the Office of the President (Appendix Figure A. 1). In the framework, decisions are made through sequential steps, beginning with the identification of a problem or issue and then turning to information gathering, policy analysis and development, consultative meetings, policy implementation and ending with an evaluation of the implemented policy/interventions. However, the actual policy-making process rarely follows the above sequence due to varying political interests, motivations and power. In, some instances, certain steps may be bypassed. In neo-patrimonial systems in which power is concentrated around the president and other influential political offices, politics may significantly drive both the policy formulation and implementation processes.

Porter and Feinstein (2013) analyse the role played by supply and demand in use of evaluation evidence in policy-making structures. One essential issue they identify, which is relevant to the findings in this paper, is that "...policy is difficult to influence through evidence unless you have access to the Central policy making structures". Using the recent drafting of two policies affecting youth—the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSME) Policy and the 2012 National Youth Policy—as case studies, we identify which actors are involved in decision making and the extent to which evidence is used in setting the policy agenda. The analysis is provided in boxes 1 and 2 and is based on stakeholder consultations undertaken as part of this report.

4 Republic of Uganda (2009). A Guide to Policy Development and Management in Uganda. Cabinet Secretariat, Office of the President.

Box 1: Policy process, evidence gaps and stakeholders: Drafting of the Amended National Youth Policy, 2012

During the drafting of the amended National Youth Policy, 2012, the agenda setting was largely driven by youth interest groups such as the Uganda Youth Network (UYONET), National Youth Council (NYC), the Uganda Parliamentary Forum on Youth Affairs (UPFYA) and development partners, e.g., ILO, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD), which has the mandate to spearhead and implement youth initiatives in Uganda, led the process. The key interest groups agreed on the focal amendments and sought political buy-in from the Minister. Following the Minister's approval, the next step was for the Ministry to establish a National Technical Working Committee (primarily composed of technocrats and members of interest groups), the task of which was to guide the drafting process. In addition, the MoGLSD was responsible for engaging the services of an external Youth Specialist. The objective of the policy revision was to ensure the alignment of the new amended youth policy with new actions such as the Commonwealth Plan of Action.

The Youth Specialist performed a literature review on initiatives that have been implemented on youth matters at the local, regional and international level since 2001, when the first youth policy was formulated. In addition, the key stakeholders conducted study visits in selected countries (Botswana, South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Kenya) where youth programmes had been successfully established. A consultative workshop was used to validate the consultant's findings/report and for stakeholders (representatives from youth groups, sector line ministries, development partners, technocrats and lobbyists) to provide input that addresses their interests and perspectives. Thereafter, the MoGLSD took responsibility for consolidating all of these ideas to develop a draft amended Youth Policy in 2012.

The draft Policy was then widely disseminated, debated and validated at the national and regional level (all four regions of Uganda). A provisional draft policy was then presented at the Senior Management Level meeting of the MoGLSD chaired by the Permanent Secretary (PS). The PS also shared the draft policy with other line ministries' Permanent Secretaries for endorsement. After this consultation stage, the revised draft policy was then presented at the Top Management Level of the Ministry, chaired by the Minister. Thereafter, the policy became a Cabinet Memorandum, and the Minister of MoGLSD presented it to Cabinet where it was tabled and vetted.

However, in 2012 the Cabinet refused to approve the draft policy because it lacked an action plan and budget. These two documents are a prerequisite for acquiring a certificate of financial implications from the Permanent Secretary and Secretary to the Treasury (PS/ST) of MoFPED. The certificate specifically indicates the availability and source of funds to implement the policy for the next five years. The MGLSD, with the support of development partners, embarked on the process of engaging a new consultant to draft the action plan. The last national stakeholder workshop was held in October 2014 to finalise the draft action plan and budget (these followed the same steps as the draft policy in the Ministry, and when this report was to be finalised, the documents had yet to be presented to the Top Management Level for support). If finalised, the draft Youth Policy, 2012, the draft Action Plan and Budget must be presented to the Cabinet for approval. It is the approved policy that will then be implemented, monitored and evaluated.

Source: *Compiled from Key Informant Discussions (Asst. Commissioner, Kyateka Mondo (MoG LSD), ILO Policy Lab (Kampala), Stephen Opio (ILO-UG), Emmanuel K (UYONET) and Samuel Kavuma (NYC), November 2014*

The description in Box 1 regarding the drafting of the NYP process highlights two critical issues: (i) the suppliers of evidence such as think tanks were missing in the consultative phases of setting the policy agenda, and (ii) the type of research utilised is based on desk reviews of other existing policies in the region and field visits by the technical committee to other case study countries. These insights bring to light the limited interaction during the review of the NYP between suppliers of evidence-based research and the demanders of evidence (policy makers and technocrats in MDAs). Even during the drafting of the action plan that included actionable indicators to facilitate implementation, monitoring and evaluation, the use of evidence-based research was often missing; however, such evidence is crucial. A key informant stated that:

"The draft NYP policy review process relied more on the analysis the consultant had done, which is more theoretical and based on policies and best practices from other countries. Empirical research will be very useful during the mid-term review of the policy process and programmes" Assistant Commissioner, Mr Kyateka Mondo, MoGLSD (November 4, 2014).

His statements were echoed by Mr Kenneth Nkumiro, Coordinator-UPFYA, who stated that:

*"Hard-core research such as use of evidence from Randomised Controlled Trials to inform policy reviews and drafting of the action plan on youth was not undertaken. We relied more on experience, statistics from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics, research done by International Alert to inform the process"***,** November 26, 2014

Policy review and development processes are not necessarily similar with respect to the type and capacity of the stakeholders involved. The recently drafted MSME policy illustrates this (see Box 2).

Box 2: Evolution and institutional engagement in the draft MSME policy in Uganda

Given the very large informal sector in Uganda, there is need for a policy to guide the development of this very important component of the private sector. This led to the drafting of the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise (MSME) policy for Uganda. The process began when a survey conducted by the Commonwealth Secretariat was used as a benchmark by the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MoFPED) to draft the 2011 MSME policy in collaboration with the World Bank (financier). However, the draft policy was not passed by Cabinet when it was presented in 2012 by MoFPED due to the concern that it was not under their jurisdiction to implement the policy. The cabinet then instructed MoFPED to pass-on the policy to Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC) as it was under their mandate.

In 2014, MTIC established a Technical Working Committee (TWC) to revise, update and re-draft the 2011 MSME policy. The TWC primarily comprised government bodies, with MTIC as the lead, and included MoFPED, the Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) and, at a later stage, MoGLSD. The private sector actors included Enterprise Uganda (EUG), the Uganda Manufacturing Association (UMA), the Uganda National Chamber of Commerce (UNCC), Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU), the Uganda Small Scale Industries Association (USSIA), the Uganda Women Entrepreneurs Association Limited (UWEAL); and a university/research institution, Makerere University Business

School (MUBS) Entrepreneurship Centre. While the original emphasis of the 2011 policy was on the business component, MTIC perceived a need to recast the draft to encompass the whole supply chain of the MSME development. Later, the ILO's Uganda's Women's Entrepreneurship Development (WED) joined the group to support the component on women,because, in their view, not enough women had been consulted. Thus, MoGLSD was brought on board to represent women and include their views. A consultant (MTAC) was then hired to support and guide the TWG.

Assessing the research methods employed in the reference section of the Consultant's report reveals that the policy was informed by different policies in the region and considered regional integration. These included: the EAC policy on industrialisation and manufacturing; COMESA policy on MSMEs; African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) country Review Report; the NDP I report and other policy papers as a means of incorporating new issues taking place. In particular, prior to the EAC industrial policy, a rigorous survey supported by the World Bank was conducted in a bid to include and support EAC policy statements that partly capture Uganda's local content. The Assistant Commissioner, Mr Emuria, noted that Uganda is the only country in the region that does not have an MSME policy, and hence speed was essential.

In November 2014, a revised draft policy was presented to the management of MTIC to incorporate their views. As of January 2015, a final draft policy was in place and a cabinet memo had been prepared together with a draft short-term action plan. When this report was finalised, MTIC was waiting for the certificate of financial implication before the Minister could present the policy to the Cabinet for approval. The proposed next steps involve recruiting personnel for the Directorate of MSMEs under MTIC, to comprise 38 staff, and preparing an MSME strategy (this will require the involvement of technical people who will be employed by the Directorate). It is expected that research institutions such as EPRC will be invited at this stage to contribute to the strategy, and the ILO has pledged to finance the MSME strategy development process.

Source: *Compiled from KII with Mr Stephen Emuria, Assistant Commissioner MSME, MTIC-January 28, 2015*

The key issues from the MSME policy process that are worth noting include: the participation of diverse institutions in the exercise and use of regional policies and previously undertaken own surveys to help contextualise the policy from a global perspective. While the primary evaluation surveys were not conducted by MTIC to inform the processes, discussions with the ministry officials indicated that there is still room for use of evidence prior to the implementation of the policy. Nonetheless, the active participation of the MUBS Entrepreneurship Centre and UIRI to a certain extent manifests the contribution of research and training institutions in the policy formulation process.

Based on the processes followed in the drafting of the NYP and MSME policies, it is apparent that the use of evidence to guide the conceptualisation of ideas is often dependent on the stakeholders involved. Typically, the need to fill a policy gap is the main driver for initiating a policy due to either international or regional demands. As a result, the review of existing policies within and outside the region combined with study visits to other countries is used in lieu of relying solely on evidence during the policy formulation stage. When the policy is in place, evaluations are considered useful during implementation and /or monitoring and evaluation. It is therefore vital to establish whether the policies currently being implemented to address youth entrepreneurship in Uganda had, prior to their implementation, used evaluation evidence to inform the processes and programme initiatives.

