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## XIX. NEEDS AND PROSPECTIVE RELIEF IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE AND THE USSR

Since the military and associated economic control of the Soviet government now extends westward far beyond the former political boundaries of the USSR, it is necessary to combine the discussion of the 1944-45 food-grain situation in the Soviet Union with that of Continental Europe west of the USSR.

During 1943-44 the food resources of Continental Europe except Russia, with the exception of those in southern Italy and, to a certain extent, in the four neutral countries, were under German control. It is true that before August 1, 1944 the Soviet Army had reoccupied the larger part of eastern Poland (which Russia had held before the German invasion in June 1941), more than half of Lithuania, and a portion of Latvia, and had penetrated into northern Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Moldavia. Furthermore, by August 1 it had advanced to the Vistula River, thus taking a portion of the Polish territory held by Germany before June 1941. But the larger part of these expansions beyond the political boundaries of the USSR took place in the latter part of July 1944. During February-March, the Soviet army had penetrated only the southeastern corner of Poland and the northern portions of Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Moldavia. Consequently, the Polish and Rumanian food resources, like those of France, which was liberated mainly after August 1, were under German control practically throughout the 1943-44 crop year.

The situation is quite different during the current crop year. The Soviet army, having started its advance in August 1944, by the beginning of October had cleared the Germans from most of the territory of Rumania and Bulgaria, and had already crossed the eastern frontiers of Trianon Hungary and the northeastern frontiers of Yugoslavia in several places. The Russians thus occupied these two normally food-surplus countries before Germany had sufficient time to ship out a significant quantity of grain from the 1944 harvest. The rapid advance of the Soviet army, assisted by the Rumanians and later by the Bulgarians, also prevented the retreating Germans from destroying much of the harvested crops.

By the beginning of November, the Soviet army had occupied the Hungarian plain east of the Danube, the principal grain-surplus area of Hungary, and the Yugoslav territory north of the Danube, prac-

tically the only grain-surplus area of Yugoslavia. It is probable that the Germans took some portion of the 1944 crops of these areas, and destroyed a considerable portion of what they could not move, since the Russian invasion of these areas, in close contact with Greater Germany, took place at a later time. But even here German takings of grain from the 1944 crop could not have been large. The Hungarian farmers must have been hostile to Nazi control during the last stages of the war and undoubtedly sabotaged the forced delivery of crops. Furthermore, connections for transporting grain to Germany from the rich Yugoslav agricultural areas of the Banat and Backa were cut so early that the Germans did not have time to move significant quantities of grain from these areas.

Thus, with the exception of the grain in Hungary proper, practically the whole 1944 crop of the lower Danube, as well as substantial carry-overs from the 1943 crop, remained in the country to be used by the local population and to provide supplies for the Soviet army and shipments to the USSR. The armistices with both Rumania and Hungary stipulate large annual payments in kind to Soviet Russia on reparations account. Hence these countries will undoubtedly ship considerable quantities of grain to the USSR.

At the same time the northern Soviet army advanced farther into the territory of the Baltic countries, and by the middle of October 1944 it had reoccupied nearly the whole territory of these countries, except the small portion of Latvia beyond Riga Bay. Germany was then cut off also from the food resources of the Baltic states, which, although not large, were of some importance in providing food for the German army fighting on this front.

Only in Poland did the front line established early in August remain essentially stationary until the middle of January 1945, when the Soviet army opened its long-expected winter campaign. In the first two weeks of this campaign, the Russians cleared most of Poland and put the whole of eastern Germany under immediate threat of invasion. The Polish territory, especially the western part incorporated into the Reich, had been an important source of food for Germany, particularly of bread grain, in 1942-43 and 1943-44. The Germans claimed that in 1942-43 they had received 825,000 metric tons of grain from western Poland,<sup>1</sup> and they may have obtained a like quantity in 1943-44. It is impossible to estimate how much grain they extracted from the 1944 crop in that area before the invasion in January. If the strength of the

<sup>1</sup> *Kölnische Zeitung*, June 18, 1944, p. 5.



Russian winter campaign was not a complete surprise to the German command, the Nazis probably removed as much grain as they could from occupied Poland and eastern Germany. However, the relatively late harvest and the labor shortage may have prevented early threshing of crops, and the Germans probably did not have a chance to remove all the grain surpluses over local requirements from western Poland and the invaded part of East Prussia.

After holding from early June to the middle of August in Normandy and Brittany, the German army retreated from France and Belgium so rapidly and so soon after the harvest that it could not have removed a substantial quantity of grain from the good French crop of 1944. Press dispatches indicate that the war action did not seriously damage the French and Belgian crops.

The bread-grain situation of Nazi-controlled Europe in 1944-45 was thus affected much more by these spectacular changes in the military situation (changes that have deprived the Germans of most of their outside bread-grain supplies) than by the relatively small changes from the previous year in the bread-grain position of Continental Europe west of the Soviet boundaries.

#### CONTINENTAL EUROPE

The 1944 wheat and rye crops of Continental Europe ex-Russia were only moderately smaller than those harvested in 1943. The weather during the 1943-44 growing period was not primarily responsible for the smaller crops. In general, the weather was rather favorable for winter crops (wheat and rye are mainly winter crops in this area), but somewhat less favorable for other small grains. Spring grains, the growth of which was somewhat retarded in 1944 because of the late and cool spring, were unfavorably affected by the summer drought that was especially severe in central Europe. However, the rains that fell in southern and southeastern Europe in late June and in July favored the growth of corn, and the European corn crop of 1944 was probably somewhat larger than the small crop of the previous year.

The decline in the wheat and rye crops from 1943 levels must be explained mainly by war conditions that intensified shortages of labor, draft power, equipment, and fertilizer. Both acreages and yields were affected, in spite of moderately favorable weather. In certain regions, such as Poland, the Baltic states, Rumania and other Danubian countries, and Italy, the bread-grain crops were reduced because military operations interfered with the sowing and harvesting of crops. In

these countries, either the sown areas were reduced, or considerable portions of the matured crops were wasted. In central Europe, the stronghold of the Nazis, the weather last year was perhaps less favorable for crops than in any other part of the Continent, but even there winter wheat and rye were affected by the summer drought much less than were barley, oats, and potatoes. Even in this area, the 1944 bread-grain production was only moderately smaller than in 1943.

Chart 20 (p. 78) and the table on page 81 summarize, by groups of countries, our rough estimates of the 1944 bread-grain production in Continental Europe ex-Russia as compared with that in preceding years. Some of these groups, as for instance "Western occupied countries," do not have the same significance in 1944-45 that they had in the previous year: France and Belgium were liberated at the outset of the 1944-45 crop year. But these comparisons are of interest even if the political position of some of these regions has changed during the period under review.

We estimate the 1944 bread-grain production of Continental Europe west of the 1939 political frontier of the USSR at about 57.5 million metric tons. This figure is only about 5 per cent below that for 1943 (60.6 million metric tons), but about 10 per cent below the 1934-38 average. Of this total 37.2 million tons, or about 1,365 million bushels, represent wheat; and 20.3 million tons, or about 800 million bushels, rye. It appears probable that the 1944 rye production fell relatively farther below the 1943 level than did wheat production. Rye is concentrated in central Europe—a region less favored in 1944 by weather and much affected by military operations in the east (Poland). On the other hand, the wheat crops in some of the neutral European countries and perhaps in France and Denmark, were better than in 1943; and this compensated somewhat for the reduction in the wheat crops of central Europe, the southeast, and Italy. Consequently, the total wheat production of the Continent ex-Russia declined from the preceding year by perhaps no more than 60 million bushels or less than 5 per cent. In our appraisal of the decline of the Continental wheat crop from 1943 to 1944, we are in fairly close agreement with the United States Department of Agriculture, although our estimates in both years are on a slightly higher level.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> *Wheat Situation* (U.S. Dept. Agr., Bur. Agr. Econ., WS-85, November-December 1944), p. 9. European wheat production in 1944 (including the British Isles) is estimated at around 1,460 million bushels against 1,540 million bushels in 1943. As the 1944 wheat production in the British Isles was 10 million bushels smaller than in 1943, the decline in Continental production is indicated at 70 million bushels.



