



AgEcon SEARCH
RESEARCH IN AGRICULTURAL & APPLIED ECONOMICS

The World's Largest Open Access Agricultural & Applied Economics Digital Library

This document is discoverable and free to researchers across the globe due to the work of AgEcon Search.

Help ensure our sustainability.

Give to AgEcon Search

AgEcon Search

<http://ageconsearch.umn.edu>

aesearch@umn.edu

*Papers downloaded from **AgEcon Search** may be used for non-commercial purposes and personal study only. No other use, including posting to another Internet site, is permitted without permission from the copyright owner (not AgEcon Search), or as allowed under the provisions of Fair Use, U.S. Copyright Act, Title 17 U.S.C.*

**INTERNATIONAL
FOOD
POLICY
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE**

FINAL REPORT

**THE IMPACT OF PROGRESA ON WOMEN'S STATUS
AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD RELATIONS**

**Michelle Adato
Bénédicte de la Brière
Dubravka Mindek
Agnes Quisumbing**

**International Food Policy Research Institute
Food Consumption and Nutrition Division
2033 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006, USA
Tel. (202) 862-5600
Fax (202) 467-4439**

July 27, 2000

**INTERNATIONAL
FOOD
POLICY
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE**

FINAL REPORT

**THE IMPACT OF PROGRESA ON WOMEN'S STATUS
AND INTRAHOUSEHOLD RELATIONS**

**Michelle Adato
Bénédicte de la Brière
Dubravka Mindek
Agnes Quisumbing**

**International Food Policy Research Institute
Food Consumption and Nutrition Division
2033 K Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20006, USA
Tel. (202) 862-5600
Fax (202) 467-4439**

July 27, 2000

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iv
OVERVIEW.....	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.....	vii
PART I: THE IMPACT OF PROGRESA ON INTRAHOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING AND RELATIVE SCHOOLING ACHIEVEMENTS OF BOYS AND GIRLS	1
1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN THE MEASUREMENT OF BARGAINING POWER	2
2.1 Determinants of Bargaining Power	3
2.2 Measuring the Determinants of Power	4
3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND DATA DESCRIPTION	5
3.1 Characteristics of Husband and Wife	7
3.2 Characteristics of the Union, Assets at Marriage, and Pre-Marriage Work Experience.....	8
4. EFFECTS OF FAMILY BACKGROUND ON HUSBAND AND WIFE CHARACTERISTICS	9
5. DETERMINANTS OF INTRAHOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING	11
5.1 Descriptive Statistics	11
5.2 Multinomial Logit Regression	12
5.2.1 Empirical Specification	12
5.2.2 PROGRESA Impacts on Poor Households	14
5.2.3 Spillover Effects on Nonpoor Households?	16
5.3 Summary and Discussion.....	17
6. DETERMINANTS OF RELATIVE SCHOOLING ACHIEVEMENTS OF BOYS AND GIRLS	18
6.1 Methodology	18
6.2 Results.....	20
7. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS.....	20
7.1 Summary	20
7.2 Next Steps	22
REFERENCES	23
TABLES.....	26

PART II	PROGRESA AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT:	46
	EVIDENCE FROM SIX MEXICAN STATES	
1.	INTRODUCTION.....	46
2.	CONCEPTUALIZING EMPOWERMENT	48
	2.1 Definitions and Conceptual Building Blocks.....	48
	2.2 Indicators of Empowerment.....	49
	2.3 Empowerment and PROGRESA.....	51
3.	RESEARCH METHODS	54
	3.1 Why Combine Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods?.....	54
	3.2 Research Design and Process.....	55
4.	INTRAHOUSEHOLD RELATIONSHIPS, COLLECTIVE ACTIVITIES, AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT	58
	4.1. Intrahousehold Relationships and Women's Role as the PROGRESA	58
	Beneficiary	
	4.1.1 Women's Views on PROGRESA'S Focus on Women.....	58
	4.1.2 Men's Attitudes Toward Women's Role in PROGRESA	59
	4.1.3 Women's Attitudes Toward PROGRESA's Time Requirements	62
	4.2 Decisionmaking on Household Expenditures	63
	4.3 PROGRESA and Collective Activities.....	67
	4.3.1 Leaving the House	68
	4.3.2 'Opening Our Minds:' Speaking about Concerns, Problems,	69
	and Solutions	
	4.3.3 Speaking Out in Groups	70
	4.3.4 'Knowing More:' Education Through the Health Pláticas.....	71
	4.4 Summary and Discussion.....	71
5.	EDUCATION AND GENDER ISSUES	73
	5.1. Attitudes Toward the Education of Girls.....	74
	5.1.1 Women's Attitudes Toward Girls' Education	74
	5.1.2 Women's Attitudes Toward Boys' Education.....	77
	5.1.3 Men's Attitudes Toward Girls' Education	78
	5.1.4 Beneficiaries' Understanding of Program Incentives	80
	5.2 Adult Education.....	82
	5.2.1 Women's Educational Aspirations	82
	5.2.2 Education that Women Want for Men	85
6.	SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.....	87
	REFERENCES	91

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is part of the PROGRESA evaluation project of IFPRI. It consists of two separate papers: a paper by Bénédicte de la Brière and Agnes Quisumbing, analyzing the data from the household surveys, and a paper by Michelle Adato and Dubravka Mindek, based on focus groups and qualitative work conducted in PROGRESA localities. Since the two papers are related and since we have drawn liberally from each others' papers in writing our own, we have decided to present them under one cover, although the authors of each paper bear the responsibility for each papers' contents. Michelle Adato is a Research Fellow at IFPRI, Bénédicte de la Brière, formerly a Post-Doctoral Fellow at IFPRI, is now a Young Professional at the World Bank, Dubravka Mindek is a doctoral candidate in social anthropology at the Escuela Nacional de Antropología e Historia in Mexico City, and Agnes Quisumbing is a Senior Research Fellow, also at IFPRI. Dubravka Mindek worked on this report as a consultant to the PROGRESA Evaluation Project of IFPRI. Authorship has been assigned alphabetically.

We are grateful to a large number of individuals in the preparation of this report. Bénédicte de la Brière and Agnes Quisumbing would like to thank Patricia Muniz, who spent many hours with us discussing and designing the module on family background and assets at marriage. We also would like to thank the members of her staff, notably Ana Núñez and Gabriela Vázquez, who shared their field experiences generously with us. Dr. José Gómez de León, Daniel Hernández, Dr. Susan Parker, and other PROGRESA staff were supportive and helpful throughout the preparation of this report. Discussions with Jere Behrman, Ben Davis, David Robicheaux, Graciela Teruel, and María Vázquez, were especially insightful. We also thank the participants in the March 2000 workshop held at PROGRESA for their candid and insightful comments, and Emmanuel Skoufias for his detailed suggestions, which did much to strengthen the final version of this report. Sanjukta Mukherjee and Ryan Washburn helped us with the growing number of data sets available for analysis. Ellen Payongayong, Cristina Quintos, and Lourdes Hinayon helped in the final stages of production of various versions of the report.

Michelle Adato and Dubravka Mindek would like to thank all the staff at PROGRESA who provided ideas and insights that helped to shape the research questions, logistical assistance in the course of the qualitative research design and fieldwork, and comments on the preliminary findings, with special appreciation expressed to Daniel Hernández and Patricia Muniz. We would also like to thank Ana Núñez for helpful discussions at various points in the research; Soledad Rojas and Minerva Garibaye for focus group facilitation; the staff at GAUSSC for coordinating fieldwork logistics; Ana Núñez, Ana Ortiz and Patricia García for assistance in the field; Rebeca Walker and Marcía Colores for providing translation of the focus group dialogues; Ryan Washburn and Lyla Kuriyan for data assistance, and Lourdes Hinayon for administrative support.

Lastly, we would like to dedicate this report to the memory of Dr. José Gómez de León, who firmly believed that PROGRESA had the potential to change the lives of many rural Mexicans. His integrity, intellectual openness, and interest in intrahousehold issues were an inspiration to all of us.

OVERVIEW

The objective of this report is to examine the impact of PROGRESA on women's status and intrahousehold relations. The program provides cash benefits linked to children's school attendance and to regular clinic attendance, as well as in-kind health benefits and nutritional supplements. Unlike previous social programs in Mexico, a unique feature of this nationwide anti-poverty program is its targeting of transfers to the mother of the family. The deliberate decision to give transfers directly to the mother was motivated by the growing literature which finds that resources controlled by women are more likely to be manifested in greater improvements in child health and nutrition than resources controlled by men. Program staff also argue that the design of the program may increase women's "empowerment" by increasing their control over resources and thus their bargaining power.

The program is composed of several components—cash benefits linked to children's school attendance, regular clinic attendance, in-kind health benefits and nutritional supplements—but the transfer of significant amounts of income directly to mothers is an innovation in terms of the design of social programs in Mexico. The size of the amount transferred by the program, corresponding to a 22% increase in the income levels of the beneficiary family, the concentration of this transfer in the hands of the mother, and the enormous scale of the program—2.3 million families in extreme poverty, or almost a third of all rural families in Mexico—suggests that the potential impact of the program in altering the balance of power within Mexican families is large.

Studies which analyze intrahousehold behavior posit that the bargaining power of spouses is key in determining who gets a larger share of household resources. While it may be difficult to measure power within the household, bargaining power may be affected by: control over resources, such as assets; influences that can be used to influence the bargaining process, such as legal rights, skills and knowledge, the capacity to acquire information, education, and bargaining skills; mobilization of interpersonal networks; and basic attitudinal attributes such as self-esteem, self-confidence, and emotional satisfaction. Studies of women's "empowerment" address similar issues through a different lens, focusing on gendered power relationships embedded in institutions including households, the state, markets and other domains, and the diverse processes through which women loosen constraints on their ability to make choices within these domains. PROGRESA has the potential to address all four factors affecting bargaining power, and to influence processes of women's empowerment, in the following ways: increasing resources in the hands of women; helping women learn through health education; creating a network of co-beneficiaries with whom women meet on a regular basis; through participation in the meetings and having control of additional resources, increasing confidence and self-esteem; and through promoting the education of girls, improving the position of future women.

Measuring the impact of PROGRESA on women's status and intrahousehold relations, and the pathways through which this impact occurs, is more challenging. Women's status is difficult to quantify in the context of large household surveys like the ENCASEH and ENCELs. These surveys have several questions which attempt to tease out various aspects of women's status and bargaining power, such as attitudes towards women's roles, questions on who within the

household takes major responsibility for certain household decisions, questions on the disposition of women's income, and questions on women's mobility and freedom of movement. Nevertheless, household surveys are blunt instruments with which to examine intrahousehold relations, because the context of such decisions is often unstated, and without adequate understanding of the socio-cultural context, survey results can easily be misinterpreted. Although quantitative data from household surveys will enable the analyst to control for individual, household, and community-level factors which affect decisionmaking, there is the danger that, without grounding in the actual realities of people's lives, the results could be gross misinterpretations of the truth.

This report takes a two-prong approach to analyzing the impact of PROGRESA on women's status and intrahousehold relations, using both quantitative survey data and qualitative focus group studies. It is composed of two separate and complementary papers.

The first paper, by Bénédicte de la Brière and Agnes Quisumbing, uses the data from the quantitative surveys—the Survey of Socio-Economic Characteristics of Households (ENCASEH) and three successive Evaluation Surveys (ENCEL)—to examine three aspects of intrahousehold relations: how family background of husband and wife influences the human and physical capital they bring to marriage; how husband's and wife's resources at the time of marriage affect household decisionmaking patterns; and how parental characteristics affect the relative schooling achievements of boys and girls. While the randomized design of PROGRESA would allow impact to be assessed by comparing the means of control and beneficiary households before and after program implementation, the paper takes a different approach by including individual and household controls in addition to variables capturing eligibility for the program, residence in control or program communities, duration of exposure to the program and amounts disbursed between July 1998 and October 1999. By including these other control variables, the authors hope to refine the estimate of the program's effects.

The second paper, by Michelle Adato and Dubravka Mindek, is based on qualitative research methods that allowed beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and *promotoras* to explain their experience of PROGRESA in their own words. Using the lens of women's "empowerment," this paper focuses primarily on the perspectives of beneficiaries and *promotoras* with regard to changes they perceive in their lives, related directly and indirectly to features of the program. Exploring the assumptions that the central role played by women in PROGRESA has both benefits and unintended consequences; and that women's and men's attitudes and beliefs have implications for the success of the program, this study examines: women's and men's attitudes toward the role of women as PROGRESA beneficiaries; the perceived benefits to the household as well as increased tensions and time burdens; decisionmaking patterns; changes women describe with regard to freedom of movement, self-confidence, and 'opening their minds;' women's and men's attitudes toward the education of girls, adult education that women want for themselves in order to improve their lives, and education they want for men to help women put into practice what they learn through participation in the program.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PART I

The objective of this report is to examine the impact of PROGRESA on women's status and intrahousehold relations. The program provides cash benefits linked to children's school attendance and to regular clinic attendance, as well as in-kind health benefits and nutritional supplements. Unlike previous social programs in Mexico, a unique feature of this nationwide anti-poverty program is its targeting of transfers to the mother of the family. The deliberate decision to give transfers directly to the mother was motivated by the growing literature which finds that resources controlled by women are more likely to be manifested in greater improvements in child health and nutrition than resources controlled by men. Program staff also argue that the design of the program may increase women's "empowerment" by increasing their control over resources and thus their bargaining power.

The program is composed of several components—cash benefits linked to children's school attendance, regular clinic attendance, in-kind health benefits and nutritional supplements—but the transfer of significant amounts of income directly to mothers is an innovation in terms of the design of social programs in Mexico. The size of the amount transferred by the program, corresponding to a 22% increase in the income levels of the beneficiary family, the concentration of this transfer in the hands of the mother, and the enormous scale of the program—2.3 million families in extreme poverty, or almost a third of all rural families in Mexico—suggests that the potential impact of the program in altering the balance of power within Mexican families is large.

The first paper has three objectives:

- to ascertain whether or not the implementation of PROGRESA contributed to an increase in women's bargaining power, using answers to a series of questions on husband's and wife's roles in making specific household decisions;
- to control for family background variables and the existing (pre-program) distribution of bargaining power within the household by using information on the couple's physical and human resources at the time of marriage, in addition to variables capturing the family's eligibility for PROGRESA, location in control or program communities, and transfers disbursed by the program; and
- to examine the extent to which parental preferences for child schooling differ depending on the child's gender.

Since bargaining power is a difficult concept to measure, the paper begins by briefly discussing four determinants of bargaining power:

- control over resources, such as assets;

- factors that can be used to influence the bargaining process;
- mobilization of interpersonal networks; and
- basic attitudinal attributes.

While economic analysis of intrahousehold issues has typically focused on the first aspect, control over economic resources, by deliberately targeting transfers to women, requiring them to leave their homes to claim the transfers, encouraging their participation in community meetings, and requiring visits to health facilities, PROGRESA has the potential for affecting women's bargaining power within the household through avenues other than control of economic resources.

In taking into account individual and household characteristics which may affect bargaining power, the study was influenced by previous work which used the following variables to capture different economic resources controlled by husband and wife:

- public provision of resources to a particular member of the household and exogenous policy changes which affect the intrahousehold distribution of these resources;
- shares of income earned by women;
- unearned income;
- inherited assets;
- assets at marriage; and
- current assets.

The provision of transfers to women through PROGRESA is an example of the public provision of resources to a particular member of the household. Owing to the randomized design of the evaluation surveys, one way of evaluating the impact of PROGRESA would be to compare the means of PROGRESA beneficiaries with those of eligible households in control communities before and after the implementation of the program. However, additional insights can be gained by controlling for individual and family characteristics in addition to program implementation. The benefits include better control of heterogeneity within control and beneficiary groups, and better isolation of program effects. Thus, the approach used in this paper is an individual and household-level analysis.

In order to come up with indicators which may affect bargaining power within the household, the IFPRI and PROGRESA teams collected additional data on factors affecting each spouse's bargaining power. Following recent work in the intrahousehold literature, this study uses characteristics of the husband and wife at the time of their marriage, which are exogenous to decisions taken within the marriage itself. The IFPRI and PROGRESA teams jointly designed a module which was first pilot-tested with *promotoras* in February 1999, and then fielded as a part of the June-July 1999 ENCEL. The findings of the research are as follows:

Family Background and Assets at Marriage

- Husbands enter marriage with more human and physical capital than their wives. Husbands have significantly more years of schooling than wives; 13% of husbands had land at the time of marriage, compared to 1% of wives, and their asset scores—an

aggregate based on a weighted sum of reported asset categories—were twice those of wives. If, as the literature suggests, human and physical capital significantly influence bargaining power within marriage, rural Mexican husbands wield more power within their households than their wives.

- The human and physical capital that husbands and wives bring to marriage are, in turn, influenced by their family background. Tobit regressions of the effects of parental characteristics on husband's and wife's schooling and asset scores, and on the wife's work experience prior to marriage show that parental characteristics are significant determinants of each spouse's physical and human capital.
- Literate parents who have either attended or completed primary school have children who complete more years of schooling. Fathers' attending or completing primary school has a positive and significant effect on both husband's and wife's schooling, but the mothers' attending or completing primary school has a positive and significant effect only on wife's schooling.
- Social status variables—proxied by the parents' wearing shoes—only have a positive and significant effect on wife's schooling. Parental landholdings also positively influence the number of years completed in school. Wives with more education and those whose mothers have attended primary school have more work experience prior to marriage.
- Asset scores seem to be influenced not only by the parental wealth, but also by the characteristics of the same-sex parent. Husbands whose fathers have completed primary school, and whose parents wore shoes in the husband's childhood, bring more assets to the marriage. Wives whose mothers are literate, whose mothers have completed primary school, whose parents wore shoes, and whose parents owned larger land areas bring more assets to their marriage.
- Maternal variables consistently have a positive and significant effect on wife's schooling and assets, and paternal variables on husband's physical and human capital.

Intrahousehold Decisionmaking Patterns

Multinomial logit regressions were performed using data on questions regarding who should make certain decisions within the household, with the following choices: husband alone, wife alone, or both spouses jointly. These decisions were: seeking the medical attention for the child, telling the child to attend school, giving the child permission to go out, expenditures on child clothing, food expenditures, house repairs, durables purchases, and the disposition of women's extra income.

Our results show that:

- Characteristics of husband and wife are the most consistent determinants of decisionmaking patterns. The husband is more likely to be the sole decisionmaker if his wife is less educated, has less work experience prior to marriage, does not speak Spanish,

or speaks an indigenous language. Husbands who speak an indigenous language are also more likely to be the single decisionmaker, indicating that women's roles may be more traditional in indigenous societies.

- Relative to individual characteristics, among poor households, residing in a PROGRESA locality does not have as predictable nor strong an effect on patterns of decisionmaking. However, transfer amounts decrease the incidence of husbands' sole decisionmaking for five out of eight outcomes.
- One of the most noteworthy outcomes is the effect of PROGRESA transfers on decisions regarding the disposition of women's extra income. While there is an increase, through time, in the probability that women decide on the use of their extra income, PROGRESA transfers have a small but significant negative effect on the probability that the woman lets her husband decide how to spend her additional income.
- Spillover effects of PROGRESA on the decisionmaking patterns of nonpoor households living in PROGRESA communities are negligible.

Relative Schooling Achievements of Sons and Daughters

We also examine the determinants of the relative schooling achievement of boys relative to girls, measured by the deviation from the locality-specific cohort mean. This measure enables us to control for incomplete schooling by looking at how well a child is doing relative to other children of the same age.

Our results show that:

- Controlling for family background characteristics such as schooling and wealth of parents, among children 6 to 16 years of age, girls do equally well as boys of the same age.
- Children of better educated parents do better relative to those the same age, but the size of the coefficient on mother's schooling is twice as large as that on fathers.
- There are clear signs of parental gender preference: better-educated fathers favor sons. This is a pattern which has also been found in the parents' generation, although we do not have any evidence that mothers in this generation give preferential treatment to girls with respect to schooling.
- Among poor households, being in a PROGRESA locality improves schooling attainment relative to other children of the same age. PROGRESA transfers have a separate positive and significant effect on children's schooling attainment. Thus, there appear to be differential effects attached not only to increased women's income from the program, but also to other components of the program. This points to the importance of beneficiary meetings and the focus of the program on children's outcomes, both of which reinforce the link between transfers and school attendance.

PART II

Women stand center stage in PROGRESA's strategy for raising the living standards of Mexico's rural poor. PROGRESA aims to improve the well being of women and children from an early age, through maternal and child health care, nutritional supplements, health and nutrition education, and incentives for keeping boys and girls in school through the primary and secondary levels. By making women the program beneficiary on behalf of the family, PROGRESA also aims to empower them by increasing their control over resources. The premise underpinning the program's focus on women is that resources controlled by women are more likely to translate into improved health and nutrition of children than if those resources were controlled by men.

Using the lens of women's "empowerment," this report explores the perspectives of beneficiaries and community *promotoras* with regard to changes they perceive in their lives, related directly and indirectly to features of PROGRESA. To a lesser extent, it also explores the perspectives of non-beneficiaries to see whether their views are different, or how they may be affected by having PROGRESA in their communities. Two additional assumptions informed the research questions in this project: 1) there are advantages to this central role for women in PROGRESA but also potentially unintended consequences such as increased social tensions within the household; and 2) attitudes and changes in attitudes are important for facilitating program success and sustainability. Change or stasis is determined not only by design features of the program, but also by how social relationships, culture and beliefs mediate those features.

Several rounds of quantitative household and community surveys conducted in 1998-1999 have asked a series of questions related to women's status and intrahousehold relationships. In addition, two qualitative studies looked at aspects of women's status. These quantitative and qualitative studies have yielded important information but also raised new questions. It was thus decided to undertake new qualitative research in 1999. The objectives were:

- to look for new issues and insights not yet identified in previous research;
- to further explore issues raised but not investigated in previous studies;
- to gain greater depth in understanding of selected issues related to women's empowerment, allowing women to explain in their own words how they and others in their communities experience PROGRESA;
- to suggest ways in which the program can be improved in order to contribute further to women's empowerment, and to better respond to their concerns and aspirations.

The research was conducted during June-July 1999 in six states: Estado de México, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Querétaro, and Veracruz. In total 23 focus groups were conducted involving 230 women: 80 beneficiaries, 80 non-beneficiaries and *promotoras* from 70 communities. The research explored the following issues:

- Women's and men's attitudes toward the role of women as PROGRESA beneficiaries: whether they support this feature of program design, whether women experience this role

in positive ways, or there are unintended consequences such as increased tensions or conflict in the household, or additional time burdens.

- Relative decision-making responsibilities of men and women related to expenditures.
- Changes that women have experienced with regard to freedom of movement, self-confidence, and ‘opening their minds,’ related to their participation in program-related collective activities such as meetings and health *pláticas*.
- Women’s and men’s attitudes toward the education of girls, and the reasons for these beliefs.
- The types of adult education that women want for themselves, in order to improve their lives; and the types of adult education that they want for men, which would enable women to take better advantage of the benefits that PROGRESA offers and put into practice what they learn through participation in the program.

The report starts with a discussion of women’s empowerment, looking at the relationship between resources, agency and outcomes, a wide range of indicators often used to study empowerment, different types of empowerment involving personal change, change in close interpersonal relationships and change through collective activity. It then discusses ways in which these ideas are relevant to PROGRESA.

The research findings are as follows:

Intrahousehold Relationships, Collective Activities, and Women's Empowerment

- Women strongly support the principle of designating women the beneficiaries. The main reasons given were that women are more responsible with money and thus more will be spent on the family, and that women are more concerned with the welfare of their children. In a majority of responses, women mentioned that men are likely to spend money they receive on alcohol. An additional reason given was that PROGRESA is for household needs such as food, and women know best what the household needs.
- PROGRESA has increased recognition of women’s importance in the family and their greater degree of responsibility toward the family relative to men. These beliefs preceded PROGRESA, at least to some extent among women, but they have been strengthened and made more explicit because of the government’s recognition of women’s importance.
- The women said that most men accept women’s role in the program. The main reason is that the benefits help the husband too, and the family as a whole. They allow their wives to spend the time necessary to fulfill their PROGRESA requirements because the benefits they receive compensate.

- Some men are unhappy with the time that women spend out of the house for their PROGRESA responsibilities. Women say they minimize conflict by making sure that their household responsibilities are taken care of before leaving the house.
- Including men in initial PROGRESA general meetings where beneficiary responsibilities and program activities are explained has been helpful, so that when their wives need to leave the house to participate in these activities they understand why.
- *Promotoras* sometimes make judgments as to what they can ask a beneficiary to do and what they should not, based on the situation in her household, i.e., if there is conflict.
- Women said that participation in the program places extra time burdens on them, referring to traveling to receive their transfers, and attending meetings, *pláticas* and *faenas*. Only a few described this as a problem, however. Others said that progress requires extra effort or explained how they manage their time carefully to meet their household and domestic responsibilities simultaneously.
- Another reason that women's time burden increases is because of the need to do work that was previously done by children who are now attending school. However, their mothers see this as worthwhile in order for their children to study. This work is also shared with other members of the family.

Decisionmaking on Expenditures and Control of Household Resources

- The question of what respective decisions are made by men and women in the household is one of the main ways in which women's empowerment is evaluated in the literature. The focus group discussions focused on expenditure decisions, where beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries said that women made decisions on their own about food expenditures, while men or couples decided about larger household expenditures. Participation in PROGRESA does not appear from these discussions to notably alter the domains of decision-making.
- There are four ways, however, in which respondents suggest that PROGRESA can increase women's autonomy with respect to household expenditure decisions: 1) she does not need to ask her husband for money whenever she needs something, she can purchase it independently with money from PROGRESA; 2) because she receives this additional household income, she has more confidence in her ability to determine whether there is enough money to buy things she thinks they need, whereas when her husband held the money, he was in a better position to judge; 3) if with PROGRESA there is more money available for the family to spend on food, which is part of her domain, women can now make more decisions about such expenditures even if the types of decisions have not changed; 4) PROGRESA money may potentially increase the domain of women's decisionmaking in some instances; e.g., because PROGRESA money is spent on clothing for children or sometimes for

herself, she may make more decisions on clothing without her husband's involvement than in the past.

- Disentangling actual areas of decision-making is difficult, however, because women's answers may reflect strategic choices about publicly presenting formal authority, while not revealing the subtle and informal ways in which women actually make decisions or exercise influence. Other types of power relations, and changes in them as a result of women's new role as beneficiary, are also difficult to understand in a sufficiently nuanced way through either focus groups or surveys. A more in-depth, preferably ethnographic, research effort would be needed to sufficiently understand these subtle patterns of decision-making and other manifestations of intrahousehold power relationships, as well as PROGRESA's effects on them, than has yet been carried out. Still, the survey and focus groups together provide a useful picture of general patterns that can be further interrogated in future research projects.
- Women described a sense of new empowerment in not having to ask their husbands for money each time they want to buy something. If, however, as in one example, she buys shoes for the children whereas he used to give her money for this, i.e., he gives her less money than he used to, this has implications for the net benefits to women. This is an issue that needs further investigation.
- In the focus groups and 1999 household surveys, women said that men rarely take women's PROGRESA income. However, interviews with doctors indicate that they do. More research needs to be done into the question, as this has a bearing on what items are likely to be purchased with the money and for whom. It also has implications for household power relations and the extent to which PROGRESA is or is not changing them.

PROGRESA and Collective Activities

- PROGRESA's mode of assistance centers on the individual beneficiary and does not involve local organizations. This limits opportunities for the type of empowerment that can occur when women participate in organizations, and the developmental second-round effects that can occur through building organizational capacity, social capital and the type of learning that occurs through participation in groups.
- The program does, however, involve activities where women gather in groups and have the opportunity to communicate with each other. There are monthly meetings with *promotoras*, which are officially for giving program-related information to beneficiaries, but in some communities also provide a space for women to talk about other concerns and problems. There are the health *pláticas*, where health issues of importance to women are discussed. There are also *faenas*, the communal work activities which do not officially have an association with PROGRESA, but which are organized by doctors or *promotoras* and often involve beneficiaries. These collective activities, as well as the trips the women make to pick up their cash

transfers, are also opportunities for them to leave their homes and their communities without their spouses.

- *Promotoras* and beneficiaries described personal changes that are forms of empowerment, including increased freedom of movement, self-confidence, and ‘opening their minds.’ The type of changes reported fall into three categories: 1) women leave the house more often; 2) women have the opportunity to speak to each other about concerns, problems and solutions; 3) women are more comfortable speaking out in groups. Such changes were more pronounced for *promotoras* than beneficiaries, though some beneficiaries had similar experiences. Some beneficiaries reported no such changes, however.
- These reported changes suggest ways in which PROGRESA can potentially contribute to longer-term social development, even if in small ways, and thus the importance of these collective activities. It should therefore be an operational concern to ensure that the monthly meetings and *pláticas* are being held. *Promotoras* could also be encouraged in their training to use the monthly meetings for more than operational concerns, instead facilitating a dialogue around concerns related or unrelated to PROGRESA. Currently, only a minority of *promotoras* have been using the meetings for this broader purpose.
- Another way in which PROGRESA contributes to women’s empowerment is through the content of what they learn in the health *pláticas*. Beneficiaries refer in general to ‘knowing more’ now and to a wide range of new knowledge in the areas of sanitation, nutrition, illnesses and other health-related issues. They also report changes that have occurred in women’s relationships with men as a result of what they have learned, for example, in the area of family planning.
- The research thus suggests that women are benefiting from a new recognition of their importance in the family, new freedom of movement, and some increased confidence, awareness and knowledge, without paying a major price in terms of intrahousehold harmony. Nevertheless, the changes in intrahousehold relations brought about by the program appear to be modest. This should not come as a surprise or disappointment, however, as change in this domain is necessarily slow as well as complex, where women make strategic choices involving challenge, conformity and accommodation. PROGRESA gives women new resources and information with which to approach these choices.

Education and Gender Issues

Attitudes Toward the Education of Girls

- One of PROGRESA’s key strategies for improving the well-being of women is through increasing girls’ education. Better education can improve girls’ future status in their households and the labor market, and improve their living standards and social participation. Although increased school attendance is the main program

objective, supportive attitudes toward girls' education among mothers and fathers is important to making the program work and making outcomes sustainable over time. In a socioeconomic environment where most women do not work in formal employment, and opportunities for using secondary education in the market are low, one might expect that attitudes toward girls' education to be ambivalent. This turned out not to be the case. Women responded vociferously in favor of girls' education. The four main reasons given were, in order of the frequency: 1) Education is important for girls' ability to obtain employment, or better employment — higher paying and less exploitative. Interestingly, the majority of responses mentioning the importance of education for employment explained this importance not in terms of her contributing additional income to the household, but rather in terms of the possibility that the marriage will fail — that the man may leave her or that the relationship will otherwise end badly, and she will be left to support herself and her children. 2) Education helps girls to have a better life generally, related to income, personal development, position in the family, and likelihood she will marry later rather than earlier. 3) Education allows girls and women to better defend themselves in their relationships with men and in public, and to get along better in the outside world. 4) Education makes women value themselves more.

