Comparing Policy Instruments in a Dynamic Environment with Strategic Firms: The Case of Minnesota Phosphorus Emissions.

This paper examines the strategic behavior of firms under emissions taxes and tradable emissions permits designed to mitigate phosphorus emissions. The Nash payoff to the regulator of the strategic game is determined for a sub-basin of the Minnesota River using econometric estimates of cost and benefit functions representative of the region. These payoffs are compared to determine the preferred policy instrument. Results show that emission permits yield lower deadweight losses than emissions taxes.


Issue Date:
2001
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20751
Total Pages:
17
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-22

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