2.2 Current policies on youth entrepreneurship and the regulatory framework

Uganda does not have a standalone national entrepreneurship policy. As such, youth entrepreneurship programmes are guided by a number of policies across different sectors. From an employment perspective, entrepreneurship is embedded within broader policies on youth, employment and Business Technology and Vocational Education Training (BTVET). From an economic/enterprise support perspective, such policy is embedded in the drafted MSME policy, the Micro Finance policy and the Investment policy (Figure 1). These policies together play a vital role in promoting entrepreneurship as a means of fostering job creation while enhancing opportunities in the more established private sector development area.

Based on the categorisation of the policies depicted in Figure 1, we review policies related to: entrepreneurship, education and skills training, fostering access to finance, support Business Development Services (BDS) and regulate the business environment. The review answers the following questions.

a) How do the existing policies foster youth entrepreneurship?
b) Are they evidence based? What are the sources of their evidence?
c) To what extent and at what point does the evidence match the current evidence on youth entrepreneurship?
d) Who are the major stakeholders?

2.2.1 An evaluation of policies from a youth, employment and training perspective

The genesis of youth and employment laws can be found in both the international regulations and the African Youth Charter, 2007. Driven by the global development agenda, Uganda has developed a number of laws addressing employment, and these include:

Figure 1: Classification of Youth Entrepreneurship Policy in Uganda



Source: Authors' classification, 2014

the National Youth Act Cap 319; the Employment Act, No 6 of 2006; the Equal Opportunities Commission Act of 2007; and the BTVET Act, 2008. These help regulate the youth and employment environment in Uganda. These laws guide and operate alongside the National Youth Policy, 2001; the BTVET Policy, 2003; and the National Employment Policy, 2011 (Figure 1). The joint aim of these policies is to empower Ugandan youths to demand their rights to quality employment, education and skills. For example, the 2001 National Youth Policy (NYP) emphasises, in one of its core strategic areas of focus, the promotion of income-generating activities and enterprise development through the provision of education, training, especially skills training, mentorship, enterprise development, and the establishment of information and extension services. The end result here is to provide youth with employable skills and requisite skills to ably engage in youth entrepreneurship. The policy has often been viewed as a static document that lacks an action plan for its implementation. The implementation of its proposals has been haphazard and piecemeal in nature. For example, the policy advocates the establishment of a "Youth Trust Bank" to provide young people with access to small interest loans to start and maintain their businesses. The policy presumes that a bank of this nature would be a permanent structure offering long-lasting solutions to the financial challenges facing young people in business and those interested in business. Although short-term interventions have been established in form of youth funds, the proposed bank has never been established. In addition, although the policy was supposed to be reviewed after 5 years, until 2012 (refer to Box 1 for details and stakeholders involved), no review had been undertaken. The MoGLSD, the Ministry mandated to execute the policy, cites several difficulties: For instance, one of the officials at the Ministry gave insights into this delay:

"Youth issues were not a priority on the Government's agenda then. More so, for some time youth issues had not radically changed. We also lacked finances to start the policy review process, which is extremely expensive."

A comparison of the 2001 NYP and the draft NYP 2012 policies regarding the promotion of entrepreneurship indicates that the old and new policies are intended to promote youth-friendly services for credit access and the promotion of skills training and entrepreneurial development among youth. However, the 2012 version proposes more comprehensive and actionable ways of achieving this. In addition, the draft highlights that youth are not a homogenous category and, thus, makes provisions that take this into consideration. Generally, the NYP 2012 draws its evidence and statistics from national statistics (UBoS) and conforms to existing evidence. The NYC acknowledges a range of activities that foster youth entrepreneurship, including skills enhancement, access to microfinance and mentoring. The challenge primarily lies in the actual design of the programmes intended to implement and operationalise the policy. Although the policies are normally in keeping with the current knowledge on what works, actual implementation has been a challenge.

"The 2001 NYP was looked at as a static document that lacked an action plan for its implementation. The revised youth policy has been formulated in a consultative

*process with an action plan for its effective implementation***"**. (Assistant Commissioner Mr Kyateka Mondo, November 4, 2014)

Another major gap in the 2012 draft policy is the lack of a description of roles and institutional linkages between the various interest groups. For instance, the point of engagement with suppliers (think tanks, universities and donors) and consumers/ demanders of evidence (policy makers) is not well articulated. Even the role of civil society to steer the youth agenda is not included. However, there is still room to consider evidence during the generation of the action plan. If successful, this will form a basis for future engagements (the suppliers of research have to make themselves indispensable to policy makers to ensure sustainable relationships). In addition, one of our key informants noted that:

*"No single coordinating entity to coordinate youth affairs is in place. The National Youth Council, which should have done this, is not aggressive enough in reconciling the policies and programmes that address youth. We feel that they are compromised, as they are largely funded by government and drive the youth political agenda.***"** Mr Emmanuel Kitamirike, Executive Director, UYONET.

The 2011 National Employment Policy (NEP) simply aims at creating an enabling employment environment for all Ugandans in the labour force. Promoting entrepreneurial activity is recognised as an important means of employment creation in the NEP. The NEP recognises that many enterprises in the informal sector are still characterised by low labour productivity, limited training, the use of basic technology, limited access to credit and finance, difficulties in obtaining raw materials and other inputs, and inadequate markets for semi processed products. In recognition of its role and the need to improve its productivity and employment potential, the NEP focuses on strategies aimed at improving entrepreneurial skills and strengthening vocational education and training as an integral component of the general education system. It also envisages productivity improvement by offering business assistance and support to MSMEs.

Although the NEP has a comprehensive plan to address youth entrepreneurship challenges, thus far, the implementation has generally been weak. Based on the stakeholder consultations undertaken for this report, the lack of an action plan to operationalise the policy was the most frequently cited reason for the lack of progress. Nevertheless, the NEP does have a draft National Action Plan on Youth Employment (which received a certification of funding from MoFPED but is yet to be approved by the Cabinet) to facilitate the implementation of the NEP. Note that it has been almost three years since the policy was passed by the Cabinet, but thus far, it has no approved plan. Some of the proposed components of the draft action plan include elements that encourage young entrepreneurs to operate businesses. For example, including tax rebates for the first five years for start-up businesses. Beyond the lack of an approved action plan, part of the inaction in implementing the policy is the limited human resource and technical capacity of persons that can fully assimilate and comprehend employment issues within the MoGLSD. Regarding the source of evidence that was utilised in the policy, government-sourced statistics are dominant. For example, in the situational analysis/problem statement section, the NEP 2011 principally uses statistics produced by UBoS. Other evidence sources include the ILO, World Bank, MoES, EPRC, Uganda Investment Authority and UNICEF.

The Business Technical and Vocational Education Training Act and Strategic Plan: The enactment of the Business Technical and Vocational Training Act in 2008 helped to concretise the Business Technical and Vocational Education Training (BTVET) Policy of 2003. Despite the presence of both the law and policy, the BTVET subsector still faces challenges related to relevance, quality and access. To deepen reforms and resolve challenges of the BTVET subsector, the MoES, with support from development partners, initiated a process to formulate a 10-year BTVET Strategic Plan in 2009. One of the major shortcomings of the 2003 and 2008 BTVET Policy and Act, respectively, was the lack of consideration for skills development for young people already in or seeking to enter the informal sector. However, the informal sector remains a very important component of the Ugandan labour market and is projected to be critical in the medium term.

Mindful of the fact that the informal sector is operating at low levels of productivity, the BTVET plan cites skills training and improvement as an important prerequisite for the development of Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) and the informal sector. With the launch of the Non-Formal Training Programme (NFTP) by the MoES in 2010, an increasing number of Ugandans have recently been given the opportunity to acquire employment-relevant non-formal skills training. Expanding training and making it an integral part of a comprehensive BTVET system is evident in the plan. In addition, the plan focuses on building specific, targeted approaches to training in the informal sector based on the needs of local markets and building human and institutional capacities among skills-development providers in training for the informal sector.

The formulation of the strategy was based on research with a highly consultative process involving consultations with approximately 300 stakeholders throughout the country. This was then followed by benchmarking the analysis against international experience in the reform of technical and vocational education and training systems. In addition, six technical papers on the different aspects of BTVET were commissioned to inform Uganda's strategy on skills development. The technical papers were compiled on: (i) Labour Market Analysis; (ii) MSE Development and BTVET; (iii) Agri-business Development and BTVET; (iv) Policy, Management and Organisation; (v) BTVET Delivery; and (vi) Social Equity (MoES, 2010).

The implementation of the BTVET Policy witnessed the introduction of entrepreneurship as a subject at both the secondary and university/tertiary levels of education with a view towards imparting practical knowledge and skills to enable youth to become job creators. At the tertiary level, some of the interventions that were put in place include the introduction of compulsory apprenticeship, a course that was believed to have high market demand , and a focus on science subjects (Bategeka, 2012). However, it remains unclear whether the curriculum is capable of changing young people's mindsets: do they view entrepreneurship as a means of self-employment after school, or is it simply another academic achievement?

Another important programme intended to equip youth with the necessary skills to enhance employment is “Skilling Uganda”—an initiative of the Ministry of Education and Sports. Despite the criteria under which the policy’s strategic plan 2012/3 - 2021/2 was formulated, a recent assessment of the programme by the Council for African Policy (2013) shows that it still does not produce the appropriately skilled workforce that Uganda needs to increase incomes and employment and to compete in the East African and international markets. Evidence further reveals that less than 40 per cent of large and medium firms in Uganda regarded courses offered by BTVET institutions as relevant (Council for African Policy, 2013). Discussions with interested parties revealed that the “Skilling Uganda” campaign is more academic and not tailored to provide local content. Many of the BTVET service providers are private. It is important to note that the programme still falls short due to several factors, principally funding. Furthermore, despite that all private institutions providing BTVET programmes have to be regulated or monitored by MoES’s BTVET department, many of the skilling programmes remain unsupervised; hence the quality of training provided is often dubious. As the Coordinator of the African Youth Development Link (AYDL), Mr Ahmed Hadji (2014), argues:

“A national certification board on content delivery of entrepreneurship training modules is not there and hence the quality of delivery by private actors is not convincing. At the moment, the modules have focused on enterprise education and not enterprise development. MUBS should feature somewhere in the BTVET policy process as they are the only institution in the country giving entrepreneurship development and addressing the Business component of the BTVET curriculum”.