Information about the 1944 bread-grain crops of *Germany* is somewhat contradictory, even in the German-controlled press. The first reduction in the basic bread ration was announced in the second half of September. The reason given was that the 1944 bread-grain crops, although satisfactory in general, were substantially (*nicht unwesentlich*) below the 1943 level.<sup>3</sup> But a few days later, Backe, Germany's Food Secretary, said that the 1944 bread-grain crop was not below the very good crop of the year before. He explained that the bread ration was reduced because oats and barley crops were so small that barley could not be used for admixture in bread flour, as in previous years.<sup>4</sup> We assume in our estimate that both the wheat and rye crops of Greater Germany were 5–10 per cent smaller in 1944 than in 1943.

Information on Czechoslovakian crops indicates that the 1944 bread-grain production of this area changed little if at all from the preceding year. German sources claimed that the Reich received a limited quantity of grain from Bohemia-Moravia in 1942–43 and again in 1943–44. It is probable that these requisitions have been raised with the recent mounting food difficulties in Germany proper.

As to *Poland*, information is very scanty, as usual. The German-controlled press, however, intimated that Polish crop conditions in 1944 were quite satisfactory or good. This was specifically stated concerning the western part of Poland incorporated in Germany, but also with regard to the various provinces of central Poland.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, we know that the Soviet army penetrated the southeastern portion of Poland even before spring sowing and that in July–August, just before and during the harvest period, the Russians swept through most of eastern Poland and reached the Vistula on a wide front. Consequently, the areas sown to spring crops must have been markedly reduced in certain regions, and a considerable portion of the grown crops in eastern and central Poland must have been wasted or destroyed, because that area became a battlefield during the summer. A satisfactory bread-grain crop, however, was probably harvested in the area that remained under German control until the middle of January. From this area the Germans could have taken as much bread grain as usual or even a larger quantity, if they were not surprised by the Russian winter cam-

<sup>3</sup> *Völkischer Beobachter*, Sept. 23, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>4</sup> *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, Oct. 3, 1944, p. 4.

<sup>5</sup> *Kölnische Zeitung*, July 13, 1944, and July 20, 1944; *Krakauer Zeitung*, July 7, 1944; *Südost Echo*, July 14, 1944.

paign. We estimate that the total Polish crop of rye and wheat may have been 10–15 per cent below the crop of 1943, even if crops were in a satisfactory condition before harvesting. There is no question that after the winter campaign the population of the entire territory of Poland was left with insufficient supplies of bread grain and that they will need early assistance. But this does not exclude the possibility that the Germans obtained as much bread grain from Poland in 1944 as they received during the two preceding years.

The German receipts of bread grain during 1943–44 from the regions outside of Central Europe (including requisitions from Occupied Russia and France) may have amounted to 1.5–2.0 million tons, or more than 10 per cent of the total bread-grain supplies of Greater Germany. Receipts during 1944–45 will be much smaller: only from Hungary could Germany move substantial amounts of grain. On the other hand, this year the Germans are not obligated to supply grain to Belgium or to Finland, as they were forced to do in previous years. Information on Belgian and Finnish receipts last year indicates that this change will save Germany some 300,000 tons of bread grain. It is evident, therefore, that German bread-grain supplies for 1944–45 from both domestic production and imports (including requisitions) were probably 10–15 per cent below those for the previous year, even before the Russian winter invasion started.

Since the invasion of East Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia, which are normally grain-surplus and potato-surplus areas, the bread-grain situation of Germany has become much tighter. This is substantiated by press reports of further reductions in bread rations and tightening of the requisition of grain from farmers (p. 225). If the Nazis decide to make a stand in western and southern Germany even after they have lost the eastern provinces, their bread situation will be decidedly strained, since the western and southern provinces are even more deficient in grain and food generally than is the whole of Germany. This must be taken into consideration by the United Nations when they make plans to supply the people of Central Europe with minimum subsistence rations after the collapse of Germany.

The wheat crops in the surplus area of the *lower Danube*, which soon after the harvest passed from German to Russian control, were quite satisfactory this year, although they were somewhat smaller than in 1943 and perhaps slightly below the good 1934–38 average. In this region also war operations rather than weather developments were responsible for reduced crops. The mild winter and cool spring favored



winter crops, although their growth was somewhat retarded in the spring. But as early as March the Russians invaded northern Bessarabia, Bucovina, and Moldavia, and this must have reduced sowings of spring wheat in that part of Rumania where spring wheat is of greater importance than elsewhere. Corn, however, must have suffered more than wheat. The autumn rye sowings, common here, were also not up to plan, although autumn wheat sowings were reported as well completed throughout the country.<sup>6</sup> In total, then, the area sown to bread grain in Rumania was probably somewhat smaller in 1944 than in 1943, and the acreage sown to corn was more sharply reduced.

Guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia probably produced similar results. Moreover, in western Yugoslavia the weather was not particularly favorable, and the Croatian wheat crop was officially reported to be only mediocre. We infer, therefore, that the 1944 wheat and rye crops in Rumania and Yugoslavia, although satisfactory, were smaller than the good crops of 1943. And although the corn crops, favored by July rains, proved to be of fair size on a reduced acreage, much corn must have been lost during the harvest because of military operations during August–October.<sup>7</sup>

Crop production in Bulgaria and Hungary was affected less by war, and weather developments were generally favorable for both the winter crops and corn. Consequently, the bread-grain crops in these countries in 1944 were at least as good as last year, and the corn crops were larger.<sup>8</sup>

As the stocks of wheat carried over in the Danube area on August 1, 1944 were larger than on the same date in 1943, the total Danubian supplies in 1944–45 are about the same as in 1943–44. The Russians might, therefore, obtain 1–2 million tons of wheat from this area without much interference with normal local consumption. The only question is whether the farmers will be ready to deliver their surpluses if they cannot get in exchange goods that they need. The tendency toward inflation was very strong in the Danube countries before the Russian invasion, and this may prevent heavy marketings of farm products.

The 1944 wheat crops in western European countries were generally as good as in 1943 or even better. Except in the Netherlands and Denmark, rye production is of small importance; and it was reduced in Denmark where wheat sowings, contracted in the preceding year in

<sup>6</sup> *Nachrichten für Aussenhandel*, Jan. 4, 1944; *Corn Trade News*, July 5, 1944, p. 265.

<sup>7</sup> *Corn Trade News*, Sept. 27, 1944, pp. 380–83, and Nov. 1, 1944, p. 430.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 16, 1944, p. 325; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, July 20, 1944; *Kölnische Zeitung*, Aug. 7, 1944, p. 5; *Südost Echo*, Sept. 1, 1944, p. 2.

favor of rye, were restored to a more normal level in 1944. The important wheat crop of France was reported to be good or excellent.<sup>9</sup> At the same time, news dispatches indicated crop destruction by war operations was not serious. It is reasonable to assume that the wheat area in France was somewhat larger in 1944 than in 1943. Although war conditions may have prevented fulfillment of the government ruling requiring farmers to plant as much land to wheat for the 1944 harvest as they had in 1937–38,<sup>10</sup> the wheat area probably expanded moderately. We believe, therefore, that the 1944 French wheat crop was somewhat larger than the satisfactory crop of 1943. Furthermore, practically the whole of this crop was available to the French population, since the Germans could have taken only an insignificant amount compared with the rather large requisitions of 1943–44.

Consequently, French wheat supplies for domestic utilization in 1944–45 significantly exceed those in 1943–44. Some press statements indicate that France is self-sufficient in wheat this year, while others report that she purchased about 5 million bushels of wheat in Canada, and that some wheat from Swiss stocks in Marseille and in Lisbon was lent to her for immediate relief of local shortages. In addition she received, soon after her liberation, 100,000 tons of wheat as a gift from the Argentine government. These facts plus information about transport difficulties within France indicate that the French government will be obliged to import several million bushels of wheat to provide for her coastal cities and perhaps even Paris, where stocks were reported to be very low.<sup>11</sup> Requirements for wheat imports may be further increased if inflation in France discourages producers from delivering their wheat. This situation may be alleviated, however, by shipping raw materials such as cotton and wool to France, thus permitting French industry to produce goods needed by farmers. This year France cannot supplement her domestic supplies of wheat by imports from French North Africa, since that area has not enough wheat for its own minimum requirements (pp. 239–40).

