The Price of Disclosure in the Thoroughbred Yearling Market

In this article, we examine disclosure as a tool to mitigate the effects of asymmetric information in a Thoroughbred yearling market. If disclosures influence market price, information contained therein must be valuable to buyers and hence diminish asymmetric information. Using public auction data, we find that disclosures do not influence price in a segment of the auction in which an implicit quality certification is available. However, in the other segment, we find evidence that some disclosures may provide valuable information to buyers.


Editor(s):
Marchant, Mary A.
Bosch, Darrell J.
Issue Date:
2013-05
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/149125
Published in:
Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Volume 45, Number 2
Page range:
243-257
Total Pages:
15
JEL Codes:
Q13; D82; L82




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-04-28

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