There is still low demand for vocational training among Ugandan youth. This calls for extensive marketing and promotion to cultivate a culture of entrepreneurship among youths at early stages in their education. Evidence from other countries—especially the Jua Kali programme in neighbouring Kenya—shows that well packaged information promoting vocational training and use of vouchers increased demand for vocational training.

2.2.2 An evaluation of policies from a youth and enterprise development perspective

The 1995 Constitution of Uganda supports enterprise development and provides for the creation of an enabling environment that promotes investments as one of the major means of addressing youth unemployment through the creation of jobs. Thus, the current laws and policies are premised on the constitution. In addition, the on-going developments at the regional level (EAC integration) and in the international scene (such as the Commonwealth policy on enterprises) have had a significant influence on the design of youth and enterprise policies in Uganda. In particular, microfinance and enterprise support are currently embedded in the 2010 Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Framework Policy and the 2010 and 1999 Micro-Finance Policy; to date, these are the only policy frameworks that to a large extent regulate entrepreneurship in Uganda. In recognition that many of the entrepreneurs and enterprises are privately owned and highly informal, the above policies were supposed to address both formality and informality and protect the businesses in place.

Specifically, **the 2010 PPP policy** formulated by the MoFPED generally seeks to create an enabling environment that ensures the provision of better quality services at competitive costs, employ private sector expertise and finance when beneficial, and reduce costs, delivery times, and risks inherent in infrastructure projects and service delivery. However, many regulatory frameworks do not explicitly include regulatory business requirements that differentiate business start-ups from those that have already taken off but unfairly treat all businesses at various stages in the same way.

Access to finance is often cited as one of the greatest barriers affecting youth enterprise start-ups. In response, the Government has developed a liberalised financial system that is all-inclusive in providing access to financial services for the poor and in rural areas. Currently, a wide range of institutions—financial and non-financial—offer various types of financial services to the population. Nonetheless, access to financial services remains low. For example, in 2013, only 54 per cent of the population had access to formal (banked and non-bank formal) financial services (EPRC-FINSCOPE III, 2013). Most MSMEs in the country still obtain credit from informal financial service providers, and the situation is worse for youth. As such, easing legal requirements on youth entrepreneurs and improving access to various types of finance are important factors in improving access to finance for young entrepreneurs.

The Micro Deposit-taking Institutions (MDIs) Act of 2003 and the Micro Finance Policy of 2005 are the main guiding regulatory frameworks for the microfinance subsector. As per the relevant policy statements, microfinance institutions are categorised along four tiers. Tier 1 includes microfinance-oriented commercial banks (min capital: Shs.4bn), Tier 2 relates to credit institutions (min capital: Shs.1bn) and are licensed by the Bank of Uganda, Tier 3 includes the MDIs, while Tier 4 includes Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOS), NGOs, companies limited by guarantee, and companies limited by shares (non-deposit taking) and not regulated by the Bank of Uganda. Although microfinance policy is not biased towards youth lending, Tiers 3 and 4 have lending requirements that are less stringent and favourable to the youth compared to Tiers 1 and 2.

To-date, many types of MFIs have been implemented, especially SACCOs, which are credit unions that act as intermediaries between MFIs and borrowers. According to MTIC (2012), there were 5,228 SACCOS in Uganda, of which 2417 were probationary and 2811 were permanent. This increased the share of SACCOs to 40 per cent of the registered cooperative societies in Uganda, which are followed by agricultural marketing cooperatives at 34 per cent (MTIC, 2012). The perception is that many youth are members of SACCOs because these institutions offer friendly interest rates for businesspeople. In addition, other youth-oriented financing programmes have emerged to increase access to finance for Ugandan youth—these are discussed in detail in subsequent sections. A randomised control trial study by Blattman et al. (2013) finds that ease in access to finance increases entrepreneurship initiatives undertaken by young people. Due to the stipulations in the Micro Deposit-taking Institutions (MDI) Act of 2003 and the Micro Finance Policy formally regulating Tier 4[5] of MFIs that do not take deposits (these have no Bank of Uganda (BoU) set capital requirement) (See BoU, 1999), it was considered prudent to develop with a policy framework that would particularly guide the growing informal private sector in the economy, hence the draft 2015 National MSME Policy (refer to Box 2 for details).

2.2.3 Laws and policies in the pipeline

The laws and policies in the pipeline include: the 2012 Draft National Youth Policy, the 2013 National Youth Enterprise Fund Bill, and the 2015 Draft MSME policy. If passed, they will have a substantial impact in changing how enterprises and entrepreneurs engage in business. Combined, these initiatives will represent the first regulatory framework and policy that directly addresses the entrepreneurship needs of all businesses in which youths aged 25-35 are the majority players.

In recognition of MSMEs' crucial role in economic growth (representing 18 per cent of GDP and 90 per cent of job creation for the employable workforce), the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC) considered it prudent to formulate an MSME policy (Draft MSME Policy, MTIC, 2015). Uganda is the only East African country without such a policy, despite the recent drive towards advancing regional integration. The overriding goal of the MSME policy is to "nurture and enhance the growth of the MSME sector to foster job creation and income generation, by promoting the creation of new MSMEs and improving the performance and competitiveness of the existing ones". Specifically, the policy will: (i) harmonise and harness the legal and regulatory mechanism for enhancing competitiveness of the MSME sector; (ii) promote the start-up, survival, formalisation and growth of MSMEs; (iii) provide a mechanism for inter-institutional collaboration in MSME development; (iv) develop strategies for facilitating the provision of financial services to MSMEs; (v) increase access to appropriate technology for MSMEs to encourage research and development; (vi) increase access to market information for MSMEs; (vii) develop the entrepreneurial, managerial and business skills of MSMEs, supported by a positive mind-set; and (viii) improve the overall business environment in which MSMEs operate. The MSME policy is comprehensive and will be critical in transforming the MSME sector.

One of the key issues in enhancing the implementation of the policy is to ensure that Uganda's tax policy is pro-investment, particularly in the informal sector. The segmentation of taxpayers into large, medium, small and micro to meet their unique needs will be crucial in this endeavour. At present, capital deductions of up to 25 per cent of start-up costs are allowed for four years, and tax deductions on incomes from agricultural loans are exempted. The government is currently reviewing the National Development Plan (from NDP I to NDP II), which will ensure the integration and mainstreaming of activities in on-going national processes and strategies.

Of all the policies reviewed so far, the MSME policy is the most comprehensive with respect to the model entrepreneurship policies. It addresses the four key

5 The reason being that regulating Tier-4 institutions could stifle the innovation, growth and outreach of MFIs in Uganda.

areas: easing access to finance capital, improving the business and regulatory environment, enhancing skills, and the provision of business development assistance and support services. As of January 2015, a final MSME draft was in place and a Cabinet memo including an action plan had been drafted. MTIC awaits a 'certificate of financial implication' before the policy is presented to the Cabinet for approval. If the proposed strategies are effectively implemented, the MSME policy has the potential to push youth and overall entrepreneurship to greater heights.

We summarise policies discussed in this section in Table 1 below.

In a essence, the ways in which the policies are stated imply that the Government has to deliver jobs for youth. The youth, employment and education training policies endorsed and in place thus far support entrepreneurship, but implementation is weak; even the regulatory environment for doing business is stifling business growth to some extent. Some of the challenges lie in changing the mind-set of job seekers beginning in school in terms of viewing entrepreneurship as a solution to unemployment and a source of employment creation for others. However, to make this effective, training that eases implementation needs to be designed and action plans aimed at changing mind-sets adopted in policy. In

Table 1: Status of current entrepreneurship policies in the policy-making cycle

No.	Policy	Year process started	Institution responsible	Support Institution	Review of Policy	Status in policy cycle	Has implementation strategy
1	National Youth Policy	2001	MoGLSD	National Youth Council	Reviewed	Implemented	No
2	Draft National Youth Policy	2012	MoGLSD	National Youth Council	Still new	Policy adoption	No
3	National Employment Policy	2011	MoGLSD		Not reviewed	Implementation	No
4	BTVET Act & Plan	2008 & 2009	MoES	MUBS and Vocational Centre	Not reviewed	Implementation	Yes
5	Draft MSME	2011	MTIC	Line ministries, PSFU, UMA, UWEAL, UIRI	Still new	Draft not yet presented to Cabinet	No
6	Micro Finance Policy	1991	MoFPED	Bank of Uganda	Not aware if it was reviewed	Implementation	No
7	Investment Code	2003	UIA	MoFPED	Not yet reviewed	Implementation	Yes
8	PPP Framework policy	2010	MoFPED	UIA	Not reviewed	Implementation	No

simple terms, as one of the key informants said:

"Dynamics of youth politics and policies are piecemeal. The laws and policies do not take off and often disappear. If implemented programmes are not sustainable in the policy, how then will they be implemented in the long run?" ---Hon. Ms Monica Amoding, National Female Youth MP and Chairperson, UPFYA

2.3 National youth entrepreneurship programmes

In Uganda, the Government, through the MoGLSD and the MoFPED, has implemented initiatives that promote entrepreneurship and business development. While government programmes that support youth entrepreneurship date from the 1990s, these have often failed due to several factors ranging from political pronouncements to the conceptualisation of the programme design. A case in point is the Youth Entrepreneurs Scheme (YES) of 1995, which was designed to train and equip youth throughout the country with entrepreneurial skills and enable them to have access to loans for start-ups and running their enterprises. Despite that monitoring and evaluation (M&E) should be an integral aspect of of programmes, this programme was not rigorously evaluated to document what did not work and why, whereas research shows that the design elements of programmes are important and influence the outcomes of the beneficiaries (Blattman et al., 2013).

To date, there is no evidence on the YES programme's output/outcome indicators such as how many jobs were created, the sectors in which the jobs were created, and for whom (sex, location, education, age, etc.), or whether business profitability improved as a result of the intervention.

