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Abstract
A dynamic model of capital structure for the noncoiporate farm is developed and analyzed. In this
model. the probability of bankruptcy increases as the farmer's debt/asset ratio increases. Funds invested outside
agriculture earn a risldess rate of return. The farmer/proprietor is also able to obtain a riskless wage from off-fann
employment; this wage may differ from the implicit wage received as a farmer. The expected return to equity on
the farm depends on the leverage. The model examines the effects on optimal capital snucture of (I) bankruptcy
risk. (2) the difference between the riskless rate and the expected renun in agriculture, and (3) the difference
between the off.farm wage and the implicit on-farm wage. The third element introduces an incentive for the
prq>rietor to change leverage over the proprietor's lifetime; this ocrurs if the difference between the wages is
nonzero but C
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