Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games
Dimitrov, Dinko; Chin Sung, Shao
2011

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Abstract

We show that the core of each strongly size monotonic hedonic game is not empty and is externally stable. This is in sharp contrast to other sufficient conditions for core non-emptiness which do not even guarantee the existence of a stable set in such games.

Details

Title Size Monotonicity and Stability of the Core in Hedonic Games
Keywords
Author(s) Dimitrov, Dinko
Chin Sung, Shao
Subject(s)
Issue Date 2011-07
Publication Type Working or Discussion Paper
DOI and Other Identifiers 10.22004/ag.econ.115722
Record Identifier https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/115722
PURL Identifier http://purl.umn.edu/115722
Language English
Total Pages 16
JEL Codes C71
Series Statement CCSD
52.2011
Record Appears in Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) > Climate Change and Sustainable Development

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