Furthermore, the YES programme fell short of the winning features of a good entrepreneurship programme; instead it focused on the microfinance components without devoting much attention to support programs such as training and business support components. Nonetheless, the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) initiated through the Northern Uganda Action Fund (NUSAF) in 2005, has yielded some positive results. One important difference between this programme and the aforementioned one is that the YOP was scientifically designed to evaluate programme impacts after implementation. It included an evaluation scheme from outset. A baseline survey was conducted during the preparatory design phase of the project, a mid-term review was then conducted to assess progress on objectives and provide recommendations for corrective measures, and a final evaluation was completed at the end of the project. The project was donor funded, and this could have largely influenced its strong M&E component.

In the subsequent sub-sections, the various on-going government-supported entrepreneurship and micro-credit support programmes are discussed, highlighting the successes, failures and challenges faced during their implementation. The extent to which they conform to the current evidence on youth entrepreneurship, the existing evidence gaps and avenues for evidence uptake are also examined. These are: the Youth Venture Capital Fund (YVCF) and the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP).

2.3.1 The Youth Venture Capital Fund, 2011

The Youth Venture Capital Fund (YVCF) was conceived in 2011 and launched in 2012. According to MoFPED officials, the idea arose from the agri-business incubator projects undertaken by Makerere University (MUK) students. The German Government (KFW) provided funds to MUK students who were about to graduate to develop their projects into entrepreneurial ventures. However, the initiative became a political tool due to the 2011-2015 National Resistance Movement (NRM) Manifesto[6] titled "Accelerating Prosperity for All: Better Service Delivery and Job Creation", which states, "The NRM government shall commence the disbursement of the Youth Graduate Fund". The original target group of the programme prior to government involvement was graduates; this idea was rejected by youth Members of Parliament (MPs), who cited unfairness to the masses that have not attained tertiary education. Thus following government involvement, the funds for the MUK agri-business incubator projects were then channelled to the YVCF for organised financial management. The Government also contributed to the Fund, and it is now being managed by MoFPED. The resources from the Government and KFW reached a combined total of Ush 12.5 billion, with an equal amount mobilised by the participating banks—Centenary Rural Development Bank (CERUDEB), DFCU Bank and STANBIC Bank (MoFPED, 2012). Commercial banks were included not only to increase the available pool of financing but also to address the adverse selection problems that previous government finance schemes had faced—especially the perceptions by beneficiaries that such finance schemes were gifts from the President and that this had affected realised repayments.

Specifically, the Fund supports the growth of viable and sustainable SMEs developed by youth in the private sector with the objective of lending venture capital debt financing to viable projects proposed by youth and to enable them benefit from associated mentoring services from participating banks. The Fund only financed business initiatives developed by youths with a minimum operation period of three months that sought to expand business in the sectors of manufacturing, agro-processing, primary agriculture, fisheries, livestock, health, transport, education, tourism, information and communication technology (ICT), construction, printing and service contractor sectors. The basis was that a qualifying business must be able to provide employment to at least four people over the loan period (MoFPED, 2012). Thus, businesses in the incubation/start-up stages could not access loans from the Fund. The programme was therefore perceived more as a political pronouncement with few, if any, consultations undertaken prior to its implementation for the targeted beneficiaries—unemployed youth.

The design and conceptualisation of the YVCF had a number of challenges. In particular, it did not follow the stipulated Cabinet guidelines mentioned earlier. Hence, the role of the Cabinet to set a strategic direction for youth entrepreneurship and business development was diminished. In addition, the initiation of this programme and its eventual development were achieved without youth involvement and participation; youths were

6 http://www.nrm.ug/sites/default/files/manifestoes/Manifesto.pdf

only seen as beneficiaries of the programme rather than active participants in the development process. The programme development process of the YVCF was contrary to the National Youth Policy, which emphasises the involvement and participation of youth in leadership and decision making. The YVCF was also designed and implemented in a manner that was contrary to the principle of equity in the opportunities and distribution of programmes, services and resources as stipulated in the Youth Policy. The programme was viewed by youths and civil society groups as only targeting relatively well-to-do urban youth and not being accessible to the rural and poor youth because of its credit access modalities through commercial banks.

Indeed, the YVCF case study again illustrates the absence of evidence and policy-research institutions in the policy-making process. In addition, the design phases of programmes often by-pass formal decision-making structures that would ideally have created a demand for evaluation evidence in implementation of such programmes. Discussions with key informants on the current status of the programme reveal that bottlenecks such as institutional governance (between MoFPED and MoGLSD), ownership and a perceived conflict of interest on the part of the service providers (banks) were being faced midway through the implementation of the programme, partly because government never assessed the needs of youth (the majority being uneducated and poor) before rolling out the Fund. Other challenges are limited political support from youth groups and public opposition to the Fund from prominent institutions such as the National Youth Council (NYC) that have strong youth voices, which also did not help the situation either. As Chairman of the NYC argues:

"We do not support the YVCF because it biased towards the educated urban youth and less to rural uneducated poor youths and hence, the NYC will only do so if the programme is implemented alongside another programme that is more inclusive."
Mr Samuel Kavuma, Chairman of the NYC, November 5, 2014

A process evaluation by Ahaibwe et al. (2014) on the implementation of the YVCF reveals that although the YVCF was expected to have a national reach, it is highly concentrated in the central region and urban areas. Gender disaggregated analysis also reveals that up to 70 per cent of the Fund (by value and clientele) was accessed by male-owned enterprises. Although training was envisaged as a crucial component of the YVCF framework, only approximately 37 per cent of surveyed Fund beneficiaries reported having had training/mentoring/coaching before or after starting their businesses. Regarding job creation is concerned, Ahaibwe et al. (2014) observe no significant differences between the average numbers of employees in enterprises supported by YVCF beneficiaries and other enterprises. On a positive note, the value of participating businesses was statistically significantly higher than that of non-participating enterprises. The results above may imply that the YVCF is likely to improve productive employment and reduce underemployment instead of generating new employment.

2.3.2 The Youth Livelihood Programme, 2013

Following experience, particular lessons learned from the design of the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) in Northern Uganda and the unpopularity of the YVCF, the Government of Uganda introduced the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) in 2013. The initiative is managed by the MoGLSD.

The YLP implementation budget is estimated at Ush. 265 billion over a five-year period (FY 2013/14–2017/18) and is sourced from the consolidated fund of the treasury. The programme targets unemployed youth aged 18-30 years with marketable vocational skills, provides financial support to enable youth to establish Income Generating Activities (IGAs), provides youth with entrepreneurship and life skills as an integral part of their livelihoods, and provides youth with relevant knowledge and information for attitudinal change (positive changes in mindset). The overall fund allocation is as follows: livelihood support fund (70 per cent); skills development fund (20 per cent); and institutional support fund (10 per cent). As noted, the YLP has a skills development component that combines entrepreneurship/business skills, life skills and vocational skills trainings. Given the evidence of the likely impacts that training has on programme outcomes, the Government should earnestly work to ensure the implementation of a skills component in all youth programmes.

Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether the micro-enterprises that youths are establishing can grow to a level that offers employment to more than three people. Key informant discussions highlighted the inconsistency in programmes implemented by the Government. They noted that many programmes operate without guidelines or operations manuals, and even where guidelines are included, new programmes such as the YVCF are not accorded proper resources to create an impact. In addition, the capacity to manage programmes with substantial financial implications is in doubt. Finally, civil society organisation (UPFYA, UYONET) and researchers (UIRI, EPRC, and IPA) were not consulted on the monitoring, evaluation or learning of the YLP programme (KII, 2014)

2.4 National Evaluation Policy on Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation, 2013

Monitoring and evaluation policies are important for our review because they form the basis for evidence-based policy and programme design, as mandated by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM). Based on the premise that M&E is better sustained if there is a sound policy and legal framework, a new evaluation policy (National Evaluation Policy on Public Sector Monitoring and Evaluation) was passed by the Cabinet in 2013. The policy provides a framework for strengthening the coverage, quality and uniformity of the assessment of public policies and investments through systematic monitoring and evaluation. The specific objectives include improving the performance of the public sector through the expansion of the coverage of public policy and programmes that are subjected to rigorous evaluation to ensure that policy makers know what works and what does not and why. This policy applies to all public policies, strategies, programmes and projects managed by MDAs, Local Governments (LGs), quasi-state organisations and executing agencies of public programmes (OPM, M&E Policy, 2011). The policy further includes the commitment that a reasonable proportion of public investment projects will be subjected to rigorous evaluation to ensure learning from the choice and implementation of public policy interventions.

Taking the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP) as a case study to ascertain whether the MDAs are utilising M&E polices, a review of the programme document affirms that the MoGLSD has planned for programme evaluation. YLP evaluation will be cognisant of the National Integrated Monitoring and Evaluation System (NIMES), a functional database will be created and the M&E capacity of staff and district focal officers will be developed. The MoGLSD recognises the importance of evaluation and has plans for a mid-term evaluation of YLP after two and half years to assess performance of the programme, document lessons learned, establish best practices and determine the level of returns from the revolving funds (MoGLSD, 2013).

2.5 Stakeholder engagement in youth entrepreneurship in Uganda

Based on their analysis of the demand and supply of research in selected sub-Saharan countries, Porter and Feinstein (2013) argue that political economy is a key determinant of the use of evaluation. They suggest that when there is an active demand for evaluation and a supply of evaluation capability appropriate for the conditions of the local political economy, evaluations will be conducted and used in the policy-making process (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Theory of Change for enhancing use of Evaluation

Source: Porter and Feinstein (2013)

To help us better understand the processes that lead to the uptake of evaluation evidence and the areas in which evaluation can be strengthened in the Ugandan youth entrepreneurship context, we analyse the stakeholders by mapping the supply of evaluations (producers of evaluation evidence, including think tanks and academic institutions) and the demand for evaluations (government agencies, civil society, development partners). With this in mind, we identify and map the institutions and stakeholders shaping entrepreneurship policy in Uganda while highlighting their role in the process. We categorise these groups into those who demand evidence and the suppliers of that evidence (see Figure 3).

