Generic advertising without supply control: implications of funding mechanisms for advertising intensities in competitive industries

Producer profit‐maximising rules for generic commodity advertising programs and associated funding levies are derived. Lump‐sum, per unit and ad valorem levies, and government subsidy funding arrangements are compared and contrasted. The initial single‐product competitive market model is extended to incorporate international trade, government price policies, and multiple commodity interactions.


Subject(s):
Issue Date:
2001
Publication Type:
Journal Article
PURL Identifier:
http://purl.umn.edu/117385
Published in:
Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Volume 45, Issue 1
Page range:
117-145
Total Pages:
29




 Record created 2017-04-01, last modified 2017-08-26

Fulltext:
Download fulltext
PDF

Rate this document:

Rate this document:
1
2
3
 
(Not yet reviewed)