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Abstract
The citrus agroindustrial system is a very interesting example of the interaction
of different forms of governance. The same producer manages his orange sales to the market
agents in different ways: this situation is called plural forms or contractual mix. On sales to
purchasers that sell the fruit for in natura consumption, the producer deals in terms of spot
market. On the other hand, contracts are predominant in transactions with juice-processing
industry. The producer can also lease part of the unused capacity of an industry in order to
process his own fruit and sell it straight to the market (quasi-integration) or integrate the sale
of the in natura fruit becoming the owner of sheds (hierarchy). This work aims at identifying
reasons that lead citrus growers to sell their product to different purchasers employing
different governances. One of the conclusions on the determinants of plural forms in the case
of citrus growing is linked to the fact that buyers from distinct channels of distribution
(quantity, quality, fruit variety, location) have specific needs, which create restrictions that
make the choice for multiple channels and forms of governance the only one available for
many producers. Nevertheless, the main conclusion is that the attributes of the transaction
are the key factors to explain the occurrence of plural forms, i.e., it is the fact that transactions
between producers and members of distribution channels are different in at least one
attribute (specificity of assets, frequency or uncertainty) that explains the adoption of
different forms of coordination. As a result, citrus producers do not show inabilities to
measure such attributes and, in especial, to identify the most efficient solution in terms of
governance, making contractual mix a stable situation rather than a transitory one.