Does aversion to the sucker's payoff matter in public goods games?

A usual explanation to low levels of contribution to public goods is the fear of getting the sucker’s payoff (cooperation by the participant and defection by the other players). In order to disentangle the effect of this fear from other motives, we design a public good game where people have an assurance against getting the sucker’s payoff. We show that contributions to the public good under this ‘protective’ design are significantly higher and interact with expectations on other individuals' contribution to the public good. Some policy implications and extensions are suggested.


Issue Date:
2009
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/210401
Total Pages:
17
JEL Codes:
C72; C91; H41
Series Statement:
09-08




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-04-26

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