<sup>9</sup> *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Oct. 2, 1944, p. 337; *New York Times*, Aug. 29, 1944, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>10</sup> *Nachrichten für Aussenhandel*, Nov. 2, 1943, and Nov. 4, 1943.

<sup>11</sup> *New York Times*, Nov. 6, 1944, p. 5; Dec. 16, 1944, p. 20; and Dec. 24, 1944, p. 20. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Jan. 3, 1945, publishes an official balance of French wheat supplies for the current crop year, in which the carryover from the previous year and imports of wheat are shown at 4.78 million quintals, or about 17.5 million bushels. As the carryover was certainly small this year, this figure indicates that imports of 5–10 million bushels of wheat are assumed in that item. It must be said, however, that the French wheat crop, excluding Alsace-Lorraine, is shown as 6.5 million metric tons. This appears to us too conservative an estimate.

Bread-grain crops of *Belgium* were also favored by weather, and were sown perhaps to a slightly larger area than in 1943, since farmers were required to plough up an additional 10 per cent of pasture land for the 1944 crops.<sup>12</sup> Available information indicates that, despite war conditions in Belgium, the 1944 bread-grain output was not smaller than in 1943 and was perhaps up to the prewar level. Since Belgium was a large importer of wheat before the war, and during the occupation received a limited quantity of bread grain (mainly rye) through German intermediation, it is certain that her domestic supplies this year are not sufficient to cover her requirements. However, the shortage of bread grain in urban communities recently reported in the press should not be attributed to lack of supplies within the country at such an early date, but to difficulties of transport and distribution. The Belgian government had bought 200,000 metric tons of Canadian wheat in 1943 for shipment when conditions permitted; and since the liberation of the country more purchases have been made, the first cargo arriving before Christmas. The government planned to import up to 13 million bushels of wheat before the end of the crop year,<sup>13</sup> but it is probable that a somewhat smaller quantity will be imported because of the shortage of shipping.

From information on the *Netherlands* bread-grain acreage and crop conditions, it appears that her supplies of bread grain in 1944 should suffice to maintain her moderate rations. But military operations, particularly if they result in the flooding of extensive areas, will reduce these supplies. Being isolated, the large coastal cities still occupied by the Germans were without bread grain by the end of October or the beginning of November,<sup>14</sup> and immediate international action was necessary to relieve their desperate situation. Several Red Cross ships were dispatched under safe conduct to the occupied Netherlands with supplies of food, including wheat.<sup>15</sup>

Of the two other western countries still under German domination, *Denmark* has satisfactory bread supplies this year. In July and August wheat and rye crop conditions appeared better than in 1943;<sup>16</sup> and while final yields were reported somewhat disappointing, the 1944 wheat crop, because of expanded acreage, was larger than that of the previous

<sup>12</sup> *Kölnische Zeitung*, June 22, 1944.

<sup>13</sup> *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Nov. 24, 1944, p. 534, and Dec. 1, 1944, p. 563; *Corn Trade News*, Dec. 20, 1944, p. 502.

<sup>14</sup> *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Nov. 3, 1944, p. 459.

<sup>15</sup> *Corn Trade News*, Dec. 20, 1944, p. 502; *New York Times*, Jan. 6, 1945, p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> *Deutsche Zeitung in Norwegen*, July 7, 1944, Aug. 10, 1944, and Aug. 16, 1944.

year, though still nearly 20 per cent below the prewar level. While the increase over the 1943 wheat crop was partially offset by a smaller rye crop, the combined bread-grain output was even slightly larger than last year, when it exceeded the prewar level and was sufficient to maintain the relatively liberal Danish bread rations.

In *Norway*, however, the grain situation in 1944 is much worse than in the previous year. Although the area sown to bread grain was apparently not reduced,<sup>17</sup> the weather was less favorable and the crop harvested in 1944 must have been smaller than in 1943. As Norway depended heavily on receipts of bread grain from Germany last year, her situation may become desperate if, under the pressure of her own food situation, Germany cuts the supply to Norway.

The bread-grain situation in the *neutral countries of Europe* promises to be somewhat relieved in 1944-45, partly because larger wheat crops were harvested in Sweden and Spain. We estimate the bread-grain production in the four neutral countries in 1944 at about the level of 1942 and some 10 per cent above the low production of 1943. But it still remained nearly 10 per cent below the 1934-38 average, mainly because the Spanish and Portuguese crops, although better than last year, were below prewar levels (see Table 2). In both of these countries winter crops were seriously damaged by a severe and prolonged drought in winter and early spring, but they were largely saved by later rains. Both of these countries have access to overseas wheat. Spain can draw on Argentine wheat under her contract renewed before the end of the last crop year (p. 65). As yet she has taken only a small portion of the 1 million tons contracted for, but since Spain usually receives the bulk of her imports in the second part of the crop year, she may take as much wheat by August 1, 1945 as she did in 1943-44. Portugal has purchased large amounts of Canadian wheat, indicating that she intends to take more wheat than she imported in 1943-44, but tonnage limitations may keep her actual imports at last year's level. Portugal's wheat crop was reported to be slightly better than that of the previous year.

The supplies of bread grain in *Sweden* this year are fairly ample. The wheat crop was much better than last year's, although still below the 1934-38 level, and the rye crop was perhaps slightly smaller than in 1943. But she has such substantial reserves of both bread grains that she was able to guarantee to deliver 150,000 tons of grain to Finland before March 1945. Sweden is also prepared to help Norway in

<sup>17</sup> *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 6, 1944, p. 5.



the same way in case of emergency.<sup>18</sup> It appears thus that Sweden will not need overseas wheat for domestic use, except to improve the quality of bread or to restore her stocks. She may, however, need feed grain, as her purchases in Argentina indicate.

In contrast, *Switzerland* requires more overseas wheat this year. Although she continued her efforts to expand her bread-grain acreage and probably succeeded in planting a slightly larger area to wheat and rye for the 1944 harvest than for 1943, the shortage of rain during the summer months apparently reduced the yield per acre.<sup>19</sup> As a result, her bread-grain production probably did not change much from the previous year, while her imports of Danubian wheat are discontinued because of war developments. Switzerland bought 5 million bushels of Canadian wheat during the fall, presumably for importation before the end of the crop year, but it must be taken into consideration that Switzerland is reported to have about 300,000 tons of wheat stored in Lisbon, as well as some stocks in Marseille, a part of which were loaned to France<sup>20</sup> (p. 215). These stocks in Europe may limit further shipments of overseas wheat destined to Switzerland.

In *Italy* and in some other countries included in our group of "others," the food-grain situation has deteriorated in 1944-45, perhaps more than elsewhere on the Continent. The condition is most serious in Italy, where the wheat crop in 1944 was the smallest since 1936, while the 1943 crop was privately estimated above the prewar average. However, other countries of this group (Greece, Finland, and the Baltic states) probably also harvested crops smaller than in 1943, mainly because of the immediate effects of military operations, but also because of less favorable weather, especially in the northern group. The 1944 bread-grain production for the entire group was perhaps 10-15 per cent below 1943 and also below the 1934-38 average (see table, p. 81).

Several factors contributed to the decline of wheat production in Italy. In the liberated southern part, war destruction and devastation caused sowings for the 1944 harvest to be reduced to an estimated 70 per cent of normal.<sup>21</sup> In the Nazi-controlled area, also, wheat acreage was probably somewhat lower than in 1943, since the plowing of pasture in the preceding year had reduced fodder production, and plans

<sup>18</sup> *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Oct. 21, 1944, p. 30; Nov. 4, 1944, p. 28; and Jan. 13, 1945, p. 18.

