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A Spatial Econometric Analysis of Compliance with an International Environmental Agreement on an Open Access Resource

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Abstract

This paper provides an empirical analysis of the role of intergovernmental relations on a country's effort to enforce the objectives of an international environmental agreement on an open access resource. Intergovernmental interaction allows signatory countries to observe compliance behavior of other signees and to punish non-compliance by applying bi- and multilateral sanctions. We use a cross-sectional dataset that contains country level information about compliance with Article 7 of the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Our identification strategy combines a spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive disturbances and an instrumental variable approach. We find a strong positive effect of other countries' compliance on the individual country's compliance score. These results suggest that repeated interactions among participants might not only play a role in enforcing the obligations of an agreement at the community level but also have an impact at the international level. (*141 words*)

Keywords: International environmental agreements, open access resources, spatial econometrics

JEL classification: C21; F53; Q22;

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1 Introduction

Global environmental problems require some form of cooperation, like international environmental agreements (IEA), in order to overcome the free-rider problem. However, the voluntary character of many IEAs neither prevents free-riding from non-signatory countries at the participation stage nor free-riding from actual signatory countries at the enforcement stage (e.g. fulfilling the obligations specified in the agreement). The governments of signatory nations have little incentive to enforce the agreements' regulations on their national industries hence the sole ratification of an IEA does not guarantee any success (Finus & Tjøtta 2003). Therefore, it is interesting that we still observe countries participating in the negotiation process and signing an IEA, even if its benefits are nonrival and nonexcludable. Further, why do signatory countries sometimes make an effort to install a mere symbolic treaty in which they agree to obligations which they expect to meet anyway and then even exert positive effort to fulfill (or sometimes overfulfill) these obligations.

Our paper argues, that one possible explanation for this behavior can be found in intergovernmental interaction among the signatory countries. The work by Ostrom (1990) suggests that interaction among individuals and a credible threat of sanctions can help to discourage free-riding and enforce sustainable harvesting rules for open access resources, at least at the community level. On an international level these conditions also exist and are sometimes even more pronounced. Countries do not act independently of each other and can nowadays easily observe whether a signatory nation defects from the agreement or not. In addition, governments have various means to impose sanctions on defectors ranging from diplomatic isolation to trade embargo and the denial of access to an economic or military union. Therefore, the aim of this study is to analyze whether the existence of intergovernmental interaction among the participants and the credible threat of sanctions can help to enforce the obligations of an IEA on an open access resource. In particular, we use cross-section data on signatory countries' effort to enforce the obligations of the Article 7 of the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, a voluntary IEA.

The primary dataset contains evaluation information on each signee's compliance effort that was compiled in 2005 by an international panel of experts (Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short 2009*b*). We use geographical distance as well as a measure of political distance between the signatory nations as empirical proxies for the transaction costs of observing other members compliance as well as the frequency of intergovernmental contacts. We interpret the estimated coefficient of the spatial lag of compliance effort as the effect of intergovernmental interaction on compliance behaviour. Given that a signatory country's own and all the other signatory countries' compliance effort is determined simultaneously, OLS would yield biased estimates of the coefficient of the spatial lag. In order to get consistent estimates of the spatial lag, we apply a spatial autoregressive model with a spatial autoregressive process in the dependent variable as well as in the disturbances. Due to less stringent normality assumptions as well as computational efficiency we apply a generalized spatial two-stage least square approach as suggested by Kelejian & Prucha (1998).

Our results suggest that intergovernmental interaction has a significant impact on a country's level of compliance. Other countries' compliance act as strategic complements and the effect decreases in distance. We also find that a country's quality of governance and its' attitude to sustainable management to have a significant positive effect on compliance score.

Furthermore, we find that the spatial spillover effect, i.e. the influence on the the other countries' decision on the level of compliance, is stronger for specific country groups, (e.g. richer countries). This supports the idea of a 'pull' effect on compliance at international level as already proposed by Fredriksson & Millimet (2002) on inter-state level in the U.S.

Our paper extends the findings in the existing empirical literature in three ways: First, to our knowledge, this is the first empirical study to examine compliance behavior under an IEA on an open access resource. The existing empirical literature (e.g. Murdoch, Sandler & Vijverberg 2003) that analyses the spatial properties of compliance behavior uses data from (international) environmental agreements on the management of global or local public goods/bads (e.g. emissions). One strand in the literature applies spatial econometric techniques to overcome the problem of migrating emissions on measuring an individual country's reduction effort. Murdoch et al. (2003) point out that the econometric analyses of reduction effort of transboundary pollution is complicated by the fact that individual country's effort is hard to measure as one country's total depositions of a pollutant are the sum of its' own emissions and that of other countries. The application of spatial econometric models and the knowledge of the pollutants' geographic migration patterns helps to reveal each country's emission reduction effort. However, they were not able to isolate the effect of intergovernmental relations on compliance effort. In our case, we directly observe each country's compliance effort and we do not face the problem of transboundary spillovers. We should therefore be able to interpret the coefficient of the spatial lag as the effect of intergovernmental relations. A second strand of spatial econometric studies measures emission reduction effort by comparing differences in the stringency of state (e.g. Fredriksson & Millimet 2002) or national government's environmental regulations (e.g. Eliste & Fredriksson 2004). These papers compare environmental regulations that are not based on an agreement. The absence of such a legal document makes it impossible to define defecting behavior at all and therefore leaves no ground for sanctions.

Second, previous studies solely concentrate on controlling for a spatial autoregressive process while estimating the parameters in their econometric model. The amount of interaction between governments and the ability and credibility to impose sanctions, however, is not homogeneous among countries. Our analysis applies an approach proposed by LeSage & Pace (2009) and decomposes the impact of spatial spillovers into a direct, indirect and total effect. This allows us to differentiate between a spatial spillover and a feedback effect.

Third, both Fredriksson & Millimet (2002) (U.S. states) and Murdoch et al. (2003) (European countries) analyzed decisions regarding environmental agreements of a group of signees that are rather homogeneous in their level of development as well as their ability to enforce the obligations of an environmental agreement. In addition, the participants are located in a relatively confined geographical area, where the criteria of strategic interaction and low transaction costs for observing other participants behavior are more easily fulfilled. We use an IEA that has been signed by countries around the globe providing large variance in levels of development, quality of governance and preference for biodiversity. This gives us the possibility to determine the spatial impact of a change in the level of effort of specific country groups.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides information on 1995 UN Code of Conduct and discusses the theoretical background. Section 3 presents the data and section 4 explains our empirical strategy. Section 5 discusses the results and section

6 concludes.