- Women frequently made comparisons between their own lives and the better lives they want for their daughters. Mothers are supportive of girls' education because they have experienced firsthand what life is like without an education.
- The responses regarding the value of girls' education were far more strongly and confidently stated than those responding to questions as to whether participation in PROGRESA put women in a better position within their own households. This suggests that the empowering effects of PROGRESA with respect to intrahousehold relationships are likely to be stronger as long-term effects, affecting the next generation of women through education more than it empowers the current beneficiaries.
- PROGRESA's incentives for girls' education thus correspond to the attitudes and aspirations of women in these communities. About a quarter of the responses reported above were made by non-beneficiaries, implying that either these attitudes exist independently of PROGRESA, or that non-beneficiaries are influenced by ideas introduced in their communities by the program and the fact that more girls are going to school now. It is likely that both are true. PROGRESA's emphasis on educating girls gives government legitimacy to the practice as well as the financial support to make it possible. Also, this emphasis may increase awareness of the issue within families and communities, a means of changing attitudes.
- When comparing the importance of girls' education to that of boys, the women tended to favor boys, their explanations revealing less distance between their attitudes and those they attribute to men. Their reasons were men's responsibility as breadwinners and head of the household, and the fact that girls get married. A smaller group of responses, mostly from *promotoras*, favored girls.

- Women were equally divided between those who said that men were supportive of keeping their daughters in school and those who said they were not. The main reason for the latter view is that men see post-*primeria* education of girls as a waste of time and money, because girls are likely to get married at a young age and become a housewife. Other reasons have to do with their physical safety in traveling to school, and the risk of their finding a boyfriend at school and getting pregnant.
- We did not get responses suggesting that PROGRESA has in the short-term influenced men's attitudes about the value of girls' education. However, men seem to be allowing their daughters to attend school, and given the strength of men's (and to a lesser extent women's) historical biases against girls' education as reported in the comments above, the fact that PROGRESA has succeeded in raising girls' enrollment should be viewed as an accomplishment. Where government programs run counter to socio-cultural biases, they can succeed in changing attitudes by the de facto presence of girls in school, by generating discussion and awareness around the issue of girls' education and de-normalizing the bias against educating them, and by giving girls' a chance to succeed and demonstrate the value of educating them. That value will be less apparent, however, as long as there are few employment opportunities for women (in the formal or informal sector) and they continue to get married and not appear to 'use' this education.
- Most of the women explained that the cash grants were higher for girls than for boys because girls have higher expenses than boys, such as for cosmetics and more expensive clothing. Almost half of these responses came from *promotoras*, indicating that at least some program principles are not well explained to or understood by *promotoras*, much less beneficiaries. PROGRESA is more concerned that the incentives work than that participants understand them. However, there is educational value in sharing the ideas behind the programs.
- Some *promotoras* explained that the higher grants for girls are to encourage fathers to allow their daughters to keep studying, as the men have strong historical biases against educating girls. The discussions on this topic by *promotoras* and beneficiaries suggest that: 1) the program's incentives for enabling girls to stay in *secundaria* are thus well-designed; and 2) the fact that PROGRESA gives higher grants for girls' schooling can promote discussion of girls' rights to education. This argues for better training for *promotoras* so that they better understand the principles and incentive structure of the program, and potential benefits of their sharing this understanding with beneficiaries.

Adult Education

- Early PROGRESA policy proposes that adult education programs, particularly those for women, will be strengthened and the contents linked to elements that are important to the aims of PROGRESA. Thus far adult education in the program

currently focuses on health, through the health *pláticas*, and does not involve other forms of education for adult women.

- The policy also proposes coordination with other government programs that involve labor training and temporary employment, which can increase people's chances of success in the formal or informal economy. Such coordination, were it to occur, would correspond to the aspirations of women, who strongly expressed their desire for education that would lead to direct material benefits, i.e., productive activities that earn them money or lower their household expenditures. Women speak highly of PROGRESA and the benefits it brings in terms of extra money, and health and education improvements. However, when asked what type of government program they most want, the women consistently spoke first of jobs. In some states PROGRESA has begun to link beneficiaries with opportunities to engage in productive activities. Given the extent to which women express their desire to have such opportunities, the program should increase its efforts to link its beneficiaries with programs that support productive activities. A relatively small number of women said they were too busy or too old to learn anything new.
- Many women mentioned reading and writing. They want these skills in order to fill out forms and sign papers, help their children with their studies and homework, and to "defend themselves," in the private and public spheres. Doctors interviewed also said that other forms of adult education for beneficiaries such as literacy and numeracy training were critical to the PROGRESA program functioning well.
- Men's expectations of and attitudes toward women and girls affect the extent to which women are able to take advantage of the benefits that PROGRESA offers and put into practice what they learn through participation in the program; for example, whether women can keep their PROGRESA money and decide how to spend it; whether girls can go to school; whether women can use some of the health services offered or put into practice what they learn about in the health *pláticas*, e.g., family planning; the cervical cancer tests, etc. Women said that PROGRESA should give education to adult men, specifically on: how to treat women and the family; birth control/family planning; domestic violence; education for couples; the importance of health care for the entire family.

General Conclusions

- If material poverty, and poor health and nutrition are seen as obstacles to the empowerment of women, then promoting these achievements is the main way in which PROGRESA contributes to women's empowerment. However, the program contributes in other ways, through putting additional resources under women's control; giving women more opportunities to leave the house; educating them on health and nutrition issues; providing new spaces in which to communicate with other women; and educating girls to improve their position in the future. These aspects of the program thus far appear to have had some impacts on 'personal empowerment' (e.g., self-esteem, 'sense of self in a wider context') though more

modest impacts on intrahousehold relationships. More generally, the spotlight that PROGRESA's design puts on women gives government recognition to women that is noticed by beneficiary and non-beneficiary families, and the program is introduced with messages about women's importance. This has fostered, if at a low level, a discourse within PROGRESA communities around gender issues.

- There are ways in which PROGRESA could strengthen its impact on women's empowerment. In addition to its health and child education strategies, PROGRESA policy originally envisioned a number of other program features that represented a more holistic and developmental approach to poverty reduction. Revisiting some of these ideas (e.g., adult education, productive projects, community participation), as well as learning from women's suggestions (such as health education for men) or from ways in which the program has been adapted in communities with good results (e.g., encouraging *promotoras* to use the monthly meetings as a forum for women to discuss problems and solutions), would make it a stronger program in terms of the benefits it brings in the short run and its potential to reduce poverty and increase its developmental impacts in the long term.

PART I

THE IMPACT OF PROGRESA ON INTRAHOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING AND RELATIVE SCHOOLING ACHIEVEMENTS OF BOYS AND GIRLS

Bénédicte de la Brière and Agnes R. Quisumbing

1. INTRODUCTION

There is growing evidence that the household cannot be characterized as one where individuals share the same preferences or pool their resources. New research has shown that the unitary model of the household has been rejected in a variety of country settings in both developed and developing countries (see Strauss and Thomas 1995; Behrman 1997; Haddad *et al.* 1997 for reviews). Although the unitary model continues to be extremely powerful in explaining many phenomena, the evidence in favor of a model where individuals within the household have different preferences, or maintain control over their own resources, is of interest to researchers and policymakers alike. Indeed, Haddad *et al.* (1997) argue that using the unitary model of the household as a guideline for policy prescriptions may lead to policy failures. First, the effect of public transfers may differ depending on the identity of the income recipient. Second, the response of nonrecipients of the income transfer must also be considered. If households reallocate resources away from the transfer recipient to compensate for the transfer receipt, the intended effect of the income transfer may not be realized. Third, at the project level, the unitary model predicts that it does not matter to whom policy initiatives are addressed, since information, like other resources within the household, will be shared. Lastly, adherence to a unitary model of the household disables many policy levers that could be brought to bear on development problems. The unitary model predicts that household behavior can be changed only by changes in prices and household incomes. In contrast, the collective model posits that a large range of policies can be used to affect household allocation outcomes, such as changes in access to common property resources, credit, public works schemes, and legal and institutional rights.

Mexico's ongoing anti-poverty program, the National Education, Health, and Nutrition Program (PROGRESA), launched in August 1997, demonstrates how emerging knowledge on intrahousehold issues and decisionmaking has been used to design an intervention that differs markedly from those previously undertaken in Mexico. The program provides cash benefits linked to children's school attendance and to regular clinic attendance, as well as in-kind health benefits and nutritional supplements (Gomez de Leon and Parker 1999). Cash benefits correspond on average to a 22% increase in the income levels of the beneficiaries, and, in contrast to previous transfer programs in Mexico, *are given directly to the mother of the family*. The program's designers deliberately chose to give the transfers directly to the mother, citing the literature (e.g., Thomas 1990) that resources controlled by women are more likely to be

manifested in greater improvements in child health and nutrition than resources controlled by men. Program staff also argue that the design of the program may increase women's "empowerment" by increasing their control over resources and thus their bargaining power (Gomez de Leon and Parker 1999: 2).

This paper attempts to contribute to the evaluation of PROGRESA in three ways. First, it aims to ascertain whether or not the implementation of PROGRESA contributed to an increase in women's bargaining power. Since "bargaining power" is a notoriously difficult concept to measure, we limit our analysis to a series of questions on husband's and wife's roles in making specific household decisions which were asked during the March 1998, October 1998, and June-July 1999 evaluation surveys. It also explicitly uses a collective model of the household as a framework for analyzing the decisionmaking outcomes. Second, it attempts to control for family background variables and the existing (pre-program) distribution of bargaining power within the household by using information on the couple's physical and human resources at the time of marriage, in addition to variables capturing the family's eligibility for PROGRESA, location in control or program communities, and monetary transfers disbursed by the program. Third, it provides additional evidence on parental preferences for differential investment in child schooling by gender.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of bargaining power and its measurement in economic studies. Section 3 discusses the data used in this paper, including the variables measuring bargaining power and the design of the modules on family background. Section 4 examines the effects of family background on the pre-marriage human and physical capital of husband and wife, which we argue are among the main determinants of bargaining power within marriage. Section 5 presents descriptive statistics and multinomial logit estimates of the probability that a decision is made by each spouse rather than jointly, and Section 6 tests whether husbands and wives exhibit preferences for the education of sons relative to daughters. Section 7 summarizes and suggests areas for future work.

2. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES IN THE MEASUREMENT OF BARGAINING POWER¹

An objective of this paper is to examine the impact of PROGRESA on the bargaining power of women within the household. However, the concept of bargaining power is elusive. This section briefly discusses the possible determinants of bargaining power and existing attempts to measure bargaining power in the economics literature, in order to motivate the choice of variables used in the analysis. Much of the literature summarized in this section was influential in the design of the module on family background and assets at marriage fielded during ENCEL 99M.

¹ This section is based on Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999).

2.1 Determinants of Bargaining Power

Bargaining power is affected by four sets of determinants: (1) control over resources, such as assets; (2) influences that can be used to alter the bargaining process; (3) mobilization of interpersonal networks; and (4) basic attitudinal attributes.²

Economic analysis of bargaining power has tended to focus on economic resources exogenous to labor supply as a major determinant of bargaining power. These include assets (e.g., Doss 1996; Thomas, Contreras, and Frankenberg 1997; Quisumbing 1994), unearned income (Schultz 1990; Thomas 1990), or transfer payments and welfare receipts (Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 1997; Rubaclava and Thomas 1997). The threat of withdrawing both oneself and one's assets from the household grants the owner of those assets some power over household resources. These threats are credible if supported by community norms or divorce laws. For example, Thomas *et al.* (1997) use assets at marriage as an indicator of bargaining power because in most of Indonesia, spouses can take what they brought into the marriage with them were the marriage to dissolve.

Factors which can influence the bargaining process include: legal rights, skills and knowledge, the capacity to acquire information, education, and bargaining skills. Some of these influences are external to the individual (e.g., legal rights), but many of them are highly correlated with human capital or education. In some instances, domestic violence can be used to extract resources from spouses or their families, as in the case of dowry-related violence in India (Rao 1997; Bloch and Rao 1996). Individuals can also mobilize personal networks to improve their bargaining power. Membership in organizations, access to kin and other social networks, and "social capital" may positively influence a person's power to affect household decisions.³ Many of these social networks are related to one's family's status within a community. Lastly, basic attitudinal attributes that affect bargaining power include self-esteem, self-confidence, and emotional satisfaction. While the economic literature has not dealt extensively with this issue, part of the success of group-based credit programs such as the Grameen Bank has been attributed to its group-based empowerment approach. Many NGOs have explicit empowerment objectives that go beyond economic means to include legal awareness, political participation, and use of contraception (Schuler *et al.* 1997). By deliberately targeting transfers to women, requiring them to leave their homes to claim the transfers, encouraging their participation in community meetings, and requiring visits to health facilities, PROGRESA does have the potential for affecting women's bargaining power within the household.

² This draws heavily on Jean-Pierre Habicht's presentation during the External Advisory Committee of the USAID/WID project, "Strengthening Development Policy through Gender Analysis," May 20-21, 1999.

³ The value of kin support is illustrated by Bangladeshi sisters' giving up their share of land inheritance in return for their brothers' support (Subramanian 1998). The assurance of their brothers' support clearly has an economic value for these women.

2.2 Measuring the Determinants of Power

In the economics literature, attempts to measure the bargaining power of individuals within the household have focused on control over economic resources. Candidate proxies for bargaining power have included: (1) public provision of resources to a particular member of the household and exogenous policy changes which affect the intrahousehold distribution of these resources (Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales 1997; Rubaclava and Thomas 1997); (2) shares of income earned by women (Hoddinott and Haddad 1995); (3) unearned income (Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990); (4) inherited assets (Quisumbing 1994); (5) assets at marriage (Thomas, Frankenberg, and Contreras 1997); and (6) current assets (Doss 1996).

Lundberg, Pollak, and Wales (1997) examine the effect of a policy which effectively transferred the child allowance from men to women in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s. They find that it increases the share of expenditures on women's clothing and children's clothing relative to men's clothing. Hoddinott and Haddad's (1994, 1995) work on Cote d'Ivoire investigates the effect of women's income share on the allocation of expenditures. Recognizing the endogeneity of women's income share, they use the difference in the educational attainment of the head and spouse, the proportion of land holdings and household business capital operated by adult women, the ratio of the spouse to the male head's education, and other dummy variables related to wife's schooling as instruments for the share of women's income. Thomas (1990) and Schultz (1990) use unearned income: Thomas (1990) tests the collective model by examining the effects of unearned income of men and women on nutrient intakes, fertility and child survival, and child anthropometrics, while Schultz analyzes the differential effects of men's and women's unearned income on labor supply and fertility in Thailand. Quisumbing (1994) examines the intrahousehold distribution of land and education as a function of father's and mother's education and inherited landholdings in the Philippines. Thomas *et al.* (1997) examine whether assets brought to marriage by husband and wife have a differential impact on child health in Indonesia. Finally, Doss (1996) examines the effects of current assets on the distribution of expenditure among different consumption categories in Ghana.

None of these measures is perfect. Labor income, which has often been included in computations of income shares (e.g., Kennedy 1992), is clearly problematic because it reflects time allocation and labor force participation decisions. Several studies (e.g., Thomas 1990; Schultz 1990) use nonlabor income (also called unearned income or nonwage income), either directly, or as an instrument for total income (Thomas 1993). Schultz (1990) and Thomas (1990) assume that nonearned income is independent of tastes and labor market conditions, which may not be true if much of nonearned income is from pensions, unemployment benefits, and earnings from assets accumulated over the life cycle. However, these concerns may be less critical in studies that focus on children (and households early in the life cycle) and in those that rely on measures of wealth that are typically inherited or given at the time of marriage (Strauss and Thomas 1995). Current asset holdings, used by Doss (1996) in her study of Ghanaian households, may also be affected by asset accumulation decisions made within marriage.⁴ Depending on provisions of

⁴ One of her sensitivity tests uses a specification with the percentage of land owned by women, but land ownership by women in Ghana may be endogenous to marriage. In Western Ghana, Quisumbing *et al.* (1998) show that women obtain strong individualized land rights,

marriage laws, assets acquired within marriage may be considered joint property and will not be easily assignable to husband or wife. The validity of inherited assets as an indicator of bargaining power may be conditional upon the receipt of these assets prior to marriage, unless bargaining power also depends on the expected value of inheritance.⁵ Inherited assets could also be correlated with individual unobservables, such as previous investments in the individual during childhood (Strauss and Thomas 1995). Finally, assets brought to marriage, while exogenous to decisions made within marriage, could be affected by assortative mating and marriage market selection (Foster 1996).

Finding the appropriate indicator of bargaining power should be guided not only by the need to find a variable which is exogenous to bargaining occurring within marriage, but more importantly by the cultural relevance of these indicators. Increasingly, economists are turning to ethnographic evidence and qualitative methods used by sociologists and anthropologists to guide the construction of appropriate measures of bargaining power.⁶ Based on anthropological evidence from the rural Philippines, Quisumbing (1994) argues that inherited landholdings are a valid measure of bargaining power since land is usually given as part of the marriage gift and major asset transfers occur at the time of marriage. Thomas *et al.* (1997) used ethnographic evidence and focus-group discussions in Indonesia to identify areas where women bring substantial asset holdings to marriage, and where they can claim these assets upon divorce. Noting that if male or female “income” is measured with error, estimated income effects will be biased, Frankenberg and Thomas (1999) investigate the possible biases from reporting spouse’s assets by interviewing husbands and wives separately and comparing their responses in the Indonesian Family Life Survey.

3. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES AND DATA DESCRIPTION

The considerations discussed in section 2 were instrumental in the design of the modules on intrahousehold decisionmaking. Some questions on women’s status and decisionmaking had already been fielded in the Survey of Household Socio-Economic Characteristics (ENCASEH), information from which was used to determine the household’s eligibility for PROGRESA. Early discussions with PROGRESA staff also helped in identifying questions which would be fielded both in the baseline evaluation survey (ENCEL 98M) and in subsequent rounds of the evaluation survey. In some cases, questions were introduced only in the October 1998 round;

equivalent to private ownership, from their husbands if they help in establishing cocoa fields. Husbands “give” their wives land to circumvent traditional inheritance practices among the matrilineal Akan.

⁵ Admittedly, a potential heir could exert much power within his or her household, but the threat of disinheritance does exist.

⁶ See, for example, Rao’s (1997) analysis of wife-beating in South India, which uses a combination of qualitative and econometric methods.

however, for all outcomes analyzed in this paper, we have observations from at least two points in time.

Evaluations of the effect of program participation on women's empowerment or bargaining power have to deal with the possibility that women with certain characteristics self-select into programs. Unless unobserved characteristics which determine selection into the program are controlled for, estimates of program impact may be biased. This issue is somewhat controlled for by the randomized design of PROGRESA, since randomized assignment to treatment implies that the distribution of all the variables for treatments and controls should be equal prior to the administration of the program (Behrman and Todd 1999). Comparison of locality means of age, education, income, access to health care, etc. did not lead to the rejection of the hypothesis that the means are equal between treatment and control localities. Thus, difference in difference comparisons of the mean outcomes between PROGRESA and PROGRESA-eligible families in control communities would be a valid way of testing whether or not the program had an effect on outcomes of interest. This is the approach followed by Gomez de Leon and Parker (1999) in their analysis of the effects of PROGRESA on women's labor force participation and decisionmaking.

The approach taken in this paper, however, examines the impact of PROGRESA at the household and the individual level. Schultz (1999), citing Hammermesh (1999), has argued that the individual (or household) level analysis is the preferred basis for evaluating the effects of the program, although it is reconfirmed by simpler program-control group differences. There are gains to including individual and household characteristics in the analysis of the impact of PROGRESA (Schultz 1999) rather than relying completely on the randomized sample design. Controls could reduce the statistical bias due to heterogeneity between the eligible families in control and program communities that may be related to the decisionmaking outcomes. Moreover, including additional control variables reduces the unexplained variation in outcomes at the household (rather than the community) level. Even if the program placement and implementation of eligibility rules are random, and thus the magnitude of the aggregate estimates of the program effects on decisionmaking outcomes are not affected by these household and individual controls, the added control variables reduce the error of the estimate and increase the statistical power of the individual model to isolate significant program effects (Schultz 1999; Manning *et al.* 1982). Moreover, including individual and household controls may help policymakers identify additional variables which can be entry points for future interventions.

To account for the possibility that randomization may not be able to control completely for individual or family-level characteristics that may affect the degree to which women's bargaining power is affected by the program, the IFPRI and PROGRESA teams jointly designed a module to collect information on family background and the human and physical capital of the husband and wife (assets at marriage).⁷ This module was first administered to a group of *promotoras* (community organizers) in February 1999 as a pilot; based on the results of the pilot and further discussion with PROGRESA staff, a module on family background was fielded as a

⁷ Patricia Muñiz, Ana Núñez, and Gabriela Vázquez were instrumental in designing and fielding the pilot survey among the *promotoras*.

part of the June-July 1999 round (ENCEL 99M). Note also that because this module was administered in the third round of the evaluation surveys, sample attrition implies that we do not have this information for all households which were originally included in the baseline. Because we wanted to examine the effects of bargaining power variables on outcomes over time, and since we are interested in the bargaining power of husband and wife, the analysis in this paper is restricted to intact couples who were interviewed in all three survey rounds (98M, 98O, and 99M). In some of our analysis, we also use the information on actual monthly amounts disbursed by PROGRESA to households during a somewhat more restricted period: between July 1998 and May 1999. Due to operational delays, disbursements were not made to all of the potential PROGRESA beneficiaries (in some localities, for example, disbursements were equal to zero), and the monthly transfers data do not represent actual receipts by households. Rather than reduce the sample size further—our sample of intact couples who were surveyed in all three survey rounds is already smaller than the 24,077 households in the “evaluation sample”—we use the poverty densification criterion and residence in treatment localities (rather than amounts received) as the criteria for identifying PROGRESA households. We refer to our smaller sample as the “analysis sample” in subsequent discussions.

3.1 Characteristics of Husband and Wife

Table 1 presents basic characteristics of the husbands and wives in our analysis sample, by category. The top panel of Table 1 shows that husbands tend to be older than wives (43.3 years versus 38.8 years) and to have completed more years of schooling (3.2 years versus 2.9 years). These differences are statistically significant. A greater proportion of husbands speaks Spanish (98% compared to 93% of wives), and husbands are also more likely to be bilingual. The second panel of Table 1 compares these individual characteristics across treatment and control communities. Although the magnitudes of the differences are not large, as indicated by Behrman and Todd (1999), the large sample sizes are conducive to a rejection of the null hypotheses that the means are equal across these groups when the comparison is conducted using individual means. At the 5% level, we do not reject the hypothesis that the means are equal for 5 out of 8 variables compared. Husbands and wives seem to be slightly older in control communities, and slightly more wives speak Spanish in the treatment localities.

In contrast, there are significant differences between poor and nonpoor households (third panel of Table 1), based on the densification criterion. Both husbands and wives tend to be younger in poor households, and a higher proportion of both speaks an indigenous language. Larger proportions of nonpoor husbands speak Spanish, and poorer wives have fewer years of schooling than their nonpoor counterparts.

The fourth panel of Table 1 compares the poor in treatment communities to those in control communities. As mentioned above, the poor are those identified as such in the “densification” phase as households eligible for PROGRESA benefits. Thus, we refer to the poor in treatment communities as PROGRESA households and those in control communities as the comparison group for evaluation purposes. While husbands tend to be older in control communities, and more wives speak Spanish in treatment communities, the differences between the poor in the two types of localities are insignificant for 6 out of 8 outcomes at the 5% level. Similarly, the nonpoor in treatment and control localities (bottom panel of Table 1) are fairly similar, except for

higher proportions of nonpoor husbands and wives speaking an indigenous language in PROGRESA localities.

3.2 Characteristics of the Union, Assets at Marriage, and Pre-Marriage Work Experience

Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the couples in our sample. Among the women interviewed, a vast majority (97.5%) were presently in a union. Only 5.7% were in a union prior to the current union.

At the time of their marriage—typically at the age of 18—or at the time they first entered a union, wives lived in a household with a minimum of 6.8 members.⁸ Only 42% of these households had a radio at the time the women married. Interestingly enough, only 27% of the wives had ever worked outside the home; among these women, the average age they started working was 13.6 years. Including those who had never worked outside the home, women had 1.5 years of work experience prior to marriage.

Most of those who worked before marriage were domestic workers (55%), followed by agricultural laborers (19.3%) and nonagricultural workers (17.9%). The majority of women also worked outside the family's farm or own-enterprise (85.8%). Interestingly enough, 43% of those who had worked prior to marriage worked in a city, and a quarter had worked in the same locality where she lives now. The remainder worked in another locality and a very small proportion had worked abroad.

The module on family background and assets at marriage asked the wife to report whether or not she and her husband owned land, farm assets, farm animals, a house, or consumer durables at the time of marriage. The question was asked separately regarding the husband's and wife's assets but neither the quantity in each category nor the value of each asset was asked. We used a modification of a procedure employed by Morris *et al.* (1999) to arrive at an aggregate asset index for each spouse.⁹ The asset score for each spouse was computed by assigning to each item on the list of assets (g) a weight equal to the reciprocal of the proportion of husbands and wives that reported owning the item at the time of marriage (w_g), multiplying that weight by the indicator (zero or one) that the spouse owned the particular asset g (f_g) and summing the product over all possible assets

$$\text{spouse's asset score} = 100 \left(\sum f_g \cdot w_g \right) \text{ for } g = 1, \dots, G. \quad (1)$$

⁸ We cannot ascertain the actual size of the woman's household at the time of marriage since she was asked only if certain members lived in the household (e.g., father, mother, sister, brother) and not the number of brothers and sisters. The household size figure is just a count of the various categories reported and should be interpreted as a minimum household size.

⁹ The assets included in the asset score were: blender, gas stove, traditional stove, television set, jewelry, clock, agricultural equipment, chicken, pig, goat, and cow.

The choice of the weighting system is based on the assumption that households would be progressively less likely to own a particular item the higher its monetary value. Morris *et al.* (1999) find that the log of the asset score is highly correlated with the log of the household asset value (computed by summing the reported value of assets) and thus is a good proxy indicator of household wealth.¹⁰ We did not include land in the asset score; rather, we have two dummy variables indicating whether the husband and the wife had land at the time of marriage.

Husbands enter marriage with more physical capital than their wives: husbands' asset scores were twice those of wives. Thirteen percent of husbands had land at the time of marriage, compared to only 1% of wives. Table 1 also indicates that husbands have more years of schooling than wives, suggesting that they enter a union with significantly more human capital as well. If, as the literature suggests, human and physical capital significantly influence bargaining power within marriage, rural Mexican husbands wield more power within their households than their wives.

Consistent with residence patterns in Mesoamerica (Robicheaux 1997), close to 50% (49.6%) of newly-married couples live with the husband's parents, although around 40% live on their own. In the newly-formed household, the mother-in-law (husband's mother) is the person who is usually responsible for buying and preparing food (60% of responses), followed by the wife herself (28.7%). On the average, it takes three years before the new wife takes charge of her own household's food expenses, an indicator that the couple is now "independent" of their in-laws, even if they may continue to share a residence.

4. EFFECTS OF FAMILY BACKGROUND ON HUSBAND AND WIFE CHARACTERISTICS

The family background module also included questions on the each spouse's household of origin. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics regarding the family background of husband and wife. Since wives are typically younger than their husbands (see Table 1), it is not surprising that a larger proportion of the wife's parents are alive, compared to the husband's parents. However, due to the residential pattern in rural Mexico, the husband's parents are more likely to be living in the same locality as the couple, and higher percentages of the husband's parents are likely to live in the same household (13.4% for the father-in-law and 14.7% for the mother-in-law). Social status of both sets of parents does not appear to be markedly different: similar

¹⁰ The asset score in Morris *et al.* (1999) is slightly different: the weight is multiplied by the number of the units of asset *g* owned by the household rather than the indicator that the household owns the asset. We used the indicator because the survey module did not ask how many of the assets each spouse owned, but only whether or not they owned at least one of each item. We also multiply our asset score by 100.

proportions reported wearing shoes when the child was growing up (66.5% for father and 63% for mothers).¹¹

The husband's parents owned slightly larger areas of land than the wife's parents, 2.6 hectares compared to 2.3 hectares, and fathers on both sides owned more land than did their wives. The husband's father owned 2.4 hectares at the time of his son's marriage, while his wife only owned 0.17 hectares. The wife's father owned 2.15 hectares when his daughter married, and his wife, 0.18 hectares.

The wife's parents appear to fare slightly better in terms of schooling and language ability, although it is possible that since the wife was asked about both sets of parents, she has better (or more favorable) recall of her parents' background. Close to 40% of the wives' fathers and 26.5% of the wives' mothers are literate, compared to 33.4% of their fathers-in-law and 22.6% of their mothers-in-law. A larger proportion of the wife's parents also attended or completed primary school compare to her in-laws, though the wife's father is more likely to have attended or completed primary school than her mother. A slightly higher proportion of the husband's fathers does not speak Spanish, while a slightly higher proportion of the wife's parents is bilingual.

Table 4 presents tobit regressions of the effects of parental characteristics on husband's and wife's schooling and asset scores, and on the wife's work experience prior to marriage. For both husband and wife, years of schooling increase with birth year, suggesting that later-born cohorts are better-educated. More years of schooling are also associated with literate parents (both father and mother), and primary school attendance and completion. Interestingly enough, the (respective) father's attending or completing primary school has a positive and significant effect on both husband's and wife's schooling, but the mother's attending or completing primary school has a positive and significant effect only on wife's schooling. Social status variables—proxied by the parents' wearing shoes—only has a positive and significant effect on wife's schooling. Lastly, parental landholdings also positively influence the number of years completed in school.

Turning now to the wife's work experience prior to marriage, the only significant variables are her own schooling and her mother's having attended primary school. Wives with more education and those whose mothers have attended primary school have more work experience prior to marriage—a result whose implications we shall discuss later.

How does parental background affect the assets that each spouse brings to marriage? Both the husband's and the wife's asset score is positively affected by their respective years of schooling. Husbands whose fathers have completed primary school, and whose parents wore shoes in the husband's childhood, bring more assets to the marriage. Wives whose mothers are literate, whose mothers have completed primary school, whose parents wore shoes, and whose parents owned larger land areas bring more assets to their marriage. It is interesting to note that maternal variables consistently have a positive and significant effect on wife's schooling and assets, and

¹¹ We thank Daniel Hernández for suggesting this measure of social status.

paternal variables on husband's physical and human capital. As we shall see later on, this same-gender effect persists in terms of the husband's investment in boys' schooling.

5. DETERMINANTS OF INTRAHOUSEHOLD DECISIONMAKING

5.1 Descriptive Statistics

The ENCEL surveys have a number of indicators of women's status, well-being, and participation in economic activity.¹² Gomez de Leon and Parker (1999) refer to these indicators as indicators of women's status and classify them into three different groups: (1) those corresponding to who makes household decisions related to children; (2) who makes decisions regarding expenditures; and (3) the degree of freedom women have to move about freely. While we also present summary statistics on (3) in the paper, we focus our analysis on outcomes related to decisionmaking related to expenditures and children.

The questions on decisionmaking are phrased in terms of who should make certain decisions within the household, with the following choices: husband alone, wife alone, both spouses jointly, another man in the household, or another woman in the household. In the baseline survey, only the first three choices were given to respondents; in both ENCEL 98O and ENCEL 99M, the last two choices were added. However, responses in the last two categories did not even account for 1% of the total number of responses. Table 5, part A shows the distribution of the responses among the categories. Without exception, the dominant response is that decisions are taken jointly by husband and wife. Aside from joint decisions, decisions regarding large household expenditures (e.g. house repairs, durables purchases) are more likely to be made by the husband alone, while decisions on food expenses and on children (taking the child for medical attention, telling the child to go to school) are more equally likely to be made by either spouse.