<sup>19</sup> *Corn Trade News*, July 26, 1944, p. 291.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Nov. 15, 1944, p. 450; *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Sept. 20, 1944, p. 292.

<sup>21</sup> Eric Englund, *The Probable European Food Situation Immediately after the European War* (U.S. Dept. Agr. Press Release 3434-44 [Oct. 24, 1944]), p. 4.

called for expansion of the area under vegetables, potatoes, sugar beets, and fodder for the 1944 crop.<sup>22</sup>

Weather developments were favorable to wheat in southern Italy, but in the north the winter and spring were too dry, while continuous rain in the second half of June interfered with harvesting and thus caused deterioration of the quality of wheat. However, the yield per acre in both southern and northern Italy was apparently not below average.<sup>23</sup> The size of crop in liberated Italy, estimated by the Allied control commission at 3.3 million tons (120 million bushels),<sup>24</sup> indicates a yield per acre on the small area sown definitely above average.

Wheat production for Italy as a whole was reported unofficially at 6.7 million tons, or 245 million bushels, placing the output of the Nazi-occupied area at 3.4 million tons, or 125 million bushels.<sup>25</sup> The total Italian wheat crop of 1944 is thus estimated to be 35 million bushels smaller than the crop of 1943, the decline apparently being equally divided between the liberated and the Nazi-controlled regions. The greater reduction of area in southern Italy was partly offset by better yields per acre than in the previous year. Nevertheless, the smaller crop in liberated Italy must result in increased requirements for overseas wheat that have to be supplied by the Allied powers. In Nazi-controlled Italy the 1944 corn and rice crops, which were reported as good, may partly compensate for smaller supplies of wheat. But the German army in Italy must be supplied from local crops, and a substantial portion of the rice crop apparently was requisitioned for the Reich.

Early in the fall, apparently influenced by optimistic reports on the crop and on deliveries by producers to the collecting points, the Italian Ministry of Agriculture estimated that import requirements for maintaining existing bread and macaroni rations in the liberated area until the next harvest did not exceed 400,000 tons or about 15 million bushels.<sup>26</sup> Imports of wheat and flour into southern Italy soon after

<sup>22</sup> *Der Bund* (Bern), July 23, 1943.

<sup>23</sup> *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, July 5, 1944; *Kölnische Zeitung*, July 20, 1944; Englund, *op. cit.*, p. 5.

<sup>24</sup> *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Oct. 3, 1944, p. 340.

<sup>25</sup> Canada, *Monthly Review of the Wheat Situation*, Oct. 31, 1944, p. 1. This estimate of the wheat crop for Nazi-controlled Italy is fairly close to the German estimate, which was reported by *Corn Trade News* (July 19, 1944, p. 281) at 128 million bushels. However, this last estimate, reported in July, probably related to a somewhat larger area, since by that date the front was somewhat to the south of the Pisa-Rimini line.

<sup>26</sup> *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Oct. 3, 1944, p. 340. It was then reported that 800,000 tons of wheat had already been delivered by producers, and that officials hoped to collect another 400,000 tons, while 1,200,000 tons were retained by producers as their quotas, and 600,000 tons for seed. A total of 400,000 tons has been written off as presumably hidden by peasants.



the harvest were relatively low. Reports state that shipments of wheat and flour during September–October from the United States amounted to 87,000 tons, and that shipments were stepped up in these two months.<sup>27</sup> A further increase in wheat and flour shipments was indicated, however, by President Roosevelt's statement early in October that 150,000 tons of wheat and flour were scheduled for shipment, in addition to food being shipped at that time.<sup>28</sup>

In January, according to press information, the Allied and Italian government experts estimated that about 28 million bushels (750,000 tons) of import wheat would be needed to maintain the bread ration of 200 grams daily, the level effective in the area north of Naples (p. 228). But even this figure appears low in the light of information that during the previous crop year the Allied powers were obliged to import 20–25 million bushels to feed the civilian population of southern Italy.

The above figure does not, however, include wheat necessary to insure a minimum existence ration for the civilian population of northern Italy, after the Nazi front collapses. The experience of the previous year indicates that war devastation and the inevitable disorganization of the old distribution system after the retreat of the Germans will result in heavy requirements for imported wheat, the quantity of which will probably not be smaller than the imports of 1943–44. Stocks are presumably being accumulated now by the Allied Military Government since the time of collapse is unpredictable.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, total Italian requirements for overseas wheat may amount to 40–50 million bushels, against about 25 million imported during the previous crop year.

There is no direct evidence that the 1944 bread-grain crop in Greece was smaller than that of 1943, but the intensification of guerrilla warfare during 1943–44 and the deterioration of the economic situation before and even after liberation must have interfered with cultivation and resulted in reduced sowings and a shorter crop for the later year. The German-controlled press reported, however, that the condition of crops was good or satisfactory.<sup>30</sup> Furthermore, the liberation of Greek Thrace from Bulgarian occupation may have improved the supply of domestic grain in that part of Greece which had been under German

<sup>27</sup> *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Oct. 21, 1944, p. 22.

<sup>28</sup> *New York Times*, Oct. 5, 1944, p. 6.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 24, 1945, p. 8, reports that the Allies are storing food for distribution in northern Italy when liberated, and the item specifically mentions a reserve of 30,000 tons of olive oil.

<sup>30</sup> *Südost Echo*, May 19, 1944, and May 26, 1944; *Kölnische Zeitung*, July 18, 1944.

control, since Thrace is regarded as a granary of Greece. But Greece as a whole was far from being self-sufficient in wheat before the war, and wheat shipments during the current crop year must necessarily be considerable. The British government officially announced that arrangements had been made to send to Greece 60,000 tons of food monthly, double the amount imported since April 1944 under the International Relief Commission. This quantity includes a good proportion of wheat, to be taken from stocks built up by the British government in the Middle East.<sup>31</sup>

In January it was reported that up to the middle of December the British and American relief organization had landed 66,300 tons of foodstuffs at the principal ports of the Greek mainland and islands.<sup>32</sup> This indicates that during the first two months after the liberation the flow of food was still not up to the planned level. But it is reasonable to expect that wheat shipments to Greece before August 1, 1945, will reach or exceed 10 million bushels.

The 1944 bread-grain crops in *Finland* and in the *Baltic states* have suffered from both military operations and unfavorable weather. The output was undoubtedly smaller than in 1943, in spite of plans to expand the grain acreage considerably, especially in Finland.<sup>33</sup> The bread-grain situation in Finland has been aggravated by the loss of a considerable portion of the agricultural area to the Soviet Union, while the population to be fed decreased but little. As mentioned earlier, Sweden has guaranteed to deliver 150,000 metric tons of grain to Finland (p. 217). Recent reports also state that Finland will receive 30,000 tons of grain under a trade agreement with Soviet Russia.<sup>34</sup> Total imports probably will exceed the quantity of grain that Finland received on 1943–44 through German intermediation (p. 89), and may enable her to maintain bread rations at the level of last year. Since the Baltic states are really included in the Soviet Union, the Russians must contribute to the solution of such bread-grain problems as war devastation has created in that area.

<sup>31</sup> *Corn Trade News*, Nov. 8, 1944, p. 440; and *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Oct. 20, 1944, p. 407.

<sup>32</sup> *Corn Trade News*, Jan. 3, 1945, p. 4.

<sup>33</sup> From various figures mentioned in the press it may be inferred that the plan was to expand the 1944 bread-grain area in Finland by 10–15 per cent over the 1943 size. Barley was apparently classified with bread grain, and even the expansion of the oats area was emphasized with a view to increasing the supplies available for human use. See *Nachrichten für Aussenhandel*, Mar. 21, 1944, and Mar. 23, 1944; and *Pester Lloyd*, May 7, 1944, p. 13.

<sup>34</sup> *New York Times*, Jan. 14, 1945, p. 1.



