STATIC AND DYNAMIC EFFICIENCY OF POOLED BROILER CONTRACTS: RELATIVE-PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS VS. FIXED-PERFORMANCE CONTRACTS

With the broiler industry as a backdrop, this paper develops theoretical models to compare optimal incentives of pooled relative-performance and fixed-performance contracts in static and dynamic models that account for both adverse selection and moral hazard. In spite of some growersÂ’' complaints about the relative-performance contracts used in the broiler industry, model results largely justify the popularity and superiority of relative performance contracts relative to fixed performance contracts


Issue Date:
2004
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/20406
Total Pages:
28
Series Statement:
Selected Paper




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-04-26

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)