Joint decisionmaking is also the norm with respect to decisions how to spend a woman's extra income (Table 5 Part B), although successive ENCELS reveal an upward trend in the percentage of women reporting that they alone should decide how to spend the extra income. Lastly, while mobility of the woman seems to be rather limited—in the vast majority of cases, a woman would seek her husband's permission before visiting friends and relatives—the interpretation of the questions on mobility is ambiguous. Going to visit a friend or relative alone does not necessarily mean that one is more “empowered” than a woman who is accompanied by her children. Focus groups in the communities (Adato and Mindek, 2000) have indicated that women like to take their children visiting (having the money to do so was cited as one of the benefits of PROGRESA).

¹² Gómez de León and Parker (1999) analyze the impact of PROGRESA on women's labor force participation and decisionmaking, comparing differences in mean outcomes between treatments and controls before and after PROGRESA.

Table 6 presents the average total monthly transfers disbursed by PROGRESA to its beneficiaries. Note that we do not know for certain whether the transfers were actually received by beneficiaries, due to refusal or to operational delays. However, very few beneficiaries declined the benefits. The data in the table do indicate that the benefits were not evenly distributed throughout the year, with no disbursements reported in January and February 1999. For the purposes of our analysis, we interpret the transfers data as the potential transfer received by beneficiary households. Where the data for a particular beneficiary household is missing, we assume that the disbursement was equal to zero. Of course, poor households in control communities and non-eligible (i.e., nonpoor) households in both program and control communities receive zero transfers.

5.2 Multinomial Logit Regression

5.2.1 Empirical Specification

Gómez de León and Parker (1999) attempt to “rank” the outcomes in terms of women’s empowerment as follows: a woman is most empowered when she makes the decision alone, followed by joint decisions, and least empowered when her husband makes the decision alone. While field work cited by Gómez de León and Parker question the apparent “jointness” of decisionmaking—while women may report that decisions are made jointly, this does not necessarily reflect equal participation in making the decision—the survey questionnaire is a rather blunt instrument in capturing the subtle distinctions between true joint decisionmaking and the husband’s deciding with the wife’s acquiescence. Given this ambiguity, we prefer to use the results of the focus groups and qualitative work to inform the interpretation of the issue and do not attempt to rank the outcomes in the quantitative analysis.

Our approach is to estimate multinomial logit regressions on the following categories: (1) husband decides alone; or (2) wife decides alone relative to the omitted category (3) husband and wife decide jointly. This approach is similar to that taken by Frankenberg and Thomas (1999) in their analysis of husbands’ and wives’ decisionmaking patterns in Indonesia.

Since we are most interested in the effect of PROGRESA on the poor, following Hoddinott and Skoufias (2000), we do a first set of regressions on poor households in treatment and control communities, with the PROGRESA dummy defined as being located in a treatment community. We also look at changes through time using two specifications: (1) pooled data with time dummies and their interaction with the PROGRESA dummy; and (2) year-by-year regressions with the PROGRESA dummy as one of the regressors.

More specifically, let $P=1$ for a PROGRESA locality, 0 for a control locality. Let $E=$ eligible household (that is, $pobreden=1$), 0 otherwise. (The variable is set to missing if $pobreden$ is missing). For the pooled data, the specification is as follows:

Probability (husband decides) = $f(P, \text{Dummy for October 98}, \text{Dummy for June 99}, P \times \text{October 98 dummy}, P \times \text{June 99 dummy}, \text{Transfers}_{it}, X_h, X_w)$ if $E=1$

Probability (wife decides) = $f(P, \text{Dummy for October 98}, \text{Dummy for June 99}, P \times \text{October 98 dummy}, P \times \text{June 99 dummy}, \text{Transfers}_t, X_h, X_w)$ if $E=1$

relative to joint decisionmaking, the omitted category, (2)

where Transfers_t refer to real monetary transfers between July 1998 to October 1998 if the survey round is O98, and from November 1998 to May 1999 if the survey round is M99; X_h is a vector of husband's characteristics and X_w is a vector of wife's characteristics.

The husband's and wife's characteristics included among the regressors are: years of schooling, age, whether or not he or she speaks an indigenous language, whether or not he or she speaks Spanish, the asset score, and whether or not he or she owns land. In addition to these variables, we also have another variable capturing the years of work experience the wife had prior to marriage (we do not have a similar measure for the husband). Years of schooling are an indicator of human capital acquired through formal schooling. Speaking an indigenous language is a proxy for more traditional ideas which may be characteristic of indigenous communities, while Spanish language ability indicates one's assimilation into the mainstream Mexican culture. It may also reflect better access to information from the media or government channels. The asset score and a dummy variable for land ownership are proxies for physical capital at the time of marriage. We argue that these measures are preferred to current assets since they are exogenous to decisions made within marriage. (We also do not have complete data on current asset ownership by gender).

We have two program indicators: residence in a treatment community for poor households, and the amounts disbursed during each time period. We also include dummies for the survey round, with (typically) the March 98 ENCEL as the base category.¹³ Finally, we interact PROGRESA with the survey round, to capture the *change* in the effect of PROGRESA between the omitted round and that particular round. Pooling the data assumes that the coefficients on X_h and X_w are the same in each time period. The impact of PROGRESA in March 1998 (the excluded survey round) is $_bP$; the impact in October 1998 is $_bP + _b[\text{Oct98} * P]$; and that in June 1999 is $_bP + _b[\text{M99} * P]$, where the $_b$'s represent coefficients of the respective regressors. If the omitted round was a true baseline (collected prior to program implementation), the coefficients on the interaction terms between PROGRESA and the survey round would have measured the differential impact of the program in period t . However, except for the data on child schooling from ENCASEH 97, the data on household decisionmaking were collected after the program began in August 1997. Thus, the coefficients $_b[\text{Oct98} * P]$ and $_b[\text{M99} * P]$ should be interpreted as the *changes* in the effect of the program between (1) March 1998 and October 1998; and (2) March 1998 and June 1999. We estimate equation (2) separately for each year to see whether the effects of PROGRESA and the transfers are different for each year.

¹³ For those outcomes which have only two observations, the earlier survey round is the omitted category.

We also estimate a similar set of regressions for nonpoor households in treatment and control localities, but do not include transfer amounts among the regressors since these households would not receive any transfers from PROGRESA.

5.2.2 *PROGRESA Impacts on Poor Households*

Marginal effects from the pooled regressions for poor households are presented in Tables 7 to 14. We discuss decisions related to children, decisions regarding household expenditures, and the disposition of women's extra income, in that order.

Decisions Regarding Children. Decisions regarding children include: deciding when to take the child for medical treatment (Table 7), telling the child to go to school when he or she does not want to (Table 8), giving the child permission to go out (Table 9), and deciding on child clothing expenses (Table 10).

Husbands are more likely to decide on medical treatment by themselves (relative to a joint decision) if their wives have less schooling and prewedding work experience, and if husbands speak an indigenous language (Table 7). Turning to decisionmaking solely by wives, we find that wives with more schooling, and—symmetrical to the result for husbands—with more pre-marriage work experience are more likely to decide to seek medical attention for the child by themselves. Interestingly enough, wives with higher asset scores are less likely to decide on medical treatment by themselves. While the PROGRESA locality dummy is insignificant, PROGRESA transfers reduce the probability that the husband decides to take the child for medical treatment by himself, although the marginal effect is very small.

Table 8 presents the results for the regressions on who tells the child to go to school if the child does not want to attend. The husband is more likely to do this by himself if his wife is less educated, if she worked fewer years prior to marriage, if he himself speaks an indigenous language, and if he brought more assets to the marriage. Wives are more likely to act on their own and tell the child to go to school if they are better-educated and if they have more work experience prior to marriage. The PROGRESA dummy is again insignificant by itself but transfer amounts have a small yet significant negative effect on the probability that the husband alone tells an unwilling child to go to school.

Table 9 presents an analysis of the question of who gives children permission to go out. Husbands whose wives have more work experience and assets are less likely to act by themselves; however, husbands who bring more assets to marriage are more likely to act on their own relative to acting jointly. Wives are less likely to give children permission to go out (relative to giving the permission jointly with the husband) if their husbands completed more years in school. Between October 1998 and March 1999, the incidence of sole decisionmaking seems to have decreased for husbands in PROGRESA localities. However, the effect of the transfer amount is insignificant.

Table 10 presents the results on decisions regarding expenditures on child clothing. Husbands are less likely to decide by themselves on child clothing expenses if their wives are better educated, speak Spanish, and have more work experience prior to marriage. Husbands who

speak an indigenous language and who bring more assets to marriage are more likely to decide by themselves. Better-educated wives, wives with more work experience, and those with older husbands are more likely to decide on clothing expenditures by themselves. While neither the PROGRESA dummy nor its interaction with the time dummy is significant, PROGRESA transfers decrease the probability that the husband decides on child clothing expenses by himself.

Household Expenditure Decisions. Regressions on other categories of household expenditures are presented next. Tables 11 to 13 show the results for food expenditures (Table 11), durables (Table 12), and house repairs (Table 13).

Husbands are more likely to make decisions on food expenditures, relative to deciding jointly with their wives, if they speak an indigenous language and bring more assets to the marriage (Table 11). They are less likely to make sole decisions if their wives are better educated. Wives are more likely to make food expenditure decisions by themselves if their husbands speak Spanish, if husbands do not speak an indigenous language, and if they themselves have more work experience prior to marriage. Interestingly enough, husbands in PROGRESA communities seem to be more likely to decide on food expenditures by themselves. This appears to contradict the findings of the qualitative work (Adato and Mindek 2000) that suggest that women feel they are the persons responsible for making decisions on food expenses. Part of this discrepancy may be due to the bluntness of a survey questionnaire compared to the more nuanced questioning in a focus group discussion. Thus, the same question on “who decides on food expenditures” can be interpreted in very different ways by the husband and wife. While the husband may decide on the *total* amount to be spent on food, it is typically the wife who decides what to buy. As the qualitative work indicates, women take the money allocated for food and go to the market, and that is where decisions are made. As will be discussed subsequently, however, the results are quite different using the year-by-year regressions.

The equation for decisionmaking on durables is estimated only with data from October 1998 and the June-July 1999 surveys (Table 12). Husbands are less likely to make sole decisions if their wives speak Spanish, are wealthier, are better-educated, and have more work experience. Husbands are more likely to decide on durables purchases by themselves if they bring more assets to marriage. Wives are more likely to decide on durables purchases if they are better educated and have more work experience. Neither residence in a PROGRESA community nor transfers significantly affect decisionmaking on durables purchases.

Results for decisions on house repairs are presented in Table 13. Husbands are less likely to decide by themselves if their wives are younger or if the wives speak Spanish. Husbands are more likely to be sole decisionmakers if they are wealthier. Very few variables are significant in the wife’s equation, possibly because of the very low percentage of wives who report being sole decisionmakers in this category. Nevertheless, older wives are more likely to decide on house repairs by themselves. We see a higher incidence of sole decisionmaking for the wife in October 1998, but the interaction of the October 1998 dummy with the PROGRESA dummy is insignificant. Decisions on house repairs do not seem to be affected by residence in a PROGRESA community nor transfers.

Decisions on Women's Extra Income. Finally, we present regression results on who decides how to spend a woman's extra income in Table 14. A woman is more likely to decide on her own how to spend her extra income if she is older, if her husband is younger, if her husband does not speak Spanish, and if her husband owns land. She is more likely to let her husband decide if she is less educated, if she does not speak Spanish, and if she has less work experience. We see very interesting and consistent results with respect to the time dummies: later ENCEL rounds seem to report higher incidences of women making decisions regarding their extra income by themselves, and lower incidences of their letting their husbands decide. While PROGRESA seems to have decreased the probability that women decide by themselves how to spend their extra income between March 1998 and March 1999, relative to their deciding jointly with their husbands, transfer amounts have also decreased the probability that the woman lets her husband decide how to spend her extra income.

Year-by-year Regressions. We also estimated the regressions separately for each year. The marginal effects of the PROGRESA dummy and transfers disbursed are presented for October 1998 and June 1999, the two survey rounds common to all outcomes, in Table 15. Although cumulative real amounts from July 1998 to October 1998 are about half the cumulative amounts from October 1998 to May 1999, the transfers in the earlier period seem to have had a more significant impact in the earlier period, probably due to the novelty of the program and of giving transfers to women, even if the marginal effects are very small. The most significant effects are observed in the reduction of husbands' sole decisionmaking in a number of areas related to children (medical treatment, enforcing school attendance, and child clothing expenses) and to household expenditures (food expenses, house repairs). Note that the negative impact on husband's sole decisionmaking in food expenses runs counter to the effects for the pooled regressions. The significance of most of these effects vanishes in the June 1999 round. Contrary to expectations, PROGRESA transfers reduced the wife's sole decisionmaking in giving the child permission to go out in October 1998 and with respect to house repairs in June 1999.

While transfers seem to have reduced the probability that the wife decided how to spend her extra income in October 1998, by June 1999, transfers were associated with a higher probability that she alone decided on the disposition of her extra income, and a lower probability that she let her husband decide how to spend it. The significance of the transfers relative to the PROGRESA dummy suggests that the monetary transfers are the crucial aspect of the program with respect to bringing about changes in patterns of decisionmaking within households.

5.2.3 Spillover Effects on Nonpoor Households?

Tables 16 to 19 present similar pooled regressions for non-eligible households in treatment and control communities. Since the effects of husband's and wife's characteristics are qualitatively similar to those for poor households, we confine our discussion to the possible effects of living in a program community on non-eligible households. These households do not participate in any PROGRESA-related activities nor receive transfers, so whatever effects the treatment dummy and its interactions have would be indicative of spillover effects.

Table 16 shows that only the interaction term between PROGRESA and the October 1998 dummy is positive and significant in the husband's equation, indicating that between March 1998

and October 1998, husbands in treatment communities were more likely to make decisions on medical treatment and to tell children to go to school, than to make joint decisions. Husbands in treatment communities also seemed more likely to give children permission to go out in October 1998 (Table 17), but no other program spillover effects are significant. Results for food expenditures, durables expenditures (Table 18) and expenditures on house repairs (Table 19) do not indicate that having PROGRESA in the community significantly changed decisionmaking patterns of non-beneficiary households. Lastly, while wives are more likely to decide by themselves how to spend their extra income and less likely to let their husbands decide in later survey rounds, the interaction terms between the round dummies and the PROGRESA dummy are insignificant, pointing to the absence of a change in behavior due to PROGRESA.

5.3 Summary and Discussion

The above regression analysis for eight decisionmaking outcomes has identified a number of variables that appear to be significant determinants of decisionmaking within marriage—and, by extension, are correlated with each spouse’s bargaining power. Wife’s education and work experience prior to marriage are positively associated with her making decisions solely, and negatively associated with her husband’s deciding by himself. Being able to speak Spanish also gives women an additional advantage; in contrast, speaking an indigenous language, and having a husband who also speaks an indigenous language, makes women less likely to decide on matters by themselves. It is possible that indigenous groups are more traditional with respect to the role of women with respect to decisionmaking. While it is also possible that indigenous groups are quite heterogeneous, we do not have information on the particular group to which the husbands and wives in our sample belong.

Among poor households, PROGRESA by itself has an insignificant effect on decisionmaking patterns. What is more interesting are the significant coefficients on the transfers, which seem in most cases to reduce sole decision-making by husbands with regard to medical treatment, school attendance, and child clothing. The year-by-year estimates also show that transfers have a significant negative effect on husbands’ sole decisionmaking with respect to medical treatment, child school attendance, child clothing expenses, food expenditures, and major house repairs. The change in decisionmaking patterns is consistent with PROGRESA’s focus on primary health care, nutrition, and education, and its objective of empowering women to participate more fully in household decisionmaking.

Most noteworthy are the effects of exposure to PROGRESA with respect to decisions regarding the use of women’s income. Among poor households, PROGRESA seems to have become more effective between March 1998 and 1999 in increasing the probability that a woman decides by herself on the use of her extra income. The transfers have an effect separate from the treatment dummy on reducing the probability that she lets her husband decide how to spend her additional income. These results for transfers are consistent regardless of whether pooled estimates or year-by-year estimates are used. The significance of the monetary transfers, despite their small marginal effects, confirms the belief that transfers targeted to poor women have the potential to change decisionmaking patterns within households.

6. DETERMINANTS OF RELATIVE SCHOOLING ACHIEVEMENTS OF BOYS AND GIRLS

The educational component of PROGRESA includes grants to facilitate and encourage the educational aspirations of children and youth by fostering their enrollment and regular school attendance, and promoting parents' appreciation of the advantages of their children's education. By giving slightly higher scholarships to girls in secondary school, the program seeks to improve gender equity, since there is evidence that in poor families, women tend to abandon their studies at a higher rate and at an earlier age than men (Adato and Mindek 2000). Indeed, the focus groups show that mothers value boys' and girls' education, even if their husbands may not see the value of a girl's continuing school, due to the high probability of early marriage. Mothers pointed out that it is desirable for girls to attend school so they can find employment, or better employment; to make them better able to defend themselves; and to have a better life generally, reflecting issues of income, personal development, and position in the family (Adato and Mindek 2000). Indeed, employment was valued not in terms of the woman contributing additional income, but in terms of her being able to support herself in case the marriage failed. These results from the focus groups relate very strongly to the multinomial regression results which show the positive impact of work experience on a woman's ability to take decisions by herself, or on the probability that a decision is made jointly rather than solely by the husband (see Section 5 above).

In this section we explore the possibility that fathers and mothers may have different preferences in investing in their children's education. We also examine the effect of parental characteristics, their interaction with child gender, and PROGRESA on a specific schooling outcome, the deviation of the child's completed years of schooling from the locality-specific cohort mean.

6.1 Methodology

Following Thomas (1990,1994, 1996a) and Quisumbing (1994), we estimate the child's schooling outcome as a function of child characteristics (gender, age, and age squared) and parental characteristics at the time of marriage: education of the husband and wife, and assets at marriage of the husband and wife. We also include a dummy for being in a PROGRESA community, beneficiary, a time dummy, and interaction terms between PROGRESA and the time dummy, between PROGRESA and the gender dummy, and between PROGRESA, the time dummy, and the gender dummy. To examine the effects of monetary transfers, both the transfers and their interaction with child gender are among the regressors, i.e.:

$$\begin{aligned}
 E_{ij}^* = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{cij} + \beta_2 X_{fj} + \beta_3 X_{mj} + \beta_4 S_{ij} \times X_{fj} + \beta_5 G_{ij} \times X_{mj} + \beta_6 \text{PROGRESA} + \beta_7 T \\
 & + \beta_8 \text{PROGRESA} \times T + \beta_8 \text{PROGRESA} \times S + \beta_9 \text{PROGRESA} \times T \times S + \beta_{10} \text{Transfers} + \\
 & \beta_{10} \text{Transfers} \times S + e_{ij}
 \end{aligned}
 \tag{3}$$

Where E_{ij}^* is the educational outcome of child i in family j ; X_c is a vector of child characteristics such as sex, age, and age squared; S is the son dummy, and X_f and X_m are vectors of exogenous father's and mother's human and physical wealth, respectively, the PROGRESA dummy and time dummy and their interactions are as described above, and e_{ij} is the error term in each equation. This equation is estimated only for poor households.

Following some tests of the unitary model which include both human and physical capital as assets brought to marriage, father's and mother's wealth at the time of marriage enter separately into the regressions. This equation is estimated both in levels and with family fixed effects. It is possible that omitted family-level variables are correlated with regressors, and thus their estimated effects on the educational outcomes may be biased. For those families with at least two children, the within family allocation can be used as the source of variation in the sample from which to estimate intrahousehold differences.¹⁴ A fixed effects estimation procedure controls for these unobservables using family-specific dummy variables. In this specific application, only the child's sex, age, age squared, and the interactions between child sex and parent characteristics, between child sex and PROGRESA, between child sex and the time dummy, between child sex and transfers, and between PROGRESA, the time dummy, and child sex remain as explanatory variables. While the effects of variables that do not vary across children cannot be identified, their gender implications may be investigated to the extent that they impact differently on children of different sex. On the other hand, if educational outcomes were affected by individual heterogeneity, a random effects procedure would be appropriate. A Lagrange multiplier statistic tests for the appropriateness of the random effects model compared to ordinary least squares (OLS) without group effects, while a Hausman test compares the random effects model to a fixed-effects specification.

The schooling outcome we consider is the deviation of each child's completed years of schooling from the cohort mean. This measure enables us to ascertain how well each child is doing relative to other children of the same age in the same locality. While we could have used years of schooling, this measure has its advantages. First, it takes into account the fact that schooling is likely to be incomplete, particularly for younger children. Second, an advantage of the deviation from cohort mean is that it is not prone to censoring, unlike schooling attainment, which could be censored at zero if some children have never attended school. The equation is estimated for children ages 6 to 16 for whom we have data on the highest grade attained from both the ENCASEH and the October 1998 ENCEL.¹⁵

While the data on transfers is disaggregated by schooling expenses, fellowships and allowances for food purchases, we use the total amount as these regressions are conducted with the 1997

¹⁴ Families with at least two children are included so that sex dummies are relevant in the family fixed effects specification. The fixed effects procedure eliminates selectivity bias since family size, which affects selection into the sample, is a family-specific variable.

¹⁵ We did not use the ENCEL 98M data since they would have referred to the same school year as the ENCASEH 97 data. We only included children who are observed in both time periods. We used the conversion from grade levels to years of schooling computed by Ben Davis.

ENCASEH and the October 1998 ENCEL. At that point, there had been very little money disbursed for school expenses, mainly because of the holidays: most transfers for these purposes took place in December 1998. We therefore use the total transfer amount received by the household between July and October 1998.

6.2 Results

Results from the schooling regressions are presented in Table 20, for the level estimates, family fixed effects, and random effects estimates. The levels estimates show that girls do equally well as boys of the same age. Mother's schooling has a larger impact on the schooling deviation than does father's schooling, consistent with the growing evidence from several countries that maternal schooling is associated with children's education (Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999). There is also evidence of parental preference for children of the same sex: better-educated and wealthier fathers favor sons, relative to daughters. This result is similar to that observed by Thomas (1994), although we do not see any signs that mother favor daughters over sons. Children living in PROGRESA localities do better relative to their cohort, and transfers seem to have a positive and significant effect over and above the effect of living in a PROGRESA community. These results are confirmed in the random effects regression.

A Breusch-Pagan test points to the significance of individual (child) heterogeneity, and a Hausman test confirms that random effects is the preferred specification. The random effects results confirm that sons do better compared to their sisters if their fathers are better-educated and are wealthier. The random effects results also confirm the positive impact of both the program and the transfers on child schooling outcomes. The transfers do not seem to benefit boys nor girls differentially.

7. SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS

7.1 Summary

This paper has attempted explore the implications of PROGRESA's implementation on two sets of outcomes related to women's bargaining power within the household: (1) women's role in household decisionmaking; and (2) relative schooling achievement of boys and girls. It takes a different approach from the comparison of group means by explicitly taking into account individual and family background characteristics which might affect patterns of household decisionmaking and decisions on child schooling. These individual and family background characteristics include each spouse's physical and human capital at the time of marriage, namely years of schooling, landownership, asset ownership, and, for the wife, work experience prior to marriage. We also included characteristics such as Spanish language ability and bilingual ability as proxies for integration into mainstream Mexican culture and the possibility that cultural norms on women's roles might be different in indigenous cultures. Unfortunately, no information about religious beliefs, which could have provided us with an additional indicator of attitudes, was available in the data set.. We also include dummy variables for the household's residence in control or program communities, and for the survey round. We also use the information on

amounts received by the households disbursed by PROGRESA to beneficiary households between July 1998 and October 1999.

The outcomes we consider are derived from eight questions on who takes decisions in certain areas: the husband alone, the wife alone, or both spouses jointly. These areas are: taking the child for medical attention, telling the child to go to school, giving the child permission to leave the house, expenditures on child clothing, food expenditures, house repairs, durables purchases, and decisions regarding the use of women's extra income. The majority of respondents say that decisions are made jointly; in our regression analysis we estimate the probability that the husband makes the decision solely, or the wife decides by herself, relative to the probability of the decision being made jointly.

We find that characteristics of husband and wife are the most consistent determinants of decisionmaking patterns. The husband is more likely to be the sole decisionmaker if his wife is less educated, has less work experience prior to marriage, does not speak Spanish, or speaks an indigenous language. Husbands who speak an indigenous language are also more likely to be the single decisionmaker, indicating that women's roles may be more traditional in indigenous societies. Relative to individual characteristics, living in a PROGRESA locality does not have as predictable nor strong an effect on patterns of decisionmaking. Rather, the effects of increase women's income received through the program have a significant effect on decisionmaking patterns over and above the rest of the program's effects. Husbands are less likely to make decisions by themselves for five out of eight outcomes—outcomes related to decisions regarding children (medical attention, school attendance, child clothing), food expenditures, and house repairs. Most importantly, we see an increase in the probability that women decide on the use of their extra income by themselves, and a decline in the probability that they let their husbands decide.

Characteristics of the husband and wife are also important determinants of the relative schooling achievement of boys relative to girls, as measured by the deviation from the locality-specific cohort mean. This is only one indicator of schooling achievement, and is meant to measure how well a child is doing relative to other children of the same age. When family background characteristics such as schooling and wealth of parents are controlled for, and individual heterogeneity is taken into account, among children 6 to 16 years of age, children of better educated parents do better relative to those the same age, but the size of the coefficient on mother's schooling is twice as large as that on fathers (in the random effects specification). There are clear signs of parental gender preference, however: better-educated fathers favor sons. Living in a PROGRESA community and monetary transfers both have a positive and significant effect on schooling outcomes, in contrast to most of the decisionmaking outcomes, when only the transfers were significant. Thus, there also appear to be differential effects attached not only to the increased individual income received through the program, but also the rest of the program itself. This points to the importance of the "health platicas" and the focus of the program on children's outcomes, which reinforce the link between the transfers and school attendance.

7.2 Next Steps

This analysis has only been a first step in examining how PROGRESA may have affected women's status and well-being. There is much more information in the ENCEL surveys on other outcomes related to women's empowerment and the differential effects by gender. For example, we can examine whether or not attitudes towards men's and women's roles have changed over time, and whether this change can be attributed to PROGRESA. We have yet to control for the effect of family background of husband and wife—characteristics of their parents—on the decisions they take within marriage. Other work has indicated that controlling for family background characteristics may improve the coefficient estimates of husband and wife characteristics by controlling for random measurement error (Quisumbing and de la Briere 1999; Quisumbing and Maluccio 1999). The impact on the educational attainment of boys and girls can also be measured in a variety of ways—whether attendance, continuation rates, and test scores. The ongoing analysis on consumption expenditures will also reveal whether or not resources in the hands of women will have a differential impact on the composition of household expenditures. The field is thus wide open for exploration.

There is much to be done in future work on this topic. As a first step, measures of program implementation can be refined. The present paper is based on the simplifying assumption that amount of transfers is an adequate indicator of the program's effect. However, transfers amounts actually received might reflect supply-side constraints as well as behavioral adaptation by the household. First, some transfers were specifically designed for schooling or food expenditures, and while the data we use come too early after the start of the implementation to offer much variation, it would be interesting to follow the use of these particular amounts, recognizing, of course, that they may be fungible within the household. Second, if the amount transferred is determined by the household's demographic composition, we cannot assume that the absolute amount transferred is less relevant than the amount transferred per capita. Indeed, we should check whether there are "economies of scale" with respect to the impact of monetary transfers. Second, there may be substantial variability in the way the program has been implemented in different localities or over time. A round dummy may be picking up changes in the economic environment over and above possible changes in the manner of program implementation. Third, we confirm that PROGRESA affects behavior not only through the transfers but also through its other aspects, which were put forward in the qualitative work (Adato and Mindek 2000)—participation in the meetings, being able to discuss their issues openly with each other, greater mobility out of the house and out of the locality—aspects of the program which are difficult to quantify using a household survey.

REFERENCES

- Adato, M., and D. Mindek. 2000. PROGRESA and women's empowerment: Evidence from six Mexican states. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Adato, M., D. Coady, S. Handa, R. Harris, R. Perez, and B. Straffon. 1999. The impact of Mexico's education, health, and nutrition program (PROGRESA) at the community level. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, August 1999. Mimeo.
- Behrman, J. R. 1997. Intrahousehold distribution and the family. In *Handbook of population and family economics*, ed. M. R. Rosenzweig and O. Stark. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company.
- Behrman, J., and P. Todd. 1999. Randomness in the experimental samples of PROGRESA (Education, Health, and Nutrition Program). Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, March 1999. Mimeo.
- Bloch, F., and V. Rao. 1996. Domestic violence as a bargaining instrument in rural India. Paper presented at the 1996 Northeast Universities Development Economics Conference, Boston University, Boston, MA, October 1996.
- Doss, C. 1996. Women's bargaining power in household economic decisions: Evidence from Ghana. Staff Paper Series No. P96-11. Department of Applied Economics, College of Agricultural, Food, and Environmental Sciences, University of Minnesota.
- Foster, A. 1996. Analysis of household behavior when households choose their members: Marriage market selection and human capital formation in rural Bangladesh. University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA. Processed.
- Frankenberg, E., and D. Thomas. 1999. Measuring power. CA: RAND Corp. Mimeo.
- Gomez de Leon, J., and S. Parker. 1999. The impact of anti-poverty programs on female labor force participation and women's status: The case of PROGRESA in Mexico. Paper prepared for the 1999 IUSSP Conference on Women and the Labor Market.
- Haddad, L., and J. Hoddinott. 1994. Women's income and boy-girl anthropometric status in the Cote d'Ivoire. *World Development* 22(4): 543-553.
- Haddad, L., J. Hoddinott, and H. Alderman, eds. 1997. *Intrahousehold resource allocation in developing countries: Methods, models, and policy*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press for the International Food Policy Research Institute.
- Hammermesh, D. S. 1999. *The art of labormetrics*. NBER Working Paper No. 6927. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau for Economic Research.

- Hoddinott, J., and L. Haddad. 1995. Does female income share influence household expenditures? Evidence from Cote D'Ivoire. *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics* 57(1): 77-95.
- Hoddinott, J., and E. Skoufias. 2000. Preliminary evidence of the impact of PROGRESA on consumption. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, January 2000.
- Kennedy, E. 1992. Household food security and child nutrition: The interaction of income and gender of household head. *World Development* 20(8): 1077-1085.
- Lundberg, S. J., R. A. Pollak, and T. J. Wales. 1997. Do husbands and wives pool their resources? Evidence from the United Kingdom child benefit. *Journal of Human Resources* 32 (3): 463-480.
- Manning, W.G., J.P. Newhouse, and J.E. Ware. 1982. The status of health in demand estimation. In *Economic Aspects of Health*, ed. V. Fuchs. Chicago, NBER: University of Chicago Press.
- Morris, S., C. Carletto, J. Hoddinot, and L. J. M. Christiansen. 1999. Validity of rapid estimates of household wealth and income for health surveys in Rural Africa. Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper No. 72. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, October 1999.
- Quisumbing, A.R. 1994. Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages: Gender differences in traditional inheritance customs. *Journal of Development Economics* 43 (2): 167-195.
- Quisumbing, A.R., and B. de la Briere. 1999. Women's assets and intrahousehold allocation in rural Bangladesh: Testing measures of bargaining power. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Quisumbing, A. R., and J. A. Maluccio. 1999. Intrahousehold allocation and gender relations: New empirical evidence. World Bank Policy Research Report on Gender and Development Working Paper Series No. 2, October 1999. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Quisumbing, A.R., E. Payongayong, J. B. Aidoo, and K. Otsuka. 1998. Women's land rights in the transition to individual ownership: Implications for tree resource management in Western Ghana. Food Consumption and Nutrition Division Discussion Paper no. 58. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, February 1999.
- Rao, V. 1997. Wife-beating in Rural South India: A qualitative and econometric analysis. *Social Science and Medicine* 44(8): 1169-1180.