2 Background and previous literature

During the last decades we have witnessed a tremendous increase in the ratification of IEA on a variety of issues. This development has also triggered the emergence of a vast body of economic literature on this subject¹. One strand of research in IEAs deals with the question why countries even participate in international environmental agreements, if they could have the same benefit by free-riding on the behavior of the other countries. Finus & Tjøtta (2003) suggest that governments with re-election concerns try to maximize votes from two groups: First, environmentally concerned voters, who do not have full information about the effect of the IEA, and second, the industry affected by the IEA, which has private information about abatement costs and can influence the political process in a more organized way (e.g. lobby groups). Politicians can gain political support from the former group by simply signing a symbolic IEA and still capture votes from the latter group by agreeing on relatively low obligations. Fredriksson, Neumayer & Ujhelyi (2007) show that governments are more likely to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, if they have strong environmental lobby groups in their country. This argument, however, would not necessarily explain the participation of developing countries in some IEAs, because the fraction of 'green votes' among the electorate is rather low in developing countries and the increase in re-election probability by capturing support from these voters is very small. An alternative argument for cooperation in IEAs is that countries are driven by equity considerations (Lange & Vogt 2003, Lange, Loschel, Vogt & Ziegler 2010). This strand of literature argues that negotiating politicians are not only driven by the absolute payoff from a proposal for their own country but also by the relative payoff compared to the other participating countries. Preference for equity seems to describe countries' behavior well at the negotiation and participation level, but do not automatically describe the variance in enforcing the actual obligations.

A further explanation is based on the potential effect of repeated intergovernmental relations and resulting bi- or multilateral sanctions if a country defects from the agreement. This argument basically builds on the ideas of Ostrom (1990). Burton (2003) incorporated these ideas in a theoretical model on community enforcement of voluntary effort restrictions on fisheries, while Bratberg, Tjøtta & Oines (2005) suggest that the enforcement of a treaty's obligations via strategic interaction of the signees could also be a valid explanation for IEAs' existence. Fredriksson & Millimet (2002) account for interaction between governments on environmental policymaking at U.S. state level by including the abatement levels of neighboring states as explanatory variables. Their results imply that U.S. states with already more stringent environmental policies have a positive "pull" effect on their neighbors' decision on abatement levels. Murdoch et al. (2003) provide a spatial probit analysis of 25 European countries' decision to sign the Helsinki protocol as well as their decision on the level of enforcement. They use the amount of spillins and targeted spillins of all other signatory countries to identify a countries strategic response. They find that spillins increase cooperation at the participation stage but induce free-riding at the enforcement stage.

¹For an excellent survey see for instance Wagner (2001) and Finus (2008)

2.1 The 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

The empirical application in this paper analyses signees' behaviour under the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. This agreement is just one among many voluntary IEA on fisheries management (e.g. the UN Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks). The reason for choosing the Code of Conduct for this study is simply data availability. Our empirical exercise requires quantifiable measures of a country's compliance effort which, to our knowledge, has not been collected for other voluntary IEAs. Although performance of other IEAs has been evaluated in most of the cases, this assessment is only of qualitative nature. In contrast, the study by Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short (2009*b*) has evaluated participatory countries' compliance behaviour under the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries after 10 years and translated this evaluation in a rich set of numeric performance indicators.

The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries had its origin in the 19th session of the FAO's Committee on Fisheries (COFI) in 1991. Related to the discussion on pelagic drift-net fishing, the COFI pointed out the importance of the FAO to promote more sustainable fishing gear and techniques. This idea was further developed and formalized at the 1992 International Conference on Responsible Fishing in Cancun. The participating nations signed a declaration that called upon the FAO to draft a Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. In October 1995, the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries was adopted unanimously by the members of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. The general objective of the Code of Conduct is to promote sustainable development and harvesting of world fisheries through responsible management (Hosch, Ferraro & Failler 2011). The code consists of 12 articles, where the first 6 articles mainly describe the legal framework of the Code and articles 7 to 12 are of more technical nature and define the Code's objectives. Most importantly, the Code of Conduct is non-binding and the principles and standards provided in the legal text are only of voluntary nature. In 2005 after 10 years of Code of Conduct 53 countries, accounting for 96 percent of the global marine catch, have been evaluated according to their compliance with the code's suggestions made in Article 7 for sustainable fisheries (Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short 2009*b*). The results have been quiet disillusioning. Not one of those countries evaluated reach an overall compliance score of more than 60 percent. The authors suggest that the lack of compliance is mainly due to the voluntary character of this international environmental agreement.

A second assessment by Hosch et al. (2011) using 9 case studies comes to a similar conclusion: Although a lot of signatory countries have implemented laws that reflect the objective of the Code of Conduct, actual change in fishing practices is hardly observed. They suggest that a lack of political will and administrative inertia are among the reasons, why the positive influence of the Code on domestic laws is not translated into real action.

2.2 Intergovernmental interdependencies in compliance behavior

Let us now have a closer look at the type of intergovernmental interdependencies in compliance with an IEA on responsible fisheries. We assume that these interdependencies are

mainly influenced by the impact of international costs and benefits related to the compliance decision with the IEA's obligations. These costs and benefits emerge basically from (not) signing or (not) complying to the IEA. They could be defined directly in the agreement or could be a result from resulting sanctions or the loss in trustworthiness in strategic interactions among the signatory governments. For example, in a recent study Rose & Spiegel (2009) demonstrate that non-economic exchange (e.g., membership in IEAs) between countries increases the likelihood of engaging in economic exchange.

While the standard economic literature on IEAs (Barrett 1994) takes the negotiating government as exogenously given, we assume that politicians who are responsible for negotiating and enforcing an IEA are driven by re-election concerns. Persson & Tabellini (1992) were among the first who analyzed the effects of strategic voting on the outcome of multilateral agreements in a theoretical framework. Buchholz, Haupt & Peters (2005) extended this analysis to IEAs². The government will increase its' re-election probability if the electoral benefits of compliance exceed its domestic and international costs (Finus & Tjøtta 2003). Let us first have a closer look at the potential benefits from signing and enforcing an IEA on sustainable fishery. In the case of IEAs on fisheries it is reasonable to assume that the re-election probability mainly depends on two groups of voters in society, general citizens and the fishery industry. The general citizens have some 'green' preferences for sustainable management of international fish stocks. One might think of this as the value attached to the sole existence of a certain fish species. However, obtaining information about the optimal set of rules to ensure a sustainable level of harvest is costly for each citizen and therefore the average citizen is badly informed. The politician can capture support from these 'uninformed green voters' twice: First by simply signing a mere symbolic IEA which is very visible. Second, if the industry complies or even over-complies, the voters might attribute this success to the (unobservable) enforcement effort of the politician.

Regarding the domestic costs of signing and enforcing the IEA, a first subset of costs comprises of loss in voter's utility through the IEA. The support for IEAs on certain pollutants (e.g. CO₂) is in general rather low because the IEA's obligations infer costs on the average citizen as well. The situation is different for IEAs on biodiversity or fisheries, which mainly affect a narrow industry. In most of today's economies the fishery industry has become an increasingly unimportant sector when it comes to employment³ and contribution to GDP⁴. However, this does not necessarily suggest that the government does not pay attention to the demands from this group. The government might even pay relatively more attention to the preferences expressed via the industry's lobbying groups (Persson 1998) as compared to the general electorate. The fishery industry has private information about its compliance costs (Finus & Tjøtta 2003) and the government can therefore capture votes from both the green voters and the fishery industry by signing an international environmental agreement

²Eckert (2003) examined the effect of constitutional rules on participation and enforcement of an IEA in a two-country model where each country consists of two federal sub-regions. Depending on the delegation of powers between the federal and the regional governments each country can have a strategic advantage in the negotiation game.

³According to FAO (1999) the average percentage of fishers among the economically active population in agriculture in high-sea fishing countries was around 4.8% in 1990.