2.5.1 Role of suppliers/producers of evaluation evidence

Producers of evaluations are specialists in this interest area and are responsible for managing and conducting evaluations. Our stakeholder analysis has identified the following institutions that are involved in undertaking empirical research on youth entrepreneurship programmes in Uganda as: Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA), JPAL, BRAC, EPRC and the Makerere University Business School Entrepreneurship Centre. Civil society institutions include the

NGO Forum and the Uganda Evaluation Association (UEA).

However, despite an increase in the supply of entrepreneurship evaluations, many of the evaluators and researchers come from structures outside of the country, thus limiting the ownership of the evaluation and decreasing the uptake of findings and recommendations. The limited evaluation expertise in national institutions can be explained by the small number of staff members with PhDs, while staff members that are highly educated are highly sought after for private consultancies. Many institutions produce quality evaluations but are disconnected from policy processes that would allow them to communicate their findings.

2.5.2 Role of demanders/users in the evaluation chain

Uganda has witnessed an emerging demand for evaluation in recent years due to an increased recognition of the value of evidence in decision making. The trend is especially evident in the area of youth entrepreneurship, where a number of evaluation studies have been released (see the evidence review section below). The increase in evidence could be attributed to the Uganda's strong National Evaluation Policy, as it is one of the first countries in sub-Saharan Africa to apply such a model. Additionally, the policies are supported by the constitution and a central agency (OPM) with a mandate to champion M&E activities. The OPM has established biannual government performance assessments, and the reports arising from these assessments are discussed at Cabinet retreats on a regular basis, thus indicating high-level demand for M&E evidence. There is also evidence of increasing demand through government-led evaluation systems. The Uganda Government Evaluation Facility was established in 2011 and set out a two-year rolling evaluation agenda, which is primarily donor funded and overseen by an M&E technical working group. The stakeholders who demand evidence for uptake in policy include those from Parliament, the Cabinet (which comprises the Ministers of all line ministries), the Legislature and development partners, who at times are also suppliers of knowledge and finance many impact evaluation studies that support entrepreneurship in Uganda. The civil society organisations, namely Action Aid Uganda and women's and youth associations (UWEAL, UYN, NYC, UPFYA, AYDL) are increasingly demanding and using information to not only understand the effectiveness of given government interventions but also to lobby and advocate for their interests within the respective youth and entrepreneurship policies.

While the Ugandan Government is playing a more active role in demanding and managing evaluations, the ownership of results is limited and excessive attention is devoted to monitoring outputs rather than evaluating long-term development results. There also seems to be a lack of public funds dedicated to the evaluation, and widespread communication of findings is lacking. Government ownership of entrepreneurship results can be especially valuable at this critical time, as a new youth policy is being developed and acted upon.

Figure 3: Categorisation of institutions influencing youth entrepreneurship in Uganda



Source: Authors own categorisation, 2015

2.5.3 Synergies between researchers and policy makers

While there has been a substantial release of impact evaluation results in recent years, the evidence has not always led to better policy. Networks among the Government, academics, think tanks and policy experts are not well established. For example, the Policy Analysis Unit in the Youth Department in the MoGLSD has been ineffective. Local supply in many instances is more oriented towards policy monitoring, particularly of programmes and projects, for example annual progress reports. With few exceptions, evaluation teams are led by foreign consultants with limited participation by national consultants. Regarding youth entrepreneurship in Uganda, there is little evidence of substantive relationships between government and evaluation personnel, except in some limited cases.

Some of the entry points for influencing research uptake in the policy arena include aligning research with the budget process, utilising the policy units in the line ministries, targeting the quarterly Senior Management Meetings at line ministries to present findings and introducing the research to the prospective users when it remains in its early stages to secure input and buy-in. Even when research and policy networks are well established, the medium whereby evidence is communicated is not always adapted to the context. Digestible information such as short briefs, videos and storytelling policy labs should be developed, and the Government should take exploit the increased number of think tanks with youth-focused policy relevance.

3. EVIDENCE-BASED ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICYMAKING IN UGANDA

This section reviews evidence from studies that have contributed to the establishment of the youth entrepreneurship evidence base and the extent to which the findings and recommendations of the studies are or could be used in the policymaking process in Uganda. The review favours evidence collected through impact evaluations, particularly those that use experimental and objective research methods with a counterfactual. Other inclusion criteria include the age group (youth), coverage (Uganda and Africa) and time period (after 2000). Studies were classified based on the type of youth entrepreneurship programme. Figure 4 shows the classification of the interventions analysed. They include training,

Figure 4: Framework for Classification of Entrepreneurship Interventions



Source: Authors' own classification, 2014 financing, business development, services/ business assistance and support, and an administrative/regulatory environment. Training is disaggregated into life skills, technical/vocational/apprenticeship and entrepreneurship education/business/ managerial and financial skills training. For financial services, we consider loans, cash and in-kind grants and savings. We disaggregate business development services into mentoring and coaching, support networks and incubators. The administrative and regulatory framework looks at the ease of doing business. It should, however, be noted that most programmes use combinations of the abovementioned services, and hence, the classification may not be applicable in many of the cases.

Although evidence on the outcomes of programmes that specifically target youth entrepreneurs is limited, the base is certainly growing, with at least seven studies on Uganda published in the last four years. The areas with the most research have been the themes of skills training and access to finance. The evidence in the area of business services, including counselling, mentoring, matching and coaching, has been very scarce, as has evidence from programmes targeting the regulatory and business environment for youth. The following sections summarise the evidence base and relevant studies.

3.1 Skills training

Promising results have been obtained from impact evaluations conducted on skills training programmes to date. The potential benefits of training for entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship ventures are large. However, it is important for programmes targeting entrepreneurship to be "smart" in the training packages they provide to achieve and sustain programme objectives. Many studies speak to a challenge of implementation rather than a challenge of evaluation. Studies from Bandiera et al. (2012), Blattman et al. (2012), Thomaz et al. (2013), AGI (2012), JPAL (2014), and Coll-Black (2014) provide many useful insights into understanding which type of skills-training programmes have greater effects on an entrepreneur and why. For example, Thomaz et al. (2013) seek to test a comprehensive employability-skills program model using a sample of 1510 youth in informal settlements of Nairobi, Kenya. The study finds a 14 percent increase in the likelihood of getting a job among youths who receive ICT training, life-skills training and on-job experience with additional gains in their weekly incomes.

However, often, training alone does not have any effect on incomes, employment, or savings. For example, a study by Blattman et al. (2012) on Liberia's ex-combatants provided training on agricultural skills in combination with a provision of start-up tools. The interventions had no effect on the hours worked or earnings for lower-income earners. One of the reasons for this lack of effect was that the program was supply driven, teaching agricultural skills to ex-combatants who were not interested in undertaking agriculture activities (Blattman et al., 2012). This result implies that demand-driven trainings are more likely to be successful than supply-driven ones and that training content matters.

In the present-day promotion of entrepreneurship as a means for job creation, a combination of different skills-training programmes can have greater outcomes if the design targets different components of the entrepreneurship supply chain. Coll-Black (2014) provides evidence to this effect on a study from the Kenya Youth Empowerment Project (KYEP). He finds that skills training positively affects youth with business start-ups or those trying to get a formal job, and business skills have an effect on youth with higher education levels. However, for youths with low education, entrepreneurship training was preferred because it was directly linked to self-employment. The study also provides evidence that 'one-size fits all' training programmes will not work because they do not target the right entrepreneurs or entrepreneurship ventures that match their skillsets (JPAL, 2014).

Another study by Bandiera et al. (2012) targeted only vulnerable teenage girls in Uganda through the Economic Livelihood Program (ELA). They found that the simultaneous provision of vocational and life-skills training reduced exposure to risky behaviours among the teenage girls, whose knowledge regarding reproductive health outcomes such as HIV/AIDS improved significantly. Using a randomised control group design, Gielnik and Frese (2013) found that entrepreneurship education targeted at undergraduate students led to an increase in business ownership within a period of 12 months. The program, taught on a weekly basis over a period of 12 weeks, trained students in the last year of their undergraduate studies. The 12-month evaluation study had a significant effect on new business start-ups, and students in the training group were 50 percent more likely to start a new business than those in the control group.

Additional impact results of youth entrepreneurship training programmes come from the AGI (2012) study, where the programme sought to increase the employment and income of 2,500 young Liberian women aged 16-27 years. They found that self-employment increased by 50 percent among girls who participated. Because the programme design involved providing cash incentives of USD 120 for each day of attendance, programme participation rates were very high. Because the programme provided training for six months, employment among the girls who received job training skills increased by 70 percent. Despite its success, the project implementation was costly due to its design elements.

3.2 Capital constraints: Microcredit, grants, and micro savings

Access to formal financial services remains limited in Uganda. The costs of those financial constraints for young entrepreneurs starting businesses are very high. Youth whose business ventures are in the incubation or start-up phases often lack the necessary collateral, verifiable credit history and steady employment requisites to access formal financial services (EPRC, 2013). As a result, microfinance has emerged as a promising avenue for financing the vulnerable category to which the youth belong. Evaluation evidence shows that access to capital has a large effect on successful outcomes for business development. Blattman et al. (2013a) evaluated the Women's Income Generating Support (WINGS) programme targeting very poor people and excluded young adults in the war-affected part of Uganda. Cash grants (worth USD 150) combined with training on business skills led to an increase in microenterprise ownership and incomes with a 30-50 percent increase in expenditure on durable assets. Nonetheless, there was no effect on the economic empowerment of women. In another example, the Youth Opportunities Programme (YOP) in Northern Uganda sought to empower and increase the incomes of poor unemployed and underemployed youth by training them to become self-employed artisans. Funding worth USD 382, in the form of cash transfers, was given out to self-organised groups of youth in Northern Uganda to use on vocational training and tools and materials to practice a craft. The programme effects were notable on income (41 percent increase), the increase in self-employment (65 percent), hours worked (17 percent higher) and the ability to keep records, register the business and pay taxes (40 percent higher). The findings also note that the effects were stronger on beneficiaries who had initial capital constraints and were higher among women than men. It was found that the group design model enhanced accountability and transparency in cash transfer usage and presented opportunities for learning among low-ability and high-ability peers.