- Robicheaux, D. L. 1997. Residence rules and ultimogeniture in Tlaxcala and Mesoamerica. *Ethnology* 36 (2) :149-71.
- Rubalcava, L., and D. Thomas. 1997. Family bargaining and welfare. CA: RAND Corp. Mimeo.
- Schuler, S. R., S. M. Hashemi, and A. P. Riley. 1997. The influence of women's changing roles and status in Bangladesh's fertility transition: Evidence from a study of credit programs and contraceptive use. *World Development* 25 (4).
- Schultz, T. P. 1999. Preliminary evidence of the impact of PROGRESA on school enrollments from 1997 and 1998. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute, June 1999. Mimeo.
- Schultz, T. P. 1990. Testing the neoclassical model of family labor supply and fertility. *Journal of Human Resources* 25 (4): 599-634.
- Strauss, J. A., and D. Thomas. 1995. Human resources: Empirical modeling of household and family decisions. In *Handbook of development economics*, ed. T. N. Srinivasan and J. Behrman. Amsterdam: North Holland.
- Subramanian, J. 1998. Rural women's rights to property: A Bangladesh case study. Land Tenure Center, University of Wisconsin-Madison, March 1998. Mimeo.
- Thomas, D. 1990. Intrahousehold resource allocation: An inferential approach. *Journal of Human Resources* 25 (4): 635-664.
- Thomas, D. 1993. The distribution of income and expenditure within the household. *Annales de Economie et de Statistiques* 29 (January-March): 109-136.
- Thomas, D. 1996a. Testing economic models of household decision making. Paper presented at the External Advisory Committee Meeting on "Strengthening Development Policy through Gender Analysis, International Food Policy Research Institute, March 18-19, 1996.
- Thomas, D., D. Contreras, and E. Frankenberg. 1997. Child health and the distribution of household resources at marriage. CA: RAND Corp. Mimeo.

Table 1— Characteristics of Husbands and Wives, by Category Limited to Families with Husbands and Wives Present, and those Responding to March '98, October '98, and June '99 ENCEL

	All						Test of difference p-value
	Husband			Wife			
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	
Age	14905	43.33	14.50	15161	38.83	13.56	0.000
Speaks indigenous language	14816	0.35	0.48	15041	0.34	0.47	0.055
Speaks Spanish	15221	0.98	0.16	15221	0.93	0.25	0.000
Years of schooling	14796	3.19	2.88	15041	2.92	2.82	0.000
Treatment vs. Control Communities							
	Treatment			Control			Test of difference p-value
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	
Husband's age	9178	43.06	14.43	5727	43.77	14.61	0.003
Husband indigenous language	9128	0.36	0.48	5688	0.34	0.47	0.070
Husband speaks Spanish	9394	0.97	0.16	5827	0.98	0.15	0.196
Husband's years of schooling	9112	3.22	2.93	5684	3.15	2.79	0.144
Wife's age	9353	38.62	13.47	5808	39.11	13.69	0.031
Wife indigenous language	9283	0.34	0.48	5758	0.33	0.47	0.129
Wife speaks Spanish	9394	0.94	0.24	5827	0.93	0.26	0.001
Wife's years of schooling	9285	2.92	2.82	5756	2.93	2.82	0.907
Poor vs. Non-Poor							
	Poor			Non-poor			Test of difference p-value
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	
Husband's age	9169	41.41	11.57	1931	46.11	11.99	0.000
Husband indigenous language	9141	0.40	0.49	1919	0.17	0.38	0.000
Husband speaks Spanish	9331	0.97	0.16	1965	1.00	0.06	0.000
Husband's years of schooling	9121	3.08	2.67	1915	3.75	3.31	0.000
Wife's age	9302	36.92	10.44	1957	41.30	10.85	0.000
Wife indigenous language	9276	0.39	0.49	1943	0.16	0.37	0.000
Wife speaks Spanish	9331	0.92	0.26	1965	0.98	0.14	0.000
Wife's years of schooling	9266	2.77	2.62	1945	3.54	3.11	0.000
Poor in Treatment vs. Poor in Control Communities							
	Poor-Treatment			Poor-Control			Test of difference p-value
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	
Husband's age	5716	41.14	11.38	3453	41.85	11.87	0.005
Husband indigenous language	5702	0.41	0.49	3439	0.39	0.49	0.085
Husband speaks Spanish	5820	0.97	0.17	3511	0.98	0.15	0.067
Husband's years of schooling	5688	3.12	2.72	3433	3.03	2.58	0.149
Wife's age	5800	36.83	10.32	3502	37.07	10.63	0.287
Wife indigenous language	5793	0.40	0.49	3483	0.38	0.49	0.173
Wife speaks Spanish	5820	0.93	0.26	3511	0.91	0.28	0.006
Wife's years of schooling	5787	2.76	2.60	3479	2.79	2.65	0.634
Non-Poor in Treatment vs. Non-Poor in Control Communities							
	Non-Poor-Treatment			Non-Poor-Control			Test of difference p-value
	n	Mean	SD	n	Mean	SD	
Husband's age	1146	45.91	12.04	785	46.40	11.92	0.382
Husband indigenous language	1140	0.19	0.39	779	0.14	0.35	0.007
Husband speaks Spanish	1168	1.00	0.07	797	1.00	0.05	0.518
Husband's years of schooling	1138	3.86	3.39	777	3.60	3.18	0.089
Wife's age	1163	41.08	10.75	794	41.64	10.99	0.262
Wife indigenous language	1155	0.18	0.39	788	0.13	0.34	0.002
Wife speaks Spanish	1168	0.98	0.14	797	0.98	0.13	0.734
Wife's years of schooling	1158	3.63	3.13	787	3.40	3.07	0.114

Table 2—Characteristics of Union, Assets at Marriage, and Wife's Pre-wedding Work Experience

A. Characteristics of union	<u>Percent (n=15221)</u>	
Presently in a union		97.47
Had a union before current union		5.72
B. Characteristics of wife's household prior to marriage	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S.D.</u>
Household size (minimum)	6.77	2.91
Ownership of radio	0.42	0.49
Ever worked	0.27	0.44
Age wife first worked	13.65	4.55
Age at first marriage	18.37	3.96
Prewedding work experience (years)	1.46	3.25
C. Type of premarriage work experience	<u>Percent (n=4056)</u>	
Agricultural labor		19.33
Nonagricultural worker		17.87
Self employed		3.60
Unpaid family worker		2.60
Domestic worker		55.08
Other		1.48
D. Location of work prior to marriage	<u>Percent (n=2569)</u>	
Inside the home		14.21
Outside the home		85.79
E. Locality of work	<u>Percent (n=4006)</u>	
In the same locality where she lives now		24.61
In another locality, but in the same area		16.15
In a larger locality		15.70
In a city		43.24
Out of the country		0.30
F. Assets at marriage	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S.D.</u>
Husband's asset score	0.02	0.07
Wife's asset score	0.01	0.06
Husband's land (0/1)	0.13	0.34
Wife's land (0/1)	0.01	0.07
G. Characteristics of new union/marriage	<u>Percent (n=15174)</u>	
<i>Residence immediately after marriage</i>		
House of parents of husband		49.55
House of wife's parents		7.25
House of other relatives		1.90
Residing with husband only		40.93
Others		0.37
<i>Person responsible for buying and preparing food in newlyweds household</i>	<u>Percent (n=8802)</u>	
Wife herself		28.69
Mother-in-law		60.09
Mother		4.99
Other woman		2.19
One of the other women		4.04
<i>Time before wife bought and prepared food for her husband</i>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>S.D.</u>
Time (years)	3.04	3.85

Table 3—Family Background of Husband and Wife**A. Characteristics of husband's and wife's parents (percent reporting yes)**

No. of observations reported is the sum of yes and no responses

	Husband				Wife			
	Father		Mother		Father		Mother	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Parent is still living	44.98	15039	54.85	15098	50.57	15062	61.77	15131
Parent living in same locality	80.59	6764	79.67	8282	56.65	7617	56.09	9346
Parent living in same household	13.39	5451	14.70	6598	5.70	4315	6.26	5242
Parent had land at the time of marriage	58.19	14776	4.91	14912	58.04	14867	4.77	14986
Parent used shoes while child growing up	66.50	14841	63.21	14943	66.51	14938	63.04	15010

B. Parents' land

	Husband				Wife			
	Father		Mother		Father		Mother	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Land owned at the time of marriage (ha)	2.42	4.42	0.17	1.37	2.15	3.93	0.18	1.58
Sum of parents' owned land	2.58	4.70			2.33	4.44		

C. Parent's schooling and language ability (percent reporting yes)

	Husband				Wife			
	Father		Mother		Father		Mother	
	%	n	%	n	%	n	%	n
Parent is literate	33.43	14131	22.58	13933	39.97	14715	26.47	14717
Parent attended primary school	32.79	13871	23.08	13676	37.91	14512	26.72	14524
Parent completed primary school	1.18	13871	0.80	13676	1.64	14512	1.08	14254
Parent does not speak Spanish	16.05	14132	18.31	13940	15.09	14692	18.58	14677
Parent is bilingual	22.33	14132	19.12	13940	23.88	14692	19.57	14677

Table 4— Effects of Family Background on Husband's and Wife's Schooling, Durables Holdings, and Wife's Pre-wedding Work Experience

	Husband's schooling		Wife's schooling		Wife's prewedding work experience		Husband's asset score		Wife's asset score	
	Coeff	t	Coeff	t	Coeff	t	Coeff	t	Coeff	t
Pre-wedding work experience (wife)									0.001	0.476
Own schooling					0.210	5.274	0.006	6.250	0.007	4.156
Year of birth	0.110	51.641	0.126	54.624						
Father literate?	0.781	6.047	0.792	6.284	0.559	1.195	-0.004	-0.337	-0.029	-1.357
Mother literate?	0.498	3.628	0.502	4.006	-0.401	-0.854	0.014	1.144	0.037	1.720
Attended primary-father	0.282	2.165	0.410	3.218	0.272	0.575	0.008	0.684	0.004	0.193
Attended primary-mother	0.203	1.493	0.542	4.345	0.852	1.830	-0.010	-0.845	-0.006	-0.291
Primary completed-father	1.240	3.987	0.913	3.402	0.515	0.519	0.067	2.733	0.004	0.093
Primary completed-mother	0.588	1.580	0.689	2.190	1.464	1.275	0.047	1.640	0.092	2.009
Did father wear shoes?	0.170	1.507	0.412	3.821	-0.005	-0.012	0.026	2.680	0.036	1.903
Did mother wear shoes?	-0.016	-0.143	0.501	4.768	0.637	1.633	0.028	2.931	0.060	3.248
Parental land (hectares)	0.024	3.767	0.036	5.694	-0.088	-3.434	0.001	1.438	0.002	2.231
Constant	-212.837	-51.240	-246.348	-54.481	-7.846	-29.892	-0.224	-34.293	-0.529	-29.139
Sigma (SE sigma)	3.085	0.024	3.141	0.025	9.488	0.139	0.205	0.003	0.310	0.008
No. of observations	12526		13697		13700		12552		13700	
Left-censored	3252		4391		10382		9788		12590	
Uncensored	9274		9306		3318		2764		1110	
Chi-squared	3736.28		5033.54		110.35		204.01		143.46	
p-value	0		0		0		0		0	

Tobit estimates. t-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 5— Patterns of Decisionmaking Within the Household (Percent Distribution), March 1998, October 1998, and June 1999

A. Intrahousehold decisionmaking												
	<i>Who takes children to the doctor if they are sick?</i>			<i>Who tells the child to go to school?</i>			<i>Who gives child permission to leave?</i>		<i>Who decides on expenditures on child clothing?</i>			
	98M	98O	99M	98M	98O	99M	98O	99M	98M	98O	99M	
No response		0.01			0.01		0.01			0.01		
Husband only	10.25	10.87	9.59	10.88	11.88	10.64	17.17	13.56	24.84	24.67	19.83	
Wife only	10.08	11.21	9.45	9.55	10.08	9.05	6.90	6.68	5.53	5.26	5.03	
Both spouses	79.67	77.70	80.77	79.57	77.75	80.13	75.76	79.62	69.63	69.79	74.87	
Other man in household		0.13	0.14		0.19	0.12	0.13	0.08		0.18	0.21	
Other woman in household		0.09	0.06		0.09	0.06	0.04	0.07		0.09	0.06	
Total responding	15125	15149	15084	15087	15125	15054	15144	15071	15123	15166	15091	
	<i>Who decides on food expenses?</i>			<i>Who decides on house repairs?</i>			<i>Who decides on durables purchases?</i>					
	98M	98O	99M	98M	98O	99M	98O	99M				
No response		0.01			0.01		0.01					
Husband only		18.30	15.29	31.14	33.94	30.09	30.93	26.75				
Wife only		18.50	19.03	2.08	3.38	3.45	3.30	3.20				
Both spouses		62.95	65.43	66.78	62.31	66.10	65.40	69.59				
Other man in household		0.13	0.16		0.28	0.31	0.27	0.38				
Other woman in household		0.11	0.09		0.08	0.05	0.09	0.08				
Total responding		15202	15203	15146	15196	15189	15181	15148				
B. Decisionmaking regarding woman's extra income												
	<i>Who decides how to spend a woman's extra income?</i>											
	98M	98O	99M									
No response		0.01										
She herself	18.24	30.75	37.25									
She should give to her husband	5.39	2.09	2.00									
Both spouses decide	76.37	67.15	60.74									
Total responding	15221	15221	15215									
C. Permission to visit parents, friends, neighbors												
	<i>If you (the woman) want to visit your parents, friends or neighbors, do you have to ask permission from your husband?</i>											
	98M	98O	99M									
No response		0.01										
Yes	88.07	92.94	92.36									
No	9.94	4.11	4.77									
No husband	1.94	2.24	2.19									
Never leaves	0.06	0.7	0.68									
Total responding	9964	15221	15215									
D. Visiting with or without companions												
	<i>If you (the woman) needs to leave to visit the above, who accompanies you?</i>											
	98M	98O	99M									
No response		0.01										
No one	18.4	12.5	16.23									
Her children	60.83	63.77	64.55									
Her husband	18.98	21	16.73									
Other people	1.71	1.45	1.41									
Never leaves	0.09	1.27	1.08									
Total responding	9964	15221	15211									

**Table 6— Average Total Monthly Transfers Disbursed by PROGRESA,
Nominal and Real Terms, in Pesos**

Month	Nominal Transfers		Real Transfers (1994=100)	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Jul-98	30.080	70.610	11.865	27.854
Aug-98	169.430	267.650	66.198	104.576
Sep-98	220.800	310.270	84.893	119.294
Oct-98	96.820	143.040	36.699	54.220
Nov-98	26.460	70.170	9.853	26.137
Dec-98	472.960	450.170	171.961	163.678
Jan-99	0.000		0.000	
Feb-99	0.000		0.000	
Mar-99	313.580	393.770	108.720	136.522
Apr-99	137.180	286.350	47.128	98.374
May-99	155.412	296.790	53.392	101.960
Total from July 98-October 98	517.124	413.032	199.655	159.515
Total from October 98-May 99	1105.590	924.226	391.054	326.732
Total from July 98-May 99	1622.713	1192.988	590.709	432.114

Table 7— Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households: Medical Treatment, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98M, 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

Who Decides to Take the Child for Medical Treatment?
(Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)

	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	0.007	0.753	-0.003	-0.304	0.003	0.275	-0.004	-0.420
Dummy for 98O	-0.024	-1.291	0.009	0.550	-0.015	-0.798	0.012	0.675
Dummy for 99M	0.008	0.412	-0.020	-1.232	0.017	0.873	-0.018	-1.046
PROGRESA x 98O	0.017	1.239	0.004	0.317	0.012	0.900	0.002	0.211
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.009	-0.674	0.008	0.650	-0.013	-1.025	0.006	0.529
Transfers					0.000	-1.981	0.000	-0.668
Husband's schooling	-0.001	-1.321	0.000	-0.153	-0.001	-1.357	0.000	-0.171
Wife's schooling	-0.004	-3.341	0.002	2.343	-0.004	-3.353	0.002	2.322
Husband's age	0.000	0.096	0.000	0.860	0.000	0.114	0.000	0.867
Wife's age	0.000	0.143	0.000	-0.192	0.000	0.092	0.000	-0.205
Husband speaks indigenous language	0.024	1.776	-0.004	-0.398	0.024	1.793	-0.004	-0.392
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.015	1.252	-0.007	-0.646	0.015	1.217	-0.007	-0.653
Husband speaks Spanish	-0.014	-1.257	-0.024	-1.634	-0.014	-1.236	-0.024	-1.627
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.005	-0.667	-0.007	-0.577	-0.005	-0.618	-0.007	-0.568
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.002	-2.578	0.003	3.936	-0.002	-2.525	0.003	3.942
Husband's asset score	0.014	0.410	0.008	0.259	0.014	0.419	0.008	0.260
Wife's asset score	-0.012	-0.263	-0.115	-1.942	-0.013	-0.274	-0.115	-1.944
Husband is landowner	-0.002	-0.382	-0.007	-0.957	-0.002	-0.333	-0.007	-0.947
Wife is landowner	0.023	0.888	-0.003	-0.114	0.023	0.887	-0.003	-0.111
Constant	-0.156	-7.234	-0.149	-6.479	-0.147	-6.467	-0.147	-6.376
No. of observations	25172				25172			
Log-likelihood	-16129.762				-16125.69			
Chi-square (p-value)	311.98 (0.0088)				332.52 (0.009)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

**Table 8 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households:
Permission to Go Out, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98O, 99M**

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Gives the Child Permission to Go out? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)							
	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community Dummy for 99M	0.014	1.105	-0.003	-0.377	0.012	0.926	-0.006	-0.685
PROGRESA x 99M	0.011	0.463	-0.012	-0.793	0.015	0.621	-0.006	-0.411
Transfers	-0.030	-1.813	0.007	0.658	-0.032	-1.903	0.004	0.379
Husband's schooling	0.000		0.000		0.000	-0.595	0.000	-1.278
Wife's schooling	-0.001	-0.789	0.002	2.374	-0.001	-0.801	0.002	2.321
Husband's age	-0.002	-1.454	0.001	0.843	-0.002	-1.461	0.001	0.805
Wife's age	0.000	0.330	0.000	-0.346	0.000	0.333	0.000	-0.338
Husband speaks indigenous language	0.000	-0.481	0.000	0.413	0.000	-0.493	0.000	0.386
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.014	0.818	-0.012	-1.155	0.014	0.820	-0.012	-1.149
Husband speaks Spanish	-0.003	-0.168	-0.002	-0.162	-0.003	-0.174	-0.002	-0.177
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.018	-0.894	0.004	0.229	-0.018	-0.889	0.004	0.244
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.021	-1.326	0.001	0.050	-0.021	-1.314	0.001	0.074
Husband's asset score	-0.002	-2.125	0.001	1.445	-0.002	-2.114	0.001	1.472
Wife's asset score	0.084	2.002	-0.041	-1.122	0.084	2.011	-0.041	-1.131
Husband is landowner	-0.122	-1.732	0.017	0.407	-0.122	-1.733	0.016	0.397
Wife is landowner	-0.011	-1.317	-0.001	-0.124	-0.011	-1.303	-0.001	-0.110
Constant	0.022	0.591	-0.038	-0.828	0.022	0.593	-0.038	-0.826
	-0.139	-4.695	-0.138	-5.919	-0.136	-4.334	-0.132	-5.498
No. of observations	16793				16793			
Log-likelihood	-10988.11				-10986.45			
Chi-square (p-value)	109.17 (0.0047)				118.65 (0.0049)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

**Table 9 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households:
Permission to Go Out, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98O, 99M**

	Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities							
	Who Gives the Child Permission to Go Out?							
	(Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)							
	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	0.014	1.105	-0.003	-0.377	0.012	0.926	-0.006	-0.685
Dummy for 99M	0.011	0.463	-0.012	-0.793	0.015	0.621	-0.006	-0.411
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.030	-1.813	0.007	0.658	-0.032	-1.903	0.004	0.379
Transfers					0.000	-0.595	0.000	-1.278
Husband's schooling	-0.001	-0.789	0.002	2.374	-0.001	-0.801	0.002	2.321
Wife's schooling	-0.002	-1.454	0.001	0.843	-0.002	-1.461	0.001	0.805
Husband's age	0.000	0.330	0.000	-0.346	0.000	0.333	0.000	-0.338
Wife's age	0.000	-0.481	0.000	0.413	0.000	-0.493	0.000	0.386
Husband speaks indigenous language	0.014	0.818	-0.012	-1.155	0.014	0.820	-0.012	-1.149
Wife speaks indigenous language	-0.003	-0.168	-0.002	-0.162	-0.003	-0.174	-0.002	-0.177
Husband speaks Spanish	-0.018	-0.894	0.004	0.229	-0.018	-0.889	0.004	0.244
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.021	-1.326	0.001	0.050	-0.021	-1.314	0.001	0.074
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.002	-2.125	0.001	1.445	-0.002	-2.114	0.001	1.472
Husband's asset score	0.084	2.002	-0.041	-1.122	0.084	2.011	-0.041	-1.131
Wife's asset score	-0.122	-1.732	0.017	0.407	-0.122	-1.733	0.016	0.397
Husband is landowner	-0.011	-1.317	-0.001	-0.124	-0.011	-1.303	-0.001	-0.110
Wife is landowner	0.022	0.591	-0.038	-0.828	0.022	0.593	-0.038	-0.826
Constant	-0.139	-4.695	-0.138	-5.919	-0.136	-4.334	-0.132	-5.498
No. of observations	16793				16793			
Log-likelihood	-10988.1				-10986			
Chi-square (p-value)	109.17 (0.0047)				118.65 (0.0049)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 10 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households: Expenditures on Child Clothing, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98M, 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides on Child Clothing Expenditures? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)							
	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community Dummy for 98O	0.0016198	0.111	-0.001972	-0.33	-0.0033978	-0.225	-0.0030059	-0.48
Dummy for 99M	-0.0358217	-1.205	0.0004946	0.041	-0.025112	-0.848	0.0026276	0.222
PROGRESA x 98O	-0.0547716	-1.719	-0.0053098	-0.382	-0.044066	-1.386	-0.0031776	-0.229
PROGRESA x 99M	0.0238007	1.177	-0.0051234	-0.631	0.0184464	0.920	-0.0061906	-0.787
Transfers	0.0030888	0.145	0.0002052	0.022	-0.0022648	-0.106	-0.0008611	-0.092
Husband's schooling	-0.0008752	-0.582	-0.0004798	-0.823	-0.0009271	-0.616	-0.0004952	-0.852
Wife's schooling	-0.0032926	-2.227	0.0012415	1.993	-0.0033315	-2.240	0.0012302	1.978
Husband's age	-0.0005472	-0.923	0.0005563	2.481	-0.0005363	-0.903	0.0005581	2.496
Wife's age	-0.0001813	-0.261	-0.00000118	-0.005	-0.0002036	-0.293	-0.00000884	-0.038
Husband speaks indigenous language	0.0396812	2.492	-0.0080951	-1.251	0.0400128	2.505	-0.0080375	-1.245
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.0015937	0.104	-0.0061232	-0.96	0.0012136	0.079	-0.0061969	-0.972
Husband speaks Spanish	0.018042	0.88	-0.0045096	-0.433	0.0183211	0.886	-0.004432	-0.425
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.0358129	-2.601	-0.0003645	-0.05	-0.0353463	-2.554	-0.000266	-0.036
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.0026674	-2.595	0.0011129	2.531	-0.0026303	-2.559	0.00112	2.546
Husband's asset score	0.0705626	1.822	0.0153568	0.741	0.0707627	1.839	0.01536	0.742
Wife's asset score	-0.0709367	-1.139	-0.0110984	-0.344	-0.0717967	-1.149	-0.0112354	-0.348
Husband is landowner	0.0047165	0.504	-0.0052943	-1.462	0.0050602	0.540	-0.0052511	-1.456
Wife is landowner	0.0132014	0.478	0.0015718	0.08	0.0135711	0.489	0.0015787	0.08
Constant	-0.1145743	-3.513	-0.118239	-7.436	-0.1046815	-3.150	-0.1160711	-7.024
No. of observations	25187				25187			
Log-likelihood	-18054.075				-18051.127			
Chi-square (p-value)	328.38 (0.0072)				361.74 (0.0073)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 11 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households: Food Expenditures, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides on Food Expenditures? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)							
	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community Dummy for 99M	0.023	2.153	-0.014738	-0.845	0.0210	1.807	-0.015	-0.868
PROGRESAx 99M	0.002	0.074	0.0233944	0.697	0.0072	0.265	0.025	0.709
Transfers	-0.022	-1.313	-0.0095257	-0.398	-0.0250	-1.455	-0.010	-0.412
Husband's schooling					0.0000	-0.726	0.000	-0.146
Wife's schooling	-0.002	-1.417	0.0019587	1.500	-0.0024	-1.439	0.002	1.490
Husband's age	-0.002	-1.032	0.0012278	0.846	-0.0018	-1.039	0.001	0.843
Wife's age	0.000	-0.385	0.0001838	0.319	-0.0002	-0.381	0.000	0.321
Husband speaks indigenous language	0.000	-0.559	0.0001027	0.173	-0.0004	-0.573	0.000	0.169
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.039	2.057	-0.0493869	-2.963	0.0391	2.061	-0.049	-2.958
Husband speaks Spanish	-0.003	-0.145	-0.0166663	-0.975	-0.0030	-0.154	-0.017	-0.975
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.031	-1.445	0.0533329	2.183	-0.0307	-1.434	0.053	2.185
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.011	-0.601	-0.030208	-1.611	-0.0107	-0.592	-0.030	-1.602
Husband's asset score	-0.003	-2.133	0.003671	3.775	-0.0028	-2.115	0.004	3.788
Wife's asset score	0.083	2.025	0.0305825	0.706	0.0828	2.035	0.031	0.708
Husband is landowner	-0.069	-0.903	-0.0932932	-1.234	-0.0697	-0.907	-0.093	-1.236
Wife is landowner	0.014	1.323	-0.0052485	-0.504	0.0141	1.332	-0.005	-0.503
Constant	0.065	1.586	-0.0112651	-0.194	0.0647	1.589	-0.011	-0.194
	-0.107	-3.334	-0.1569233	-4.091	-0.1024	-3.130	-0.156	-4.110
No. of observations	16810				16810			
Log-likelihood	-14866.691				-14866.255			
Chi-square (p-value)	212.5 (0.008)				217.25 (0.008)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 12 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households: Expenditures on Durables, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides on Durables Expenditures? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)							
	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community Dummy for 99M	0.014	0.927	-0.004	-1.048	0.014	0.942	-0.005	-1.264
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.015	-0.497	-0.003	-0.392	-0.016	-0.501	-0.001	-0.143
Transfers	-0.019	-0.909	0.004	0.734	-0.019	-0.877	0.003	0.545
Husband's schooling	0.000		0.000		0.000	0.054	0.000	-0.782
Wife's schooling	-0.001	-0.509	0.001	0.774	-0.001	-0.509	0.000	0.745
Husband's age	-0.004	-1.938	0.000	2.252	-0.004	-1.930	0.001	2.240
Wife's age	0.000	-0.579	0.000	1.528	0.000	-0.579	0.000	1.536
Husband speaks indigenous language	0.000	-0.128	0.000	0.546	0.000	-0.126	0.000	0.524
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.003	0.148	-0.011	-1.648	0.003	0.147	-0.011	-1.640
Husband speaks Spanish	0.023	1.053	0.003	0.411	0.023	1.050	0.003	0.400
Wife speaks Spanish	0.019	0.690	0.012	0.908	0.019	0.690	0.012	0.913
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.044	-2.119	0.003	0.484	-0.044	-2.116	0.003	0.493
Husband's asset score	-0.002	-1.901	0.001	1.806	-0.002	-1.899	0.001	1.823
Wife's asset score	0.180	3.307	-0.020	-1.085	0.180	3.305	-0.020	-1.085
Husband is landowner	-0.273	-2.984	0.027	1.334	-0.273	-2.983	0.027	1.324
Wife is landowner	-0.009	-0.655	-0.005	-1.276	-0.009	-0.655	-0.005	-1.269
Constant	0.008	0.157	0.016	1.163	0.008	0.157	0.016	1.158
	-0.103	-2.556	-0.102	-7.065	-0.104	-2.506	-0.101	-7.187
No. of observations	16742				16742			
Log-likelihood	-11893.684				-11893.376			
Chi-square (p-value)	205.17 (0.0061)				206.9 (0.0061)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 13 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households: Expenditures on House Repairs, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98M, 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides on Major House Repairs/Expenses? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)							
	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	-0.006	-0.312	0.000	-0.117	-0.009	-0.460	-0.001	-0.295
Dummy for 98O	0.004	0.115	0.013	1.668	0.011	0.302	0.014	1.822
Dummy for 99M	0.007	0.200	0.009	1.102	0.013	0.396	0.010	1.240
PROGRESA x 98O	0.021	0.833	-0.005	-0.909	0.018	0.727	-0.005	-1.031
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.005	-0.229	0.001	0.190	-0.009	-0.374	0.000	0.048
Transfers					0.000	-1.223	0.000	-0.871
Husband's schooling	-0.001	-0.894	0.000	0.862	-0.001	-0.919	0.000	0.836
Wife's schooling	-0.002	-1.359	0.000	0.249	-0.002	-1.371	0.000	0.233
Husband's age	0.001	0.889	0.000	0.395	0.001	0.900	0.000	0.403
Wife's age	-0.001	-1.942	0.000	2.183	-0.001	-1.967	0.000	2.155
Husband speaks indigenous language	0.026	1.450	-0.008	-1.621	0.026	1.460	-0.007	-1.609
Wife speaks indigenous language	-0.005	-0.275	0.003	0.634	-0.005	-0.289	0.003	0.621
Husband speaks Spanish	0.018	0.714	0.000	-0.032	0.018	0.718	0.000	-0.025
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.040	-2.494	0.002	0.489	-0.040	-2.467	0.003	0.504
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.001	-1.251	0.000	1.127	-0.001	-1.231	0.000	1.150
Husband's asset score	0.099	2.238	-0.008	-0.571	0.099	2.236	-0.008	-0.569
Wife's asset score	-0.076	-1.096	-0.014	-0.661	-0.077	-1.101	-0.014	-0.671
Husband is landowner	0.013	1.353	-0.003	-1.085	0.013	1.374	-0.003	-1.070
Wife is landowner	-0.011	-0.287	0.002	0.145	-0.011	-0.280	0.002	0.147
Constant	-0.084	-2.327	-0.094	-7.794	-0.078	-2.132	-0.093	-7.666
No. of observations	25180				25180			
Log-likelihood	-18385.697				-18384.476			
Chi-square (p-value)	170.6 (0.0039)				171.78 (0.0039)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 14 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Poor Households: Wife's Extra Income, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 98M, 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides How to Spend Wife's Extra Income? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)							
	Without Transfers				With Transfers			
	Wife Alone		She Lets Husband Decide		Wife Alone		She Lets Husband Decide	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	0.005	0.281	0.002	0.579	0.005	0.288	-0.001	-0.191
Dummy for 98O	0.153	3.863	-0.034	-3.701	0.153	3.773	-0.028	-3.146
Dummy for 99M	0.262	8.635	-0.042	-4.498	0.262	8.492	-0.037	-3.790
PROGRESA x 98O	-0.005	-0.175	0.003	0.532	-0.005	-0.171	0.000	0.079
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.043	-2.230	0.009	1.350	-0.043	-2.208	0.006	0.921
Transfers					0.000	0.044	0.000	-2.100
Husband's schooling	0.000	-0.141	-0.001	-1.351	0.000	-0.143	-0.001	-1.407
Wife's schooling	0.000	0.311	-0.001	-2.961	0.000	0.308	-0.001	-2.994
Husband's age	-0.001	-1.778	0.000	1.166	-0.001	-1.775	0.000	1.171
Wife's age	0.002	2.863	0.000	-1.634	0.002	2.858	0.000	-1.685
Husband speaks indigenous language	-0.015	-1.008	0.003	0.636	-0.015	-1.007	0.003	0.642
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.001	0.053	0.003	0.589	0.001	0.054	0.003	0.553
Husband speaks Spanish	-0.049	-2.375	-0.005	-1.069	-0.049	-2.378	-0.005	-1.049
Wife speaks Spanish	0.013	0.802	-0.008	-2.091	0.013	0.804	-0.008	-2.061
Wife's prewedding work experience	0.000	-0.333	-0.001	-2.119	0.000	-0.333	-0.001	-2.069
Husband's asset score	-0.005	-0.098	-0.003	-0.207	-0.005	-0.098	-0.003	-0.198
Wife's asset score	-0.077	-1.368	0.010	0.503	-0.077	-1.371	0.010	0.506
Husband is landowner	0.016	1.720	-0.004	-1.346	0.016	1.719	-0.004	-1.323
Wife is landowner	0.027	0.702	0.006	0.496	0.027	0.702	0.006	0.505
Constant	-0.271	-7.014	-0.040	-4.271	-0.271	-6.971	-0.034	-3.596
No. of observations	25260				25260			
Log-likelihood	-17800.002				-17796.564			
Chi-square (p-value)	995.88 (0.0307)				1015.64 (0.0309)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 15 — Marginal Effects of Treatment Dummies and Transfers, by Time Period, October 98 and June 99

