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Abstract
This paper investigates how the control and devolution of productive assets are
allocated among husband and wife. Theory predicts that bargaining power within
marriage depends on the division of assets upon divorce (exit option) and on control over
assets during marriage (noncooperative marriage). In empirical applications, bargaining
power is typically proxied by variables such as dowry payments, assets brought to
marriage, and ownership of assets within marriage. Using detailed household data from
rural Ethiopia, we show that assets brought to marriage, ownership of assets, control
within marriage, and disposition upon death or divorce are only partly related (strictly
speaking, surveyed households do not “own” land since all agricultural land is legally
owned by the state). In rural Ethiopia, control over productive resources is centralized
into the hands of the household head, be it a man or a woman, irrespective of ownership
at or after marriage. Disposition upon death or divorce only loosely depends on
individual ownership during marriage but control over assets is associated with larger
claims over these assets upon divorce, a finding consistent with the presence of incentive
problems. Assets brought into marriage have little impact on disposition upon death, but
matter in case of divorce.