In an ILO programme that provided a combination of entrepreneurship training, grants and loans to young Ugandan business owners, Fiala et al. (2013), found that men who were given loans and training support reported greater profits (54 percent), whereas men who only participated in the entrepreneurship training and had no access to a loan reported no effect on profits. Again, in this instance, none of the interventions had any effect on business growth for women, although unconditional cash grants had a small effect in the creation of new businesses for those women who received them. Other studies, notably the one by Fafchamps et al. (2011) in Ghana, have found that in-kind grants have a stronger effect on business profits for men than unconditional cash grants. In addition, Fafchamps et al. (2011) noted that in-kind grants yielded large business profits among women whose firms were originally profitable. For unconditional cash grants to work, the use of strict eligibility criteria, such as the approval of business plans to be used, is vital (Blattman et al. 2013a).

Generally, a synthesis of the studies indicates that in-kind grants perform better than cash grants. Cash grants tend to perform better for business start-ups than for business expansion. On average, studies indicate that loans generally perform better than grants, and the effect is higher when combined with training. Intuitively, micro credit and grants for entrepreneurship development often works if the program also tries to understand who becomes an entrepreneur and why. As a result, providing access to credit to youths who want to make entrepreneurship an occupation and to employment for others is justified and often achieves labour market outcomes.

Table 2 provides detailed summaries of programmes reviewed in this sub-section and their effects on outcomes.

Table 2: Summary of key programmes—only those conducted in Uganda—and their effects

Name of programme	Type of Evaluation	Category	"+" or "-" effects
Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents programme (Bandiera, O., Buehren, N., Burgess, R., Goldstein, M., Gulesci, S., Rasul, I., and S. Munshi., 2012)	The program aims to achieve greater economic and social/ health empowerment through training, safe spaces to share experiences, and credit support for income-generating activities.	Skills training	✓ Entrepreneurial ability: + ✓ Financial and analytical skills: + ✓ Involve in income generating activity: + ✓ Savings: + ✓ Increase access to loans: +
Reminders vs. Financial incentives for loan payments. (Xinena Cadena & Antoinette Schoar, 2011).	Three interventions are undertaken: (1) "cash back", where borrowers receive a 25% reduction in the monthly interest rate ex-post if they make payments on time, (2) "future interest reduction", where customers are given a 25% interest rate reduction on their next loan if the current loan is paid on time, and (3) borrowers receive SMS reminders every month three days prior to the due payment date.	Financial services	✓ Borrowers with small loans (cash back and SMS): + ✓ Borrowers with larger loans (future interest rate): + ✓ Repayment period: + ✓ Younger borrowers for (SMS reminders): +
Starting a Lifetime of Savings (SaLSa; Karlan, Dean, Julian Jamison and Jonathan Zinman. 2014)	Examines two interventions (financial education curriculum and a group savings account) offered randomly to Church of Uganda youth groups (16-28 years).	Financial services	✓ Earnings: + ✓ Financial knowledge (for the financial education only): + ✓ Financial knowledge (for accounts only): 0 ✓ Input to decision making such as knowledge and risk aversion (financial education only): +
Women's Income Generating Support (WINGS) programme (Blattman, Chris; Green, Eric; Annann, Jeannie; Jamison, Julian, 2013a).	This study investigates the effects of giving cash grants and business skills training to the very poorest and most excluded women in a war-affected region, northern Uganda.	Financial services & skills training	✓ Cash transfers on entrepreneurship: + ✓ Hours worked: + ✓ Earnings/income: + ✓ Household consumption: + ✓ Savings: + ✓ Expenditure on durable assets: + ✓ Empowerment (for women): 0
Student Training for Promoting Entrepreneurship (STEP; Gielnik et al., 2013)	Makerere University and Uganda Christian University received the training right away (treatment group), and others were placed in a waiting group (control group) that received the training after completion of the study	Skills training	✓ Starting a business: + ✓ Entrepreneurial self-efficacy: + ✓ Action knowledge: + ✓ Action planning: + ✓ Entrepreneurship goals: +

Name of programme	Type of Evaluation	Category	"+" or "-" effects
Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) - Youth Opportunities Program (YOP; Blattman, C. and Fiala, N. and Martinez, S., 2013b)	YOP provided cash transfers to groups of young adults with the goal of encouraging trade-based self-employment.	Financial services & skills training	✓ Income: + ✓ Profits:+ ✓ Women with few initial assets and access to loans: + ✓ Credit constraints: + ✓ Recordkeeping: + ✓ Hours worked in other professions and trade: + ✓ Hours worked in agricultural activities: 0 ✓ Register business formally: + ✓ Pay taxes: +
Stimulating Microenterprise Growth: Results from a Loans, Grants and Training Experiment (Fiala, Nathan, 2013)	Impact evaluation of a loans, grants, and training intervention		✓ Loans and training on profits for men: + ✓ Loans only (long term): 0 ✓ Business investment decisions (for women): – ✓ Business Investment decisions (for men): + ✓ Impact of grants on women: 0

Source: EPRC, 2014 (forthcoming)[7]

3.3 Business Development Services

Micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSME), due to their sheer limitation in size and resources, are highly dependent on BDS to provide capacity building and support their business growth in areas such as training, advice, information, business planning, marketing, modern technology, communication, and other services. For example, despite the government's support of business growth through fiscal incentives (tax rebates), impact evaluation studies in the area of BDS in Sub Saharan African are rare. In one paper, Schoof (2009) argues that there is a high correlation between business assistance and sustainability of businesses among young people such that those who receive business support in form of mentoring, support networks, business clubs and incubators are likely to grow their businesses with time. An assessment by Enablis (2013), , reveals that entrepreneurs who received business growth support and training created more jobs for others (the number of employees increased from 8 employees to 12) and had intentions to expand their business in the future. Thus, business support and peer-working programmes targeted at entrepreneurs irrespective of their age group led not only to employment growth but also higher turnover for businesses. In Kenya, through a program that provides mentoring and technical support to young entrepreneurs (18-35 years), 45 percent of entrepreneurs receiving mentoring support report an increase in their businesses gross turnover, with 22 percent employing an additional 1 to 4 full-time employees. Others (45 percent) reported an increase in individual/institutional customers, 30 percent reported an increase in their assets, and 37 percent reported an increase in their level of business investments without acquiring a loan (Youth Employment Inventory website, 2014).

7 Youth entrepreneurship in Uganda: A review of evidence

Based on the evidence reviewed, Uganda has an extensive MSME sector comprising approximately 1.1 million enterprises that employ approximately 2.4 million people (MTIC, 2015). Well-targeted BDS to youth-led MSMEs could potentially solve, to a great extent, the youth unemployment dilemma in the country. An impact evaluation study that provides BDS on Uganda's MSME potential as a means for job creation should be conducted as a means of increasing the evidence of the advantages of BDS to entrepreneurship growth.

3.4 Regulatory environment

Uganda's business and regulatory environment, like that of many developing countries, is cited as one of the major challenges constraining private investment and growth. Evidence shows a negative correlation between extensive regulatory barriers and firm entry, measured by the number of procedures required, the time it takes to comply and the cost involved (Djankov et al., 2000). Most enterprises in Uganda are in the informal sector due to the high costs of formalisation (MTIC, 2014). The lack of formalisation among MSMEs limits their ability to access credit, subcontracting, business linkages and marketing. A recent World Bank "Doing Business 2015" report reveals that the ease of doing business is still poor. Uganda was ranked 150th out of 189 countries surveyed (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Uganda's rank on ease of Doing Business



Source: Authors' compilation from Doing Business Various Reports, World Bank

Table 3: Indicators of Uganda's business regulatory environment by rank, 2007-2015

Indicator rank	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
Starting a business	107	114	129	129	137	143	50	151	166
Acquiring construction permits	110	81	81	84	133	109	183	143	163
Getting electricity						129	166	178	184
Registering property	166	163	167	149	150	127	149	126	125
Getting credit	159	158	109	113	46	48	23	42	131
Protecting minority investors	60	122	126	132	132	133	117	115	110
Paying taxes	43	55	70	66	62	93	165	98	104
Trading across borders	160	141	145	145	148	158	145	164	161
Enforcing contracts	71	119	117	116	113	116	42	117	80
Resolving insolvency	44	48	51	53	56	63	157	79	98
Total	175	178	181	183	183	183	185	189	189

Notes

Reform making it easier to do business

Change making it more difficult to do business

Source: Authors' compilation from Doing Business Various Reports, World Bank

The DB ranking was based on 10 areas of regulation: i.e. starting a business, acquiring construction permits, obtaining electricity, registering property, getting credit, protecting minority investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business/resolving insolvency (Table 3).

As shown in Table 2, for instance, although Uganda reduced the number of procedures for starting a business from 18 in 2010, the number has stagnated at 15 for the last three years (2013 to 2015) and taken up to 32 days. Uganda's number of procedures remain the highest in the East African region. These bureaucratic procedures contribute to the high levels of business informality that is apparent in Uganda and can be a major hindrance to young entrepreneurs. In this context, youth become easily tied up in red tape and lose their entrepreneurial enthusiasm.