		Poor Households							
		October 98				June 99			
		Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
		ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
A. Decisions Regarding Children									
Medical decisions									
Treatment		0.005	0.476	0.000	-0.022	-0.006	-0.479	0.000	0.048
Transfers		0.000	-2.624	0.000	-0.163	0.000	-0.698	0.000	-0.710
School attendance									
Treatment		0.001	0.068	-0.007	-0.649	-0.006	-0.605	-0.003	-0.295
Transfers		0.000	-2.955	0.000	-1.111	0.000	-0.727	0.000	-0.137
Give child permission to go out									
Treatment		0.009	0.557	-0.015	-1.695	-0.017	-1.484	0.002	0.209
Transfers		0.000	-0.644	0.000	-2.931	0.000	-0.413	0.000	-0.403
Child clothing expenses									
Treatment		0.008	0.533	-0.006	-0.894	0.000	0.010	-0.005	-0.606
Transfers		0.000	-2.804	0.000	0.222	0.000	-0.600	0.000	-0.832
B. Decisions on Expenditures									
Decisions on food expenditures									
Treatment		0.010	0.711	-0.005	-0.294	0.001	0.098	-0.032	-1.882
Transfers		0.000	-1.901	0.000	1.593	0.000	0.039	0.000	-0.839
Durables expenditures									
Treatment		0.008	0.482	-0.005	-1.173	-0.002	-0.136	-0.002	-0.469
Transfers		0.000	-0.544	0.000	-0.365	0.000	0.182	0.000	-0.731
House repairs									
Treatment		-0.004	-0.195	-0.003	-0.750	-0.006	-0.377	-0.006	-1.191
Transfers		0.000	-2.294	0.000	0.762	0.000	0.355	0.000	-2.201
		October 98				June 99			
		Wife Alone		She Lets Husband Decide		Wife Alone		She Lets Husband Decide	
		ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
C. Decisions on how to spend women's extra income									
How to spend woman's income									
Treatment		-0.016	-0.824	0.002	0.616	-0.025	-1.066	0.002	0.615
Transfers		0.000	-2.018	0.000	-0.424	0.000	2.319	0.000	-2.311

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 16 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Non-Poor Households: Medical Treatment and School Attendance
Multinomial Logit Estimates, data from 98M, 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides to Take the Child for Medical Treatment? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)				Who Tells the Child to go to School? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	-0.013	-1.253	0.001	0.118	-0.007	-0.664	-0.004	-0.393
Dummy for 98O	-0.028	-1.372	-0.015	-0.756	-0.014	-0.693	-0.018	-0.888
Dummy for 99M	-0.015	-0.623	-0.002	-0.095	0.003	0.117	-0.005	-0.274
PROGRESA x 98O	0.035	2.676	0.004	0.273	0.029	2.218	0.011	0.722
PROGRESA x 99M	0.002	0.148	-0.007	-0.449	-0.003	-0.199	-0.001	-0.035
Husband's schooling	-0.002	-1.229	0.001	0.565	-0.001	-0.758	0.001	0.820
Wife's schooling	-0.004	-3.247	0.000	-0.053	-0.004	-3.500	0.001	0.575
Husband's age	0.000	-1.172	0.000	-0.001	0.000	-0.682	0.000	-0.238
Wife's age	0.001	2.553	0.000	-0.130	0.001	1.937	0.000	0.438
Husband speaks indigenous language	-0.007	-0.535	0.018	1.359	-0.008	-0.544	0.002	0.152
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.034	2.672	-0.024	-1.813	0.043	3.332	-0.019	-1.419
Husband speaks Spanish	0.032	1.687	-0.006	-0.368	0.013	0.800	-0.004	-0.245
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.010	-0.570	0.008	0.601	-0.002	-0.119	-0.003	-0.184
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.002	-2.384	0.003	4.552	-0.001	-1.055	0.001	2.439
Husband's asset score	0.003	0.080	-0.037	-1.016	0.005	0.164	-0.039	-1.506
Wife's asset score	0.071	1.411	-0.112	-2.272	0.012	0.216	-0.034	-0.819
Husband is landowner	-0.014	-1.933	0.003	0.345	-0.009	-1.320	0.000	-0.036
Wife is landowner	-0.049	-1.336	0.064	2.344	-0.013	-0.319	0.040	1.717
Constant	-0.184	-6.243	-0.157	-5.622	-0.195	-7.152	-0.141	-5.434
No. of observations	15450				15396			
Log-likelihood	-9493.5523				-9411.2051			
Chi-square (p-value)	321.04 (0.0113)				216.54 (0.0094)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 17 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Non-Poor Households: Permission to Go Out and Child Clothing
Multinomial Logit Estimates, 98M and 99M (Permission); 98M, 98O, and 99M (Child Clothing)

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Gives the Child Permission to Go Out? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)				Who Decides on Child Clothing Expenditures? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	0.023	2.013	-0.008	-1.028	0.010	0.662	-0.003	-0.423
Dummy for 98O					-0.015	-0.514	-0.003	-0.253
Dummy for 99M	-0.027	-1.040	0.001	0.082	-0.038	-1.192	-0.004	-0.245
PROGRESA x 98O					0.017	0.864	-0.005	-0.554
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.018	-1.131	0.002	0.187	-0.011	-0.497	-0.005	-0.491
Husband's schooling	-0.002	-1.390	0.001	0.976	0.000	-0.147	0.000	-0.238
Wife's schooling	-0.003	-1.648	0.001	0.821	-0.005	-2.910	0.001	0.864
Husband's age	0.000	-0.504	0.000	0.396	-0.001	-2.818	0.000	1.096
Wife's age	0.001	1.378	0.000	-0.441	0.001	1.508	0.000	0.012
Husband speaks indigenous language	-0.029	-1.558	0.008	0.631	-0.030	-1.302	0.024	2.932
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.040	2.480	-0.010	-0.816	0.064	2.867	-0.039	-4.572
Husband speaks Spanish	-0.006	-0.252	0.012	0.530	0.047	1.826	0.000	-0.001
Wife speaks Spanish	0.014	0.666	0.007	0.569	-0.030	-1.474	0.004	0.365
Wife's prewedding work experience	0.001	0.457	0.002	2.684	-0.002	-1.512	0.001	3.600
Husband's asset score	-0.013	-0.265	-0.048	-1.478	0.003	0.057	-0.044	-1.729
Wife's asset score	-0.057	-0.616	0.009	0.261	0.006	0.074	0.009	0.250
Husband is landowner	0.000	0.036	-0.012	-1.320	0.008	0.789	-0.005	-1.033
Wife is landowner	-0.026	-0.468	-0.014	-0.367	0.001	0.032	0.014	0.535
Constant	-0.214	-5.649	-0.138	-5.163	-0.153	-3.456	-0.112	-4.929
No. of observations	10271				15439			
Log-likelihood	-6434.0233				-10936.234			
Chi-square (p-value)	147.8 (0.0097)				415.26 0.0085			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 18 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Non-Poor Households: Food and Durables Expenditures, Multinomial Logit Estimates, Data from 980, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides on Food Expenditures? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)				Who Decides on Durables Expenditures? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Husband Only		Wife Only	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	0.014	1.127	-0.007	-0.425	0.018	1.092	0.000	0.057
Dummy for 99M	-0.022	-0.820	0.014	0.401	-0.046	-1.245	0.016	1.469
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.010	-0.544	-0.007	-0.330	-0.002	-0.095	-0.011	-1.538
Husband's schooling	0.001	0.799	0.003	1.769	0.000	0.183	0.001	0.967
Wife's schooling	-0.006	-3.053	0.000	-0.122	-0.004	-1.895	-0.001	-0.811
Husband's age	-0.001	-1.087	0.000	0.409	-0.001	-1.350	0.001	1.995
Wife's age	0.001	0.893	0.000	-0.610	0.001	1.098	0.000	-1.436
Husband speaks indigenous language	-0.016	-0.789	0.002	0.075	-0.034	-1.195	0.005	0.652
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.046	2.113	-0.039	-1.745	0.045	1.584	-0.013	-1.653
Husband speaks Spanish	0.043	1.497	0.023	0.614	0.037	1.195	0.016	0.867
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.012	-0.634	-0.002	-0.097	-0.045	-2.407	0.009	0.920
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.004	-3.423	0.004	3.480	-0.001	-0.491	0.001	1.872
Husband's asset score	-0.033	-0.659	0.104	2.237	0.024	0.381	-0.025	-1.066
Wife's asset score	0.026	0.308	-0.055	-0.654	-0.176	-1.290	0.001	0.035
Husband is landowner	0.015	1.322	-0.027	-2.122	0.013	0.829	-0.007	-1.275
Wife is landowner	-0.032	-0.595	0.002	0.022	0.008	0.127	0.011	0.545
Constant	-0.164	-4.369	-0.160	-3.754	-0.130	-2.877	-0.108	-4.973
No. of observations	10406				10368			
Log-likelihood	-9231.8859				-7385.994			
Chi-square (p-value)	158.66 (0.0068)				122.46 (0.006)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 19 — Determinants of Reported Decisionmaking of Non-Poor Households: Expenditures on House Repairs and Spending Women's Extra Income, Multinomial Logit Estimates, data from 98M, 98O, 99M

Marginal Effects Presented; Standard Errors Corrected for Clustering on Localities

	Who Decides on Major House Repairs/Expenses? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)				Who Decides How to Spend Wife's Extra Income? (Husband/Wife Alone Relative to Decision Made Jointly)			
	Husband Only		Wife Only		Wife Alone		She Lets Husband Decide	
	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z	ME	z
PROGRESA community	0.010	0.497	0.002	0.384	-0.003	-0.118	0.000	-0.067
Dummy for 98O	0.010	0.240	0.010	0.972	0.069	1.693	-0.035	-3.225
Dummy for 99M	-0.012	-0.316	0.023	2.437	0.196	5.367	-0.031	-3.078
PROGRESA x 98O	0.009	0.313	-0.001	-0.104	0.032	1.117	0.005	0.710
PROGRESA x 99M	-0.009	-0.345	-0.008	-1.207	-0.007	-0.267	0.003	0.467
Husband's schooling	0.001	0.853	0.000	0.081	0.000	0.106	-0.001	-1.039
Wife's schooling	-0.005	-2.717	-0.001	-0.997	-0.001	-0.606	-0.001	-2.276
Husband's age	-0.001	-1.060	0.000	1.246	0.000	0.717	0.000	0.430
Wife's age	0.000	0.412	0.000	-0.761	0.000	0.243	0.000	-0.259
Husband speaks indigenous language	-0.041	-1.450	0.011	1.934	0.011	0.525	0.002	0.230
Wife speaks indigenous language	0.060	2.585	-0.021	-3.118	-0.006	-0.272	0.008	1.134
Husband speaks Spanish	0.066	2.201	0.011	0.750	-0.029	-1.097	-0.003	-0.325
Wife speaks Spanish	-0.042	-1.926	0.009	1.168	0.048	2.608	-0.003	-0.550
Wife's prewedding work experience	-0.001	-0.756	0.000	1.446	-0.003	-2.968	0.000	0.430
Husband's asset score	0.093	1.854	-0.025	-1.172	0.009	0.171	-0.009	-0.558
Wife's asset score	-0.058	-0.792	-0.001	-0.057	0.002	0.025	0.014	0.678
Husband is landowner	0.015	1.269	-0.007	-1.635	0.024	2.785	-0.004	-1.123
Wife is landowner	-0.016	-0.343	0.011	0.801	-0.081	-1.333	0.022	1.257
Constant	-0.146	-2.867	-0.101	-5.606	-0.295	-6.323	-0.053	-5.122
No. of observations	15575				15674			
Log-likelihood	-11358.03				-11125.311			
Chi-square (p-value)	208.00 (0.0055)				724.46 (0.0266)			

z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

Table 20 — Child Schooling: Determinants of the Deviation from the Locality-Specific Cohort Mean, 1997 and 1998

Poor Households; Data from ENCASEH 97 and 98O ENCEL, Children Observed in Both Years

	Levels, OLS		Family Fixed Effects		Random Effects	
	With Robust Standard Errors		Coeff	t	Coeff	z
	Coeff	t				
Son	-0.167	-1.042	-0.050	-0.347	-0.092	-0.703
Age	-0.009	-0.239	-0.049	-1.466	-0.037	-1.208
Age squared	0.000	-0.072	0.001	0.788	0.001	0.616
Husband's schooling	0.046	3.959			0.036	3.148
Wife's schooling	0.058	5.019			0.064	5.511
Husband's asset score	-0.502	-1.093			-0.402	-1.039
Wife's asset score	-0.279	-0.625			-0.354	-0.716
Husband is landowner	0.146	1.755			0.103	1.333
Wife is landowner	0.065	0.217			0.051	0.140
Son x husband's schooling	0.022	1.559	0.020	1.487	0.022	1.887
Son x wife's schooling	0.002	0.110	-0.017	-1.228	-0.008	-0.623
Son x husband's asset score	1.005	1.940	0.482	1.078	0.782	1.926
Son x wife's asset score	-0.039	-0.083	-0.001	-0.001	0.039	0.074
Son x husband's land index	0.025	0.255	0.092	1.074	0.052	0.667
Son x wife's land index	-0.327	-0.897	-0.241	-0.567	-0.271	-0.724
Dummy for October 1998	0.095	1.038	0.111	1.160	0.101	1.064
Oct 98 x son	-0.050	-0.422	-0.045	-0.335	-0.049	-0.373
PROGRESA community	0.142	1.884			0.167	2.384
PROGRESA x Oct 98	-0.062	-0.960	-0.083	-1.260	-0.075	-1.155
PROGRESA x son	0.038	0.402	-0.031	-0.352	-0.015	-0.185
PROGRESA x Oct98 x son	0.070	0.885	0.089	0.961	0.091	0.995
Transfers up to Oct98	0.001	3.941			0.001	4.321
Transfers x son	0.000	0.362	0.000	0.647	0.000	0.365
Constant	-0.578	-2.771	0.274	1.571	-0.394	-1.981
Number of observations	12371		12121		12121	
F statistic	10.34		2.44			
Chi square					211.25	
p-value	0.000		0.001		0.000	
Breusch-Pagan test for random effects (p-value)					2320.12	0.000
Hausman test: Fixed vs random effects (p-value)					17.24	0.305

t- or z-statistics in bold are significant at 10% or better.

PART II

PROGRESA AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT: EVIDENCE FROM SIX MEXICAN STATES

Michelle Adato and Dubravka Mindek

1. INTRODUCTION

Women stand center stage in PROGRESA's strategy for raising the living standards of Mexico's rural poor. PROGRESA aims to improve the well being of women and children from an early age, through maternal and child health care, nutritional supplements, health and nutrition education, and incentives for keeping boys and girls in school through the primary and secondary levels. By making women the program beneficiary on behalf of the family, PROGRESA also aims to empower them by increasing their control over resources (Gomez de Leon and Parker 1999). A program policy document states that:

PROGRESA seeks to improve the condition of women and empower the decisive role they play in family and community development. The aim in this regard is to satisfy their health-care and nutritional needs, while providing them with information and skills to promote their advancement. The focus in all cases is to ensure that mothers are the depositories and holders of all economic benefits for their households (PROGRESA 1997:3).

The premise underpinning the program's focus on women is that resources controlled by women are more likely to translate into improved health and nutrition of children than if those resources were controlled by men. These findings have been established in the international literature (see for example, Thomas 1990; Haddad 1999), and informed the design of PROGRESA (Gomez de Leon and Parker 1999).

The program has the potential to empower women in additional indirect ways, though these are not explicit in the program design: through giving women more opportunities to go out of the house on their own, through collective activities where women can communicate with each other (monthly meetings held by *promotoras* and the health *pláticas*¹⁶); and the changes in attitudes that can come about in communities when the government puts women center stage as grant recipients, and when the education of girls is emphasized.

Using the lens of women's "empowerment," this paper explores the perspectives of beneficiaries and community *promotoras* with regard to changes they perceive in their lives, related directly and indirectly to features of PROGRESA. To a lesser extent, it also explores the perspectives of

¹⁶ *Promotoras* are beneficiaries elected by other beneficiaries to serve as a liaison between PROGRESA offices and communities. They receive training and communicate regularly with beneficiaries about the program. *Pláticas* are monthly health talks that beneficiaries are required to attend as a condition of receiving grants.

non-beneficiaries to see whether their views are different, or how they may be affected by having PROGRESA in their communities.¹⁷ Two additional assumptions informed the research questions in this project: 1) there are advantages to this central role for women in PROGRESA but also potentially unintended consequences such as increased social tensions within the household; and 2) attitudes and changes in attitudes are important for facilitating program success and sustainability. Change or stasis is determined not only by design features of the program, but also by how social relationships, culture and beliefs mediate those features. We thus wanted to understand how the program is experienced and evaluated through the eyes of beneficiaries, and the responses of women and men in the face of program principles, objectives and design features introduced in rural areas where gender biases are strong.

Several rounds of quantitative household and community surveys conducted in 1998-1999 have asked a series of questions related to women's status and intra-household relationships. In addition, related questions have been explored through focus groups and interviews conducted by PROGRESA researchers in 1998 (PROGRESA 1999) and researchers at *Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social* (CIESAS 1998). These quantitative and qualitative studies have yielded important information but also raised new questions. It was thus decided to undertake new qualitative research in 1999. The objectives were:

- to look for new issues and insights not yet identified in previous research;
- to further explore issues raised but not investigated in previous studies;
- to gain greater depth in understanding of selected issues related to women's empowerment, allowing women to explain in their own words how they and others in their communities experience PROGRESA;
- to suggest ways in which the program can be improved in order to contribute further to women's empowerment, and to better respond to their concerns and aspirations.

The research was conducted during June-July 1999 in six states: Estado de México, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Michoacán, Querétaro, and Veracruz. In total 23 focus groups were conducted involving 230 women: 80 beneficiaries, 80 non-beneficiaries and *promotoras* from 70 communities. The research explored the following issues:

- Women's and men's attitudes toward the role of women as PROGRESA beneficiaries: whether they support this feature of program design, whether women experience this role in positive ways, or there are unintended consequences such as increased tensions or conflict in the household, or additional time burdens.
- Relative decision-making responsibilities of men and women related to expenditures.

¹⁷ Though we were interested in differences that might emerge, non-beneficiaries are not considered a "control" group in any strict sense of the word, since their status as non-beneficiaries implies they started from a different socio-economic position and because by nature of living in PROGRESA communities, they are potentially affected by ideas circulated by the program.

- Changes that women have experienced with regard to freedom of movement, self-confidence, and ‘opening their minds,’ related to their participation in program-related collective activities such as meetings and health *pláticas*.
- Women’s and men’s attitudes toward the education of girls, and the reasons for these beliefs.
- The types of adult education that women want for themselves, in order to improve their lives; and the types of adult education that they want for men, which would enable women to take better advantage of the benefits that PROGRESA offers and put into practice what they learn through participation in the program.

Section 2 of this paper is a discussion of the conceptualization of women’s empowerment and its relevance to PROGRESA. Section 3 describes the methods used, the reasons for choosing them and the research sites and process. Section 4 focuses on issues related directly to intra-household relationships and to personal empowerment through collective activities. Section 5 looks at issues concerning girl’s education and adult education. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions.

2. CONCEPTUALIZING EMPOWERMENT

2.1 Definitions and Conceptual Building Blocks

This focus on women’s central role in welfare and development has its origins in the Women in Development (WID) perspective of the 1970s that sought to bring women into the development process and focused on women’s roles in that process. The thinking on “empowerment” through development was introduced with WID but evolved as a part a Gender and Development (GAD) analysis that emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s. GAD analysis focused on the dynamics and structures of gender relations and gender inequalities, how they shape the nature of basic constructs of development analysis (households, labor markets or the informal sector) and how they affect women’s conditions with regard to her physical situation, health, sexuality, education, means of livelihood, and other aspects of their lives (Rowlands 1998) The concept of women’s empowerment derives from the fact that power relations are embedded in relationships between women and men, in other social relationships in which women are involved, and within institutions that affect women’s lives, including households, the state, markets and other domains of civil society. Women’s empowerment thus implies a shift in these power relations in favor of women.

Empowerment can be defined as “processes by which those who have been denied the ability to make choices acquire such an ability” particularly in the areas of strategic life choices, such as choice of livelihood, whether and who to marry, or whether to have children (Kabeer 1999: 437). However, empowerment can also involve changes in the ability to make smaller but still meaningful choices in direct or indirect ways. Kabeer (1999) provides a useful framework for understanding empowerment, involving the concepts of resources, agency and achievements.

People's access to resources (material, human and social) reflects rules and norms that "give certain actors authority over others in determining the principles of distribution and exchange" in different institutional arenas (household, market, community). Agency is the ability to define one's goals and act to try to realize them. It can be manifested as decisionmaking, bargaining, negotiation, deception, manipulation, subversion and resistance, as well as cognitive processes of reflection and analysis. Sen (1985) also combines the ideas of resources and agency to create what he calls "capabilities." Achievements are outcomes, represented in studies of empowerment as indicators.

Resources, agency and achievements must be viewed in an integrated manner in order to be useful in assessing empowerment. Access to resources does not automatically translate into changes in the choices women are able to make (Kabeer 1999: 443). For example, in the case of PROGRESA, women's access to transfers do not necessarily mean that they can make choices about how to spend those resources, which calls for an inquiry into agency, e.g. does she decide, act more freely without permission, negotiate, or give up the resources to her husband? Likewise, her ability to decide how to spend these resources does not automatically translate into better outcomes, in terms of her physical welfare or her relationship with her spouse. Furthermore, improvement in women's health does not necessarily imply that this is a result of women's agency. These are empirical questions, some of which are examined in our research. Others can be inferred by considering assessments of agency in relation to outcome indicators reported in other reports that evaluate the impact of PROGRESA on health, consumption, and school enrollment and attendance (see Gertler 2000; Hoddinott and Skoufias 2000; Schultz 2000a; Schultz 2000b).

2.2 Indicators of Empowerment

Many indicators that attempt to measure empowerment in its different dimensions have been developed through empirical research. Table 1 breaks these indicators into six dimensions: decision-making related to the household; other types of 'choice;' women's rights in marriage; economic security; participation in the public domain; and cognitive processes, including beliefs and perceptions.

These indicators are drawn from a number of studies across a number of countries and continents. While there is striking degree of commonality among the indicators used in studies of empowerment, it is important to keep in mind the contextual nature of empowerment — something that is empowering in one place may not be empowering in another.

Another categorization of indicators is offered by Rowlands (1998), based on a study of an organization in Honduras, *Programa Educativa de la Mujer* (PAEM, Women's Educational Programme) where women meet in groups to identify their needs, learn about their situation as poor women, and in some cases take on small productive projects. Through this study Rowlands identifies three different but related types of empowerment: personal empowerment, empowerment in close relationships, and collective empowerment. The characteristics of each are shown in Table 2.

Table 1— Empowerment Indicators¹⁸

Decision-making related to the household	food cooked, purchase of food and other household expenditures, purchase of major household goods, buying and selling of land and livestock, house repairs, purchase of clothing and jewelry, purchase of gifts, spending of husbands income, disciplining of children, children's education (whether they go to school, how much schooling, type of school), children's health (when to go to doctor), when sons and daughters marry, how to rear children.
Other types of 'choice'	who to marry, use of family planning, number of children to have, whether to work, whether to visit friends and relatives.
Women's/girls' rights in the household and marriage	access to food, education and health care compared to men/boys; whether women's own income or other assets are taken from them; domestic violence; dowry paid; fewer justified grounds for divorce by husbands, equality in grounds for divorce
Economic security	whether women can support themselves without their husbands, whether they make economic contributions to the household, whether they have assets and savings to use or under own name or control
Participation in the public domain	whether they visit public places (without male relatives), participation in public action; participation in organizations, speaking out in meetings, political and legal awareness
Beliefs and perceptions	belief in daughters' education, perceptions of own capabilities, beliefs in women's independence and rights, beliefs in equal access to food, education, health care and decision-making for women

¹⁸ This table merges findings from a number of studies, each of which uses only a selection of the indicators in the table. It is of course not exhaustive. See Becker, 1997; Cleland *et al.* 1994; Hashemi *et al.* 1996; Jejeebhoy 1997; Kishor 1997; Kritz *et al.* 1997; Morgan and Niraula 1995; Osmani 1998; Razavi, 1992; Rowlands 1998; Sathar and Kazi 1997; Sen 1998. Kabeer (1999) breaks many of these indicators down according to some of the studies that use them.

Table 2 — Types of Empowerment

Personal Empowerment	Empowerment In Close Relationships	Collective Empowerment
Characteristics:	Characteristics:	Characteristics:
Self-confidence	Ability to negotiate	Group identity
Self-esteem	Ability to communicate	Collective sense of agency
Sense of agency	Ability to get support	Group dignity
Sense of 'self' in a wider context	Ability to defend self/rights	Self-organization and management
Dignity	Sense of 'self' in the relationship	
	Dignity	

Indicators of empowerment processes identified in the Honduras study were: increasing ability to act, to perceive themselves as capable, hold opinions, use time effectively, leave the house and community, control resources, interact with and speak out in front of others, initiate activities and carry them out, organize others, and respond to events. The idea expressed most often by the women translated as “dignity” but also means self-respect, self-worth, honor and the expectation of and right to receive respect. Rowlands correctly cautions that empowerment is not a linear process, but rather it involves progress and setbacks, and that it will be experienced in different ways by different people, even in similar programs. We will return to some of these ideas over the course of this paper.

2.3 Empowerment and PROGRESA

PROGRESA is concerned primarily with increasing the basic well being of poor families, particularly in the areas of education, health and nutrition. The program puts women at the center because it is through them that the welfare of children and the family as a whole is to be increased. In this sense, the program is not primarily concerned with women’s empowerment in the way that it is defined above. However, as Kabeer (1999:437) points out, there is “a logical association between poverty and disempowerment because an insufficiency of the means for meeting one’s basic needs often rules out the ability to exercise meaningful choice.” In this sense, the primary focus on increasing education, health and nutrition can be seen as a form of empowerment, for women in the short-term but more effectively, for girls as future adults.

The program does, however, potentially contribute to empowerment in some of the dimensions identified in the preceding section. By putting resources in women’s hands, by encouraging women not to turn over the money to their husbands, by directing the benefits toward expenditures that normally fall within the decision-making domain of women (e.g., food), by

giving women education in health, nutrition and family planning, and by giving higher grants for girls' schooling to encourage their attendance, the program can be seen to be concerned with empowerment of women, both beneficiary women and their daughters as future women. The elements of personal empowerment and empowerment in close relationships are important to achieving PROGRESA objectives because self-esteem, dignity and the ability to negotiate with husbands are all important to women's ability to manage the PROGRESA money and spend it on the family, to leave the house for program activities, including meetings, clinic visits and *pláticas*, and to make use of the health education, e.g. use family planning.

Notably absent as an objective of the program is collective empowerment. Unlike its predecessor anti-poverty program PRONOSOL, PROGRESA is not demand-driven and does not encourage the formation or use of organizations to access or use resources. PROGRESA benefits go directly to households and not to organizations, and there is no formal role for collective activity in the functioning of the program. There is thus limited scope for collective forms of empowerment, and the channels for personal empowerment through participation in groups are similarly narrow. PROGRESA nevertheless does involve some activities where women gather in groups. *Promotoras* hold monthly meetings for beneficiaries. While these are intended primarily as a means for transmitting basic information about the program and answering questions, we found in our research that in some communities they turn into chances for women to communicate, share experiences, problems and solutions, and give them the experience of speaking out in a group.

Though PROGRESA is very different from the PAEM program in Honduras in its objectives and structure, in some communities we found descriptions based on these collective activities that sounded much like those reported by Rowlands (1998): In PAEM, women said they shared experiences and difficulties, searched for solutions together, and felt less alone as they found out that women had similar problems to theirs. They spoke about being woken up, knowing more things. They explained how at first they felt embarrassed to speak in front of the other women, but in time they began to talk, had built their confidence and were better able to interact as well with others, including strangers and people in authority. Some noted significant changes in their relationships with their husbands, though for many this was limited or there was no change. One area where there was change was in their ability to leave the house unaccompanied. Whereas some women had never done this before, participation in the group meant that they had the opportunity to travel outside of their communities. The greatest change came about for those who took on leadership roles in the organization, who learned to organize others, lead, negotiate and carry out plans they made with the women. These findings were far more pronounced and widespread than in PROGRESA — empowerment through collective activities was the objective in this program whereas in PROGRESA it was not, and according to the household surveys only a small minority of communities use PROGRESA meetings for more than conveying program information. However, as will be seen later in this paper many PROGRESA women talked about opportunities to talk about concerns, find common experiences and develop their confidence — and described cognitive processes of reflection and analysis. This was more often the experience of *promotoras*, the community workers who take on leadership roles, but to some extent of beneficiaries as well.