The preceding analysis suggests that total receipts of overseas wheat by Continental Europe ex-Russia during 1944-45 may be expected to fall within the wide range of 100-175 million bushels. The lower figure is based on the possibility that the Germans will continue their resistance, perhaps until summer, on lines essentially the same as in mid-February, and that the shipping situation will remain as tight as at present. The higher figure implies the assumption of an early German collapse, opening wider areas for relief and considerably easing the shipping position. Actual imports probably will fall between the two extremes.

These estimates suggest a marked increase in Continental imports over the 1943-44 receipts of about 65 million bushels of overseas wheat, yet the lower figure indicated for 1944-45 does not fully compensate for the decline of Continental crops in 1944. The deficiency, however, will be suffered mainly in Nazi-occupied areas. Imports of even 100 million bushels (if properly distributed) would not only meet the larger 1944-45 requirements of liberated Italy and the minimum needs of other liberated areas and neutral countries, but would also allow for the accumulation of moderate emergency reserves necessary to meet larger requirements resulting from the eventual collapse of the Nazis.

#### BREAD-CONSUMPTION AND RELIEF

The changes in bread-grain supplies on the Continent west of the USSR, caused by crop and war developments of the past year, were reflected in adjustments of bread rations by certain countries in that area. In general, the countries under Nazi control, whose supplies of bread grain were reduced or threatened, were obliged to lower their rations, while the liberated countries sought to increase theirs by bringing wheat from overseas. However, the disorganization of domestic transport and distribution systems within the liberated area as well as the tightness of ocean shipping have generally delayed the success of this effort, and in some cases made the bread situation worse, for the time, than in the last year of occupation.

Our previous discussion (p. 93) brought out that in the spring of 1944 *Rumania* was forced to reintroduce bread rationing and to raise the rate of flour extraction because of the Russian invasion of Bessarabia and Bucovina. *Bulgaria* lowered her high bread ration in July by about 10 per cent, although she harvested as large a crop in 1944 as in the previous year. Developments in these countries after their complete occupation by the Soviet army during August-September 1944 are not

clear. Apparently there was no further reduction in their bread rations, at least in the early months after the occupation. As before, *Rumania* rationed only cheap bread, while consumption of other kinds was almost unrestricted.<sup>35</sup> Available information indicates that the *Bulgarian* ration in October was the same as in July.

The bread ration in *Hungary* was not changed until the second half of November, when the ration of normal consumers in Budapest was reduced from 250 to 200 grams (9-7 ounces) daily. Supplements for manual workers remained unchanged.<sup>36</sup> Information on further developments in *Hungary* is not available, but indications are that sufficient bread grain remained within the country to have restored the 250-gram ration. Press reports indicate that deliveries of agricultural products by farmers soon after harvest were small, although Nazi authorities assisted traders in their efforts to move crops from threatened areas.<sup>37</sup> Effective maintenance of the *Hungarian* ration of 250 grams must depend, however, on the policy of Soviet authorities.

Little is known about the food situation in *Yugoslavia*. The western portion is normally deficient in bread grain and this deficit may be more acute now than usual (p. 214). Up to the end of December 1944, however, negotiations between the Yugoslav (Tito) government and the Allied Military Liaison had not resulted in agreement on terms and conditions of relief operations to be carried on with military supplies, but we understand that such agreement has since been reached. The United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) does not plan to undertake an independent relief program in this area until the postmilitary period.<sup>38</sup> However, it is probable that the Soviet army is supplying western *Yugoslavia* with grain from the Danubian grain-surplus area now under its control. Press reports stated that the Soviet government assigned 500,000 tons of wheat to the Yugoslav National Liberation Committee for relief of the population.<sup>39</sup> Even if this be true, because of transport difficulties within the country there will still be a limited requirement for overseas wheat along the Dalmatian coast of *Yugoslavia*.

*Germany* reduced her bread rations only moderately in the middle of October 1944. The weekly ration to normal consumers was lowered

<sup>35</sup> *Corn Trade News*, Dec. 6, 1944, p. 481.

<sup>36</sup> *Südost Echo*, Nov. 17, 1944, p. 2, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Dec. 19, 1944.

<sup>37</sup> *Südost Echo*, Nov. 17, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>38</sup> *UNRRA Monthly Review* (United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, Washington, D.C.), December 1944, p. 9.

<sup>39</sup> *Corn Trade News*, Oct. 11, 1944, p. 402.

to 2,225 grams (78 ounces), a reduction of 200 grams or about 8 per cent. Basic weekly rations of heavy and heaviest workers were also reduced 200 grams, while supplementary rations to the heaviest workers were cut an additional 100 grams. Proportionally, these reductions were smaller than that made in the ration to normal consumers. Rations for children under 6 and for self-suppliers were lowered by only 100 grams, while those for children and youths 6–18 years old, and for night and overtime workers, remained unchanged.<sup>40</sup> Consequently, the average reduction of bread rations at that early date for all groups of civilians in Germany was perhaps not greater than 5 per cent. We have estimated (p. 213) that German supplies of bread grain for the current year would be at least 10–15 per cent below those for 1943–44. The relatively small reduction in bread rations may be attributed either to a government policy to maintain civilian bread rations at the expense of accumulated reserves, or to the fact that last year's supplies of bread grain from domestic crops and outside sources exceeded by 5–10 per cent the amount necessary to maintain the rations then in effect. Under the second alternative, German reserves of bread grain could have remained intact until the Russian invasion of eastern Germany.

The October reductions in bread rations resulted in a net decrease in total German food rations, since they could not be compensated for by increased rations of other kinds of food. It is true that the 1944 potato crop in Germany was somewhat better than the poor one of 1943. The increased supplies of potatoes were even mentioned as one of the reasons for reducing the bread ration, though there are no direct indications of a larger potato allotment for human consumption in 1944–45 than in 1943–44. More potatoes were distributed to consumers in September–October 1944 than during the previous spring and summer before the new potato crop was harvested, but apparently no more than in September–October 1943. The small distributions of potatoes during the second half of 1943–44 were compensated for, however, by additional allotments of rye bread, rye flour, or other cereals (p. 95).

The consumption of fat in Germany promises to be no larger in 1944–45 than in the previous year. According to reports, butter production has been slightly smaller; and low yields per acre of oilseeds have held vegetable oil output at last year's high level, in spite of a 25 per cent expansion in the acreage planted to oilseed.<sup>41</sup> Nor may any

<sup>40</sup> Details on reduction of bread rations are given in *Völkischer Beobachter*, Sept. 23, 1944, p. 2.

<sup>41</sup> See "Ernährung aus eigener Kraft," in *Die Deutsche Volkswirtschaft*, October 1944, pp. 811–13.

compensation be expected from lard and other pork fats, since feeding of hogs to lighter weights was prescribed for the current year because of shortages of feed grain and potatoes. Supplies of meat, however, may be somewhat larger temporarily, since German officials planned to economize on feed by reducing the number of swine, particularly young hogs. Additional meat rations were planned to make up for smaller rations of fats,<sup>42</sup> and the extra meat protein may compensate partly for the reduced vegetable protein from bread. However, meat rations can be larger only during the time herds are being reduced, and further difficulties must be experienced later.

After the Russian winter invasion of western Poland and the eastern provinces of Germany the German food situation further deteriorated, and additional reductions in food rations became inevitable. Definite information on further cuts in German bread rations is not yet available, but press reports indicated that, by an order of the Secretary of Food on February 2, 1945, all food ration cards issued for an eight-week period had to last nine weeks.<sup>43</sup> This meant a flat reduction of all food rations by more than 11 per cent. If this may be regarded as an indication of a lasting decrease in the bread ration, the total of this reduction and that of October will exceed 15 per cent for all groups of consumers combined and will approach 20 per cent for normal consumers.

Potato rations for civilians were also cut by about one-fifth. Such reductions in food rations mean a great decrease in German food consumption, but the maintenance even of these reduced rations may result in a rapid dissipation of the existing reserves of food, particularly bread grains. Russian occupation of the German provinces east of the Oder-Neisse line may mean a loss to the Reich of one-fourth of its total bread-grain crop and of an even larger portion of its potato crop. Moreover, the inhabitants of that territory normally composed only about one-sixth of the total population of the Reich, and many hundreds of thousands of these have fled to the west.