⁴The average percentage of fishery exports per GDP among high-sea fishing countries was around 0.8% in 1995 (FAO 1999).

with loose obligations. The government simply negotiates for low compliance goals at the signatory level and/or keeps the level of enforcement low. Another factor influencing the costs of compliance for the domestic industries is driven by the heterogeneity of fishing capacity between industries in different countries. Dayton-Johnson & Bardhan (2002) and Burton (2003) provide community-level models of fishery that allow for heterogeneity in fishing capacity among the different players.

A second subset of costs is related to the enforcement of the IEA. In many countries the fishery industry is dispersed over a number of locations and the central government delegates control function related to the IEA to regional governments or bureaucratic agencies. Installing and maintaining a bureaucratic apparatus that controls the compliance requires public funds that could be used to provide public goods elsewhere. These direct costs of enforcement depend on the country's level of institutional quality.

Our main interest is on the impact of international costs related to the IEA. These costs emerge basically from not signing or not complying to the IEA. They could be defined directly in the agreement or could be a result from resulting sanctions in repeated interactions among the signatory governments. At community level (e.g. a small fisher town), repeated interaction among participants of an agreement make the threat of sanctions more credible, thus increasing each participant's reduction effort and decreasing the incentive to free-ride (e.g. Ostrom 1990, Burton 2003). Ostrom (1990) outlined a set of 5 broad characteristics that need to be met in order to have a stable agreement: 1) Members support the rules of the agreement and effective monitoring. 2) Outsiders can be excluded. 3) Members or communities have repeated communication and dense social networks. 4) The harvesting (and compliance) effort of the other members is observable. 5) Moderate rates of change in the stock of resources and the level of harvesting technology. So far, the literature (e.g. Dietz, Ostrom & Stern 2003) suggests that there are only a few settings in the world that fulfill all 5 conditions. Most of these cases can be found in situations where a common property resource is shared by a community in narrowly defined geographic area.

Common property resources where sustainable management requires some form of international cooperation between a number of countries have so far been considered not to fulfill the necessary conditions for an Ostrom-type governance of the commons. Maybe this argument does not hold for all IEAs. Let us first have a look at how the institutional framework created by the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries actually performs vis-a-vis these 5 conditions. We basically go through the conditions one by one and examine how these characteristics apply to the Code of Conduct : 1) The participating nations agreed to the set of rules by signing the agreement. Although the Code of Conduct is voluntary, there is some legal document where signees clearly indicated their approval. If one member country defects from the agreement there is at least the possibility for other members to refer to the legal document. 2) The Code of Conduct was signed by 53 countries that account for 96 % of the global marine catch. Although it is not possible to exclude the fishing nations responsible for the remaining 4 % of the global catch, we are confident that new entrants play a neglectable role. 3) Although the fishing industries from different nations do not engage in frequent face-to-face communication, the official representatives of the signatory countries do. They meet permanently in international boards (e.g. UN general assembly meetings, WTO meetings) and engage in a wide number of negotiations (e.g. EU and NATO enlargement). Hence, there is repeated interaction among the participant countries at least at

the diplomatic level. In addition, there are bi- and multilateral tools that make the threat of sanctions, in case a member country defects, very plausible. For example, EU-member countries use the veto-threat to block participation aspirations of some of its neighbouring countries such as Turkey and Croatia. 4) It is assumed that signatory nations do neither have information about the others compliance effort and it could be hard to identify players that defect. However, this is not the case in high-seas fishing. Nowadays, fishing nations actually have very good information about other countries fishing practices and harvesting effort, both legal and illegal. 5) It is probably not reasonable to assume a moderate change of technology over this 10-year period.

Although this was just a back-of-the-envelope comparison, its purpose was to illustrate that there is some ground for supporting the idea that on international level, repeated interaction among governments could have an effect on country's compliance behavior in the context of a IEA. Among Ostrom's characteristics the extent of knowledge about other members' behavior (characteristic 4) and the frequency of interaction among countries (characteristic 3) define the probability that defection and under-compliance will be revealed as well as the likelihood of becoming subject of bi- or multilateral sanctions. The key assumption of this paper is that these characteristics, and therefore the likelihood of a sanction, are inversely related with the distance between two countries. It is easier for Australia to observe fishing behaviour of Japanese vessels in a high-sea fishing zone in the Indian Ocean than it is to observe Nigerian vessels in a high-sea fishing zone in the Atlantic. The amount of interactions between official representatives of two countries also decreases in distance. Although most countries have representatives in multinational boards and organizations there are other multinational institutions that are composed of only countries within a specific region of the world (e.g. EU, MERCOSUR, ASEA, African Union). Based on this discussion we argue that, all else equal, the compliance behavior of one country is positively related to the compliance behaviour of other countries and this effect is decreasing in distance.

At community level (e.g. a small fisher town), strategic interaction among participants of an agreement make the threat of sanctions more credible, thus increasing each participant's reduction effort and decreasing the incentive to free-ride(e.g. Ostrom 1990, Burton 2003). Ostrom (1990) outlined a set of 5 broad characteristics that need to be met in order to have a stable agreement: 1) Members support the rules of the agreement and effective monitoring. 2) Outsiders can be excluded. 3) Members or communities have repeated communication and dense social networks. 4) The harvesting (and compliance) effort of the other members is observable. 5) Moderate rates of change in the stock of resources and the level of harvesting technology. So far, the literature (e.g. Dietz et al. 2003) suggests that there are only a few settings in the world that fulfill all 5 conditions. Most of these cases can be found in situations where a common property resource is shared by a community in narrowly defined geographic area.

Open access resources where sustainable management requires some form of international cooperation between a number of countries have so far been considered not to fulfill the necessary conditions for an Ostrom-type mechanism to manage open access resources. Let us first have a look at how the institutional framework created by the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries actually performs vis-a-vis these 5 conditions. We basically go through the conditions one by one and examine how these characteristics apply to the Code of Conduct : 1) The participating nations agreed to the set of rules by signing the agreement.

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3 Data

We compiled our dataset from a number of sources. Our main variable of interest, compliance with the Article 7 of the Code of Conduct, is taken from the study of Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short (2009b). They evaluated⁵ the performance of all 53 sig-

⁵A more detailed description of the evaluation method can be found in Pitcher, Kalikoski & Ganapathiraju (2006)

natory countries⁶ using a set of 44 different score variables. Each score variable ranges from 0 to 10, with higher scores indicating better compliance. The definition of the score variables is directly drawn from the clauses of the Code. Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short (2009b) used a great number of separate sources including: national legislation, international treaties (www.searoundus.org), country synopses from FAO, reports to FAO and NGOs, web-pages of national fisheries agencies, NGO web-pages as well as information of published work and fisheries experts to derive the compliance score for each country. To ensure consistency, a formal scoring protocol was employed. A subsample from this data has been used in Pitcher, Kalikoski, Short, Varkey & Ganapathiraju (2009) to evaluate 33 signatory countries' performance in ecosystem-based management of fisheries. In addition, Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short (2009a) use the overall compliance scores from the report and regress it on corruption, the United Nations Human Development Index and the Yale Environmental Performance Index on participating countries compliance with the code. The latter study provides a basis for the choice of control variables in our empirical specification.

The 44 score variables can be divided into 6 different subgroups, which can then be broadly categorized into *behavioral* and *intentional* indicators. The former set of performance indicators, which are *Regulations*, monitoring, control and surveillance system (*MCS*) and *Socio-Econ*, summarizes measures, which requires real action. It contains mainly indicators that are quantifiable and have an immediate effect on fishing stocks.

