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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to empirically analyze how the
asymmetry of information affects the market of rural credit of affiliates
of Coamo (Toledo - PR). It is verified that the asymmetry affects the
offer and the demand for credit. As to offer, the financial agent cannot
grant credit to the interested borrowers because, given the lack of information,
it can put at risk its loan portfolio. As to demand, the borrowers
should be well informed on the terms of contracts or other documents
they are signing, otherwise they can compromise their income/
capital due to a contractual misinformation. The level of asymmetry of
information can be reduced by means of the adoption of strategies that
strengthen the proximity between borrowers and lenders, what can reduce
financing costs. This proximity - expressed in the form of better
definition of guarantees by the lenders and of a closer follow-up of financed
projects - it is an important aspect to reduce the risk of default
in the sector.