There is no direct indication of changes in the bread rations of Bohemia-Moravia, but they must have been reduced at least as much as the German.

In *France*, during the last months of German occupation and soon after the partial liberation, bread rations could not be maintained at the level to which they were raised in October 1943 (p. 94), mainly be-

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>43</sup> *New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1945, p. 5. After Feb. 21, 1945, these measures were apparently consolidated by cutting rations of civilians by 12.5 per cent. See *ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1945, p. 12.



cause the transport system was ruined and the distribution system disorganized. In many places, particularly in the south (Marseille and Lyon), bread rations were reduced to half the previous level or even less. Gradually, with some assistance from Allied army supplies, bread rations were raised from the low level to which they had fallen in July–August, but the previous level had not been restored by October 1944. The bread ration fixed for Paris at the beginning of that month was 70 ounces weekly,<sup>44</sup> which was 5 per cent below the previous year's ration for a normal consumer. Further developments are not clear. According to Swiss press reports, the new French Minister of Food asserted in the Consultative Assembly on November 23 that bread rations had been increased to 350 grams daily (86 ounces weekly), thus exceeding the previous year's ration by about 17 per cent. However, dispatches in the same press a few days later reported that the bread ration in Paris and other large cities could be raised to 300 grams per person daily—no more than the level in the preceding year.<sup>45</sup>

Though information on the *size* of the bread ration is contradictory there is no question that the *quality* of bread has been improved, for in October the flour-extraction rate was reduced to 85 per cent from the 97 per cent in effect from March 15, 1944. This change indicates a rather optimistic government appraisal of wheat supplies within the country, since some 14 per cent more wheat would be required at the 85 per cent extraction rate, to maintain the bread ration even at last year's level. At the time the extraction rate was lowered the price of bread was increased from 3.70 to 4.70 francs per kilogram, in order to reduce the heavy burden of the bread subsidy on the budget.<sup>46</sup>

Civilian supplies shipped to France by the United States military services from the first landing to the beginning of 1945 totaled only 175,000 tons, according to press reports from the Office of War Information.<sup>47</sup> They included such foodstuffs as wheat, flour, and sugar, but apparently these did not compose the bulk of the cargoes. Shipments of civilian goods to France in January amounted to 46,000 tons. This does not indicate a substantial acceleration of shipments in recent months. Moreover, January shipments consisted more of raw materials than of

<sup>44</sup> *Corn Trade News*, Oct. 4, 1944, p. 393. The same source says that in Marseilles the bread-grain ration was raised from 150 grams to 200 grams daily—still but two-thirds the ration fixed in October 1943.

<sup>45</sup> See *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Nov. 24 and 28, 1944.

<sup>46</sup> *New York Times*, Oct. 7, 1944, p. 4; *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Nov. 18, 1944, p. 26.

<sup>47</sup> *New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1945, p. 5.

foodstuffs and apparently included no wheat or flour. A limited tonnage (26 ships with a total capacity of 182,000 tons) recently scheduled to carry civilian goods of various types to France during the first quarter of this year will perhaps somewhat facilitate the shipping of badly needed supplies.

In *Belgium*, similarly, bread rations could not be maintained effectively during August–September even at the level to which they were reduced in the preceding May. In October, however, the Belgian government decided to increase the bread ration of normal consumers from 62 to 74 ounces per week. Distribution of army supplies, in addition to grain from domestic resources, permitted this increase,<sup>48</sup> but it brought the bread ration only to the level of the preceding winter (p. 94). According to late November reports, the Belgian Ministry of Food announced that food rations for certain sections of the population were to be increased.<sup>49</sup> Military developments in December unfavorably affected the food situation in Belgium and it is probable that for a time, at least in certain localities, even the legal bread ration established in October could not be maintained.

The situation in the liberated portion of the *Netherlands*, even at the end of November 1944, was worse than during the German occupation, but in January rations were raised to their earlier level.<sup>50</sup>

Responsibility for the maintenance of bread and other food rations in the western liberated countries remains with their national governments. These governments have also assumed the responsibility of purchasing and shipping overseas wheat, within the narrowly limited shipping and unloading facilities assigned to them. Through February activity of UNRRA within this area was limited to assisting the military in fields of health, welfare, and displaced-person services. However, by a decision of the Central Committee on February 26, UNRRA was allowed to provide emergency relief to especially suffering areas in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Norway, where hitherto its activities were banned under restrictions confining them to nonpaying countries. It may be expected, therefore, that UNRRA will send into these areas limited supplies from its resources. An early acceleration of shipments of relief supplies to this area is also indicated by the recent press report<sup>51</sup> of a joint program, being worked out by Anglo-

<sup>48</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 6, 1944, p. 7; *Corn Trade News*, Nov. 1, 1944, p. 430.

<sup>49</sup> *London Grain, Seed and Oil Reporter*, Nov. 24, 1944, p. 534.

<sup>50</sup> *New York Times*, Nov. 22, 1944, p. 8; *Corn Trade News*, Jan. 10, 1945, p. 14.

<sup>51</sup> *New York Times*, Feb. 9, 1945, pp. 1, 5, and Feb. 27, 1945, p. 8.



American economic representatives, to make available immediately to the liberated countries at least 10 per cent of Britain's reserves of such goods.

In European neutral countries bread consumption changed little from the previous year. It was reported in the press that in *Spain* the bread rations were increased in expectation of better crops,<sup>52</sup> but the amount of increase has not been revealed. It could not be large, however, since the Spanish wheat crop of 1944 remained below the prewar level, and imports of Argentine wheat must be limited by the shortage of tonnage. In *Portugal* the bread ration was left without change since this year's crop was only slightly better than the poor one of 1943.<sup>53</sup> *Switzerland* was forced to reduce her bread and flour rations as well as to lower the quality of bread in the autumn of 1944. This became necessary because of very small Swiss receipts of food from abroad last fall, as the transit across France has been clogged. Swiss efforts to insure transit of food through one of the southern French ports had not proved successful up to the end of December. Under such circumstances the Swiss government found it necessary to require from November 1 an admixture of 20 per cent of potatoes in baking flour, as it did in the preceding spring, and in addition to reduce the rations of bread and flour. The bread ration in November–December was about 5 per cent below the July level, while that of flour had declined by more than 40 per cent (see p. 94).<sup>54</sup> Bread rations in *Sweden* will probably remain without quantitative change unless that country succeeds in replacing the bread grain she delivers to Finland. But Swedish bread may contain more wheat this year, because of the better wheat crop.

The food situation in *Italy* illustrates how difficult it is to restore normal food conditions in a country that has passed through the horrors of modern war, even when that country normally was nearly self-sufficient in food. Only in southern Italy, below Rome, could the bread ration of a normal consumer be brought to 300 grams (10.5 ounces) daily. In February the bread ration in Rome and in the liberated area to the north remained at 200 grams (7 ounces) per day.<sup>55</sup> This level prevailed in spite of President Roosevelt's request of the military authorities in November to bring the bread ration up to 300 grams daily

<sup>52</sup> *The Times* (London), Sept. 12, 1944, p. 3.

<sup>53</sup> *Corn Trade News*, July 12, 1944, p. 273.

<sup>54</sup> *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Oct. 19, 1944, and Dec. 29, 1944.

<sup>55</sup> M. L. Matthews in *New York Times*, Jan. 18, 1945, p. 5; see also *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1945, p. 5, and Feb. 11, 1945, p. 10; and Office of War Information, "Italy's Economy: The Situation Now," *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, Nov. 18, 1944, esp. p. 5.

in all areas of liberated Italy, and in spite of the announcement by Secretary of State Stettinius in the beginning of January that "the British and American governments have been in agreement for some time on the question of bread rations for Italy of 300 grams per person daily."<sup>56</sup>

Furthermore, the effective maintenance of bread rations at the present levels really is the only encouraging aspect of Italy's food situation. Other kinds of food usually are distributed on ration cards only in minimum quantities, and these rations are frequently not fulfilled for long periods,<sup>57</sup> while prices of food on the black market are too high for people of moderate means. Numerous reports from Italy in the American press indicate that the food situation, except for bread distribution, has deteriorated rather than improved during recent months, in spite of strenuous efforts by the Allied authorities to improve economic conditions in Italy.<sup>58</sup> Such a situation is all the more deplorable since the Nazis exploit it skillfully for their propaganda purposes in northern Italy, which they still dominate.