In contrast, intentional measures contain a number of performance indicators that could be considered less tangible and implementation and maintenance of some of these indicators does not necessarily require large effort and funds from the government. These subgroups have a more symbolic character and evaluate a country's good intentions. It consists of the indicators *Objectives*, *Framework* and *Precautionary*.

Although both set of indicators are important to evaluate a country's compliance to the code of conduct, we expect a stronger strategic intergovernmental interaction in the indicators that measure actual behavior. For example, a fishing country that has updated its fleet to meet the criteria of minimizing by-catch wants its competitors in the same fishing area also to apply to this criterion. Hence, fulfilling this requirement of the code of conduct is costly and has a direct effect on the fishermen's competitiveness. In comparison, the complying nation is less interested whether the other fishing nation has developed plans and compiled a set of management objectives to meet the requirements of the code of conduct. An additional argument for the preference for the behavioral measures is that compliance to the intentional measures does not necessarily result in real action (Hosch et al. 2011).

We use similar empirical proxies as McWhinnie (2009) for technological capability, harvesting costs and government's ability to enforce compliance. As data on fishery specific technology is not available, we use the country's gross domestic product, *GDP*, to measure a country's technical capability. Data on GDP per capita (Purchasing Power Parity) stems from the World Development Indicators (WDI 2007) and is varying between \$776 and \$32145 with a mean of \$11899. To capture harvesting costs we use the average distance from a country to the FAO zones it is operating, *COST*. We use a GIS-shapefile with coordinates of

⁶Given that these 53 countries account for 96 percent of the global marine catch, we are confident that sample selection bias plays a negligible role.

ports in each country and identified the closest port to each FAO area. We then calculated the great circle distance from this port to the center of a FAO zone and repeated this step for each FAO zone the country is fishing in. These distances were weighted by the fish capture of the country in the respective FAO zone. In our sample Bangladesh, Senegal and Japan are on average high distance fishing countries, whereas the Philippines, Ireland and Peru are fishing the main part of their capture in waters close to their home port. The ability to enforce compliance can be proxied via a country’s level of good governance (Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short 2009a). Therefore, we include a standard measure for quality of governance based on the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) from the PRS group, *GOV*⁷. This is a composite indicator that combines, among others, information about governmental stability, bureaucratic quality and corruption. We further add a dummy variable *EU* that accounts for countries, who are subject to the EU’s common fishery policy.

Furthermore, the country’s cost of compliance is influenced by the degree of competition in the FAO area, *COMPET*. To capture this characteristic we construct the following indicator based on the FAO fishery statistics for each country i ($i = 1, \dots, n$.)

$$COMPET_i = \sum_{z=1}^Z \left(\sum_{i=1}^n \frac{l_i}{f_i} \right) \times \frac{f_i}{\sum_{z=1}^Z f_i} \quad (1)$$

where l is a dummy variable which is 1 whenever country i is fishing in zone z , with ($z = 1, \dots, Z$)⁸, and f_i is the catch of country i in zone z . The first part of equation (1) allows us to measure the strength of competition a country faces in each zone whereas the second part captures the importance of each zone for country i in relation to its total fish catch. Our measure on environmental performance, *BIO*, stems from the Yale Environmental Performance Index (Emerson, Esty, Levy, Kim, Mara, de Sherbinin, Srebotnjak & Jaiteh 2010), which provides a composite index from six subareas. In line with Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short (2009a), we have chosen one of the subareas - biodiversity - for our measure of environmental performance of a country for the following reasons. First, there are concerns of high collinearity of the overall environmental performance index with the GDP of a country. This stems from the fact that 50 % of the index is based on environmental health variables, like water sanitation. Second, the biodiversity index is based on following variables: the national extend of protected areas, a measure of the degree to which the country’s wildest areas are protected, the timber harvest rate and the oversubscription of water resources. In our opinion this subgroup captures the countries attitude to sustainable management and use of natural resources best. In our sample Yemen is the country with the lowest score of 13.7 and New Zealand has the highest score with 73.5 points. To measure the size of the fishing industry in relation to the country size, we use data on the export value of fish from the FAO Fisheries Statistics divided by GDP per capita of that country, *EXPORT*. The size of the fishing industry allows us to capture the potential of the industry to lobby against costly adaptations to more sustainable fishing measures. Bigger industries

⁷Using the World Banks Good Governance Index as in Pitcher, Kalikoski, Ganapathiraju & Short (2009a) or Smith, Roheim, Crowder, Halpern, Turnipseed, Anderson, Bourillón, Guttormsen, Liguori, McNevin, O’Connor, Squires, Tyedmers, Brownstein, Carden, Klinger, Sagarin & Selkoe (2010) instead, does not change our main results.

⁸ based on the 17 FAO major fishing areas

will easier get attention by the government and politicians will avoid implementing policies, which could affect many voters negatively in the short run. The Code of Conduct does not only cover management of high-seas fish grounds but all fishing grounds including exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and inland fisheries. As the latter two areas are less of a concern of other signees we include a variable *EEZ* that is the fraction of the county’s catches in its’ EEZs of its total catches. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the variables we use in our regressions.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
<i>Regulations</i>	49	2.548	1.735	0.143	7.286
<i>MCS</i>	49	4.459	1.717	1.333	9.167
<i>Socio-Econ</i>	49	3.772	1.902	0.333	8.000
<i>Objectives</i>	49	4.392	1.809	1.333	8.222
<i>Framework</i>	49	4.977	2.006	0.857	7.857
<i>Precaution</i>	49	3.771	2.287	0.667	7.667
<i>GDP</i>	49	9341.047	10976.470	241.984	35959.340
<i>COST</i>	49	717.200	1668.991	0.876	8960.758
<i>GOV</i>	49	0.660	0.209	0.311	0.996
<i>EU</i>	49	0.245	0.434	0.000	1.000
<i>COMPET</i>	49	11.407	2.518	6.000	16.000
<i>BIO</i>	49	49.353	15.656	13.700	73.500
<i>EXPORT</i>	49	0.008	0.026	0.000	0.183
<i>EEZ</i>	49	0.578	0.296	0.044	1.059

4 Empirical Implementation

To determine the influence of intergovernmental relationship on the country’s level of effort, as discussed in section 2.2, we base our empirical strategy on a spillover model of strategic interaction (Brueckner 2003). In this framework a country decides on the level of compliance c_i , but the country is simultaneously affected by the level of compliance chosen elsewhere, which indicates the spillover effect.⁹ This leads to following objective function for country i :

$$V(c_i, c_j; X_i) \tag{2}$$

⁹ Following Autant-Bernard & LeSage (2011) in static cross-sectional models of spatial interaction, where observations reflect a steady state equilibrium outcome, the countries’ simultaneous decision on the level of compliance can be interpreted as representing a sequence that would occur over time during movement to the next steady state equilibrium.

