Cooperative Growth and Decline: A Game Theoretic Approach to Understanding Members'’ Allocation Choices

In the present research, the agent’'s choice to leave or join a cooperative is modeled to be a function of alternative investment opportunities and choices made by other agents who are faced with an identical set of possible strategies. Once the agent has made the decision to join a cooperative, the agent may reevaluate available alternatives in each period. The result is a multi-period repeated game in which the growth or decline of a cooperative is determined.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2006
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/21279
Total Pages:
23
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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