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Presented at the SCC-76 Risk Group Annual Meeting March 15, 2013

Motivation

- New interest in shallow-loss policies.
- New, proposed ARC program in latest version of 2012 Farm Bill.
- Want to evaluate deductibles vs. coinsurance in implementation of shallow-loss policies.
- What can we say about the ARC program's proposed 89% guarantee?
 - Risk management
 - Expected value
 - Loss adjustment expenses

Comparing Policies

- Comparison of actual policies is difficult, e.g. ARC vs. SURE
 - Premium differences?
 - Base/underlying coverage
 - Whole farm vs. single crop
 - SURE's disaster trigger
- For apples-to-apples comparison:
 - Pseudo-ARC vs. pseudo-SURE, both "free" add-ons
 - Assume paid, underlying coverage at same level
 - Mono-crop environment, no disaster trigger

What are we comparing?

	Pseudo-ARC	Pseudo-SURE
Style	Deductible	Coinsurance
Base Covg. (b)	55-85%	55-85%
Guarantee	89%	min(1.15*b, 90%)
Reimb. Rate	100%	60%

- ARC is not specified as an add-on
- Comparisons not reasonable for $b \le 70\%$

A Basic Model of Crop Insurance

- Revenues, Y ~ F
- Deductible policy has guarantee, T_D , and pays max(0, $T_D Y$)
- Coinsurance policy has guarantee, T_c , and pays C*max(0, $T_c Y$)
- Assume farmers risk-averse, care about E[U(Y)]

Results

- Coverages induce new distributions:
 - $Y_D = Y + max(0, T_D Y)$ $Y_D \sim F_D$
 - $Y_c = Y + C^*max(0, T_c Y)$

- $Y_C \sim F_C$
- When $E[Y_D] = E[Y_C]$, we show:
 - $Y_D >_{SSD} Y_C >_{SSD} E[Y_C]$
 - $Y_C >_{SSD} Y_{C'}$ if T < T' and C, C' adjust accordingly
 - Orderings are robust to adding a 'payments floor'

Implementing Pseudo-Policies

- Base coverage, b
- Base coverage is a stop-loss/deductible coverage, with a guarantee, $T_G = b^*E[Y]$, and fair premium, P
- Insured revenues, $Y_G \sim F_G$
- Deductible policy (pseudo-ARC), has guarantee, T_D , and pays max(0, $T_D Y_G$)
- Coinsurance policy (pseudo-SURE), has guarantee, T_c , and pays C*max(0, $T_c Y_G$)

Comparing the CDF's



Intuition

For shallow-loss policies:

- Same fair value implies deductible preferred to coinsurance preferred to fixed payment.
- Same fair value implies lower coinsurance threshold, T_C, is preferred.
- EU-equivalent policies, $E[U(Y_D)] = E[U(Y_C)]$, means coinsurance must have higher expected value.
- Not what we observe with ARC. The higher EV is compensating a negative risk premium.

Generating Revenue CDF

- Hyde County, SD, Spring Wheat.
- USDA/NASS Yield Data, 1975-2008.
- Expected and Realized Prices from MGE Futures.
- Same method as last year
 - Bootstrapped regressions of price/yield deviates
 - Variation from repeated regression estimates
 - Pairwise block-bootstrap of county yields with national prices, preserves rank correlations
 - Blown-up to farm-level with scaled white noise

Wheat Revenues per Acre

- Price-yield deviates coefficient: 0.955
- Price-county yield correlation: -0.464
- Simulated farm-county yield correlation: 0.968
- Price-farm yield correlation: -0.164
- Mean Revenues per Acre: \$225.34
- Std. Dev. of Revenues: \$74.48

Histogram: Revenue per Acre



Pseudo-ARC vs. Pseudo-SURE

- Comparing as if free add-on coverage
- Base coverage levels, b = 55-85% (5% increments)
- Want to identify indifferent ARC threshold, T_D, such that E[U(Y)] is equal across policies
- Assume CARA-utility: U(Y) = 1 exp(-a*Y)
- Test across many levels of R_A coefficients
- Results are robust to CRRA specification as well, e.g. U(Y) = log(Y), or to scaling up acres