where c_{-i} is a vector of the chosen level of compliance c by the other countries and X_i is a vector of intracountry characteristics of country i , which determine preferences for the i 's level of c . Country i chooses the level of c_i to maximize equation (2). Due to the fact that this depends on both, c_j and X_i , the solution can be written as :

$$c_i = R(c_j; X_i) \quad (3)$$

where function R represents a reaction function, which indicates country's i response to the compliance behavior of the other countries. The position of the reaction function depends on the intracountry characteristics X of country i . Following our previous discussion on intergovernmental relationship we expect the sign of the reaction function's slope to be positive, which indicates that the decisions on the level of compliance is a strategic complement. For our empirical analysis of the effect of intergovernmental relations on compliance the econometric function takes the following general form

$$c_i = \rho W_n c_j + X_i \beta + \epsilon_i \quad (4)$$

where c_i is a $i \times 1$ vector of the dependent variable, X_i is the $n \times k$ matrix of control variables, β is the corresponding $k \times 1$ vector of regression parameters and ϵ_i is an error term. W_n is a $n \times n$ spatial weighting matrix, with elements ω_{ij} , which represents nonnegative weights that typically capture the pattern of interaction between country i and country j . The scalar autoregressive parameter ρ reflects the strength of interaction between country i and country j . Given our assumption that each country's level of effort is public knowledge to the other countries and that the decision of the own and the other countries decision are determined simultaneously¹⁰, equation (4) cannot be consistently estimated using OLS since the spatial lag $\sum_{j=1}^J \omega_{ij} c_j$ is endogenous and correlated with the error term ϵ_i (Ord 1975, Anselin 1988). Estimation is further complicated due to another form of interdependence that arises in spillover models of strategic interaction. It is often assumed that ϵ_i includes omitted variables that are spatially dependent. In this case governments will share some unobserved, regional characteristics, that are correlated with the effort to comply with code's suggestions, e.g., countries fishing in high nutrition areas with plentiful fish which influences compliance scores. Spatial correlation in the error term can make OLS estimates inefficient (Anselin 1988). This leads to following definition of the error term.

$$\epsilon_i = \lambda M_n \epsilon_i + v_i \quad (5)$$

where M_n is a $n \times n$ spatial weighting matrix, which is assumed to be the same as W_n in equation (4). λ is again a scalar autoregressive parameter, which reflects the strength of interaction between country i and country j and v_i is a well-behaved $n \times 1$ vector of error terms. To deal with the problem of a spatial autoregressive process in the dependent as well as in the error term we apply an instrumental variable (IV) type approach for cross-sectional models as suggested by Kelejian & Robinson (1993) and Kelejian & Prucha (1998),

¹⁰ Following Autant-Bernard & LeSage (2011) in static cross-sectional models of spatial interaction, where observations reflect a steady state equilibrium outcome, the countries' simultaneous decision on the level of compliance can be interpreted as representing a sequence that would occur over time during movement to the next steady state equilibrium.

proceeding in three steps.¹¹ In the first step equation (4) is estimated using a two-stage least squares estimator (2SLS), where the matrix of exogenous instruments H is a subset of linear combinations of, X^* , the other countries' characteristics and, W_n , a weight matrix. In this step the spatial autoregressive process in the error term is ignored:

$$H = (X, W_n X, W_n^2 X) \quad (6)$$

Using $Z = (W_n r_i, X)$ we can define the consistent, but not efficient, 2SLS estimator for ρ and β as

$$\left(\tilde{\rho}, \tilde{\beta}' \right)' = (Z' P_H Z)^{-1} (Z' P_H c_i) \quad (7)$$

where $P_H = H(H'H)^{-1}H'$. Although the first step deals with the simultaneity problem of the compliance decision, one still needs to account for the spatial autocorrelation in the error term. Therefore, in the second step, we derive the residuals from the first step to estimate λ and the variance σ_v^2 of the i.i.d. error term in equation (5) by general moments' method as proposed in Kelejian & Prucha (1999). This estimation method leads to a consistent estimation of $\tilde{\lambda}$. In the last step we apply a Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to the model to account for spatial correlation and reestimate equation (7) by a 2SLS procedure. By this transformation we get $r^*(\tilde{\lambda}) = r - \tilde{\lambda}W_n r$, $X^*(\tilde{\lambda}) = X - \tilde{\lambda}W_n X$ and $Z^*(\tilde{\lambda}) = Z(\tilde{\lambda}) - \tilde{\lambda}W_n Z$, which leads finally to the consistent and asymptotical normal generalized spatial two-stage least squares estimator (GS2SLS) for ρ and β

$$\left(\hat{\rho}, \hat{\beta}' \right) = \left(\hat{Z}^*(\tilde{\lambda})' \hat{Z}^*(\tilde{\lambda}) \right)^{-1} \hat{Z}^*(\tilde{\lambda})' c^*(\tilde{\lambda}) \quad (8)$$

Following our econometric strategy we estimate the following function for each of the 6 different compliance indicators:

$$\begin{aligned} COMPL_i = \rho \sum_{j=1}^J \omega_{ij} COMPL_j + \beta_1 GDP_i + \beta_2 COST_i + \beta_3 GOV_i \\ \beta_4 EU_i + \beta_5 COMPET_i + \beta_6 BIO_i + \beta_7 EXPORT_i + \epsilon_i \end{aligned} \quad (9)$$

$COMPL_i$ is the compliance score of country i , ω_{ij} is a spatial weight assigned to country j by country i , $COMPL_j$ is the compliance behavior of country j and ρ is the corresponding parameter of interest. Strategic interaction between governments requires ρ to be statistically significant, where a nonzero coefficient implies that the country's level of compliance is a function of the effort made by other countries'. According to our hypothesis, we expect ρ to have a positive sign. The null hypothesis is that there is no strategic interaction effect between the governments, which suggests that the decision on the level of compliance

¹¹An alternative approach to estimate these models requires the use of maximum likelihood (ML) estimators. But recent literature has shown that the IV estimator approach is computationally simpler, has similar performance in small samples to ML and has no distributional assumption (Kelejian, Prucha & Yuzefovich 2004).

is made independently. A country’s decision on the level of effort is, of course, not only the outcome of strategic interaction between governments. We expect the country’s with higher technological capabilities to achieve better compliance score. Mean distance to the fishing areas, *COST*, and mean competition among the FAO zones, *COMP*, are expected to be negatively correlated with compliance behavior. *GOV* should depict a positive sign. A country’s effort to preserve biodiversity, *BIO*, is expected to have a positive sign. In contrast, we expect that a strong fishing industry, *EXPORT*, has a negative influence on the compliance score. Following Gray & Hatchard (2003) and Daw & Gray (2005) the EU common fishery policy (CFP) can be seen as a political success but an environmental failure. Due to the strict top-down structure of the CFP and a choice of fishery management tools giving the wrong incentives the CFP leads to an alarming state of many fish stocks within the European waters. Therefore we expect the sign of *EU* to be negative.

To capture the spatial relationship distance information was generated by using longitude and latitude information (taken from the CEPII database) of each country’s most populated cities and are calculated according to the great circle formula. Choosing the most populated cities and not the capitals of a country for our distance calculation allows us to capture the distance between the economic centers of the countries. We use the squared inverse distance between the most populated cities of each country pair to determine the off diagonal elements of the matrix W . Using the squared inverse distance simply assigns closer countries a stronger weight than more remote ones. Finally, matrix W got row standardized.

5 Results

5.1 Regression Results

We first estimated equation (9) for each of the three behavioral compliance indicators, *regulations*, *MCS* and *Socio-Econ* (see Table 2).