UNRRA could not take an active part in the relief activity in Italy until a decision was made in September at the Montreal meeting of the Council to authorize a \$50-million limited program of aid to mothers and children and displaced persons. In December the UNRRA mission in Italy was concluding arrangements for this relief program, and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board had assured a moderate amount of tonnage to transport the necessary supplies in January and February.<sup>59</sup> The character of the relief program indicates that these supplies will not include important quantities of wheat or flour.

The food situation of the urban population in *Greece* probably deteriorated in the early months of the current crop year, since military operations in the Balkan theater interfered with the functioning of the International Relief Commission and limited the arrival of food from outside. But, according to the press,<sup>60</sup> the Allies were providing early in November a daily ration of 1,100–1,200 calories with the object of eventually reaching 2,000 calories, and the decision was made to increase the bread ration after November 15. It is probable, however, that this decision could not be made effective for some time because of the civil

<sup>56</sup> *New York Times*, Jan. 8, 1945, p. 6. An official announcement that a bread ration of 300 grams will be introduced from Mar. 1 throughout liberated Italy was reported in *ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1945, p. 13.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 18, 1945, p. 5, and Feb. 10, 1945, p. 5.

<sup>58</sup> See Office of War Information, *op. cit.*, for details on restorative measures taken in Italy by the Allies.

<sup>59</sup> *UNRRA Monthly Review*, December 1944, p. 8.

<sup>60</sup> M. Bracker, in *New York Times*, Nov. 5, 1944, p. 17, and *Corn Trade News*, Nov. 15, 1944, p. 452, referring to the Athens correspondent of *The Times* (London).



war that interrupted arrivals of food in the Athens area, where the food deficit was most acute. On the basis of actual arrivals of foodstuffs in Greece before the middle of December (p. 221), we infer that urban food rations at the end of 1944 could have been no better than six months earlier.

Under an agreement with the Allied Military Liaison, which is responsible for civilian-relief operations in Greece, UNRRA personnel went into the liberated areas of Greece soon after the Germans were expelled, and operated there as agents of the military authorities. The responsibility for procuring and shipping foreign relief goods remains, however, with the military authorities. During the acute conflict in the Athens-Piraeus area a part of the UNRRA personnel working in that area was evacuated from Greece, but the larger part remained and assisted in relief operations, as did the personnel in other provinces of Greece where full-scale relief operations continued.<sup>61</sup> Plans for further co-operation of UNRRA with the military authorities were under consideration late in December.

There is little information on relief to the population of liberated Poland and of the liberated portion of Czechoslovakia, where food conditions, at least in urban communities, must be extremely critical. UNRRA's relief work there is still in the preparatory stage, although that organization offered its services as early as May 1944 and both the London and Lublin Polish governments requested aid several months ago. Not until the latter part of January did the Soviet government inform UNRRA that certain Black Sea ports and inland transport facilities were available to receive relief supplies for Poland and Czechoslovakia. As UNRRA had been previously assured of moderate shipping space by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board, supplies may have been loaded in February.

It may be inferred from the preceding discussion that bread consumption in Nazi-controlled Europe has already substantially declined, and may decline further before the end of the crop year. Improvement in the liberated countries, on the other hand, has proceeded only gradually. At the beginning of 1945, bread consumption in these countries was on the average no larger than in 1943-44, and in some areas it was even smaller. Consequently, total bread consumption in Continental Europe west of the pre-1939 Russian frontier will be somewhat lower in 1944-45 than last year, and this decline cannot be compensated for by larger consumption of other kinds of food.

<sup>61</sup> UNRRA *Monthly Review*, December 1944, pp. 8-9.

#### SOVIET RUSSIA

At the time of the 1944 harvest the Soviet government had under its control the entire territory of the USSR. However, the liberation of the eastern Ukraine and of a part of the central black-soil area occurred in the preceding fall, when the winter crops were being planted, and the Crimea and the Ukraine west of the Dnieper were not completely liberated until the spring of 1944—too late to prepare thoroughly for the spring sowing campaign (see map, p. 105). Consequently, crops in the reoccupied areas were planted on an acreage far below the prewar level. The shortage of tractors, horses, machinery, and adult male labor, as well as the devastation in rural districts, made the problem particularly difficult.<sup>62</sup>

No official estimate of the total acreage sown to grain for the 1944 harvest has been published, and the few figures revealed by Soviet officials, concerning the plan of sowings and its fulfillment, are not easy to interpret. Moreover, this plan covered but a portion of the Soviet territory, roughly east of the Dnieper River,<sup>63</sup> and applied only to collective farms. It provided for increases in grain and total crop areas in the collective farms of 13.4 and 18.5 million acres respectively over 1943, but did not give specific acreage figures for either year. While it is evident that the expansion was planned mainly for the newly liberated areas, it is not clear whether the 1943 data upon which the increases were based did or did not include crop acreage sown in regions then under German control. If they did not, the planned expansion appears rather small, for in the region east of the Dnieper liberated after July 1, 1943 (see map, p. 105) the 1938 grain area was about 25 million acres, of which some 22 million were in collective farms. Consequently, the proposed increase in grain acreage for the entire area covered by the plan was only about 60 per cent of the prewar acreage in collective farms of the newly liberated parts of that area. Furthermore, from the estimate of the 1943 grain acreage given earlier (p. 103), it is clear that in the territory liberated before July 1, 1943 the grain area amounted to only a small fraction of the normal prewar acreage.

<sup>62</sup> Butenko, People's Commissar of Agriculture of the Ukrainian SSR, said that the draft power on the Ukrainian farms was reduced to one-third of the 1940 level. See the Soviet daily, *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* [Socialistic Agriculture] (Moscow), June 24, 1944. In the Crimea it was possible to restore only 700 of the 3,800 tractors that were there before the war (*Corn Trade News*, Dec. 20, 1944, p. 505).

<sup>63</sup> It does not include western provinces of the Ukraine nor those portions of White Russia, or of Kalinin and Leningrad provinces, that were liberated during the winter and spring of 1943-44. The official agricultural plan for 1944 was published in *Sotsialisticheskoe Sel'skoe Khoziaistvo*, April 1944, see esp. pp. 3-5.

According to official reports, however, the spring sowing campaign of 1944, in spite of the late spring, proceeded much better than that of 1943. The sowings were completed more quickly and satisfactorily than in the preceding year. This is explained partly by the fact that in the 1944 sowing campaign tractors were in better repair, and the performance per tractor was greater. The same reports, referring to the USSR as a whole, state that in 1944 collective farms planted to spring crops nearly 12.5 million acres more than in 1943. Including autumn sowings, the increase in the total crop area was reported at nearly 30 million acres (12 million hectares), and the increase for grain at about 22 million acres (9 million hectares).<sup>64</sup> Again, however, it is not clear whether the 1943 data included crop areas sown in territory then under German control.<sup>65</sup> The United States Department of Agriculture interprets the reported increase of 9 million hectares as a net gain over the 1943 grain areas of both the invaded and uninvaded portions of the Soviet Union.<sup>66</sup> If this interpretation is correct, the net increase of 9 million hectares means a substantial improvement in Russia's grain situation.

Moreover, 1944-45 feed-grain requirements in the USSR, because of the great decimation of livestock herds in the liberated territory, are below the prewar level, while the areas planted to other important crops such as potatoes, sugar beets, and certain oilseeds were also considerably larger in 1944 than in 1943. According to reports by the Soviet officials the potato area was expanded by more than 2 million acres (850,000 hectares), that under sunflower by about 1.5 million acres (600,000 hectares), while the sugar-beet acreage was increased by 50 per cent.<sup>67</sup> However, it should not be inferred that the 1944 acreage under these important crops approached the prewar level, for at least half of the acreage was in territory invaded by the Germans. We believe that, relative to prewar levels, the 1944 acreages under these special crops were much lower than that under grain. The sugar-beet acreage in particular could not have been more than half as large as in prewar years.

