Equilibrium management of fisheries with altruistic overlapping generations

We imbed a classic fishery model, where the optimal policy follows a Most Rapid Approach Path to a steady state, into an overlapping generations setting. The current generation discounts future generations’ utility flows at a rate possibly different from the pure rate of time preference used to discount their own utility flows. The resulting model has non-constant discount rates, leading to time inconsistency. The unique Markov Perfect equilibrium to this model has a striking feature: provided that the current generation has some concern for the not-yet born, the equilibrium policy does not depend on the degree of that concern.


Issue Date:
Dec 10 2011
Publication Type:
Working or Discussion Paper
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/123635
Total Pages:
24
JEL Codes:
Q01; Q22; C 61
Series Statement:
CUDARE Working Papers
1124




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-22

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