The sign of the spatial lag ρ is positive and significant at the 1%-level in 2 out of 3 cases. This suggests that a country’s compliance behavior is positively influenced by the compliance of other signatory countries. Our empirical proxies for harvesting technology ($\ln(GDP)$) and costs (*COST*) do not appear to have a significant impact on enforcement behavior. These results are in line with McWhinnie (2009). Countries with a higher quality of institutions have significantly better compliance scores. As expected, members of the European Union (*EU*) sharing the EU CFP have on average a lower compliance score. The remaining indicators for cost of compliance, average competition in the FAO area (*COMPET*), a country’s effort to protect biodiversity (*BIO*) and the importance of the fishing industry (*EXPORT*) do not depict a significant coefficient. The choice of instruments passes the Hansen-J test for over-identification and the second stage estimates yield a sufficiently large R^2 between 0.5 and 0.8 depending on the compliance indicator. In contrast to the previous compliance indicators, we do not find a significant spatial relationship among country’s compliance behavior captured by our weakest behavioral indicator, *Socio-Econ*. *Socio-Econ* evaluates how the government manages conflicts among different fishing sectors, how the needs of indigenous people and local fishing communities are met.

In addition to the enforcement of behavioral objectives, we repeated our exercise for the

Table 2: Determinants of compliance with behavioral objectives

	<i>Regulations</i>	<i>Monitoring</i>	<i>Socio – Econ</i>
ρ	0.652*** (0.151)	0.776** (0.298)	-0.104 (0.386)
$\ln(GDP)$	0.002 (0.034)	-0.058 (0.039)	0.031 (0.040)
<i>COST</i>	-0.010 (0.052)	0.060 (0.092)	0.048 (0.151)
<i>GOV</i>	5.546*** (1.631)	7.433*** (2.155)	5.859*** (2.126)
<i>EU</i>	-1.138*** (0.354)	-1.281*** (0.436)	-0.581 (0.487)
<i>COMPET</i>	-3.691 (5.694)	1.944 (9.138)	-6.583 (9.376)
<i>BIO</i>	0.003 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.012)	0.031*** (0.011)
<i>EXPORT</i>	2.164 (2.980)	4.050 (5.529)	-5.438 (4.826)
<i>EEZ</i>	0.668 (0.483)	0.128 (0.652)	0.686 (0.853)
Hansen J-Statistic	0.291	0.842	0.301
Anderson-Rubin Wald test	0.000	0.000	0.000
1 st stage F-Test	0.000	0.000	0.000
R ²	0.957	0.595	0.540

Notes: Weight Matrix: *Squared Inverse Distance*. 49 observations. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.

intentional indicators, *objectives*, *framework* and *precaution*, as well, which is summarized in Table 3. Strategic interaction plays a significant role on enforcement effort regarding *precaution* (at the 5%-level) but not in the case of *framework* and *objectives*. Once again, quality of governance is the main driver of compliance behavior. In contrast to the behavioral compliance scores, effort to protect biodiversity is significantly positively correlated with compliance in all three areas.

5.2 Robustness and Sensitivity

Due to the fact that theory doesn't provide guidance in the choice of the weighting matrix, we start to test the robustness of our results by analyzing the sensitivity of our model speci-

Table 3: Determinants of compliance with intentional objectives

	<i>Precaution</i>	<i>Framework</i>	<i>Objectives</i>
ρ	0.435** (0.177)	0.178 (0.307)	0.522* (0.305)
$\ln(GDP)$	0.004 (0.025)	-0.005 (0.026)	-0.029 (0.029)
<i>COST</i>	0.028 (0.059)	-0.072 (0.067)	-0.021 (0.075)
<i>GOV</i>	7.547*** (1.412)	7.217*** (1.754)	7.113*** (1.802)
<i>EU</i>	-0.083 (0.383)	-0.595 (0.421)	-0.957** (0.442)
<i>COMPET</i>	-7.866 (7.086)	-10.124 (6.509)	-10.813 (6.990)
<i>BIO</i>	0.016** (0.007)	0.037*** (0.010)	0.019** (0.010)
<i>EXPORT</i>	-2.363 (3.277)	-1.661 (3.016)	0.625 (2.899)
<i>EEZ</i>	0.286 (0.636)	0.756 (0.819)	0.597 (0.763)
Hansen J-Statistic	0.315	0.858	0.223
Anderson-Rubin Wald test	0.000	0.003	0.000
1 st stage F-Test	0.000	0.000	0.000
R ²	0.778	0.689	0.841

Notes: Weight Matrix: *Squared Inverse Distance*. 49 observations. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10%-level, respectively.

fication on the choice of the weighting matrix. Therefore, a variety of spatial weight matrices are constructed.¹² First, a weight matrix of spatial interdependence is calculated using the simple inverse distances between the most populated city of each country pair in our sample. This underlies a linear relationship between distance and strength of interdependency between the governments. The results stay relatively stable in sign and strength. But it can be observed that with this weighting scheme the differences between the intentional and behavioral measures of compliance decreases. This suggests that by giving closer countries a stronger weight (i.e., squared inverse distance) the importance of real action increases while the importance of just intentions decreases. Second, we apply a nearest neighbor concept,

¹² Again all matrices are row standardized.

where countries are defined to be neighbors if the distance between their most populated cities is less than 3150 kilometers, which is the minimum distance from the most remote country in our sample to his nearest neighbor. This cut-off point has been taken in order to avoid a so called 'island states' effect in weight matrices (Anselin 1988). The off diagonal elements of the weight matrices have been determined in the following way. If countries are outside those distance bands, they are assigned a value of 0 else the off diagonal elements of the matrices are defined by the squared inverse distance as in the basic specification. The results stay relatively robust, with a stronger interdependence in the behavioral indicators than in the intentional ones.

Next, to get an emphasis in the political interdependencies between the governments we augment the distance based weighting matrix by a political measure. Therefore, based on the paper of Rose & Spiegel (2009) we construct a weight based on mutual involvement in 443 IEAs and distance in the following way

$$w_{ij} = \left(\sum_{t=1}^T \frac{1}{\sum_{t=1}^T t_i} \times g \right) \times \frac{1}{d_{ij}^2} \quad (10)$$

where $g = 1$ if country i and j signed treaty t and else 0. d is the great circle distance between the most populated cities of country i and j . Using this weight matrix reveals a more equal distribution of interdependence between the different compliance indicators. Two out of three behavioral indicators as well as two out of three intentional indicators yield significant estimates of interdependence with a rho between 0.50 and 0.64 and t-values between 1.97 and 2.37.