As will be seen in this paper, women in the focus groups talk about women being more responsible with money than men; about their leaving the house for PROGRESA activities and men who ‘oppress’ their wives by not letting them go out; about their eyes being opened through the health lectures; and about the importance of education to women’s lives. Non-beneficiaries in these PROGRESA communities say some of the same things, and these ideas can not be attributed strictly to PROGRESA. However, the spotlight that PROGRESA’s design puts on women in a variety of ways gives government recognition to women in a way that is noticed by beneficiary and non-beneficiary families, and the program is introduced with messages that convey ideas about women’s importance, creating a low level discourse around gender issues.

Nevertheless, empowerment as measured by the types of indicators listed in the previous section is modest in this program. Changes in intrahousehold relationships, empowerment in close relationships, are subtle where they are reported at all. This should not come as a surprise or disappointment, however. Kabeer (1999: 457) points out that “although there is a role for individual agency in challenging gender inequality, larger structural change is also important because where cultural values constrain women’s ability to make strategic life choices, individuals cannot tackle these alone. Women can and sometimes act against the norm, but they pay a high price for this.” Women may then ‘choose’ to conform to certain gender norms and hierarchies because of the culturally-specific status it brings or because of her decision that the price of challenge is too high. For example, women leave the house as needed for their PROGRESA responsibilities but are certain to prepare their husbands meals and do all their other housework before leaving. This increases their time burdens but is clearly the price they are willing to pay for domestic harmony. It is also a strategic choice in the sense that if they did not do this they are unlikely to be able to leave the house as needed.

Collective empowerment is even less evident. The greatest change appears to be in personal empowerment, through the way women see themselves and certain conditions in their lives as women, which does have the potential to translate into the other forms of empowerment. Even if ‘measurable’ changes in empowerment are small, they are a start: “The availability of alternatives at the discursive level, of being able to at least imagine the possibility of having chosen differently, is thus crucial to the emergence of a critical consciousness, the process by which people move from a position of unquestioning acceptance of the social order to a critical perspective on it” (Kabeer 1999: 441). Furthermore, the greatest empowerment effect of the program is likely to be for future generations, for the girls who grow up with the benefit of greater education that prepares them for a better position in the economy and in the household.

Each of the studies of empowerment cited in the previous section does not measure all of the indicators listed. Rather, in each case a small subgroup was chosen. Similarly, in our study we focus on several issues selected based on the literature on women’s empowerment and the priorities of program stakeholders, including those of PROGRESA officials interested in learning about impacts on women, and beneficiaries through their level of response to different questions asked in the focus groups and issues they raised on their own.

3. RESEARCH METHODS

3.1 Why Combine Quantitative and Qualitative Research Methods?

Large-scale quantitative household and community-level surveys of the type carried out by PROGRESA in 1998 and 1999 enable the collection of data from a vast number of households and villages and thus provide information about program impact throughout the states where the data was collected. The breadth of coverage is thus large, giving a basis for comparability between regions, a controlled experimental design and statistical analysis to establish relationships between different variables. There are, however, constraints on what this data can capture revolving around validity issues that stem from: the difficulty of communicating to respondents exactly what is meant to be asked (due to the necessary brevity of questions and the use of proxies); the inability of respondents to express exactly what they mean or explain their answers (due to the use of closed questions); the inability to follow up when more information or clarification is needed; the difficulty of developing rapport and trust in order to maximize truthfulness in the replies. Although some discussion can take place during a survey, the time and instrument is not conducive to developing depth in understanding.

The strength of qualitative research methods is that they allow for all of the above. In addition, they are particularly well suited for enabling the understanding of the significance of local context to the phenomenon being studied, the complexity and multiplicity of explanatory factors, and latent, underlying or less obvious issues. By often focusing on peoples “lived experience” they enable a richer understanding of the meanings that people give to events, processes and structures in their lives. They provide “thick descriptions that are vivid, nested in a real context, and have a ring of truth that has strong impact on the reader” (Miles and Huberman 1994). In doing all this, however, they are time and resource intensive. There are thus limitations on the number of individuals and communities that can be included in any given study. This in turn constrains the ability to compare between different places or people, and the type of statistical or modeling techniques that can be used on the data.

The use of quantitative and qualitative methods together and in complementary ways is well established theoretically and empirically (Brewer and Hunter 1989; Creswell 1995; Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). Triangulation, where several types of data are used in a single study, enables the weaknesses of one method to be offset by the strengths of another (Denzin 1978; Jick 1979). A study of 57 mixed method studies from the 1980s identified five purposes for mixing methods: 1) triangulation: seeking convergence of results; 2) complementarity: examining overlapping and different facets of a phenomenon; 3) initiation: discovering paradoxes, contradictions, fresh perspectives; 4) development: using the methods sequentially, such that results from the first method inform the use of the second method; and 5) expansion: adding breadth and scope to a project (Greene *et al.* 1989).

Bearing in mind the advantages identified above, a qualitative component was designed for the PROGRESA evaluation specifically because:

- There were questions to be asked that were more suited to open-ended responses rather than closed categorical or continuous answer options.
- Respondents could answer in their own words and explain background to responses, enabling a more precise understanding of the meaning of their responses.
- Women in PROGRESA communities could raise experiences and concerns that we had not anticipated.
- Responses could be probed and challenged, and contradictions explored or clarified.
- Congruence and differences in survey and focus group results could be explored and interpreted.
- Respondents were able to propose solutions as well as report problems.
- Responses could help to interpret survey results, and suggest new questions and response options for further survey work, as well as areas for additional qualitative research.

3.2 Research Design and Process

This research involved focus groups conducted with beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and *promotoras*. Focus groups were chosen rather than semi-structured interviews for the following reasons:

- Opinions are dynamic, and individuals' comments can trigger recollections and opinions of other group participants.
- Responses may be more candid because in the group they are anonymous to the interviewer so there is less fear of being identified than when interviewed in their homes.¹⁹
- Focus groups are cost- and time-efficient, where more individuals can be interviewed at a lower cost and in less time than through individual interviews.

Focus groups have certain disadvantages compared to individual semi-structured interviews, however. These are:

- Frequencies of responses reported are rough indications of the relative strength of a particular opinion, not a representation of the number of people who hold a particular opinion.²⁰
- It is not possible to identify who in the group is speaking, and to relate comments to other of her characteristics or opinions.

¹⁹ Given people's current association between household surveys and their inclusion/exclusion in the PROGRESA, there is more reason to believe that they might bias their answers with the hope of being included or not dropped from the program.

²⁰ In this paper, frequencies presented generally represent undercounts because often individuals note agreement with an opinion through nods and do not repeat the idea expressed by another. In the coding process used for this data, the undercount is further exacerbated by coding similar comments made by different individuals in immediate succession as one data 'chunk.'

- There is less time to probe and gain clarity because of the number of respondents and time pressures.
- It is not possible to get everyone to answer, so some opinions may be missed. In particular, people with minority viewpoints, or those less accustomed to speaking in groups, may be uncomfortable speaking and these views are not heard.

Research questions were developed through the following steps:

1. Previous quantitative and qualitative research reports were reviewed, which revealed partially answered questions in need of further investigation.
2. A series of meetings were held with PROGRESA stakeholders to reveal concerns and interests related to intra-household issues and women's status.
3. A preliminary set of questions was drawn up and circulated to researchers and PROGRESA stakeholders for comments and additions.
4. These questions were tested in pilot focus groups and then adapted for the remaining groups, with some additional questions added or dropped based on findings in subsequent groups.

The focus groups were conducted in six Mexican states. In five of these states, beneficiary localities were selected nearby the treatment communities in the ENCEL surveys, but not in these communities in order to avoid overburdening them. The sixth state (Estado de México) was where the pilot groups were conducted, the data from which was analyzed along with the other groups. *Promotoras* participated from communities surrounding the towns near communities where the beneficiary/non-beneficiary groups were held. The one exception was Estado de México where no *promotora* group was held. Two of the eight communities were primarily indigenous, monolingual communities. Additional monolingual communities were represented by *promotoras* in these regions.

Twenty-three focus groups were conducted involving 230 participants: 80 beneficiaries, 80 non-beneficiaries and *promotoras* representing 70 communities from 7 regions. A group of beneficiaries and a separate group of non-beneficiaries were convened in each of 8 communities in 6 states.²¹ The locations are shown in Table 3.

²¹ Throughout this paper, the states from which different responses emanate are identified for the information of the reader. However, the sample size in this research is not large enough to make meaningful comparisons across regions, i.e., to analyze responses based on their regional context. Instead, more emphasis is placed on findings that were common across regions.

Table 3 — Focus Group Locations

Beneficiaries and Non-beneficiaries Came From the Following 8 Communities:	<i>Promotoras</i> Came from 70 Communities Surrounding:
Rincón del Curungueo, Michoacán	Zitácuaro, Michoacán
La Fundición, Michoacán	
Huejutla, Hidalgo (Nahuatl)	Huejutla, Hidalgo
El Cantarito, Veracruz	Tantoyuca, Veracruz
Tecomate, Veracruz (Tenek)	Tempoal, Veracruz
Tzinbanzá, Querétaro	Cadereyta, Querétaro
Zoquitipa, Guerrero	Chilapa, Guerrero
San Ildefonso, Estado de México	

Focus group facilitators used structured questionnaires so all groups were asked the same questions. Beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and *promotoras* were asked parallel questions to collect views of each group on the same issues. *Promotoras* were asked to comment (as key informants) on the experience of women in their communities, as well as on their personal experience. Some questions were adapted, added or eliminated depending on their relevance to the respective group. Each focus group lasted between two and four hours,²² with the longer sessions those of *promotoras* who tended to speak more frequently and at greater length.

Focus groups were tape recorded and tapes transcribed, and transcribed material coded in a computerized qualitative data analysis program. Frequencies of responses were recorded for each group in each community. Data was coded in Spanish, with selected quotes translated into English for inclusion in this paper.

The following sections report the focus group results. Coded responses are clustered into higher-order codes that are presented thematically in this paper. Response frequencies are given usually where they are particularly high, noting a large consensus on a particular viewpoint. Frequencies can also be viewed as rough indications of *relative* strength of different viewpoints, i.e. the number of comments made signifying one viewpoint can be compared to that of a contrasting viewpoint. Given the imprecision that focus group frequencies represent for the reasons stated above, these should not be evaluated as statistical comparisons. Note that frequencies reported here represent number of times a point was made, either by one individual or a *group* of individuals in discussion, in both cases given a count of only 1. To distinguish between them, individual quotes are presented as single paragraphs, while discussions are presented with each person's point on a different line, marked by a dash (—) to signify a new speaker. A key to identify the origins of the quotes (location and whether speaker is a beneficiary, non-beneficiary or *promotora*) is located in the references.

²² Questions related specifically to gender issues made up approximately one-third of the interview guide, as this fieldwork was also part of other components of the program evaluation.

4. INTRAHOUSEHOLD RELATIONSHIPS, COLLECTIVE ACTIVITIES, AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT

4.1. Intrahousehold Relationships and Women's Role as the PROGRESA Beneficiary

The designation of women as the primary beneficiaries of PROGRESA (men may be beneficiaries under a narrowly defined set of circumstances) was a deliberate design feature of PROGRESA intended to increase the welfare benefits to the household. However, by giving benefits to women when men have historically represented the family in government programs, the potential exists to create intrahousehold tensions. We thus wanted to explore local perceptions of PROGRESA's policy of giving benefits to women, how people understood the reasons for this policy, women's and men's attitudes toward this aspect of program design, and the effects of this choice, both positive and negative. Answers to these questions also provide insight into empowerment processes by revealing how the program's focus on women affects women's and men's attitudes toward women's capabilities and the value of their role in the family.

4.1.1 Women's Views on PROGRESA'S Focus on Women

When asked why PROGRESA gives money to women instead of men, *promotoras*, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries all explained that the money goes to women because women are more responsible with money and thus more will reach the household. They were strongly supportive of giving the benefits to women. Women were bluntly and vociferously critical of men's lack of responsibility with respect to managing household income. A frequent response to the question of why women were made beneficiaries of PROGRESA is represented by the following comment by a non-beneficiary: "we are more careful with money than the men. Well there are men that are careful with money, but they are very few." (NBM1-18). One hundred and thirty-four (134) comments, a very high number of responses in the context of this sample of focus groups, reflected the idea that women were more responsible towards the family than were men. Of these comments, 59 referred specifically to managing money. Note the following typical comment made by a *promotora* from Querétero, stating that women are more conscientious and responsible when it comes to money:

Today I don't have, what am I going to do for eating, for tortillas? I will always look for the manner how to do it. If I have to, I will ask to borrow the money. Nevertheless, the men do not take the risk to go and ask to borrow money. Men go around and say, I'm going to drink a soda, but the women don't, because they think if I drink it, maybe I won't have enough money for shoes, clothes. Women don't eat. But the men on Saturday, he receives money, he takes it and if he finds his friends, he doesn't care, he is capable of finishing all this money. To come home again without anything. So the worry is with the mother. (PQ-18)

Of these types of responses, almost 70% of the comments specifically mention that men drink alcohol with the money they receive, rather than giving it to the family. This type of comment from a *promotora* in Guerrero was offered frequently :

Here in our municipality, the help we asked for, they want to give it to the women, and we asked, even the men asked, why to the women? Why not to the men? It is because women have children, and women work more than men. She does everything. All household tasks. She takes care of children, she also attends to her husband when he comes. She even goes to work with the husband. I think we work more than men. So I think it is the support for the woman and not for the man because if they give it to the man, he goes out and finds some friends and they drink. He drinks a few glasses, he finishes the money that he earns. He goes home and he screams that he wants to eat but he doesn't give the money to women to buy something to eat. (PG-18)

Of the comments referring to women's higher level of responsibility toward the household, almost half reflect an additional explanation for why money should go to women: that they have a greater degree of knowledge as to what the household needs:

I know if I am lacking salt, if the sugar is going to be finished, or all this kind of thing. If the shoes of the children are going to wear out, I will buy a new pair. I see the children more than my husband, because he goes out to work. The father is always a father, but the mother will always be better. When they come home at night, they haven't seen the children. They only say, 'here is the money, you know what to do with it' and they leave.

There is some evidence that PROGRESA has increased the recognition of women's greater degree of responsibility toward the family. This is partly because it is an idea expressed directly to *promotoras* in their training: "We were told at the beginning, that women know better how to spend money. What we are going to buy for our children, and men don't" (PV2-18). Nevertheless, beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries put these ideas in their own words. It is notable that, in response to a question about why PROGRESA money is given to women, non-beneficiaries made a quarter of the comments stating that women are more responsible toward the family. This could be interpreted in two ways. One is that these are beliefs held by women before PROGRESA arrived; the second is that PROGRESA's radical designation of women as beneficiaries causes people in communities to think about why the government is doing this, and leads to a more explicit recognition of this relative strength that women have. It is probable that both of these interpretations are correct. It is thus conceivable that this recognition that women are receiving from the government elevates their status. Note this comment by a Querétero non-beneficiary: "[The government] took women into consideration because she is the one who thinks about what the family needs, about food. And because PROGRESA seems to be for the family, the children will have better nutrition." (NBQ-18)

4.1.2 Men's Attitudes Toward Women's Role in PROGRESA

Given the new time requirements that PROGRESA introduces, the fact that the associated activities all require that women leave the house, and the new resources put in women's hands, the potential exists for domestic disharmony. This can be disempowering for women (particularly in its most extreme form as violence). We thus wanted to learn how men were reacting to women's roles in PROGRESA, whether they resent these new responsibilities and privileges, or whether they accepted them. The vast majority of responses we received indicated that men did not have a problem with women's roles in PROGRESA. However, a smaller though still significant number of responses indicated that men did have problems in this respect:

they were either a) unhappy with women's responsibilities and the time demands; or b) wanted men to be the beneficiaries instead.

Among the responses indicating husbands' positive feeling toward PROGRESA, the main reason given is that the benefits help the husband too, and helps the family as a whole. The point is made simply by a *promotora* in Michoacán and a non-beneficiary in Guerrero:

For us that have children at school, the truth is that the fathers like PROGRESA very much, because it is help for them, because the truth is their salary is very small. (PM1-19)

I see my father. My mother gets PROGRESA. My father tells her, 'woman, PROGRESA came, thanks to God, PROGRESA came, go and get your money. He is satisfied because he is old and can't work. (NBG-19)

Regarding women's PROGRESA responsibilities, most responses indicated that men do not give their wives a hard time about this. For example, a beneficiary from Michoacán said:

Sometimes I tell him, look. I am busy and like now, there is an announcement [the focus group] and I'm busy...And he says to me, if you won't be here to give me the meal its o.k. You just prepare it and you go. But he never says to me 'today you can't go' or 'why don't you send the child instead.' (BM1-19)

Note that the above comment implies that she still needs to perform her household responsibilities, which means the program increases her time burden.

The idea that men see the time taken away from the home compensated by the resources women bring home is summed up by a non-beneficiary observing her neighbors in PROGRESA: "The men do scold them, but when they come home with the money, they are very satisfied." (NBG-19)

Including men in PROGRESA general meetings at the program outset can be helpful down the line, so that when their wives need to leave the house to participate in PROGRESA activities, they understand why. A *promotora* from Querétaro explained that men do not complain about their wives participating in *faenas*²³ (referred to here as "work") because the responsibilities were explained in advance:

I have never heard that any man doesn't allow a woman to go to work.... That is because the day we agreed that we will work, we had a community meeting and there were men and women at the meeting. They were both there and they were both conscious that the men will give permission to the woman to go to work. (PQ-19)

²³ *Faenas* are communal work activities that are not officially associated in any way with PROGRESA. However, in many cases they are organized by doctors or teachers who specifically recruit beneficiaries and in some cases tie their benefits to participation, although this is not supposed to occur.

Nevertheless, there were also comments indicating that PROGRESA responsibilities do cause conflict in some households. A *promotora* in Querétero explained that men in her community do not mind when women go to get their payments, but some do have a problem with their wives attending *pláticas* and *faenas*:

Husbands get angry when women go to *pláticas*, or when we come here, or when they spend a lot of time out. Men get angry only when women go to *faenas* or *pláticas*. But when they go for the money, even if they go the whole day, they don't get angry. (PQ-19)

Another *promotora* in the group agreed with all but the last statement:

They do not like that women spend a lot of time in meetings. Like now. Because when you take attendance and everything else, it takes a lot of time, 3, 4 hours. So they say that they are wasting their time. And also, when they have small children and they are sick and they leave them. That's why husbands get angry. Because they spend much time in meetings, or when they go for the money and they have to wait and they only waste their time. (PQ-19)

Promotoras sometimes help beneficiaries deal with these family problems, and make judgments as to what they can ask beneficiaries to do and what they should not. A *promotora* in Michoacán explained that

I have two cases- I say to Juana...as far as he lets you go to the *pláticas*, and take your children to the health center, that is more than sufficient. Even if you don't participate in the *faenas*, because if you do or you don't do *faenas*, you will continue to receive the assistance. I don't have to force her to participate in *faenas*, because she would have a problem in her house. It's not convenient. So now those that can do *faenas* voluntarily, fine. And those who can not, I can not force them. (PM1-19)

Women did not speak easily about domestic violence in the focus groups. Participants were mostly quiet in response to this area of questioning. It was mentioned 9 times. Although some of these comments referred to problems beneficiaries had in connection with PROGRESA, there is no evidence that the violence started with PROGRESA. It is more likely that program requirements may provoke incidences of it in households where it already exists. Where domestic violence was mentioned, women would not say that they experienced it themselves, but rather that they knew of such a case in their community. A *promotora* in Veracruz described how:

In my community it happened that women went to receive the money and the husband got drunk and when she came back, he told her that she had to give him the money. But the woman didn't want to give him, so he hit her.

A Querétero *promotora* told the story of a beneficiary whom she does not require to attend some PROGRESA activities because she has an aggressive husband:

maybe he even hits her. I think that because she looks like a very scared person and she is always in a rush. So that's why I tell her, well if you like to come, come, if you don't, don't. Because you see that not everybody always agrees.

Informal conversations with local authorities revealed additional evidence of domestic violence in communities in Veracruz and Hidalgo. One local official said (paraphrased): 'you see that women, her husband hits her because he wants the money,' and 'you see the other one, he gets angry because he doesn't want her to go here and there.' In this case, the official explained that he assisted by speaking to the husband to explain why she had to go.

These stories were few in number, however, either because PROGRESA was not associated in any significant way with domestic violence, or because it was a subject that women were not comfortable talking about. However, focus groups and surveys are inadequate methods for exploring issues involving domestic conflict, particularly that which involves violence, and other research methods would be necessary to adequately understand how PROGRESA has affected domestic relationships in complex ways.

4.1.3 Women's Attitudes Toward PROGRESA's Time Requirements

Since it appears that beneficiaries still need to take care of all their domestic responsibilities, fulfilling their PROGRESA requirements certainly has the potential to increase women's time burdens. If these are experienced as substantial additions, the program has the potential to detract from women's well being. Beneficiaries and *promotoras* were thus asked about whether they felt that PROGRESA's requirements increased their time demands significantly and if so, whether they experienced this as a problem. The responses were mixed, with about an equal number of women saying that these time demands are or are not a problem. However, this line of questions did not generate a great deal of discussion, suggesting that PROGRESA's time demands are of some concern but not a major problem among beneficiaries.

Those who said the program requirements were not a burden either did not explain or said that they liked to go to the *pláticas* and meetings with the *promotoras*, that the *faenas* were not hard work or that they were used to this kind of work, or that the time required was worthwhile, e.g.: "she who wants to move forward has to struggle" (BM1-20)." Some said they were not a burden but they would have to plan their time carefully so that they could help their husbands, do their housework and attend the meetings, this way "he does not get annoyed and we don't have problems." (BM1-20) Those who said the requirements were a burden referred to the *pláticas*, meetings and *faenas*.

Another way in which women say their work has increased is by the need to do work that was previously done by children who are now attending school, particularly *secundaria*. Although some women said that the father also does some of this work, more often it was the mother. For example, when asked who does the child's work when s/he is in school, a *promotora* from Hidalgo said: "Well, us. When I stay in the kitchen, I have to do all my housework, because I prefer that my son study. So that one day he can pass the exam." (PH-20) This was echoed by a *promotora* in Veracruz, saying "I don't care if I get more tired. Their father isn't bothered if they don't help, that's why we receive PROGRESA. For children to study. So I prefer to work, in any case, for you to study." (PV2-20) (For additional discussion of the value that women place on the ability of children to study, see Adato *et al.* 1999).

4.2 Decisionmaking on Household Expenditures

The question of which decisions are made by men and women in the household is one of the main ways in which women's empowerment is evaluated in the literature. Since many questions aiming to assess decisionmaking were asked in the household surveys (see de la Brière and Quisumbing 2000) we did pursue this line of questioning in great detail. However, some discussion took place related to expenditure decisions. The main point that emerged is that by making the woman the beneficiary, it puts her in a position to decide how to spend the PROGRESA money and thus additional household income. An additional point made was that because she receives this additional household income, she has more confidence that there is enough to spend on items she identifies as necessary, because she otherwise does not feel she is in a position to judge whether income generated and held by her husband is sufficient to cover extra expenditures. Note the following comments from beneficiaries in Querétero (BQ-21):

For example, if we didn't have PROGRESA and he hardly has enough money to eat, how can I tell him, listen lets buy something for the children— if he is the only that knows how much he earned and he knows if it is enough or not.

Lets suppose that yesterday we didn't have PROGRESA. So I tell him we have to buy some clothes for the children. So if I tell that to him, it is because I know that we do have what we received. But if we didn't have PROGRESA, how could I tell him that? That is why I am telling you that now we have more confidence.

...I do feel this confidence to tell him lets buy something, because it is me who receives this money, but if we wouldn't have it, I wouldn't feel such confidence to tell him, lets buy some clothes, because I don't know, He is the one who is going to work and if the money doesn't reach far enough then how can I tell him let s go shopping.

There is also empowerment that comes from being able to buy something without having to always ask their husbands for money. As beneficiaries from Michoacán expressed it:

Now we don't demand, every moment, 'give me for shoes, give me for that.' Now we take the money from PROGRESA and we buy from that money. Now we don't bother them so much. (BM1-21)

In my house, sometimes because he is the only one who works, he becomes upset if I ask him every moment- if I tell him the shoes are finished. And he tells me, but I just gave you for the other son, and now the other one. (BM1-21)

These comments have potentially contradictory implications regarding women's empowerment. On the one hand, they suggest that women have a degree of new independence, where they are less frequently in the position of having to ask for money. On the other hand, if they are spending their PROGRESA money on things that used to be paid for by men, then the net benefits to them are reduced. In only two cases women said directly that they received less money now from their husbands, though the nature of the comments is significant if the phenomenon is more prevalent than revealed in the research. A beneficiary from Veracruz said that the men: "no longer buy clothes for the children. No, not anymore. In the past, they did buy it, shoes, clothes, notebooks, everything that our children need." (BV2-22) However, the

responses to this question were too few to attempt to draw conclusions. This is an important issue to understand accurately because if women are asking for and/or receiving less money than before they received PROGRESA benefits, the net income they receive or control may not have changed.

We were interested to know whether women's access to PROGRESA resources meant that they now made more independent decisions about what to buy for the household. We approached this through general discussions about how different types of expenditure decisions were made in their homes and by whom. Women generally claimed that men were the ultimate authority in the family — if he objects to something, she cannot do it. However, there was also a unanimous response that women make most decisions about small household expenditures, in particular food purchases. There was little difference in the comments of beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, suggesting that this hierarchy of decisionmaking probably preceded PROGRESA. *Promotoras* mentioned other areas in which they make decisions with disproportionate frequency to beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries; however, *promotoras* also focused mainly on food and other small household expenditures. The following comment by a Michoacán *promotora* was common: “We both decide about education of children, but about the house, the food, it's me who decides.” (PM2-22) A number of comments suggest that women take money and go to the market, and that is where the decisions are made. A non-beneficiary said that regarding “how to keep the house and what to buy for the house, it is me who decides. Because I am who goes to the market and brings the things we need. If I have the money, I buy.” (NBM1-22) The following comment from a beneficiary suggests that women decide because they make better decisions for the family: “The mother is who decides what we will buy because if we ask the kids or the husband and they have a different opinion what they want could be more expensive, and we don't have enough money for it.” (BM2-22)

Some responses indicated that for bigger expenditures men and women decide together; for example, the purchase of large household items (a crib, improvement of the house), or to save money. In other comments, women said they consult men on other issues outside of food and small household expenditures. The difference in responses was not marked between beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and *promotoras* (there was some difference from *promotoras*, though we had expected more). There was limited indication from the focus group data that participation in PROGRESA has enlarged the domain of women's decision-making. However, the focus groups did not address this issue extensively enough to be more than suggestive in this regard. De la Brière and Quisumbing (2000) found based on household survey data that relative to individual characteristics, for poor households, residing in a PROGRESA locality does not have as predictable or strong an effect on patterns of decisionmaking. However, transfer amounts do decrease the incidence of husbands' sole decisionmaking for five out of eight outcomes. The focus groups do not approach the same questions, but do suggest three ways in which PROGRESA appears to increase women's autonomy with respect to household decisions: First, women do not need to ask their husband for money every time they need something, as they can purchase it independently with money from PROGRESA. Second, as noted above, because she receives this additional household income, she has more confidence in her ability to determine whether there is enough money to buy things she thinks they need. Third, if women are permitted to decide how to spend PROGRESA money because it is seen as their money, and if with PROGRESA there is more money available for the family to spend on food (which is part

of her domain), women can now make *more* decisions about such expenditures even if the *types* of decisions have not changed. Observe the following exchange between the facilitator and a beneficiary from Veracruz:

Well if it's the money from PROGRESA, the money that they don't earn, it's me who decides. But the money that he earns, on his job, well he decides. [Q: so the money he earns he can spend it on whatever he wants.?] No, this is the money for something we need, something we need in the kitchen for example. [Q: For example, if you tell him you need a cooking pan, what does he do?] They don't say no. If I tell him that I need a pan, he will buy it for me, or he will give me the money and I will buy it. [Q: And the PROGRESA money?] We decide. The women. (BV)

Fourth, there is some evidence that PROGRESA money may expand women's domain of decision-making. Decisions about purchasing clothing and shoes were not mentioned among the types of household expenditure decisions that are made by women alone. These were usually mentioned as the husband's or joint domain. Note the following comment from a *promotora* explaining that her husband gives her money, and "I am responsible for the food for the whole week. And if he notices that our children don't have shoes, he knows that this is his obligation." (PM1-22) However, in some households PROGRESA money is used to buy clothes and shoes, for the children and sometimes for the women. In the focus groups, it was mentioned relatively often that PROGRESA allows the purchase of clothes and shoes for the children. The implication is thus that in households where men were previously responsible clothing decisions, PROGRESA may move some of these decisions to her domain:

I don't receive scholarship, only for nourishment. When they give it to me, sometimes [my children] have shoes and clothes, then I save it for food. And if I see that my children need a pair of pants or something like this, I buy a pair of pants for my children. But it is always for them. I am the one who makes the decision about the money they give me, because I am the one who knows what they are needing. (PM1-24)

However, as cautioned earlier, the question of whether men are giving women less money than before, e.g., if he used to pay for clothes whereas now he does not, is important to assessing net benefits for women.

The findings in the focus groups regarding decision-making are largely consistent with the PROGRESA household survey data from 1998 and 1999, but not entirely. In the survey data respondents reported that both spouses make expenditure decisions jointly for food, children's clothing, durable purchases, house repairs and 'woman's extra income' in between roughly 62 and 80 percent of the cases, though 'husband only' is between approximately 5 and 15 times more frequent than 'wife only' as the next highest answer. The exceptions are food expenditures where it is roughly even, and women's extra income where women are much more likely to decide than to give the money to men (de la Brière and Quisumbing 2000: 30). The main contrast with the focus group results is on the issue of food expenditures, where the survey data reports that both spouses decide in 63-65% of the cases, whereas in the focus groups the responses were almost uniformly the wife. Also, in the survey data between 61-76% of respondents said spouses jointly decide on spending women's extra income, though there was no indication of what income this is, e.g., PROGRESA or other income. In the focus groups, in discussing women's PROGRESA

income, beneficiaries mainly said they make these decisions on their own because they are in their domain of food and to a lesser extent, children's clothing.

These discrepancies can be understood by recognizing that while there are formal categories and hierarchies of decision-making, there are also many shades of gray. Women may strategically choose to say publicly that a decision is made by her husband or jointly because this is what is supposed to happen according to the institutional norms of the household, even if in practice she makes these decisions.²⁴ For example, in a study by Silberschmidt (1992) in Kenya, women said that men should be consulted on all issues, but in reality women made many of these decisions themselves. This is strategic in the sense that they get their own way while avoiding confrontation. Kabeer (1999:447) cautions that statistical perspectives on decision-making “tell us very little about the subtle negotiations that go on between women and men in their private lives. Consequently, they may underestimate the informal decision-making agency which women often exercise.” Changes in power relations within the household “is often precisely about changes in informal decisionmaking, with women opting for private forms of empowerment which retain intact the public image, and honour, of the traditional decision-maker but which nevertheless increases women’s ‘backstage’ influence in decision-making processes” (Kabeer 1999: 447-8; see also Kabeer 1997; Basu 1996; Chen 1983). Focus groups as conducted in this research were also insufficient for adequately understanding decisionmaking because given the breadth of issues covered, insufficient time was available to probe as much as necessary. A more in-depth, preferably ethnographic, research effort would be needed to accurately understand these subtle patterns of decision-making and other manifestations of intrahousehold power relationships, as well as PROGRESA’s effects on them, than has yet been carried out. Still, the survey and focus groups together provide a useful picture of general patterns that can be further interrogated in future research.

