Rational Fools and Cooperation in a Poor Hydraulic Economy

Local community-level water management is crucial for rural development in the poorest parts of the world, in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. Local cooperative institutions have been successful in water management in some cases, but there are numerous cases of failure. The paper draws upon the relevant lessons from the theoretical literature on cooperation in game theory, both in economics and evolutionary biology. Then it goes into the evidence from field studies by anthropologists and others on the conditions for success or failure of local cooperation. This points to some additional insights which the theoretical models are yet too constricted to incorporate.


Issue Date:
1993-05
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/233195
Total Pages:
26
JEL Codes:
D23; D62; D74; H40; O12; Q15
Series Statement:
Working Paper
C93-015




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-04-26

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