Networks of Many Public Goods with Non-Linear Best Replies

We model a bipartite network in which links connect agents with public goods. Agents play a voluntary contribution game in which they decide how much to contribute to each public good they are connected to. We show that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium can be posed as a non-linear complementarity one. The existence of an equilibrium point is established for a wide class of individual preferences. We then find a simple sufficient condition, on network structure only, that guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibria, and provide an easy procedure for building networks that respects this condition.


Issue Date:
Jun 17 2015
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/206421
Total Pages:
31
JEL Codes:
C72; D85; H41
Series Statement:
CCSD
057.2015




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-28

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