5.3 Determining the impact of spatial spillovers

The dependence structure in a spatial regression model allows us to retrieve more detailed information about the interaction effects (LeSage & Pace 2009). Consider for example the effect of institutional quality, *GOV*. An improvement in this variable in country i will have a direct effect on the compliance of country i as well as an indirect effect on the compliance of all other countries due to the spatial dependence¹³. Following LeSage & Pace (2009) the magnitude of the spatial spillover will depend upon the position of the countries in space, the degree of connectivity among them, which is determined by the spatial weight matrix W , the parameter ρ , which represents the strength of spatial dependence in our variable of interest and the parameter β . The total effect of a change in the explanatory variable consists of three components: the direct effect, due to the change in the explanatory variable; the indirect spatial spillover effects, which indicates the impact from the change in country i to the other countries; and a direct spatial spillover effect, which can be interpreted as a feedback loop. This feedback loop captures the effect that arises from a change of the explanatory variable in country i on the dependent variable in country j and the change in country j also affects the dependent variable in country i . Since the impact of changes in

¹³Due to this interdependencies the derivative of y_i with respect to x_{jk} will be potentially non-zero and is determined by the spatial multiplier $n^{-1}\iota'(I - \rho W)^{-1}\iota$ and the direct impact β_k , where n is the number of observations and ι is a $n \times 1$ vector of ones. The spatial multiplier captures the magnitude and distribution of the spatial spillovers in the system. For a more detailed discussion see (e.g. Anselin 2003).

the explanatory variables differs over all observations, LeSage & Pace (2009) suggest using scalar summary measures of these impacts. Table 4 presents the scalar summary measures for a simultaneous marginal increase in the k^{th} explanatory variable accounting for spatial spillover effects and divided into direct, indirect and total effects.

Table 4: Quantifying direct, indirect and total effects

		<i>Cumulative Average Effects</i>							
		Regulations		Monitoring		Precaution		Objectives	
<i>ln(GDP)</i>	Direct	0.003	(0.023)	-0.064	(0.107)	0.004	(0.019)	-0.031	(0.373)
	Indirect	0.030	(0.277)	-0.081	(4.819)	0.019	(0.097)	-0.256	(0.159)
	Total	0.033	(0.286)	-0.145	(4.920)	0.023	(0.108)	-0.056	(0.158)
<i>COST</i>	Direct	-0.011	(0.025)	-0.007	(2.204)	0.031	(0.043)	-0.017	(0.163)
	Indirect	0.004	(0.241)	-0.045	(15.801)	0.062	(0.254)	0.038	(1.948)
	Total	-0.006	(0.250)	-0.053	(15.977)	0.093	(0.280)	0.022	(1.985)
<i>GOV</i>	Direct	6.310***	(0.590)	5.805	(84.060)	7.973***	(11.074)	8.010	(7.091)
	Indirect	11.901	(23.527)	5.961	(1044.418)	7.115	(11.074)	12.384	(163.346)
	Total	18.208	(23.885)	11.766	(1063.031)	15.088	11.201	20.394	(166.575)
<i>EU</i>	Direct	-1.304***	(0.187)	-0.834	(19.130)	-0.084	(0.129)	-1.067	(0.696)
	Indirect	-2.656	(7.097)	-0.739	(202.430)	0.027	(0.508)	-1.544	(18.021)
	Total	-3.960	(7.258)	-1.573	(205.789)	-0.574	(0.578)	-2.611	(18.376)
<i>COMPET</i>	Direct	-3.780	(8.329)	-8.877	(314.966)	-8.111	(9.345)	-10.969	(23.011)
	Indirect	0.896	(78.062)	-16.420	(1683.090)	0.159	(33.993)	-5.408	(186.359)
	Total	-2.883	(81.042)	-25.296	(1688.258)	-7.951	38.909	-16.377	(189.348)
<i>BIO</i>	Direct	0.004	(0.007)	-0.012	(0.250)	0.017**	(0.009)	0.022	(0.045)
	Indirect	0.015	(0.101)	-0.019	(1.006)	0.023	(0.069)	0.044	(0.801)
	Total	0.020	(0.105)	-0.030	(0.995)	0.040	(0.075)	0.067	(0.816)
<i>EXPORT</i>	Direct	2.703	(4.652)	-1.868	(187.250)	-2.480***	(0.817)	-0.445	(6.367)
	Indirect	9.760	(63.484)	-5.454	(1249.884)	-1.595**	(0.736)	1.782	(78.534)
	Total	12.463	(65.581)	-7.322	(1261.876)	-4.075***	(0.723)	1.336	(80.022)
<i>EEZ</i>	Direct	0.751***	(0.205)	0.078	(2.057)	0.305**	(0.140)	0.617	(0.991)
	Indirect	1.253	(0.951)	0.065	(20.949)	0.389	(1.131)	0.418	(6.453)
	Total	2.004**	(0.900)	0.144	(21.288)	0.695	(1.224)	1.035	(6.535)

Notes: Weight Matrix: *Squared Inverse Distance*. 49 observations. Spatial Multiplier: Regulations (2.813); Monitoring (6.113); Precautions (1.620). Inferential statistics are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 replications. Standard errors in parenthesis.

In comparison to our previous estimates, as presented in Table 2 and Table 3, we see a significant increase in the impact of changes of the explanatory variables on a country's compliance effort. Depending on the different compliance indicators the magnitude of the

increase in impact differs between $1.620 \times \beta_k$ and $6.113 \times \beta_k$, which represents the size of the spatial multiplier. This suggests that ignoring the spatial spillover effects while estimating the factors determining the level of compliance will lead to biased estimates that underestimate the impact of the variables by a factor of 1.6 to 6.1, respectively. Focusing on the components of the total effect gives us an interesting insight on the importance of the spatial spillovers in our model of strategic interaction. For the compliance indicators that require real action, *regulations* and *monitoring*, we observe that the magnitude of the impact is mainly driven by spatial spillover effects cumulated over all regions in the sample. Compared to the direct effects the behavior of the other countries influences the decision on the level of compliance by country i in the extent of 60% to 79% respectively. Whereas in the case of the intentional indicator *precautions* the decision on the level of effort is just affected by the behavior of the countries in the extend of 36%. These results support our argument that the complying country is less interested whether other fishing nations have developed plans and compiled a set of management objectives to meet the requirements of the code of conduct than in measures that require real actions.

Since Table 4 represents cumulative parameter estimates for a simultaneous marginal increase in the k^{th} explanatory variable, we are not able to examine the dissemination of the impact of a change in compliance effort of a particular country or group of countries in space. Therefore, following Egger, Larch, Pfaffermayr & Walde (2008), we exogenously change a single country's explanatory variable by a standardized amount $\Delta(\hat{\beta}X_k) = 1$ and holding all other variables constant. This allows us to focus on the spatial spillover effect of a change in compliance effort, where the magnitude of the effect depends on the position of the country in space, the degree of connectivity among the countries and the strength of spatial dependence. Following our discussion on the intergovernmental relationship and compliance behavior we expect that strategic interactions between governments make a threat of sanctions for non-compliance more credible. Furthermore, we assume that the potential to sanction non-compliance is not equally distributed among the participating countries, but rather depend on specific characteristics, like the level of economic development. Therefore, we calculate the direct, indirect and total effect of a standardized change in an explanatory variable for country groups that differ in their level of economic development (Table 5).

