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
Issues in Modeling Bioterrorism in the Agrifood Sector

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WCC-72, Las Vegas


June 9, 2003









- Canada and Mexico Joined the NAFTA to Obtain Preferred (tariff free) and More Secure Access to the United States Market
 - How Can This Access be Maintained While Meeting Legitimate Security Concerns?
 - How Real is the Bioterrorism Threat?
 - What Would be the Economic Effects of a Bioterrorism Attack?




Fraction of GDP Exported, 1990-2002




Fraction of Canadian Exports to US and Mexico, 1995-2001




Fraction of US Exports to Canada and Mexico, 1995-2001



Canada's Agri-Food Exports: Total, US, Mexico, 1994-2002, Bil. Can. Dol.



Fraction of Canada's Agri-Food Exports to the US and Mexico.



From Where Would an Attack Originate?

- United States
- NAFTA Partner Country
- Other Country

Terrorism Targets

- Humans
- Food
- Water
- Livestock
- Crops
- Infrastructure

Product Flows

- About 40% of Canada's Shipments to the US Move Via Rail
 - 60% of total at 4 border crossings
- Most of the Rest Via Truck
 - 60% of total at 4 border crossings 55 %
 from 3 border crossings in Ontario alone

Product Flows

A Border Slow Down Changes

"Just in Time Delivery"

to

"Give Me Time Delivery"

How Real is a Biosecurity Threat?

 "The US livestock industry...is extremely vulnerable to a host of highly infectious and often contagious biological agents...APHIS...would probably be unable to help eradicate intentional introduction, especially if this were done at multiple sites."

National Research Council, Making the Nation Safer. 2002

Terrorism Targets

- The Major Economic Impacts Would Come From Terrorist Attacks on Livestock and Crops
- In Taiwan a Naturally Occurring FMD Outbreak in Swine Only
 - 1/3 of herd destroyed
 - exports to zero
 - price declined 44%
 - revenue declined 64%

Foot and Mouth Disease

- "How To" List on APHIS Web Site
- Easy to Transport
- Highly Infectious
- Major Cost to Eradicate
- No Risk to Human Health

FMD Control Measures

- Protect Disease Free Zones Through Animal Movement Control
- Slaughter Infected, Recovered and Susceptible Animals
- Disinfect: Premises, Implements, Trucks, Cars, Clothes
- Destruction of Cadavers, Litter, and Animal Products in Infected Area
- Quarantine

GTAP

- Computable General Equilibrium Model
- Captures Economy Wide Effects
 - Perfect competition
 - Constant returns to scale, CES technology
 - Domestic and imported products are treated as differentiated goods via the Armington assumption
 - Welfare changes measured using equivalent variation
 - 11 Agricultural sectors
 - 9 Countries/regions

Foot and Mouth Disease

- Modeled Via Negative Productivity Shocks in Primary Production (Cattle, Swine, Milk)
 - Labor
 - Capital
- Immobile
 - Land
- Intermediate Inputs (feed) Released

Scenarios – FMD in US Only

- Scenario 1A
 - 5 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
- Scenario 1B
 - 10 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
- Scenario 1C
 - 20 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
- Borders Remain Open!!!!


Scenarios – FMD in US Only

- Scenario 2
 - 10 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
 - A ban on US Exports of Livestock, Swine, Meat and Dairy Products to FMD-Free Countries


Scenarios – FMD in US Only

- Scenario 3
 - 10 % reduction in Output of Cattle, Milk and Swine
 - A Ban on US Exports of Livestock, Swine, Meat and Dairy Products to FMD-Free Countries
 - Shift in US Domestic Demand Away from
 Domestic Products and Towards Foreign
 Products


Meat and Dairy Price Effects, US




Meat Trade, US




Dairy Trade, US




Effect of Adding a Ban on US Exports for -10% Output Shock




Effect of Adding a Ban and a Demand Shift on US Exports 10% Output Shock




Canada's Exports – No Ban or Demand Shift




Effect of a Ban and a Demand Shift on Canada's Exports - 10% Output Shock



Welfare Effects



Welfare Effects



Problems

- Cost of Control, Compensation and Eradication Neglected
- Short-Run Effects
- Small Price Increase for Swine

Thanks And Let's Hope There Is Never an Attack!!!