The Tax Act guides the payment of taxes in Uganda. Globally, Uganda stands at 104 in the ranking of 189 economies in the ease of paying taxes (Table 2). On average, firms make 31 tax payments a year, spend 209 hours a year filing, preparing and paying taxes and pay 36.5 percent of their profit in taxes. The ranking in 2014 was partly driven by Uganda's simplified registration for a tax identification number (TIN) and value added tax through the introduction of an online system. Although the government under the Uganda Registration Services Bureau (URSB) and Uganda Investment Authority (UIA) is deepening reforms to create a one-stop centre for registration services, challenges remain. The registration and formalisation of businesses is guided by the Business Registration Act. Economies around the world have made paying taxes faster and easier for businesses by consolidating filings, reducing the frequency of payments or offering electronic filing and payment, and Uganda could do the same. Generally, a tax process administration that is transparent encourages compliance and ease of payment.

Evidence on the ease of access to microfinance shows that ease in obtaining credit leads to entrepreneurship growth (Fiala et al., 2013). Table 2 shows that Uganda is ranked 131 out 189 countries in getting credit, scoring zero (0 out of 8) on depth of credit information and credit registry coverage in 2015. This shows the rigidity in credit markets; young potential entrepreneurs do not have enough available information on which credit schemes they can access. Hence, young people generally have negative attitudes towards banks due to information asymmetry.

Table 4 puts into perspective a summary of the evidence reviewed in this section on the essential design elements that are successful in fostering youth entrepreneurship.

4. STRATEGIES TO INFLUENCE YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP

To understand the means through which evidence has been utilised to influence youth entrepreneurship policy in Uganda, it is essential first to appreciate the extent to which statistics and evaluations have been used and from which sources. It is from this critical understanding that suggestions can be made on how researchers can effectively

Table 4: Summary of key design elements for successful youth entrepreneurship programmes

Key design elements	What seems to work as per evidence
a. Type of intervention products	▪ Short training delivered in isolation yields little effect. ▪ Providing a comprehensive package of training, financing and business development services is more effective than standalone programmes. ▪ In-kind grants perform better than cash grants. ▪ Loans generally perform better than grants. ▪ The effect of loans is greater when combined with training.
b. Targeting mechanism	▪ Business training seems to work better for existing businesses by improving their business knowledge, whereas vocational training may have a stronger effect on potential entrepreneurs. ▪ In cases where interventions target both males and female, the effects tend to be stronger for the males.
c. Length of exposure	▪ Longer trainings have longer-term effects than short training periods
d. Delivery channel	▪ Involving the private sector in the program delivery of public interventions can enhance the effectiveness. This can be in the form of public private partnerships. ▪ Demand-driven trainings perform better than supply-driven trainings.
e. Delivery setting	▪ Apprenticeships/on-job training and longer training result in stronger labour market outcomes than classroom-based and shorter programmes. ▪ Experiential and action oriented training yields a stronger effect.

Source: Authors' synthesis of evidence from impact evaluations conducted in Uganda strategise to influence the youth entrepreneurship agenda in Uganda.

4.1 Extent of evidence uptake in the policy process in Uganda

Uganda has an elaborate framework for policy formulation and management, which among other requirements, necessitates the use of research and evidence in policy formulation. However, in practice, the use of evidence is curtailed by the low capacity for policy development in Ministries, Department and Agencies (MDAs). Although most ministries have policy and planning units in place, their capacity to conduct rigorous empirical work to inform policy is generally lacking. In most cases, the MDAs rely on external consultants to provide the required technical input. The contracted consultants are expected to undertake rigorous research, but it is not possible to ascertain whether this is done given that most of the reports are not publicly available. At the same time, the over-reliance on consultants and the outsourcing of key policy functions has made it difficult for ministries to dictate the pace and direction of policy issues within their respective sectors. Consequently, many aspects of policies are sometimes not based on empirical evidence. At times, the debates and opinions of individual policymakers may influence policy formulation.

Basheka et al. (2012) support the above observations as they also assert that in many instances, there is limited policy-oriented evidence-based research and analysis that affects policy development, design and reviews. This has a long-term effect on the desired development outcomes or their short-term intended objectives.

On a positive note, MDAs utilise descriptive research undertaken by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBoS) to inform the situational analysis component of the policies. In most of the policies reviewed (see section 2), there is clear evidence of the use of statistics generated by UBoS. Statistics on labour market indicators such as youth employment, unemployment, underemployment, self-employment, and the type of occupation and employment in the informal sectors, among others, are all vital in facilitating the development of effective policies and programmes. In a bid to provide current information for use in the generation of labour market indicators to facilitate decision-making and policymaking in the area of youth employment and entrepreneurship, the government has conducted a number of surveys through UBoS. Some of the major surveys commissioned by the government include The National Labour Force and Child Activities Survey 2011/12, Urban Labour Force Surveys, Labour Modules in the National Household Surveys (UNHS), conducted every 3 years, and Labour Modules in the National Panel Surveys (UNPS), conducted annually.

Furthermore, there have been isolated cases where rigorous impact evaluation research evidence has informed youth programmes. A good example is the Youth Livelihood Program (YLP), whose product design was largely informed by the successes of the Youth Opportunities Program (YOP) under the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF). Box 3 details the design of the YOP program and its effects, as evaluated using a randomised control trial (RCT). The programme was managed by the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).

Box 3: Programme design of the Youth Opportunities Program (YOP)

Youth Opportunities Program (YOP) is a program under the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF). YOP provided cash transfers to groups of young adults with the goal of encouraging trade-based self-employment. The program targeted people aged 16 to 35 in Uganda's conflict-affected north, inviting them to form groups and submit grant proposals to pay for vocational training and business start-ups. The YOP was designed to help the poor and unemployed and underemployed youth become self-employed artisans, increase their incomes, and thus promote social stability and reconciliation. The government disbursed YOP funds between July and September 2008, 5 to 7 months after the baseline survey in 2006 that continued to 2008. Funding was randomly assigned, and treatment groups received unsupervised cash grants of $382 per member on average. Programme results reveal a positive effect on labour market outcomes. For example, program participants' incomes were higher than before, participation in trade plus working hours increased, and recordkeeping/accounts, tax registration and the registration of informal businesses improved.

The success of YOP was largely attributed to the group model used by the program. Group organisation may enhance accountability and the probability of investing the cash transfers rather than consuming them. It also presents opportunities for learning, with the low ability youth learning from their high ability peers.

Source: Blattman et al. (2013)

4.2. Effective communication and identification of room for engagement

Generally, evaluations that find their way into policy are those that have been undertaken by the Ministry in which the policy is being formulated (e.g., YOP under OPM) or from development partners (who either financed the policy processes or provided the capacity and data). The uptake and use of evidence from researchers/policy research institutions has been limited. Understanding which key research products are required and at what level of the policymaking process research will be useful is critical in changing this trend. The problem lies not only in poor synergies between policymakers (demanders of evaluations) and researchers (suppliers of evaluations) but also between one specialised research institution with another and between researchers and actual practitioners on whom the evidence has a great effect. Thus, to influence youth entrepreneurship agenda in Uganda, several strategies will be required simultaneously: a bottom-top approach (in which evaluation evidence is directly presented to both potential and existing entrepreneurs; Figure 6) and a top-bottom approach (Figure 7—here, evaluations are demanded by policymakers, and researchers /institutions undertake the work based on an agreed design).

In a concrete example on how this process works, Blattman et al. (2013) find that skills training, such as training in managing finances and recordkeeping, should target youth entrepreneurs who have accessed a loan at start-up because this will enhance on-time loan repayments. Such findings should be shared with future young entrepreneurs who are thinking of getting a loan to start a business because there is credible evidence that supports these findings. If researchers succeed in changing the mind-set of potential and already existing entrepreneurs, then scaling up at policy level for inclusion will be facilitated (Figure 6). In the latter approach, policymakers' demand for evaluations in which the packaging of evaluation outcomes with financial implications, if taken up, are often required, if even given an audience (Figure 7). Constant and persistent follow-ups with the responsible person(s) in ministries/policy elites is then required if the recommendations made are to be considered.

In a different argument, we note that evaluation outcomes that are directly taken up in policy are often undertaken by the responsible ministry as the study design was tailored towards their needs. For example, the NUSAF I YOP impact evaluation results are currently informing the design and up-scaling of the NUSAF II in the region as the OPM implements the programme. In this case, the demanders of evaluations are also the suppliers. Thus, researchers who want to

Figure 6: Bottom-top approach



Source: Authors' own configuration, 2015

Figure 7: Top-Bottom approach



Source: Authors' own configuration, 2015 influence entrepreneurship should express a willingness to work with the technical team at the OPM. It is through this collaboration that researchers can sell or input their ideas into the programme initiatives taking place within the OPM with possible spillovers to other ministries implementing entrepreneurship initiatives that are inclusive of youths. This will, in the long run, create networks between policymakers and researchers/institutions. Understanding the institutional context is thus essential.

Another key avenue for increasing research uptake and utilisation in policy processes is the creation of platforms through which the various interest groups and stakeholders can share and review results accruing from the evidence, such as the YEF National Advisory Committee (NAC), the Uganda Evaluation Association (UEA), The Uganda Economics Association (UEA), and the Restless Development Platform.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We conclude the report by drawing together the main findings from the preceding sections on policy, regulatory frameworks and evidence. Finally, we offer recommendations for government and researchers.

5.1 Conclusion

The objectives of this context analysis report are to improve our knowledge on <u>what works</u> and <u>does not work</u>, <u>for whom</u> and <u>under what circumstances</u>, in youth entrepreneurship programmes; encourage the uptake of evidence in the policymaking process; understand the channels and methods through which research translates into policy; and identify entry points and change agents to champion the process. The review involved an analysis of existing policies, laws, regulatory frameworks and evidence that promote youth entrepreneurship as a means for job creation. The evidence review considers studies that experimentally evaluated programmes herein; we critique the programme design, costs involved, interventions employed, and results found.

Our analysis reveals that broad policies in relation to youth, employment and entrepreneurship initiatives exist and incorporate strategies aimed at fostering enterprise development among the youth. However, the challenge lies in their effective implementation. Given the cross-cutting nature of youth entrepreneurship, most of the policies aimed at enhancing the growth of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are spread across different Ministries' Departments and Agencies (MDAs), e.g., (MTIC, MoGLSD and MoFPED). This implies that for successful policy development and implementation, collaboration between the different line ministries that have a stake in fostering entrepreneurship development for youth is important. In addition, policies need to have clear funding mechanisms and provide an effective implementation environment that promotes youth entrepreneurship and business development services.