First, let us look at the case, where the quartile with the highest economic development changes their compliance behavior, measured by *regulations*, by one unit. With 3.866 the total effect of such a change will be far above the average effect and will be mainly driven by the spatial spillover effect. Now, let us consider the case where the quartile with the lowest economic endowment changes their compliance behavior by unity. With 2.500 the total effect is below the average effect and just about 2/3 of the total effect of the highest quartile. By looking on the distribution of the total effect into the direct and indirect effect we see that the difference of the impact of a standardized change on compliance behavior of the highest compared to the lowest quartile is mainly due to a change in the spatial spillover effect. This effect can be strongly observed in both behavioral compliance indicators, *regulations* and *monitoring*. In our intentional compliance indicator, *precautions*, the impact of the spatial spillover compared to the total effect as well as the difference between the highest and lowest quartile is not that strong, which again supports our argument that countries are more interested in real action than in good intentions. In a further step, we increase the

Table 5: Spatial effects of a standardized change in an explanatory variable

	Countrygroup	Direct		Indirect		Total	
<i>Regulations</i>							
	Average	0.145	(0.155)	2.322	(6.108)	3.468	(6.245)
	Highest Quartile	0.224	(0.340)	3.940	(15.203)	5.164	(15.521)
	Lowest Quartile	0.150	(0.118)	1.803	(2.511)	2.953	(2.600)
	1st & 2nd Quartile	0.172	(0.217)	2.848	(9.291)	4.020	(9.490)
	3st & 4nd Quartile	0.120	(0.101)	1.817	(3.110)	2.938	(3.193)
<i>Monitoring</i>							
	Average	-0.398	(16.296)	0.493	(164.595)	1.096	(167.247)
	Highest Quartile	-0.440	(19.477)	0.067	(418.910)	0.627	(428.271)
	Lowest Quartile	-1.275	(44.165)	1.889	(126.594)	1.614	(101.144)
	1st & 2nd Quartile	-0.187	(10.831)	0.034	(252.879)	0.846	(258.490)
	3st & 4nd Quartile	-0.600	(22.223)	0.934	(99.087)	1.334	(93.386)
<i>Precaution</i>							
	Average	0.058	(0.071)	1.007	(1.846)	2.065	(1.913)
	Highest Quartile	0.087	(0.132)	1.629	(4.156)	2.715	(4.283)
	Lowest Quartile	0.060	(0.062)	0.797	(0.975)	1.857*	(1.034)
	1st & 2nd Quartile	0.068	(0.092)	1.211	(2.639)	2.278	(2.726)
	3st & 4nd Quartile	0.049	(0.053)	0.810	(1.098)	1.859	(1.148)
<i>Objectives</i>							
	Average	0.142	(0.102)	1.913	(28.560)	3.055	(29.105)
	Highest Quartile	0.223	(2.967)	3.164	(72.173)	4.387	(73.502)
	Lowest Quartile	0.150	(1.416)	1.513	(13.640)	2.663	(13.979)
	1st & 2nd Quartile	0.168	(1.840)	2.319	(43.780)	3.487	(44.609)
	3st & 4nd Quartile	0.117	(0.970)	1.524	(14.958)	2.641	(15.230)

Notes: Weight Matrix: *Squared Inverse Distance*. Rank Variable: GDP/capita (constant 2000). Spatial Multiplier: Regulations (2.813); Monitoring (6.113); Precautions (1.620). Inferential statistics are obtained by Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 replications. Standard errors in parenthesis.

group size to analyze the behavior of this effect in more detail. Therefore, we divided the sample in two equally sized groups, a group with relatively richer and a group with relatively poorer economies. Focusing on the total effect we are able to observe an interesting effect. Whereas the total effect of the group of poorer nations is nearly constant, the total effect of the group of richer nations changes significantly. This effect stays robust for both, the behavioral and intentional indicators.

6 Conclusion

So far, strategic interactions among participants have only been considered to be useful in enforcing the objectives of an agreement in the context of small communities. This paper suggests that some international environmental agreements and existing intergovernmental relations fulfill, to a certain extent, the criteria of an Ostrom-type mechanism to manage open access resources. Modern technology allows countries to observe other signatory countries' compliance behavior and repeated intergovernmental relationships make the threat of sanctions in the case of non-compliance credible. We use cross-section information on country-level compliance to the Article 7 of the 1995 UN Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries to identify the drivers of the participating countries' effort levels. To estimate the effect of strategic interaction on one country's compliance behavior we use the spatial lag of the other countries' compliance behavior and apply a generalized spatial two-stage least square approach as suggested by Kelejian & Prucha (1998). We find strong support that a country's enforcement effort of objectives that require real action is positively related to the other signees' level of compliance. The relationship is rather weak for objectives that are more symbolic. We also find evidence that quality of governance, EU membership as well as a country's effort to protect biodiversity have an impact on compliance behavior. Furthermore, we find that the spatial spillover effect, i.e. the influence on the other countries' decision on the level of compliance, is stronger for specific country groups, e.g. richer countries. This supports the idea of a pull effect on compliance on the international level.

Our results suggest that intergovernmental relationships have an impact on a country's effort to enforce the objectives of an IEA on open access resources. However, the low levels of overall compliance to the agreement indicate that strategic interaction on international level is not a sufficient constraint to ensure the sustainable management of an open access resource.

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Appendix: Description and Sources of Variables

Table 6: List of countries

Angola	Latvia
Argentina	Morocco
Australia	Mexico
Bangladesh	Malaysia
Brazil	Namibia
Canada	Nigeria
Chile	Netherlands
China	Norway
Germany	New Zealand
Denmark	Pakistan
Ecuador	Peru
Egypt	Philippines
Spain	Poland
France	Portugal
United Kingdom	Russian Federation
Ghana	Senegal
Indonesia	Sweden
India	Thailand
Ireland	Turkey
Iran	Ukraine
Iceland	United States
Italy	Vietnam
Japan	Yemen
Korea. Rep.	South Africa
Sri Lanka	

Table 7: Variable description and sources

Variable	Description	Source
<i>Regulations</i>	Measures the degree of compliance on regulation on stocks, fleets and gear	Pitcher et al. (2009a)
<i>MCS</i>	Measures the degree of compliance on effectiveness of monitoring, control & surveillance. Also measures the extent of illegal fishing	Pitcher et al. (2009a)
<i>Socio – Econ</i>	Measures the government’s ability to manage conflict among different fishing sectors and how needs of minorities are met	Pitcher et al. (2009a)
<i>Objectives</i>	Evaluates the government’s plans and strategies to meet the objective of the Code of Conduct.	Pitcher et al. (2009a)
<i>Framework</i>	Evaluates the government’s procedures of implementing the plans and strategies.	Pitcher et al. (2009a)
<i>Precaution</i>	Measures the degree of precautionary principles and the among of contingency plans applied.	Pitcher et al. (2009a)
$\ln(GDP)$	Natural log of Gross domestic product per capita in 2000, in constant Dollars (PPP)	World Bank (2008) WDI
<i>COST</i>	Minimum great circle distance between port and center of a fishing zone weighted by the amount a country is fishing in that zone	Authors’ calculation FAO (2008)
<i>GOV</i>	ICRG indicator of Quality of Government. Higher values indicate higher quality of government.	PRS Group (2007)
<i>EU</i>	Dummy variable = 1 if country is member of the European Union and 0 otherwise.	Authors’ calculation
<i>COMPET</i>	Average degree of competition in FAO areas in which the country is fishing.	Authors’ calculation
<i>BIO</i>	Biodiversity & Habitat indicator from Yale Environmental Performance Index. Measures the degree at which a country achieves a target of protecting terrestrial biome, critical habitats and manages marine protected areas.	Emerson et al. (2010)
<i>EXPORT</i>	Export value of fish divided by GDP	Authors’ calculation World Bank (2008) and FAO (2008)
<i>EEZ</i>	Amount of catch in EEZ as a fraction of total catch.	Authors’ calculation www.searoundus.org