Carbon Trading and No-Permanency of Agricultural Sequestration: Institutional Design and the Choice of Working Rules

The institutional development of a domestic carbon trading institution in Canada that includes carbon off-sets must address the problems of providing the appropriate incentives to generate carbon reductions and removals and the problem of non-permanency of sequestered carbon. The paper analyzes two rule sets to address these problems and estimates the economic impact of these sets.


Issue Date:
2006
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/21364
Total Pages:
18
Series Statement:
Selected Paper 157087




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-04-26

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