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000100691 037__ $$a422-2016-26931
000100691 041__ $$aen
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000100691 084__ $$aD7
000100691 084__ $$aL2
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000100691 245__ $$aOne Player Games versus Two Player Games: Comparing Agribusiness Cooperatives with Investor-Owned Business Models
000100691 260__ $$c2011
000100691 269__ $$a2011
000100691 270__ $$mfred_parker@ncsu.edu$$pParker,   Frederick
000100691 300__ $$a20
000100691 336__ $$aConference Paper/ Presentation
000100691 520__ $$aCooperative business firms are prevalent in agribusiness, yet no concise generalized
model exists to demonstrate how and why cooperative firms differ from, and may be
selected over, the more common investor owned business firm. It is shown within a
generic transaction game that cooperatives fill both producer and consumer roles as an
aggregated player that is expected to maximize aggregate producer and consumer payoffs
rather than maximizing either payoff separately, which contrasts with investor owned
firms as essentially two player games between separate and competing producers and
consumers where each player seeks to maximize their separate payoff individually. A
cardinally valued game theoretic matrix is used to demonstrate the expected differences
between these one-player versus two-player games, which clearly demonstrates that
cooperatives are expected to achieve greater total payoffs and social welfare relative to
investor owned firms, because investor owned firms generate dead weight loss when
maximizing producer surpluses as expected under prevailing microeconomic theory. The
use of cardinal payoff values rather than ordinal is important because it permits
aggregation of payoffs within the model, and because it directly reflects the cardinal
payoffs actually used in agribusiness decisions, such as revenue, expense and profit
measures. The results may indicate the reason that cooperative firms are selected and
have been successful in agribusiness. However, weaknesses of the cooperative model are
also discussed, conjecturing that cooperatives may be preferable to investor owned
businesses under limited circumstances but because these circumstances occur frequently
in agribusiness the cooperative model is observed more frequently there.
000100691 542__ $$fLicense granted by Megan Watmuff (megan@aomevents.com) on 2011-02-22T23:15:08Z (GMT):

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000100691 650__ $$aAgribusiness
000100691 6531_ $$aCooperatives
000100691 6531_ $$aGame Theory
000100691 6531_ $$aCollective Action
000100691 6531_ $$aAgricultural Economics
000100691 6531_ $$aTheory of the Firm
000100691 700__ $$aParker, Frederick
000100691 8564_ $$s197667$$uhttp://ageconsearch.umn.edu/record/100691/files/Parker%20F.pdf
000100691 887__ $$ahttp://purl.umn.edu/100691
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000100691 912__ $$nSubmitted by Megan Watmuff (megan@aomevents.com) on 2011-02-22T23:16:49Z
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  Previous issue date: 2011
000100691 982__ $$gAustralian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society>2011 Conference (55th), February 8-11, 2011, Melbourne, Australia
000100691 980__ $$a422