From the review, we also note that despite the inclusion of research in the policy process and the existence of an M & E policy that calls for periodic reviews of policies and programmes as a basis for evidence-based policy and programme creation, in practice, the use of evaluation research is limited.

Although most ministries have policy and planning units in place, their capacity to conduct rigorous empirical work to inform policy is generally weak. There is a need for a partnership between the policy analysis unit at respective ministries and existing policy think tanks in the area of problem identification and research during the policy formulation process. In addition, there is a need to build and strengthen the capacity of the planning units in the use of research evidence through improving their abilities to access, understand, commission, evaluate and use research through professional learning.

Evidence from the "Doing Business" World Bank report (2014) shows that Uganda's business and regulatory environment is one of the constraining factors hindering private investment and growth in Uganda. As a result, most youth enterprises are still trapped in the informal sector, thus inhibiting their entrepreneurship growth potential. In addition, most of the current policies do not focus on specific clusters of MSMEs, such as youth, people with disabilities and women. Although these clusters operate in the same business environment as other players, they face greater challenges, which might limit the effectiveness of the designed polices. Our findings also indicate that entrepreneurship implementation has primarily been left in the hands of private actors, which makes it hard to regulate because different service providers often have conflicting interests and goals. As long as the government is the ultimate policymaker, it is still the overall responsibility of government to provide leadership in entrepreneurship coordination and implementation if programmes are to be monitored and evaluated effectively against set national priority areas and objectives.

A critical review of the evaluation evidence shows that for programmes to be successful, a combination of entrepreneurship skills training and the promotion of entrepreneurship through the provision of finance and business development support services were provided. Studies that evaluated various financing modes of business ventures found that in-kind grants performed better than unconditional cash grants, and microcredit yielded better labour market outcomes than grants, particularly when financial training was provided to participants. Although a combination of business training and financing yields stronger effects on the outcomes alluded to above, business training improves knowledge, whereas financing alone does well in enhancing business investments. For most financing programmes targeting young men and women, the effects tend to be stronger among males. This may suggest that interventions should be designed with special gender considerations. Lastly, we also see that the design elements of the programmes matter such that although some programmes may yield positive outcomes, the cost per participant may far outweigh the benefits. Training must be relevant, and trainees' willingness to access knowledge is important for enhancing non-necessity entrepreneurs' capabilities.

In a nutshell, for evidence-based research to feed into policy, synergies between policymakers/users and researchers/producers need to be revisited. Currently, institutions seem to work independently, often duplicating efforts with no intermediate effects in the policy arena.

5.2 Recommendations for government

Several recommendations for government emerge from the context analysis. Although some of these may extend beyond the specific findings of the review, they closely follow the thrust of the conclusions and should be taken into consideration in any public investment in youth entrepreneurship or in the formulation of interventions. That is:

- **Close policy implementation gaps:** The implementation and integration of policies aimed at fostering youth entrepreneurship have often been weak. It is recommended for the government to identify the most effective delivery designs to provide youth entrepreneurship services, whether via public institutions for monitoring and supervision, public-private partnerships for cost effectiveness and efficiencies, or the education system for national coverage and early sensitisation. The role of the cabinet here is essential; the cabinet should not approve policies without an action plan, budgets and strong M&E frameworks.

- **Promote evidence-based policymaking:** Research uptake, particularly evidence-based research in policy and programme design and implementation, should be taken earnestly to allow for successful program effects and sustainability in the long run. It will not only ease the monitoring and evaluation of the programmes against policy objectives; it will enable accountability for the "value of money", legitimacy in design and expenditure patterns. For structured and holistic long-term programmes, the need for evidence-based research to inform their design cannot be over emphasised.

- **Improve skills training for youth in an informal sector:** Training has to be relevant, and the youth have to show a willingness to be trained for the programme to be effective, particularly youth programmes that target informality. Prioritise the "business component" of the BTVET system by ensuring that the existing curriculum and training programmes are not majorly inclined towards the TVET aspects but also prioritise business education and skills development for youths who are largely engaged in the informal sector. In addition, a combination of different training schemes is critical in achieving positive, significant effects on designed programmes, such as the starting of businesses and the sustainability of already existing businesses that are gender disaggregated and have financial issues. Thus, the standardisation of training products for all BTVET institutions is important.

- **Create an enabling environment that supports MSMEs/informality:** As a way of reducing the current levels of informality, there is a need to minimise and simplify regulatory and administrative procedures and to maximise the support needed to comply with them. Making tax payments easier will make it easier for young people to start up and run their business.

- **Strengthening the role of National Planning Authority:** Given the existence of several regulatory and policy frameworks aimed at guiding entrepreneurship initiatives in the country, there is need for government to strengthen the role of NPA to coordinate youth issues through its youth desk and human resource department. This will improve the quality of service delivery as a one-stop centre for youths in businesses development activities.

- **Financial education and mentoring:** To realise the objectives of the Youth Venture Capital Fund (YVCF) and the Youth Livelihood Programme (YLP), a significant focus should be placed on business training and mentorship in addition to the loans and grants the youth are receiving in respective programmes.

5.3 Recommendations for researchers

For researchers, we recommend that:

- Synergies between researchers, think tanks and universities should be strengthened because many institutions are undertaking research on entrepreneurship, but information asymmetry on existing knowledge is still common.

- Recognising institutional-level strengths and weaknesses is critical in delivering and changing young entrepreneurs' mind-sets for the better.

- Researchers should endeavour to learn the policymaking processes in practice as a means of identifying entry points for their research to feed into policy. Often, good research never finds its way into policy, and remains on office shelves simply because researchers do not take the initiative to study and identify innovative ways of making their products useful in the policy environment.

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APPENDIX

Appendix Figure A.1: Policymaking process in Uganda: The Norm



Source: Adopted from A guide to Policy Development & Management in Uganda (2009), Office of the President

Appendix Questionnaire Guide

GENERIC QUESTIONS ON YOUTH ENTREPRENEURSHIP POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT

1. Which branch of government holds the key to policy change in relation to youth entrepreneurship/ employment?
    a. What are the policymaking structures?
    b. What are the policymaking processes?
    c. What are the relevant legal and regulatory policy frameworks?
    d. What are the opportunities and timing for input into formal processes?
    e. Who are the key players in the policy process?
2. What role does informal politics play in the policymaking processes (whether personality based, patronage based or group based)?
3. Is there a demand for youth entrepreneurship research and new ideas among policymakers?
4. Which circumstances are likely to lead to failure to utilise evidence-based policymaking?
5. How do external forces influence policymaking processes?
6. Which global-, national- and community-level political, social and economic structures and interests affect the room for the manoeuvring of policymakers?

To what extent are decisions routine, incremental, fundamental or emergent, and who supports or resists change?

Appendix Table A.1: List of key informants

No.	Name	Position	Organisation	Contact	Date of meeting
1	Mr. Emmanuel Katamirike	Executive Director	Uganda Youth Network	256-312-276944	4 November, 2014
2	Mr. Kyateka Mondo	Asst. Commissioner Youth and Children	Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development	256-44-342942	4 November, 2014
3	Mr. Samuel Kavuma	Executive Director	National Youth Council	256-782-495140	5 November, 2014
4	Mr. Richard Kalule	Legal officer	PPDA Authority	256-700-114995	19 November, 2014
5	Mr. Moses W. Watasa	Commissioner Information/OPM Spokesman	Office of the Prime Minister	256-772-976398	20 November, 2014
6	Mr. Michael Barnabas Aliyo & Ms. Zeridah Zigiti	Principal Economists	Ministry of Finance Planning and Economic Development	256-772-474102	24 November, 2014
7	Mr. Ahmed Hadji	Advocacy	CSO	256-702-799015	25 November, 2014
8	Mr. Kenneth Nkumiro	Coordinator	Uganda Parliamentary forum on Youth Affairs (UPFYA)	256-702-942838	26 November, 2014
9	Hon. Monica Amoding	National Female Youth MP and Chairperson UPFYA	Parliament of Uganda	256-414-377677	26 November, 2014
10	Mr. Ahmed Hadji	Executive Director	African Youth \development Link (AYDL)	256-702-799015	27 November, 2014
11	Mr. Stephen Opio	National Programmes Coordinator	International Labour Organisation (ILO)	256-771-000593	27 November, 2014
12	Mr. Onduri Francis	Acting Director Social Protection	Ministry of Gender Labour and Social Development (MoGLSD)	(Meeting not completed; to finish another day)	27 November, 2014
13.	Mr. Nathan Bwire	Principal Youth Officer	Planning Unit, MoGLSD	Meeting not yet scheduled	
14.	Mr. Stephen Emuria	Assistant Commissioner, MSMEs	Ministry of Trade, Industry and Cooperatives (MTIC)		28 January, 2015

Appendix Figure A.2: Stakeholder mapping- A visual overview of the key actors influencing policies on youth entrepreneurship

Stakeholder mapping: A visual of the key actors influencing policies on youth entrepreneurship

Youth entrepreneurship policies in Uganda are driven by three key government ministries MTIIC, MoGLSD and MoES often with external input. The Cabinet approves all policies, although the President has veto powers; while the MoFPED has powers on budget approval and issuance of certificate of financial implication prior to passing of policies.



Source: Author's own compilation, 2015

Appendix Table A. 2: Stakeholder matrix: Youth entrepreneurship stakeholders involved



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

Source: Author's own compilation, 2015

Economic Policy Research Centre
Plot 51, Pool Road, Makerere University Campus
P.O. Box 7841, Kampala, Uganda
Tel: +256-414-541023/4, Fax: +256-414-541022
Email: eprc@eprc.or.ug, Web: www.eprc.or.ug