Indifferent Thresholds

• R_A = 0.001

Guarantees:

Base (Pct)	Base (\$)	ARC, Indiff. (Pct)	ARC, Indiff. (\$)	SURE (Pct)	SURE (\$)
55.00%	\$123.94	60.33%	\$135.95	63.25%	\$142.52
60.00%	\$135.20	65.79%	\$148.26	69.00%	\$155.48
65.00%	\$146.47	71.26%	\$160.58	74.75%	\$168.44
70.00%	\$157.74	76.74%	\$172.93	80.50%	\$181.40
75.00%	\$169.00	82.22%	\$185.27	86.25%	\$194.35
80.00%	\$180.27	86.35%	\$194.57	90.00%	\$202.80
85.00%	\$191.54	88.09%	\$198.49	90.00%	\$202.80

EV and Risk Premium R_A = 0.001

Base (Pct)	EV[SURE]	EV[ARC, Indiff.]	Risk Premium (SURE to ARC)	EV[ARC, 89%]
70.00%	\$10.84	\$10.84	\$0.0007	\$19.34
75.00%	\$14.24	\$14.24	\$0.0009	\$19.34
80.00%	\$17.23	\$17.22	\$0.0007	\$19.34
85.00%	\$18.59	\$18.59	\$0.0001	\$19.34

Impacts on Loss Adjustment Expense

- Another possibility is that the higher threshold reflects savings of loss adjustment expenses; moving to deductible policy means fewer claims.
- Simple econometric model of claims costs:

$LAE perUnit = a + b \cdot total claims + c \cdot indemnity perUnit + \epsilon$

...with fixed per-claim costs and variable costs with the size of indemnities. *b* represents returns to scale.

Preliminary LAE Data

- LAE as percent of gross premium, 1995-2010
 - Grant-Thornton Report, 2011 survey of crop insurers
- RMA Summary of Business, 1995-2010
 - Premium, Indemnity, No. Claims by crop, county, coverage level and year.
- All data are national, annual aggregates
 - N=16 for the regression.

Regression Results

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	=	16
					F(2, 13)	=	44.05
Model	119641.421	2 5	9820.7107		Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	17655.4409	13 1	358.11084		R-squared	=	0.8714
					Adj R-squared	=	0.8516
Total	137296.862	15 9	153.12416		Root MSE	=	36.853
expperu	Coef.	Std. Er	rr. t	P> t	[95% Conf.	In	terval]
uindem	- 0002527	000051	7 _4 89	0 000	- 0003644	_	0001411
	0002527			0.000	0003044		
indemper	.0439411	.00491	.7 8.94	0.000	.0333186	-	0545636
_cons	132.4082	36.8500	3.59	0.003	52.79845	2	12.0179

Estimating Claims Savings

- Average unit size: 80.67 acres
- Fixed claims cost per unit: \$132.41
- Variable adjustment cost: 4.39% of indemnity
- Returns to scale: 0.025c per claim, nationally
 - 599,080 avg annual units w/earned premium (wheat)

Claims Savings (Cost)

Claims savings per acre (*b*=0.85, vs. Pseudo-SURE):

• Saved fixed costs per acre (fewer claims):

 $(F_{0.9} - F_{0.89}) * 132.41 / 80.67 =$ \$0.017

- Lost fixed-cost economies of scale (fewer claims):
- $-(F_{0.9} F_{0.89})*0.00025*599,080/80.67 = -0.0193
- Lost variable adjustment cost (higher EV):
- $-0.0439^{*}\Delta EV per Acre = -0.0329
 - Total: \$0.0352

What Did We Learn?

- Deductible policies provide better risk management
- Shallow-loss risk premiums are often very low; these policies bite near the peak of the distribution
- ARC 89% threshold is paying higher expected value; higher EV dominates the cost difference
- Back-of-the-envelope: no LAE savings
- Same cost ARC policy should have pseudo-SURE indifferent threshold.

Future Research

- Better loss adjustment expense data
- Expansion to more crops
- Testing for robustness to different estimates of revenue/yield distribution

Questions?