<sup>64</sup> The characteristics of the 1944 spring sowing campaign and of its results are reported by Benediktov in an article in *Socialistic Agriculture*, May 30, 1944, and in an interview given by him in the Soviet daily, *Izvestiia*, Aug. 4, 1944. The above figures on the increase of sown acreage were revealed first by Benediktov in that early interview, but they acquired greater publicity after being published in *Izvestiia*, Nov. 14, 1944. See *Corn Trade News*, Dec. 20, 1944, pp. 503-04.

<sup>65</sup> *Izvestiia* (Nov. 14, 1944), in which the original information was published, was not available to us.

<sup>66</sup> See U.S. Dept. Agr., Office of Foreign Agr. Relations, *The Food Situation in Continental Europe, the Mediterranean Area, and the Soviet Union in 1944-45*, Dec. 1, 1944, p. 9.

<sup>67</sup> See an interview with Benediktov, in *Izvestiia*, Aug. 4, 1944.

From other information in the Soviet press the 1944 grain area in the entire territory of the USSR may be roughly estimated at about 90 per cent of the prewar acreage. This estimate is based on an assumption that the acreage sown to grains for the 1944 harvest in the *entire liberated territory* amounted to about 70 per cent of the prewar grain acreage within the same area.<sup>68</sup>

Nearly 40 per cent of Russia's prewar grain acreage was in the area within the maximum German penetration (see map, p. 105). If crops in this territory were restored to 70 per cent of the prewar acreage the 1944 grain area of the entire USSR could be about 88 per cent of prewar if the acreage in uninvaded territory remained as high as before the war. But since the grain acreage had been previously expanded in certain of the uninvaded regions (p. 103), and these expansions were apparently maintained in 1944 (at least in the normally grain-deficit regions of central European Russia, Transcaucasia, and the southern Soviet Republics of Central Asia), the total acreage harvested in the USSR in 1944 could have reached or somewhat exceeded 90 per cent of the prewar acreage.

There is less uncertainty as to the level of 1944 grain yields in the USSR. Weather favored the development of grain crops during the 1943-44 growing season in practically all important agricultural regions—a contrast to the situation of the preceding year, when a large area was seriously affected by drought (p. 104). The Commissariat of Agriculture in an official report on crop conditions as of the beginning of July,<sup>69</sup> appraised them as good in the Ukraine, the lower Volga, and central and northern areas of European Russia. The report adds that weather also favored development of crops in western Siberia. It is of particular importance, considering climatic conditions in the principal grain regions of the USSR, that the report emphasized an abundant supply of soil moisture. Such a condition normally assures an abundant grain crop in Russia.

No official estimate of the 1944 grain crop has been published, but

<sup>68</sup> U.S. Dept. Agr., Office of Foreign Agr. Relations, *op. cit.*, p. 8, says: "... in the Ukraine, 65 percent of the pre-war acreage was planted to all crops in 1944 and 73 percent to grain crops. In the Crimea 70 percent of the pre-war acreage was planted, and in White Russia (Belorussia) the grain area harvested this year was more than 60 percent of the pre-war figure. In the Kuban Province [North Caucasus], which was liberated in the spring of 1943, 77 percent of the pre-war acreage was reported to have been sown for the 1944 harvest." Nothing is said about the important liberated area of the central black-soil region, but it may be assumed that conditions there were similar to those in the Ukraine. On the basis of this information, our assumption that 70 per cent of the prewar grain acreage was sown in 1944 in the entire liberated area appears conservative.

<sup>69</sup> See *Socialistic Agriculture*, July 11, 1944, p. 2.



numerous unofficial or semiofficial communications in the Soviet press on harvesting and threshing results in different parts of the USSR reported that yields were good, or at least not below prewar, in practically all important grain-producing regions.

Unsatisfactory cultivation under war conditions, and such detrimental factors as the invasion of fields by weeds (officially reported for preceding crops), would necessarily have lowered grain yields even under the favorable weather conditions of last season. Furthermore, harvest losses must have been higher in 1944 than usual, particularly in the liberated areas, since the number of tractors, combines, and even simple harvesting machines was greatly reduced. Harvesting machines are now frequently drawn by cows, and in many regions scythes are of no less importance in the harvesting than are combines. These conditions undoubtedly retarded the harvest and consequently reduced the crop actually secured in 1944. But since weather is still the dominant factor determining the level of grain yield in Russia, it may reasonably be expected that the return of grain per acre actually harvested may have exceeded the prewar average.

With yields above average and acreage approaching 90 per cent of the prewar level, the total Russian grain crop of 1944 may not have been very far below the prewar average. Consequently, the supply of grain from the new crop should be substantially larger than in 1943-44, even on a per capita basis. On the other hand, stocks of grain on August 1, 1944, after the deficient crop of 1943, must have been considerably smaller, and per capita total supplies of domestic grain, therefore, may be not much larger than in 1943-44.

Supplies of foreign grain are, however, more accessible to Soviet Russia now than last year. As the Danubian grain-surplus area is now under the control of the Soviet army, substantial quantities of wheat, corn, other grains, and pulses may be brought into the Soviet Union, particularly the newly liberated areas, where agricultural production could not be sufficiently restored. The convenient Danube and Black Sea route may be used for this purpose. The sudden seizure of the middle stretches of the Danube by the Soviet army could have resulted in the trapping of a substantial river fleet. We estimated, earlier (p. 214), that the Soviet Union may take 1-2 million tons of bread grain, mainly wheat, from this year's supplies in the Danube countries without interfering unduly with the normal consumption of the native populations. A comparable, if somewhat smaller, quantity of other grains and pulses may be available from satisfactory 1944 crops in the

Danube area. Soviet Russia may claim all these grains, at least from Rumania and Hungary, as reparation payments in kind.

Under the circumstances we do not expect Soviet Russia to receive as much lend-lease or mutual-aid wheat from North America in 1944-45 as last year, although the more convenient route through the Black Sea is now open. The small shipments of grain products to Soviet Russia under lend-lease during August-December 1944 seem to support this conclusion, though developments will depend upon the Russian policy with regard to importing wheat by the Black Sea route. The fact that December purchases of flour by the War Food Administration for lend-lease shipment to Russia were made mainly on the Pacific Coast<sup>70</sup> indicates, however, that the Vladivostok route was chiefly considered at that time.

Nevertheless, improved supplies of bread grain had not resulted in an increase in Russian bread rations by December 1944.<sup>71</sup> Food rations remained on as low a calorie basis as in the previous spring (p. 108), though this does not necessarily mean that present grain supplies in the USSR do not permit any increase in the bread ration. Reports in the Soviet press indicate that the obligatory grain deliveries by collective farms this year proceeded very satisfactorily.<sup>72</sup> It is quite possible that the Soviet government found it advisable first to restore its much deflated grain reserves, and to defer increasing the rate of bread-grain consumption. Such policies were followed by the Soviet government even in peacetime.

With domestic supplies of potatoes and vegetables, as well as sugar and vegetable oil somewhat larger than last year, the urban food situation may be relieved a little, but requirements for meat products and fats, to be delivered under the lend-lease agreement, will continue to be large. August-December lend-lease shipments of meat and fat to the USSR appear to have been maintained better than those of grain.

<sup>70</sup> *Northwestern Miller*, Dec. 20, 1944, p. 9.

<sup>71</sup> U.S. Dept. Agr., Office of Foreign Agr. Relations, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

<sup>72</sup> Grain deliveries in excess of the established plans for grain collection are reported in the Soviet press for various regions. Even collective farms of the devastated Ukraine and of White Russia volunteered to deliver in the fund of the Red Army 250,000 tons and 50,000 tons of grain respectively over their obligatory deliveries. See editorial in the *Bolshevik*, October 1944, No. 19-20, pp. 3-4.