A Model of Incentive Compatibility under Moral Hazard in Livestock Disease Outbreak Response

This paper uses a principal-agent model to examine incentive compatibility in the presence of information asymmetry between the government and individual producers. Prior models of livestock disease have not incorporated information asymmetry between livestock managers and social planners. By incorporating the asymmetry, we investigate the role of incentives in producer behavior that influences the duration and magnitude of a disease epidemic.


Issue Date:
2005
Publication Type:
Conference Paper/ Presentation
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/19200
Total Pages:
21
Series Statement:
Selected Paper 133432




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-24

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