Another area in which more research needs to be done is around the question of whether men take women’s PROGRESA income, or part of it. This has a bearing on what is likely to be purchased with the money and for whom. For example, it is an indication of whether some of the money is being spent on alcohol, a question for which it is difficult to get candid responses when asked directly. It also has implications for household power relations and the extent to which PROGRESA is or is not changing them. In the focus groups, few women spoke out on this issue, and those who did said that men do not take women’s PROGRESA income. Below is a discussion among a group of *promotoras* from Guerrero, and a comment from a *promotora* in Veracruz. In both cases the *promotoras* say they explain to their husbands that PROGRESA money is for food and for the children:

[Q: Are there some women whose husband asks them for the money they get from PROGRESA?]

- There are some who get asked, but they don't give them any.

²⁴ Another possible contributing explanation for the survey results is that the question "who decides on food expenditures" could be interpreted differently by the husband and wife, and sometimes it is men who answer the survey. The husband may decide on the total amount of money to be spent on food, while the wife decides what to buy (de la Brière and Quisumbing 2000).

-They ask for bread and they don't get any [a line of a song: "*piden pan, no les dan*"]
 -I would say that they don't get asked for it. Or at least in my case, my husband never tells me "give me the money for me". I tell him "I don't earn this money", and we talk and he knows they gave it to me for eating, right? I tell him "this money is for nourishment, and the other is for the students, and this is for here [home]" and we buy everything and we all eat together, and he doesn't say "give it to me, give me some of it". (PG-24)

Yes, but this money that I get for my children, I don't give him anything, because I tell him "they give it to me for my children, and you have the right to drink your soda with what you earn, but what they send me is a help for my children, only for my children" [Q: Does he get upset?] No, he doesn't. He says it's fine, and wherever I have left I save it. Whenever I need something else for my children, I have saved some and I buy wherever my children need. (PV1-24)

Most comments to this effect were made by *promotoras*, who are more likely to be able to stand up to their husbands than beneficiaries. However, a few such comments came from beneficiaries. In either case, the responses were too few to enable us to draw conclusions. Doctors interviewed as part of a separate study said that one of their concerns with PROGRESA is that men take the income from their wives (Adato *et al.* 2000). Given the likelihood that beneficiaries may not be candid on this issue in either the survey or focus groups, and given the importance of this issue with regards to determining how PROGRESA money is spent and controlled, more in depth research should be done to determine what is actually occurring within households.²⁵

4.3 PROGRESA and Collective Activities

PROGRESA aims to empower women by giving them access to new resources and educational opportunities, and hopes to encourage their agency through increasing their control over resources within the household. The program's mode of assistance centers on the individual beneficiary. This means that there is no role for community organizations in the program, unlike a demand-driven program such as the former PRONASOL²⁶. Although PROGRESA was deliberately designed differently to overcome some of the problems associated with that earlier program (Yaschine 1999), PROGRESA's targeting of individual households reduces the opportunities for "empowerment through collective activities" and the developmental second-round effects that can occur through building organizational capacity and social capital, and

²⁵ One way to address the issue of whether respondents are answering truthfully in the context of a program evaluation is to consider motives for prevarication; another is to assess how critical respondents are in other areas. Using both of these criteria, we found no reason to believe that *promotoras* were not being honest and candid; however, on some questions we were less confident of beneficiaries' responses. Given the concern among some beneficiaries that critical comments might result in their exclusion from the program, they may have been less willing to offer responses that directly contradict the conditions that PROGRESA specifies; for example, that husbands should not take the money and use it on alcohol. In general, for these more sensitive issues, semi-structured interviews and participant observation are more likely to obtain reliable results than either surveys or focus groups.

²⁶ PRONASOL, *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad*, was the Mexican government's main anti-poverty program from 1988 to 1994.

facilitating learning that occurs through participation in groups. This type of empowerment was not an objective of PROGRESA. The program does, however, involve some activities where beneficiaries gather in groups. There are monthly meetings with *promotoras*, which are officially for giving program-related information to beneficiaries and answering questions, but in some communities also provide a space for women to talk about problems and share solutions. There are the health *pláticas*, where health issues of importance to women are discussed. There are also *faenas*, the communal work activities that are not officially associated with PROGRESA, but in many cases are organized by doctors or teachers, who enlist the help of *promotoras* and recruit beneficiaries. These collective activities, as well as the trips the women make to pick up their payments, are also opportunities for them to leave their homes and their communities without their husbands.

We asked women whether participation in PROGRESA made them feel differently about themselves, gave them new confidence, or changed their relationships in any way with their husbands. These questions provoked a great deal of response. In total, 75 comments or discussions stated that these kinds of changes had taken place through participation in activities related to the program. However, about one-third as many comments stated that there had been no change, most of which referred to their relationships with their husbands, a finding consistent with Rowlands' (1998) proposition that change comes the hardest in this domestic arena. Two-thirds of the comments indicating change were made by *promotoras*, because a) they were better able to understand and respond to the question, and b) to the extent that their comments reflect their own experiences, there is greater scope for this type of empowerment of *promotoras* than beneficiaries, given the leadership responsibilities they take on. However, *promotoras* were asked to respond based on what they see among beneficiaries in their communities rather than their own experiences, which many did, as will be seen in the comments below.

These results suggest that women have felt empowered in some ways through participation in the program, although this experience has not been uniform, and some feel little or no change. But where women describe changes they have felt through participation in PROGRESA, it is compelling evidence of how the program can potentially benefit women beyond the material sphere. In doing so, the focus group results also suggest how PROGRESA program operations could encourage activities that promote empowerment in communities where it is not currently occurring.

The type of changes reported by women in the program fall into four categories: 1) women leave the house more often; 2) women have the opportunity to speak to each other about concerns, problems and solutions; 3) women are more comfortable speaking out in groups; 4) women have been educated through the health *pláticas*.

4.3.1 *Leaving the House*

Women explained that PROGRESA requires them to leave the house for various activities: to collect their benefits, attend monthly meetings and health *pláticas*. A *promotora* from Michoacán explained that PROGRESA had affected the lives of women in her community in the following way (in this case “participate” refers to women attending the activities):

I have seen that all mothers, like indigenous women that we are, things changed a lot. I notice it because now women participate a lot, when there is an *asamblea*, or meeting, or *plática*. They participate a lot because they have this responsibility, in order for the support to come. (PM2-21)

Some comments suggest less male control of women's movement, and a greater awareness among women that they should be able to leave the house. Although it is likely that to become a *promotora* a woman has more freedom of movement than the average women, many *promotoras* describe changes they have observed in themselves through their involvement in the program. A *promotora* from Michoacán described a new relationship that women have with their husbands and with other women since the introduction of the program:

It's not the same. More than anything, in my case, now we know each other a little bit more. We have more trust in each other. And the women, we know whom we have for a companion, like a friend, that we can treat as a husband and not as a rival. We won't have with us a macho man. Like those that don't give us permission to socialize with the others. Those are macho men that don't understand their wives. Those that have them like slaves. (PM1-21)

Another comment from a Veracruz *promotora* suggests that their greater mobility extends beyond their PROGRESA activities. She also makes the point that designating women as beneficiaries gives them new status by giving government recognition to their importance:

Now we see that they are taking us into consideration. That the government cares about us, the women. It's not like before when PROCAMPO came only to the men. And the husband used to tell us, 'today I will take you to Tantoyuca' so he took us to Tantoyuca, nothing more. Now with the money of PROGRESA, I go anywhere. I take my children visiting. At least every two months we take our children visiting. So they can see that what we receive, we share it with the whole family. (PV-21)

4.3.2 'Opening Our Minds:' Speaking about Concerns, Problems, and Solutions

Monthly meetings with *promotoras* and the health *pláticas* are opportunities not only for women to leave the house but also for them to talk to each other. This does not *necessarily* occur, however. The main purpose of the monthly meetings is for *promotoras* to convey information about the program to beneficiaries, answer questions, and fill out a monitoring form with questions primarily about the program's education and health components. Nevertheless, *promotoras* and beneficiaries from some communities said that these meetings, as well as the health *pláticas*, are also an opportunity for women to speak with each other, share problems and solutions, and realize their common experiences. This type of setting is where agency is potentially cultivated, where those "more intangible, cognitive processes of reflection and analysis" (Kabeer 1999:438) can take place.

A Querétaro *promotora* said that whereas in the past "there are people that are very closed, that don't have any communication with others," now "we unload what is on our minds to each other." (PQ-21) Some *promotoras* said that women in their communities did not have opportunities to get together before, but through these new meetings:

now we are in a better position. Because before even though we are from the same place, we knew each other only by name. We never talked to each other, did not have a friendship, no social contact. Now we can speak about everything. Some speak more, some less. And those that almost didn't speak, now they speak more...Now they feel more comfortable. This serves us to civilize ourselves a little bit. To wake up, to be more open. Because also some women didn't leave their houses, and now they do it a little bit more. (PM1-21)

When asked what changes she had seen in beneficiaries, a *promotora* from Guerrero said:

Beneficiaries defend themselves better since PROGRESA. [Q: why?] Because of *pláticas*, because they speak with each other...beneficiary with beneficiary, with other women who are in the program. For example, in my community I hold a meeting and we begin to talk, and they have more experience. Now they know how to speak more. Because they ask each other things. We have meetings, so we speak to each other. For example, here we are in the meetings, we have a chat, and we ask you, how do you handle something, how did you do it? That is how, one to the other, we open our minds. Well one thinks better, we guide each other more. (PG-21)

A *promotora* from Michoacán also explained how women speak to each other about issues and problems that their PROGRESA activities have introduced in their lives, related, for example, to their need to leave the house more often. The awareness of change necessitated by the program has reached men as well:

In the past some husbands didn't allow their wives to go out, and then in our meetings we speak about that. We comment on that. That's why I say that is useful for educating ourselves... Because the husbands say, 'I will allow my wife to go because if the other women go, why should I have my wife here like a slave? So the men are also getting educated. (PM1-21)

4.3.3 *Speaking Out in Groups*

Participation in meetings gives women experience speaking in groups. As in other areas, this appears to be more significant in the experience of *promotoras* than beneficiaries, since *promotoras* spend more time in groups with each other, e.g., in their training, and speaking to groups of beneficiaries. A *promotora* from a mostly indigenous region of Hidalgo explained that:

in the past we had more shame, we didn't like to speak in public and now, we have had a lot of meetings, training. Now when have meetings, we don't feel nervous. Now we know what we are going to say to the other women. (PH-21)

But *promotoras* also make a similar point in discussing changes they have seen among beneficiaries:

I noticed the change because in my community women participate more, in their opinions. It seems that PROGRESA meetings served them a lot, because in the past they were ashamed. They didn't want to express what they think, and now they do. (PV1-21)

The different dimensions of empowerment described above: leaving the house more often, speaking to each other and speaking out in groups, as well as the education they receive in the *pláticas* and the *promotora* training, are mutually reinforcing. This process, particularly that in the experience of a *promotora*, is described by a *promotora* from Querétaro:

It's not that we didn't know in the past, but that we were more afraid to speak, you know, we didn't have courage. [Q: and now why do you speak?] Because of the experience, we learn through experience. Through attending *pláticas*, training. One becomes motivated to continue going forward, to speak. So that is how it is now, because in the past, we were oppressed (passive) the men were telling us, you don't go out, so we stayed. (PQ-21)

4.3.4 'Knowing More:' Education Through the Health *Pláticas*

Another important way in which PROGRESA contributes to women's empowerment is through the content of what they learn in the health *pláticas*. How women value and use what they learn there is discussed in detail in a separate report on program operations (Adato *et al.* 2000), but some of the changes that they have facilitated in women's lives are reported here. Some comments refer to beneficiaries in general 'knowing more' through what they learn in the *pláticas* and other PROGRESA-related activities. For example, a Michoacán *promotora* said that since PROGRESA "it is not the same. Because before the women were more closed in their minds, and now they are more intelligent." (PM1-21) A second type of comment refers to changes that have occurred in women's relationships with men as a result of what they have been taught in the clinics. For example, a *promotora* from Guerrero said that "it seems yes, the men give more place to the women because before PROGRESA they had one child every year, but now they allow them to grow up, they plan families now." (PG-21) Women reported that in the *pláticas* they learned about the following: food preparation, feeding children with liquid salt solutions, vaccinations, pregnancy checks, mosquito protection, boiling water, boiling vegetables, washing vegetables and fruits well, using disinfectants/chlorine, cooking foods well, keeping food covered from dust or flies, washing hands, pneumonia, digging holes to bury or burn garbage, AIDS protection, birth control, family planning, medicines for different illnesses, cancer detection, to clean the roads, use latrines, clean latrines well, make baby food and juice, choosing nutritious foods, monitoring children's weight in relation to their age, growing their own vegetables, selecting between organic and inorganic garbage (Adato *et al.* 1999).

4.4 Summary and Discussion

Respondents in the focus groups made the point strongly that the program should give PROGRESA benefits to women, because they see women as more responsible toward the family and better managers of money. They also make the point that in designating women as beneficiaries, the government is encouraging recognition within the household and community of women's importance in the family. Furthermore, they present evidence that women are able to leave the house for their program requirements and that their husbands are in most cases accepting these new roles and activities of their wives. Women now have new resources in their hands, and this gives them more confidence to decide to spend that money, or more money to spend on items that are within their decisionmaking domain.

Nevertheless, the changes in intrahousehold relations brought about by the program appear from these discussions to be modest. There is some evidence of tensions created within households, and women's time burdens are increased as they manage their PROGRESA requirements and their unaltered domestic responsibilities simultaneously in order to preserve domestic harmony. In some cases, men take women's PROGRESA income or women give it to them. All this should not come as a surprise or a disappointment, however. As Rowlands points out, "empowerment in close relationships" is the area where change is the slowest. In the Honduras organization reported on earlier, some women experienced a great deal of change, while others reported none or even conflict and discouragement. Close relationships are where the individual woman is "up against it on her own... and where positive and negative aspects of their lives are most closely intertwined" (Rowlands 1998:23). Change is thus a more complex proposition. Kabeer (1999: 457) also analyzes the constraints of structure and culture that mediate processes of change within the household, arguing that there is a role for individual agency in challenging gender inequality, but where cultural values constrain women's ability to make choices, individuals cannot challenge them on their own without paying a high price. Women may then 'choose' to conform to certain gender norms and hierarchies because of the culturally-specific status it brings or because of her decision that the price of challenge is too high. Thus, a PROGRESA beneficiary make the strategic choice not to leave the house sometimes, or to fulfill all her domestic responsibilities before leaving the house, because within this structural context it is in her interest to do so, both in terms of preserving the integrity of her domestic relationships and assuring that she can continue to leave the house. Similarly, a woman may continue to consult her husband on expenditures where she is accustomed to doing so, or she may choose to publicly state that she is consulting her husband on all or most decisions, while in practice she makes some of these decisions on her own, and her PROGRESA benefits make these autonomous decisions easier.

These different dimensions of change described in the discussion of collective activities emphasize the importance of PROGRESA activities such as the monthly beneficiary meetings called by *promotoras*, and the health *pláticas*. Through increasing women's knowledge, self-confidence, awareness of common problems and ability to speak in public, PROGRESA can potentially contribute to longer-term social development, apart from the direct material benefits offered by program transfers and the health and education incentives. In the absence of any organizational development and the types of collective empowerment that organizations can facilitate, and in the absence of employment opportunities that would take women out of the house and give them opportunities for social interaction with other women, the PROGRESA monthly meetings and *pláticas* emerge as potentially valuable avenues for empowering women, even if in only small ways. It should thus be an operational concern to ensure that the monthly meetings and *pláticas* are being held. Survey data from November 1999 shows that approximately 78% of beneficiaries attend meetings with the *promotoras* at least once per month.²⁷ However, when asked how these meetings were used, most beneficiaries who

²⁷ There may be some confusion here whether beneficiaries are referring to the *promotora* meetings or health *pláticas*, since the *promotoras* attend the monthly health *pláticas*. In one meeting we attended in Nayarit in June 1999, *promotoras* said they had monthly meetings but upon further probing we learned that they were referring to the *pláticas*.

responded referred to transmission of information related to the program. Only 15.5% selected 'sharing experiences with other women' and another 10.4% selected 'discussing problems with PROGRESA.' *Promotoras* should be encouraged to use these meetings for more than narrow operational concerns, facilitating a dialogue around concerns related or unrelated to PROGRESA. The purpose and methods for creating such a dialogue could be made part of the *promotora* training.

One additional point should be raised briefly here, though it is not a subject of this study. While *promotoras* and beneficiaries report empowering experiences at the individual level through their participation in collective activities, there is evidence that PROGRESA is simultaneously contributing toward collective disempowerment at the community level by breaking down social capital. This is because the program's targeting structure, which divides communities into beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries, introduces new tensions in communities and has resulted in non-beneficiaries refusing to participate in communal activities because they are "not being paid."²⁸ This issue is raised in Adato (1999) and will be further explored in a forthcoming report on the impact of PROGRESA on community social relations (Adato, forthcoming).

5. EDUCATION AND GENDER ISSUES

One of PROGRESA's key strategies for improving the well being of women is through increasing girls' education. Better education can improve girls' future status in their households and the labor market. PROGRESA'S incentives for the education of girls is based on the belief that increasing girls' level of education is fundamental to improving their living standards and social participation (PROGRESA 1997). The way in which the program aims to increase their education is by providing grants for families whose children stay in school, compensating for income that would be earned or domestic chores they would carry out if they were to drop out. These grants are slightly higher for girls than for boys, to counteract the fact that under conditions of poverty girls are more likely than boys to abandon or be taken out of secondary school before finishing.

Although increased school attendance is the main program objective, supportive attitudes toward girls' education among mothers and fathers is likely to be important to making the program work and making outcomes sustainable over time. Based on their 1998 study, CIESAS researchers raised the concern that families are sending their children to school in order to get benefits, but when the program ends attendance will again decrease. A separate study by IFPRI in early 2000 found similar concerns among some school directors interviewed. While the monetary incentives may keep girls in school in the short-term, changes in parents' attitudes towards girls education would make it more likely that girls would stay in school over time rather than drop

²⁸ The main communal activities referred to are *faenas*, or communal work parties. Although *faenas* are not officially part of PROGRESA, in many communities they are being unofficially organized with the participation of PROGRESA beneficiaries.

out eventually,²⁹ once the initial enthusiasm about the program wears off, in the case that benefits do not arrive for some time, or that the program is withdrawn altogether ('more likely' rather than 'would' since the economic factor may still overpower changed attitudes). We thus wanted to explore how the program's school requirements for girls corresponded with the beliefs of mothers and fathers and how the program might in turn be affecting those beliefs. To do this we asked women about whether they thought it was important to educate girls and why, and what their husbands thought about this.

5.1. Attitudes toward the Education of Girls

5.1.1 Women's Attitudes toward Girls' Education

In a socioeconomic environment where most women do not work in formal employment, and opportunities for using secondary education in the market are low, one might expect that attitudes toward girls' education to be ambivalent. This turned out not to be the case. Women responded quite vociferously in favor of girls' education. Eighty-eight (88) comments or discussions gave reasons why it was important to educate girls. The main reason, stated in half of these responses, was the importance of education for girls' ability to obtain employment, or better employment — higher paying and less demeaning or exploitative. The next most frequently stated reason reflected the idea of having a better life generally, related to income, personal development and position in the family. The third largest category of responses stated that education allows girls and women to better defend themselves in their relationships with men and in public.

Interestingly, the majority of responses mentioning the importance of work put this importance not in terms of her contributing additional income to the family, but rather in terms of the possibility that the marriage will fail — that the man may leave her or that the relationship will otherwise end badly, and she will be left to support herself and her children. The following comments are from *promotoras* in Michoacán and Veracruz:

Us women always should study more because sometimes when we get married we don't know who we are marrying, we don't know what responsibility he is going to have toward us, if they treat children well. Sometimes the husband leaves and us women keep the children. How are we going to maintain those children that stay under our care if we don't have any study, if we don't know how to earn something that is not working as a house maid, or that it's not so little that it won't be enough for the family. (PM2-26)

Well, because like my *companeras* say, we don't know what kind of luck we are going to have. Sometimes they [husbands] leave us, this one is unfaithful, and is also for lack of studies, and later they leave us there with a family and we can't find where to work. And to not work, like the *companera* says, as house maids. We can work in a store or something so we know we have sufficient [money]. (PV1-26)

²⁹ Some school directors reported that PROGRESA encourages parents to enroll their children but that over time, some drop out because they are not motivated enough by their parents.

Other comments were made that a woman might marry a man who can not support her well, who does not work, who is “an addict” or “doesn't know how to manage.” In these cases, she can support him.

Many responses suggest that education does not only permit girls to get employment, but also *better* employment. Many women mentioned the importance of education in enabling girls to get work other than domestic work (a house maid), although a couple of women pointed out that in some areas even maids need *secundaria*³⁰: “before they gave them jobs anywhere without asking for many study certificates. Now even to work in a house we need a *secundaria* certificate.” (PM1-26) Education is seen a means by which women can earn more money, and respondents aspire to have their daughters working as a secretary or a nurse, or in a shop, pharmacy or factory, jobs that they believe require a secondary education. It is also a way that women can leave their villages and have better lives in the city. Note the following dialogue among beneficiaries in Querétaro:

- You see, as housemaids in Mexico, well in the city, because we are in Mexico, but in the city because they only go as housemaids to mop floors.
- And to wash is tiring.
- And little payment.
- That hasn't happened to us because I tell my children: ‘I worked in that because I didn't study.’
- [Q: As housemaids?]
- We don't want that.
- [We want them to] work in a job that is so.
- And they don't get exploited. (BQ-26)

Women frequently made comparisons between their own lives and what they want for their daughters: “In my case I didn't study, then I didn't know anything, and if I had a daughter I would say better for her to study so she wouldn't be the same as I was.” (PM2-26) Mothers are supportive of girls' education because they have experienced firsthand what life is like without an education.

The second theme that emerged in explaining why women see girls' education as valuable centers around the educated girl being in a better position in relation to her husband. An educated girl is seen to be able to “defend herself” better within the household (PV-26); she “gets better treated” (BM2-26), is “not only waiting for her husband to give her everything, but she is working so they can help each other and they are a better family.” (BQ-26) Education also means that women can “can value themselves.” (BQ-26) Note the following discussions among *promotoras* in Michoacán:

- [Q: How do you think a husband treats his wife if she finishes *secundaria*?]
- Better.
- Because she has better knowledge, he can't trick her so easily.
- Trick her in the sense that ‘you stay cooking and I go to work, and you better finish cooking.’ Then the one who studies, even *preparatory*, has more vocabulary and she says

³⁰ *Secundaria* refers to secondary school.

'you don't have those rights, I also have my rights'. It's supposed to be better because one who doesn't study is always more narrow-minded, but those who study are more confident. (PM1-26)

...sometimes when they get married [husbands] mistreat them, and that way they would defend themselves better." (PM2-26).

These responses supporting girls' education were far more strongly and confidently stated than those responding to questions as to whether participation in PROGRESA put beneficiaries in a better position in relation to their husband. This suggests that the empowering effects of PROGRESA with respect to intra-household relationships are likely to be greatest in the long-term, affecting the next generation of women through higher levels of education more than it empowers current beneficiaries.

Outside of their households, better educated women were also said to get by more easily in the outside world. A group of non-beneficiaries discussed this point in Guerrero:

-I say so because having studied, one changes very much.

-Not only children change [adults too].

-...For example a drunk, suppose a drunk comes and sits in a chair, and then another man, the governor or the teacher, comes and tells him 'move.' I mean someone who is well dressed is going to sit there, and they move the poor drunk and they seat him wherever they want. It's the same with education. They see [one] more educated wherever ones goes and the one who is not they leave them aside. They have done it in many places. I have seen that. (NBG-26)

— For example we go to Sinaloa and we have seen people who don't know how to speak with us, they only speak Mixteco... the doctor passes by and if he sees that you know they attend you right away. Its not that I want it, but I've seen those things happen.

— They don't understand those poor people, they cant read and they show them the paper or the doctor writes what he wants and they don't know: "Look if you don't know, move," even when the son is dying in her arms. I've seen that many times....

— For that reason not only the man is going to [learn to] read, also the woman.

— Study is needed everywhere. (NBG-26)

Some additional comments suggest that women who study marry later, and that this makes their lives better:

-She wouldn't think about marrying very young, she would think of studying, and it would take her longer to get married.

-They would enjoy life better.

-They would enjoy their youth.

-If they don't study, they are only waiting to get married. (PM2-26)

The strength of these answers suggests that program features that support girls' education correspond to the views of women in the community. It is not possible to say, however, that the attitudes expressed by women about the value of girls' education are a *result* of PROGRESA. Roughly one-quarter of the responses of the types reported above were made by non-

beneficiaries. This implies that either a) at least to some extent, these ideas existed in the communities independently of PROGRESA; or b) because the non-beneficiaries are in the same communities as beneficiaries, they are influenced by the ideas introduced by PROGRESA and the fact that more girls are going to school now. It is likely that both are true.

If the education of girls was believed to be valuable before PROGRESA arrived (but not economically feasible without the benefits), then PROGRESA's emphasis on educating girls gives government legitimacy to this belief, supporting the women's views as valid (since mothers appear to support the idea of girls' education more than the fathers) as well as the financial support to make it possible. Increased attendance of girls in school and the program's emphasis on girls' education is also likely to focus awareness of the issue within families and communities, which can lead to more supportive attitudes. This is a reason to encourage discussion among *promotoras* and beneficiaries of program objectives in relation to girls' education (see section 5.1.4).

5.1.2 Women's Attitudes toward Boys' Education

When pushed further on the issue of girls' education, specifically, when asked to compare its importance to the education of boys, the responses became less forceful. On the one hand, the women said that girls and boys have the same "capacity", "right" and "necessity" to go to school. Over 50 comments were made by beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries and *promotoras* that school was equally important for girls and boys:

—... if the girl has the desire to study for *licenciada*, also the boy can. I mean, both have the same capability, it's just a matter for them to decide. (NBQ-27).

Not because he is a little man we are going to give him more school, or because when they grow up and they have a wife they have to support her. I think the woman has the same right to go to school. Not because she is a girl should she study less. (BM-27)

Well, me in my place, I also think that, well, also as much as one needs it, the other needs it. (PV1-27)

However, their conviction was weaker when faced with the hypothetical choice of sending either a boy or girl to school. In the face of this dilemma, they favored boys in about 60% of the responses. Most of those who favored girls were the *promotoras*. This may be a reflection of their PROGRESA training.

The reasons that boys' education is seen as more important than girls' education revolves around men's responsibility as breadwinners and head of the household, and the fact that girls get married. The reasons can be broken down into three categories. The first is that men take care of families. Below are comments from *promotoras* in Hidalgo and Michoacán:

[Q: Why do you choose the boy...?]

—Because the boy always has to be educated.

[And the girl?]

—Also, but we sometimes finish the studies and sometimes we get married and then we leave our studies half way, and the boy doesn't. The boy helps his parents, he goes on, he gets educated, if he finds a job he gets married, and he has to support his wife, his family. That's why we think like this, first we help the boy, they are going to be the breadwinners. (PH-27)

—I think sometimes they have more obligations than one [women], I think. I have one little boy, he is 5 years old and I say all should study as much as they want but also one has to demand it, but the man always has more weight at home because he has to have a good job, a good education precisely for having a good job. He is going to marry and have a family, and maintain his family.” (PM-27)

Secundaria was said to be important for getting a job, any job as well as a better job:

Also now, sometimes men want to work and if they don't have at least *secundaria* —now the least [requirement] is *secundaria*— if they don't have it they won't get hired. (BM1)

I would like my sons to have a profession, I didn't have it, and even if I have to work or whatever, I don't want them to work hard, to become a farm or construction worker, or anything like that. (NBM1)

A much smaller group of responses favored sending the girl to school, so that they do not suffer like their mothers do, or because girls work harder and are more committed to their studies.

5.1.3 Men's Attitudes toward Girls' Education

This research did not speak to men directly; instead women were asked about their husbands' attitudes toward sending daughters to school. Just over half of the responses indicated that men were supportive, though not much explanation was offered as to why. It was not possible to judge from their short answers whether the men believe in the value of educating girls or whether they allow their girls to go to school to receive PROGRESA.

The main reason that men were said to look negatively on post-*primaria* education of girls is that they see it as a waste of time and money, because girls are likely to get married at a young age and become a housewife. Below are comments from a Michoacán beneficiary and *promotoras* in Veracruz and Guerrero:

Before my other daughters got married, he used to say: “why does a woman want to study if in the end they go to school and they study very much and after that they leave with the boyfriend and they didn't know how to take advantage of school, and then they get married with very lazy and drunk men, and what good did school do for them? Sometimes I even took the bread out of my mouth to give it to them, and all that for them to leave *primaria*” (BM1-27)

There are some fathers that say “I am going to make my son study because he is the one who is going to... maintain a family and you [the girl] are going to be maintained, and you are not going to go to school”. That's also why I think they support their daughters less, the girl. (PV1-27)

I studied *primaria* and my father used to tell me... I wanted to study *secundaria* and he told me: 'no, to wash diapers you don't need to study, you are going to get married, you are going to have children and is not necessary that you study.' I wanted to study but no. And that's what they say sometimes, 'no, my girl shouldn't study because she is going to get married. Maybe at school she is going to have a boyfriend, or they get spoiled at school, and the difference is that they don't let their daughters study. But as I told you, it is about one's personality, about one knowing to take care of oneself and to respect oneself. That's why I think that is why they tell me 'the boy should study' because the boy doesn't have any problems. But I think it is the same because if the boy had a problem, he took the girl or the girl had problems with the boy, then he also had problems. (PG-27)

A number of comments, as in the last one from Guerrero, indicate that another reason men object to sending their daughters to *secundaria* relates to their safety: that they may find a boyfriend and get pregnant in school, or encounter risks on the road in traveling where there is no local *secundaria*, or that they are at risk with male teachers.

We did not get responses suggesting that PROGRESA has in the short-term influenced men's attitudes about the value of girls' education. However, even if men are less convinced of the value of girls' education, in many areas PROGRESA has succeeded in convincing them to allow the girls to continue:

In the morning the minibuses are full with *secundaria*'s children. Now there's no father in any family that says 'because you are a little woman you don't go to *secundaria*. Now men and women, they all go to *secundaria*, everybody" (PQ-26)

Given the strength of men's (and to a lesser extent women's) historical biases against girls' education as reported in the comments above, that PROGRESA has succeeded in raising girls' enrollment (and where it increases attendance³¹) this should be viewed as an accomplishment. Where government programs run counter to socio-cultural biases, they can succeed in changing attitudes by the *de facto* presence of girls' in school, by generating discussion and awareness around the issue of girls' education and de-normalizing the bias against educating them, and by giving girls' a chance to succeed and demonstrate the value of educating them. However, that value will be less apparent as long as there are few job opportunities for women and they continue to get married and not appear to 'use' this education. In practice they do 'use' this education, as a number of studies have revealed that women who enter marriage with higher levels of education have greater bargaining power and access to assets within their households (Quisumbing 1994). The comments from women above regarding the value of girls' education indicate additional ways in which women use education. However, these different levels of visibility will differentially affect attitudes, and as long as job opportunities are limited and

³¹ According to Schultz (2000a) PROGRESA has a more pronounced affect on school enrollment rates than on attendance rates. He explains this in terms of possible greater measurement error in attendance reporting. It is also possible that children enroll in school but do not always attend; whether this is reflected in their benefits depends on the extent to which schools are reporting absences, an issue raised in Adato *et al.* 2000.

women are seen not to 'need' education, the post-PROGRESA sustainability of increased girls' enrollment is in question.

5.1.4 *Beneficiaries' Understanding of Program Incentives*

PROGRESA's grants for girls in *secundaria* are slightly higher than grants for boys. This is an incentive feature of the program: by offering grants slightly higher for girls, the program aims to encourage parents to enroll and keep their girls in school. This feature of program design responds to the fact that under poverty conditions it is girls that are taken out of or abandon *secundaria* before finishing the three school years. We wanted to know if mothers are conscious of this problem, and how they understood the higher grants for girls, as a way of exploring women's views of girls' education and their awareness of the biases against educating girls. We were also interested in how aware *promotoras* and beneficiaries are of the incentive features built into the program.³² In asking why grants are higher for girls than for boys, we obtained three types of answers. The most frequent one was that girls have higher expenses than boys, indicating that the women were not aware of the incentive feature of the program. The reasons given for girls' higher expenses were cultural and physiological differences: girls spend more money on their personal appearance than boys, and they menstruate. Note the following discussions among beneficiaries in Michoacán. These were typical discussions in almost all the focus groups:

- For example, now in school, girls clothing was more expensive than boy's. Girls' clothes were very expensive.
 - They use more material and dresses have more value...
 - Girls wear more things than boys
 - For example, a girl wears a ring, and a band for her hair...
 - And a boy doesn't: pants, shirt and shoes.
 - [Q: Is that why they give more money for the girl?]
 - Well, I think so.
 - We guess that.
 - But we don't know for sure.
- (BM2-25)

It is not only beneficiaries who offered these answers but some *promotoras*, in five states. The following discussions are among *promotoras* in Hidalgo and Querétaro:

- Because as they say, girls have more expenses
- Because *secundaria* girls, you have to buy them 'design' [*corte*]...
- A uniform...
- No, the boy doesn't.
- They wear a uniform, but it is already made. We buy it already made because the boy only wears pants and a shirt. And the girl wears her blouse, her uniform, her socks, and besides that she uses other things as her hair spray. (PH-25)

³² This issue emerged during informal exploratory fieldwork in Durango, where we were surprised by *promotoras'* interpretations of this program feature and wanted to determine the extent of these interpretations in other regions.

- I suppose, well, me at least, that girls have more expenses than boys, for example a girl has to buy towels monthly, and a boy doesn't.
- That's why I say that the girls' expenses are a little bit higher than boy's.
- A girl has many things to wear and use, and the boy doesn't.
- The girl, uses hair clippers and the boy doesn't. (PQ-25)

It should be added here that many of those who offered this type of explanation also qualified their replies by saying that this is what they thought but were not sure. The fact that nearly half of these explanations were given by *promotoras* indicates that at least some program principles are not well explained or understood by many *promotoras*, which means that it will be less understood by beneficiaries who receive their information from *promotoras*. PROGRESA is more concerned that the incentives work than that participants understand them. However, there is educational value in sharing the ideas behind the programs with *promotoras* and through them, beneficiaries. This value is suggested by the responses below from *promotoras* who do understand the logic of these incentives.

These answers, roughly half as many as those referring to girls' higher expenses and all from *promotoras*, indicate an understanding of the historical biases that underpin the incentive structure of the programs school grants for girls. They communicate two different ideas: 1) that the higher grants encourage fathers to allow their daughters to keep studying; 2) the incentive to go to school means the girls will avoid getting married at a young age. The responses are particularly revealing about men's/father's attitude towards the education of girls, and suggests the value that PROGRESA has in convincing men to allow their daughters to continue. Below are discussions among *promotoras* in Michoacán, Guerrero, and Veracruz:

There has been more discrimination against women for a long time. I can tell you about my experience when I was a girl and my father said "you won't study further than third grade" and my brothers finished *primaria*. Then it comes out that this was discrimination against women, and for women to be able to study further they get more support. (PM2-25)

I think it is another way of... for example girls get a little higher grant to study, so they don't get married too young, because we [women] are used to getting married very young, and if they have the grant they can finish *primaria* and go to *secundaria* and from there they can keep studying... The father used to tell them "I don't have money to send you to *secundaria*" and for that reason they married young, and now it is different because they have some resources and economic support to go to school, to study. That's how I see it because I have a girl and they study though PROGRESA and a little with the help of their father, because we help each other. (PM2-25)

—Sometimes [the fathers] don't let girls study, they tell them "you are not going to go to school because... you stay mixing corn, you stay to clean the house. You can't do this. The boy studies because he is going to go out and work, and it's going to be useful for him, but what good is it going to do for you to get married? You are going to get married." That's what they tell girls.

[Q: And then, why does PROGRESA give more money for girls than boys?]

—For them to make a bigger effort.

—Also for their fathers to allow them to study. (PG-25)

[Q: Why do you think girls receive more?]

—To give more opportunity to girls because there are some 14 year old girls who don't want to go to school because they are embarrassed and they stay at home to help their mothers, and they start going out with boyfriends and they get married at an early age. That's why now they give more money to girls for them to start wanting to study, for them to have better opportunities...

—Also, because some parents say "I am going to send my son to study because he is going to support his family and you are going to be supported and you are not going to go to school". I think women, girls, get more support because of that. (PV1-25)

With respect to the issue of women's empowerment, these discussions have two implications. One is that the program's incentives for enabling girls to stay in *secundaria* are well-designed, i.e., they respond to biases that remain vivid as expressed by these women above. The second is that discussions among *promotoras* and beneficiaries as to the reasons for giving higher grants for girls' schooling can be a forum for discussing issues of gender inequalities in their communities and households. The comments above indicate an awareness among the *promotoras* of women's rights to education. Extending opportunities for these issues to be discussed among *promotoras* and beneficiaries provides channels for developing women's "sense of self in a wider context" (Rowlands 1998:23), a dimension of personal empowerment. From an operational standpoint this argues for better training for *promotoras* so that they better understand the principles and incentive structure of the program, and suggests potential benefits from their sharing this understanding with beneficiaries.

5.2 Adult Education

5.2.1 Women's Educational Aspirations

PROGRESA policy states that "in order to effectively increase educational opportunities for all members of poor families, adult education programs will be strengthened and their contents will be linked to elements that are important to the aims of PROGRESA. In this area, emphasis is placed on the importance of offering educational opportunities to adult women." (PROGRESA 1997: 7) Thus far adult education currently focuses on health, through the health *pláticas*, and does not involve other types of education. The policy also makes reference to coordinating with other government programs in the area of labor training and temporary employment, which can increase people's chances of success in the formal or informal economy. Such coordination, were it to occur, would correspond to the aspirations of women as they expressed in the dialogues below. Furthermore, in interviews with doctors, they said that other forms of adult education such as literacy and numeracy training were critical to the success of the Progresa program (Adato *et al.* 2000).

In asking women what types of education they would find useful, we attempted to direct the discussion towards types of education that related to the objectives of PROGRESA. However, the discussions consistently veered towards skills that women would like to learn in order to engage in productive activities. This was revealing in terms of understanding women's aspirations and priorities and the types of government interventions that would respond to these. Women speak very highly of PROGRESA and the benefits it brings in terms of extra money, and health and education improvements. However, when asked what type of programs they most want, the women consistently spoke first of employment.

Approximately 60 comments or discussions proposed education that would lead to some direct material benefit, i.e., lower home expenses or earn them money. They are particularly interested in activities that they can do in their free time and in their home, so as not to interfere with household responsibilities. The activity mentioned with the highest frequency, approximately 60% of the replies, was sewing, because it is cheaper for them to buy materials than manufactured clothing:

Well, maybe dressmaking, because we always have to buy our clothes and if one learns how to make it, one can save some money. Because I have asked about the prices of the material, and one buys the clothing already made. [I want to learn] dressmaking, to knit, to prepare food or bread, or pastry-making, all that. Some times one needs something, and that way one would avoid buying bread and all that. Well for us, the women, I think that would be nice, and that would be useful. (PQ-31)

They also suggested a sewing workshop that would allow them to make clothes not only for their families but also for sale. This was seen as a good option especially for young women, “so they can get ahead in life” (BM):

- That they give us some little machines to make dresses.
- This way there were be some jobs.
- That they train us.
- Something that is useful.
- For our own benefit .(BQ-31)

Other skills that they mentioned were in crafts, hair cutting, baking bread, pastry-making, cooking, and typewriting. *Promotoras* mentioned skills related to nursing activities: giving injections, applying salt solution and giving first aid. They pointed out that these skills would be valuable where there are no clinics nearby. For example, a *promotora* in Veracruz said “I would like to learn medicine, to give medicine because in my community there’s no one to give injections, or to recommend medicine.” (PV1-31) Note that *promotoras* are sometimes asked to give health *pláticas* when there are no medical professionals available to give them (Adato *et al.* 1999). This additional exposure that they have to health education may explain their interest in and ambition to learn the activities of nurses.

After productive skills, the second largest category of responses mentioned reading and writing. They wanted these skills in order to sign papers, help their children with their studies and homework, and to "defend themselves" (e.g., not to be “tricked”):

- I think in the community there are many people who in the first place can’t write their names. At least [learn] to write their name, to sign a paper...” But they are already helping us with that. (PQ-31)
- Also for helping children to do their homework because many times they tell me “mother, my teacher says you should teach me this” but how can I help them if I don’t know?
- Like my daughter is in *secundaria* and she tells me “the teacher says that you should help me with this,” “oh, but I didn’t even finished *primaria*, how am I going to help you?”

—It is very nice to know more, because when my son was in fifth grade, I could help him more or less, but when he went to sixth I didn't know. Then he was the one who taught me. (NBQ-31)

—To learn a little bit more, because I don't know how to read

—I would like to read because I see they bring their notebooks and they are writing and I wonder what they are writing in there, and I don't know. I would like to study to read a little or write and know some more to defend myself a little bit better.(BM2-31)

—More than anything to help my children, because sometimes they ask us “mother, I don't understand in here” and if I don't know, what can I say? And if one knows a little then one can solve their problem, teach them wherever they can't solve. (BM1)

In total, over 100 comments were made by women regarding new skills they would like to learn. However, a smaller group of comments expressed that women did not have enough time to learn anything new: they were too busy with their domestic and field activities or with taking care of young children. Some also said they consider themselves too old to learn, expressing fear that at their age they wouldn't be able to understand or memorize:

The real truth, I think first we wouldn't have time to come to study, and second as our *compañera* says, we are too old, we are not in the age, and we don't pay attention. We are thinking about writing when we have to go feed [our family], we have to wash, we have to clean the house, and then I think I wouldn't have time (NBM-31)

The idea of helping people out of poverty through access to skills and opportunities for participation in the formal and informal economies is not entirely outside of the vision of PROGRESA. Early policy envisioned coordination with other government departments in order to provide access to skills training and new economic opportunities, with an emphasis on productive activities for women:

The struggle against extreme poverty by means of targeted actions should not only the development of capabilities of the members of poor households and greater access to basic social infrastructure, but also the opening of new income alternatives. Through coordination with various federal agencies and state governments, ProgresA will seek to foster productive actions and projects in the areas where it is implemented... initiatives aimed at groups of the poor population that have traditionally only had limited access to options for carrying out productive activities, such as women, will also be emphasized (PROGRESA 1997: 26-7).

In some states PROGRESA has begun to link beneficiaries with opportunities to engage in productive activities. Given the extent to which women above express their desire to have such opportunities, the program should increase its efforts to link its beneficiaries with programs that support productive activities. Early PROGRESA policy envisioned a number of elements of the program that represented a more holistic and developmental approach to poverty reduction. Revisiting some of these ideas would make it a stronger program in terms of the benefits it brings and its potential to reduce poverty and increase its developmental impacts in the long term.

5.2.2 Education that Women Want for Men

As illustrated throughout this paper, men's expectations of and attitudes toward women and girls affect their lives in many ways. This extends to their participation in PROGRESA, and the extent to which they are able to take advantage of the benefits that PROGRESA offers; for example, whether women keep their PROGRESA money, whether they can decide how to spend it; whether girls can go to school, and whether women can use some of the health services offered or put into practice what they learn in the health *pláticas*, e.g., family planning; the cervical cancer tests, etc.³³

When asked what type of education that they would like to see for the men, the weight of women's responses were the reverse of how they answered for themselves. Although some comments suggested income-generating skills for men, about twice as many referred to education that corresponds to what the women are learning in PROGRESA and other issues that affect how men behave in the household³⁴. Some answers were interesting in what it revealed about intrahousehold relations, suggesting aspects that women did not raise elsewhere in the discussions. For example, while women were largely silent on domestic violence, several proposed education in domestic violence and 'how to treat the family' in response to a question about types of education they would like to see for men. Some women suggested that men are somewhat "abandoned" by the program, because everything is aimed at women and their children.

The following areas were proposed for men's education:

- How to treat women and the family
- Birth control/family planning
- Domestic violence
- Education for couples
- The importance of health care for the entire family

Below are discussions on these issues between groups of *promotoras* in Guerrero and beneficiaries in Querétaro:

[Q: Would you like PROGRESA to give talks to your husbands?]

—Of course.

—So it could help them to manage PROGRESA better.

—That's it.

[Q: Like what?]

—How to treat the family.

³³ See Adato *et al.* (2000) for an explanation of what women learn in the *pláticas*, and problems they and their husbands have with male doctors' involvement in cervical cancer testing and family planning.

³⁴ Though generally, this question received far fewer answers than those asking about education for women. A questions about education for men was not part of the original focus group interview guides, however, but rather was added after the issue emerged in spontaneously in one of the groups. This may account for the low number of responses received in total.

—How to treat women.
 —More than anything, to teach them how to be more understanding/reasonable.
 —Because they don't want to go to the health center.
 —They don't go to their appointments, I don't know about men.
 —They say why come to the *centro de salud* if they are not sick, that they are going to come to the health center when they get sick.
 —I tell him that they told us that all the family had to go, but they don't want to, and I don't tell him anything. All women and all children go, but men don't.
 —It's because sometimes they say this program is for women, not for men. (PG-32)

—I think it is necessary, because there was a man whose wife "got the air" [*le daba el aire*, epilepsy] and if she gets pregnant, we think hopefully God won't let it happen, but if in her delivery she "gets the air" who knows what would happen....

—We told her husband... the nurse went to tell him to use birth control, and he told her "if you don't want me to have sexual intercourse with my wife, then I'll do it with you..."

—Because there are men who don't understand...

[Q: A *plática* about that?]

—Yes.

—About birth control. (PG-32)

—That our husbands pay more attention, because they always say that pregnant women need vaccinations... and men don't get that nor talks. The doctor said he was going to give talks for men also.

[Q: And would you like it if there were talks for men?]

—Yes.

—Because they also... I say there are diseases for men too.

—Men are told that they should have an operation to not have more family, but they don't have disposition to do it, because they say "I feel I'm not going to be the same."

—They should explain to them.

—That would be better if they had talks.

—And they have more heavy and dangerous jobs, they need more protection.

—So husbands also had more support.

—They are very abandoned...

—Because they don't have talks or anything....

—They are the ones who are responsible for the family. (BQ-32)

—It would be good if they give us talks to the couples

—To the husband and wife

—So one can live better as a couple

—Because there are some who hit their wives, so they stop hitting them, to stop doing that. There are husbands who hit. They could tell the husband "you are going to treat your wife this way, you shouldn't hit her," and he comes happy, (PG-32)

—I would like them to have talks about health. That's important for everybody and men usually don't like... they have the opinion that they don't go to meetings, for example, they don't go with the doctor.

[Q: Which subjects about health would you like your husbands to lean?]

—All.

[Q: But which ones?]

—Birth control, that's important that they also know about that, because sometimes we know but they don't take it into account.

—And there are some *machistas* who say they won't: "you are going to have all the children I want". And even if he can't support all of them, for him is very easy to make them, [laughs]

—They also should know.

—Don't you think so?

—And also about the diseases they can get.

[Q: Like which ones?]

—Like AIDS.

—Of course. (PG-32)

On a few occasions women questioned the feasibility of *pláticas* for men, saying that they work hard, or migrate for work, so that they would not have the time or ability to attend *pláticas*. Below is one such comment from a beneficiary in Veracruz:

Local translator: She says men don't [learn], because they grew up very poor and now all they have done is to work with the machete, and they don't think they can learn anything else or that they are going to have time to get educated or to learn anything new because they have their responsibilities and they have to work. But in the evening they can come to a talk to learn something, but in the evening, not in the daytime. (BV2-32)

6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This research provided beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries, and *promotoras* a chance to describe in their own words how they and other women and men in their communities experience PROGRESA. It also provided a window into ways in which the program has contributed to women's empowerment, as well as ways in which it could make a greater contribution than it has up to now. PROGRESA is designed to increase the well being of women and girls in a range of ways in the short- and long-term, in direct and indirect, material and non-material ways. It also can produce unintended consequences due to gender-based socio-cultural tensions that present women with new challenges. Because it is confronting longstanding gender biases, the program's success in the long-term depends to some extent on changing attitudes and beliefs among men and women. This research examined these issues from several vantage points.

The overall finding of the research is that PROGRESA's emphasis on women is well-guided. While it has introduced some new tensions in the household and burdens on women, on balance women feel it has helped to improve their position and helped the family as a whole. Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries provided overwhelming reinforcement for the concept that giving resources to women means more will reach the family, emphasizing mainly that men are less responsible with how they spend their income, that men spend their money on alcohol, and that women know what the household needs. Women also feel that by making them beneficiaries, the government is recognizing them. Thus, by recognizing women's importance to the family's welfare and choosing them to take on PROGRESA's responsibilities, the program may be having a less tangible but longer-term impact on women's status.

Given both the new attention and time demands that PROGRESA put on women, there is the potential to create tensions in their households. However, most women said that men were supportive of their roles in PROGRESA, mainly because it brings needed money to the family. Some women do experience problems with their husbands related to PROGRESA's demands, particularly because they take her away from the house. Including men in early PROGRESA meetings where the responsibilities are explained can help men to be more tolerant later. *Promotoras* sometimes excuse a woman from a program activity when they know it may get her in trouble at home. We received few reports of domestic violence, but feel that focus groups are unlikely to bring out this information. From the beneficiaries' point of view, they do experience extra time demands on an already busy schedule, naming the time spent in getting their grants, attending monthly meetings, *pláticas*, and *faenas*, and extra work they do at home so their children can study. However, almost all felt that the benefits of participation outweighed the costs.

With regard to intrahousehold expenditure decisions, we did not find much direct evidence of change connected to PROGRESA. Beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries say that the one area in which they make decisions on their own is about food purchases. If PROGRESA makes more money available for food for the family, she then may be making more decisions even if the type of decisions has not changed. There is some evidence that they are exercising broader decision-making authority, in that some said they no longer have to ask their husbands for money every time they need something, for example, shoes for the children. With a few exceptions, they also said that men do not take their PROGRESA money. However, doctors interviewed said that men are taking women's PROGRESA money in some communities. This is an area that needs to be explored further, as it has significance for what items are likely to be purchased with the money and for whom, as well as implications for household power relations and the extent to which PROGRESA is or is not changing them.

Our research identified several ways in which PROGRESA can potentially empower women beyond that derived from the direct material benefits, through processes that occur in program-related collective activities. For some, through being able to leave the house more often without their husbands; by gathering in meetings and health *pláticas* and speaking to each other about concerns, problems and solutions; by developing more comfort with speaking out in groups; and through health, nutrition, sanitation, family planning and family care education they are receiving in the health *pláticas*, women say they have developed greater confidence, a greater awareness of their situation as women, and in general they know more. This experience has not been uniform, however, and some feel little or no change. Collective empowerment is limited in the sense that PROGRESA does not build any organizational capacity that could produce second-round social or economic benefits. However, the elements of personal empowerment generated through collective activities as reported above are sufficiently valuable on their own to merit consideration of how to institutionalize opportunities for such interaction, i.e., encouraging *promotoras* through their training to use their meetings for discussions that go beyond program operational concerns.

One of PROGRESA's key strategies for improving the well being of women is through increasing girls' education. Although increased school attendance is the main program objective,

supportive attitudes toward girls' education among mothers and fathers is important to making the program work and making outcomes sustainable over time, reducing the chances that girls will drop out once the initial enthusiasm about the program wears off, or in the case that the benefits do not arrive on time, or that the program is withdrawn altogether. In asking women their views of girls education, we found strong support — mainly because women believe that education will help girls to get better, more skilled and less exploitative jobs. They see this as important particularly because marriages may fail; and because it will improve their position in the family, and ability to defend themselves in their interpersonal relationships and in the public sphere, and will give them a better life than their mothers had. The fact that these responses were far stronger than those concerning how PROGRESA has helped women's current status, implies that the potential future benefits of PROGRESA (through encouraging girls' education) are higher than the current benefits. The program gives government legitimacy to the belief in girls' education as well as the financial support to make this education possible, both of which help in convincing men to allow their daughters to go to school. Increased attendance of girls in school and the program's emphasis on girls' education is also likely to focus awareness of the issue within families and communities, which can lead to more supportive attitudes. This makes it important that *promotoras* understand and discuss with beneficiaries the program structure and objectives with regard to educating girls. Currently, beneficiaries and some *promotoras* think that families receive higher grants for girls school attendance than for boys because girls have higher expenses, e.g., clothing, cosmetics, etc.

In spite of these views on girls' education, most women still value boys' education more because of men's role as breadwinners, and the girls future as a wife — revealing less distance between the attitudes of men and women than initially conveyed. Though some men were said to be supportive of sending their daughters to school, many were not because they believe educating daughters past *primaria* is a waste of time and money since they will get married; or fathers are worried about girls' safety. Given these biases, if PROGRESA succeeds in raising girls' enrollment and attendance this should be viewed as an accomplishment. Also, where government programs run counter to socio-cultural biases, they can succeed in changing attitudes by the *de facto* presence of girls in school, by generating discussion and awareness around the issue of girls' education and de-normalizing the bias against educating them, and by giving girls' a chance to succeed and demonstrate the value of educating them. That value will be less apparent, however, as long as there are few employment opportunities for women (in the formal or informal sector) and they continue to get married and not appear to 'use' this education.

With regard to education for women, PROGRESA originally envisioned linking with adult education programs, particularly those directly relevant to the aims of PROGRESA, and those that would involve training and temporary employment. Although adult education currently consists of only the health *pláticas*, we found that other types of adult education linked to productive activities would meet women's strongest aspirations. While women like, appreciate and need the benefits of PROGRESA, they ask for government programs that will give them skills that will help them engage in productive activities and earn income. They also want to learn to read and write, in order to sign papers, help their children with their studies and homework, and to defend themselves. Doctors also stress the importance of reading and writing skills to the program's success. Women also said they would like PROGRESA to give *pláticas* to men on health care, family planning, and domestic relations, revealing the nature of problems

the women face at home and constraints on their ability to take advantage of what PROGRESA teaches them.

As seen in this paper, women in the focus groups talked about the importance of giving resources to women and not men, about women's greater degree of responsibility with money, about being able to leave the house rather than being 'oppressed' by men who do not let their wives go out, about their eyes being opened through the health lectures, and about the importance of girls continuing their education and the benefits to women of being educated. However, non-beneficiaries in PROGRESA communities said some (though not all) of the same things, and the focus groups do not provide unambiguous evidence that these attitudes are strictly a result of PROGRESA. Nevertheless, the spotlight that PROGRESA's design puts on women gives government recognition to women in a way that is noticed by beneficiary and non-beneficiary families. This, and the fact that PROGRESA is introduced with various messages that convey the ideas about women's importance that underlie the program, directly and indirectly creates a discourse around gender issues. As one non-beneficiary put it, the government "took women into consideration because she is the one who thinks about what the family needs."

If material poverty, and poor health and nutrition are obstacles to the empowerment of women, then promoting these achievements is the main way in which PROGRESA contributes to women's empowerment. However, this paper has revealed other ways in which the program empowers women, through putting resources under their control; giving government recognition to their importance; giving them more opportunities to leave the house; educating them on health and nutrition issues; and for some, providing spaces in which to communicate with other women in new ways. Perhaps most significantly, it increases girls' chances of a greater position of power in future relationships (household, labor market, etc.) by helping them continue their schooling.

This paper also suggests ways that PROGRESA could strengthen its impact on women's empowerment. In addition to its health and child education strategies, PROGRESA policy originally envisioned a number of program features that represented a more holistic and developmental approach to poverty reduction. Revisiting some of these ideas — e.g. adult education, productive projects, community participation — as well as learning from beneficiaries and *promotoras*' suggestions (such as health education for men), or from ways in which the program has been adapted in communities with good results (e.g., by encouraging *promotoras* to use monthly meetings as a forum for women to discuss problems and solutions), would make it a stronger program in terms of the benefits it brings in the short run and its potential to reduce poverty and increase its developmental impacts in the long term.

REFERENCES

- Adato, M. Forthcoming. The impact of PROGRESA on community social relationships. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Adato, M. 1999. The impact of PROGRESA on community social relations: A preliminary assessment. In *The impact of Mexico's education, health, and nutrition program (PROGRESA) at the community level*, by M. Adato, D. Coady, S. Handa, R. Harris, R. Perez, and B. Straffon. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Adato, M., D. Coady, L. Kuriyan, D. Mindek, and M. Ruel. 1999. A preliminary operations evaluation of PROGRESA at the level of beneficiaries, communities, and institutions. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Adato, M., D. Coady, and M. Ruel. 2000. An operations evaluation of PROGRESA at the level of beneficiaries, communities, and institutions. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Basu, A.M. 1996. Female schooling, autonomy and fertility change: What do these words mean in South Asia. In *Girls' schooling, women's autonomy and fertility changes in South Asia*, eds. R. Jeffery and A.M Basu. New Delhi: Sage.
- Becker, S. 1997. Incorporating women's empowerment in studies of reproductive health: An example from Zimbabwe. Paper presented at the seminar on Female Empowerment and Demographic Processes, Lund.
- Brewer, J., and A. Hunter, 1989. *Multimethod research: A synthesis of styles*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- de la Brière, B., and A. R. Quisumbing, 2000. The impact of PROGRESA on intrahousehold decisionmaking and relative schooling achievements of boys and girls. In *The impact of PROGRESA on women's status and intrahousehold relations: A final report*, by M. Adato, B. de la Brière, D. Mindek and A. Quisumbing. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropoligía Social (CIESAS). 1998. *Acercamiento etnografico y cultural sobre el impacto del program PROGRESA en doce comunidades de seis estados de la Republica*. Mexico City. Draft.
- Chen, M.A. 1983. *A quiet revolution. Women in transition in rural Bangladesh*. Cambridge, MA: Schenkman.

- Cleland, J., J. F. Phillips, S. Amin, and G. M. Kamal 1994. *The determinants of reproductive change in Bangladesh: Success in a challenging environment*. World Bank, Regional and Sectoral Studies. Washington DC: The World Bank.
- Creswell, J. W. 1995. *Research design: Qualitative and quantitative approaches*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Denzin, N. K. 1978. The logic of naturalistic inquiry. In *Sociological methods: A sourcebook*, ed. N.K. Denzin. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Gertler, P. J. March 2000. A preliminary evaluation of the impact of PROGRESA on health and health care utilization. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Greene, J. C., V. J. Caracelli, and W. F. Graham. 1989. Towards a conceptual framework for mixed-method evaluation design. *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 11.
- Gómez de León, J., and S. Parker. 1999. The impact of anti-poverty programs on female labor force participation and women's status: The case of PROGRESA in Mexico. Paper prepared for the 1999 IUSSP Conference on Women and the Labor Market.
- Haddad, L. 1999. The welfare impacts of the income earned by women. *Agricultural Economics* 20.
- Hashemi, S.M., S. R. Schuler, and A. P. Riley. 1996. Rural credit programs and women's empowerment in Bangladesh. *World Development* 24(4).
- Hoddinott, J., and E. Skoufias. January 2000. Preliminary evidence of the impact of PROGRESA on consumption. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Jejeebhoy, S. 1997. Operationalising women's empowerment: The case of rural India. Paper presented at the seminar on Female Empowerment and Demographic Process, Lund.
- Jick, T. D. 1979. Mixing qualitative and quantitative methods: Triangulation in action. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 24.
- Kabeer, N. 1999. Resources, agency, achievements: Reflections on the measurement of women's empowerment. *Development and Change*, 30.
- Kabeer, N. 1997. Women, wages and intra-household power relations in urban Bangladesh. *Development and Change* 28(2).
- Kishor, S. 1997. Empowerment of women in Egypt and links to the survival and health of their infants. Paper presented at the seminar on Female Empowerment and Demographic Processes, Lund.

- Kritz, M. M., P. Makinwa, and D. T. Gurak. 1997. Wife's empowerment and fertility in Nigeria: The role of context. Paper presented at the seminar on Female Empowerment and Demographic Processes, Lund.
- Miles, M. B., and A. M. Huberman 1994. *Qualitative data analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Morgan, P., and B. Niraula 1995. Gender inequality and fertility in two Nepali villages. *Population and Development Review* 21(3).
- Osmani, L. N. K. 1998. The Grameen Bank experiment: Empowerment of women through credit. In *Women and empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World*, ed. A. Afshar. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- PROGRESA. 1999. La participación de las mujeres en las decisiones al interior de sus hogares. Mexico City, Mexico. Mimeo.
- PROGRESA. 1997. PROGRESA: Education, health and nutrition program. Mexico City, Mexico. Mimeo.
- Quisumbing, A.R. 1994. Intergenerational transfers in Philippine rice villages: Gender differences in traditional inheritance customs. *Journal of Development Economics* 43 (2).
- Razavi, S. 1992. Agrarian change and gender power: A comparative study in south eastern Iran. Ph.D. diss., St. Anthony's College, Oxford University, United Kingdom.
- Rowlands, J. 1998. A word of the times, but what does it mean? Empowerment in the discourse and practice of development. In *Women and empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World*, ed. A. Afshar. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Sathar, Z. A., and S. Kazi 1997. *Women's autonomy, livelihood and fertility. A study of rural Punjab*. Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Studies.
- Schultz, T. P. 2000a. Impact of PROGRESA on school attendance rates in the sampled population. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Schultz, T. P. 2000b. Final report: The impact of PROGRESA on school enrollments. Report submitted to PROGRESA. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. Mimeo.
- Sen, A. K. 1985. *Commodities and capabilities*. Amsterdam: North Holland.
- Sen, P. 1998. Violence in intimate relationships: A research project in India. In *Women and empowerment: Illustrations from the Third World*, ed. A. Afshar. New York: St. Martin's Press.

- Silberschmidt, M. 1992. Have men become the weaker sex? Changing life situations in Kisii District, Kenya. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 30(2).
- Tashakkori, A., and C. Teddlie 1998. *Mixed methodology*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Thomas, D. 1990. Intrahousehold resource allocation: An inferential approach. *Journal of Human Resources* 25 (4): 635-664.
- Yaschine, I. 1999. The changing anti-poverty agenda: What can the Mexican case tell us? *IDS Bulletin* 30(2).

KEY FOR QUOTATION CITATION CODES

B	=	beneficiary
NB	=	non-beneficiary
P	=	<i>promotora</i>
G	=	Guerrero
H	=	Hidalgo
M	=	Estado de México
M1	=	Michoacán (study 1)
M2	=	Michoacán (study 2)
Q	=	Querétero
V1	=	Veracruz (study 1)
V2	=	Veracruz (study 2)